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This thesis examines the emergence and evolution of ‘progressive activism and 
organisation’ between 1976 and 2006 in the African township of Guguletu and the 
coloured township of Bonteheuwel within the City of Cape Town. In doing so it 
compares both how activism has changed over time (including as a result of 
democratisation) and how it differed between and within these two communities.  
Whilst at heart an empirical study of activism it seeks to move beyond the 
specificities of the cases studied to also draw broader conclusions about the nature 
and causes of collective action and organisation. Drawing on both social movement 
and class theory it aims to shed some light on the fundamental question of the 
relationship between structure and agency - why do people act and what defines the 
form of action they take? 
 It combines a quantitative study of the changing relationship between race, 
class and state policy with qualitative studies of activism in Guguletu and 
Bonteheuwel. These two studies cover in detail: the development and unfolding of 
the riots of 1976; the great boycott season of 1979/80 which saw large numbers of 
Africans and coloureds across Cape Town drawn into school, bus and consumer 
boycotts; the development of activism between 1980 and 1985, including the impact 
of the United Democratic Front; the township unrest of 1985-7; the transition period 
between 1988 and 1994; and post-apartheid activism in the two communities. 
It draws on theories of class which recognise the importance of peoples’ positions 
within the state’s distributional networks (citizenship), experiences and expectations 
of social mobility and the impact of historical experience of class formation on 
expectation (moral economy). In doing this it shows how differences in race, 
education, age and labour market position all interacted to pattern activism in the 
case studies. Struggles in Cape Town throughout the period 1976-2006 were not 
dualistic conflict between classes, races or between the oppressed and forces of 
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global capital, nor were they mechanistic responses to the opening and closing of 
political space. They were complex coalitions of competing and collaborating class 
forces which were defined by the underlying nature of the city’s political economy 





It is hard to know who to thank first as without the help and generosity of many 
people this thesis would not have been possible. The funding for this thesis came 
from the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council, who both covered the costs of 
my fees and provided me with a living and travel allowance. I must also thank the 
French Institute for Southern Africa (IFAS) for a research grant which allowed me to 
return to South Africa in 2008 to undertake some additional research. 
At the University of Edinburgh, where I was registered for this thesis, I would like 
to thank my supervisors, Paul Nugent and Sarah Dorman, as well as the staff of the 
Centre for African Studies and the School of Social and Political Studies. 
In South Africa many people helped make this thesis possible; indeed without their 
generosity and assistance there would have been little to write about. 
I would like, therefore, to thank the people who helped me with my archival 
research. These include the staff at the University of Cape Town’s Manuscripts and 
Archives Centre, the University of the Western Cape’s Mayibuye Archive, the South 
African History Archive at the University of Witwatersrand and the Cape Town 
branch of the South African National Archive. Without their assistance, knowledge 
and photocopiers this thesis would not have been possible.  Special thanks must 
also go to the member of staff at Cape Town High Court who allowed me to roam 
the basement, uncovering records of political trials amidst mountains of old case 
files. 
I would also like to thank the various academic and university staff who assisted me 
in my time in South Africa. These include Claire Benit-Gbaffou and Sophie Oldfield, 
as well as the staff at UCT’s Data First Centre, without whom chapter two would 
have never been possible. I would also like to extend a special thanks to everyone at 
the Centre for Social Science Research, particularly Jeremy Seekings. They provided 
me with a home away from home, a place to study, access to a wealth of material 
vi 
 
and contact, and above all invaluable support challenge and encouragement. Their 
assistance was invaluable and much appreciated.  
Perhaps most importantly, I would like to thank all the South Africans who gave so 
freely gave of their time to assist me, particularly my interviewees. I never offered 
any financial reward for my interviews, yet I found a willingness to help me in my 
work that surpassed my expectations. My interviewees are the people who made 
the history which is written about in this thesis and they deserve great credit for the 
parts they played in creating the new South Africa. 
Finally I would like to thank the friends and family that supported me throughout 
my time, both in South Africa and writing up at home. These include Judith 
Kennedy who was a great friend and help in my research and all the other staff at 
Ilrig. I would also like to say a special thanks to Faried, Lahmeez, Omar, little Faried 
and the twins. They welcomed me into their home, treated me like a member of 
their family and made my time in South Africa truly special. 
Last of all I would like to thank my wife, Sarah, for all the support she has given me, 
emotionally and practically, as well as my son Owen, whose arrival provided an 







Declaration ......................................................................................................................... i 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................ iii 
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................... v 
Glossary of Abbreviations Used ................................................................................... xv 
A Note on Terminology ................................................................................................ xix 
Map of Case Studies..........................................................................................................xxi 
Chapter One Introduction: Race, Class, and Collective Action in a South African 
City .................................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 1 
1.2. Thesis Rationale ..................................................................................................... 3 
1.3. Research Questions and Thesis Coverage ........................................................... 8 
1.3.1. Setting the scene: Guguletu and Bonteheuwel ............................................12 
1.4. Theories of Collective Action ...............................................................................15 
1.4.1. Political Opportunities, Resources and Rationality.....................................16 
1.4.2. Social Structure and Action ...........................................................................20 
1.5. Organisation and Activism in South Africa and Cape Town: Current 
Understandings ...........................................................................................................22 
1.5.1. Activism and Apartheid ................................................................................22 
viii 
 
1.5.2. Activism after Apartheid: Decline of the Old, Rise of the New (Social 
Movements) ............................................................................................................. 31 
1.6. Towards a Theorised Understanding of South African Activism: Race, Class 
and Rationality ............................................................................................................ 36 
1.6.1. Class in South African Scholarship .............................................................. 37 
1.6.2. Class, Citizenship, Consumption and Education ........................................ 43 
1.6.3. Race, Class and Collective Action in a South African City ......................... 49 
1.7. Thesis Structure .................................................................................................... 51 
Chapter Two Apartheid Policy, Structural Transformation and the Shifting 
Contours of Differential Discrimination (1948 to 2006) ............................................... 55 
2.1. Introduction: Race and Class in South Africa .................................................... 55 
2.2. Restrictions, Reform and Abolition: The Changing Contours of Racial Policy 
in South Africa 1948-2006 ........................................................................................... 58 
2.3. Shifting Patterns of Discrimination in the South African and Cape Town 
Labour Market, 1976-2006 .......................................................................................... 64 
2.3.1. Expanding Opportunities beneath the Race Ceiling: the Coloured Labour 
Market before 1984 .................................................................................................. 65 
2.3.2. Insiders and Outsiders: the African Labour Market before 1984 ............... 74 
2.3.3. Deracialisation, Unemployment and Growing Differentiation: the 
Coloured Labour Force 1984-1990 ......................................................................... 84 
2.3.4 Unemployment, Inequality, Education and Opportunity: The African 
Section 10 Labour Force in the Western Cape, 1984-1990 .................................... 91 
ix 
 
2.3.5. Changes in the Apartheid Labour Market 1984-1990:  the Role of 
Discriminatory Legislation .....................................................................................95 
2.3.6. Equal Opportunities in an Increasingly Unequal Society: The Post-
Apartheid Labour Market .......................................................................................95 
2.4. Beyond Employment: Apartheid, Discrimination and Welfare Transfers 1948-
2006 ............................................................................................................................. 101 
2.4.1. From Race to Universality: Changing Pattern of Redistribution through 
Welfare Payments .................................................................................................. 102 
2.4.2. Forced Removals, Shortages and Race Privilege: Housing under 
Apartheid ............................................................................................................... 107 
2.4.3. From Race towards Class and State Provision to Privatisation: Housing 
after Apartheid ...................................................................................................... 115 
2.4.4. Race, Class and the Continuing Legacy of Apartheid Discrimination in 
Housing Provision ................................................................................................. 121 
2.5. Conclusion: Race, Class and Differential Discrimination ................................ 122 
Chapter Three Race, Class and Revolt: The Student Uprising of 1976 in Cape Town
 ........................................................................................................................................ 125 
3.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 125 
3.2. The Uprising of 1976 in Current Literature: Student Revolt or Universal 
Revolution? ............................................................................................................ 127 
3.3. Armchair Revolutionaries and Old Timers: The Dearth of Radical Politics in 
Cape Town before 1976 ......................................................................................... 130 
3.4. Students before 1976: Discontent without Action ............................................ 143 
x 
 
3.5. Students in Revolt: The Unrest of 1976/7 in the Western Cape ...................... 145 
3.5.1. Following Soweto: The Outbreak of Revolt in Cape Town ...................... 148 
3.5.2. Unrest in Progress: A Student Protest ........................................................ 154 
3.6. Conclusion: Race, Class and Revolt: Differential Discrimination and the 
Student Uprising of 1976/7 ....................................................................................... 168 
Chapter Four From Bread and Butter to Banners and Rallies: The Changing 
Contours and Limits of Progressive Organisation, 1977 - 1985 ................................. 175 
4.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 175 
4.2. Calm after and before the Storms: The Limited Impact of the Soweto Uprising 
on Progressive Politics 1977-9 .................................................................................. 181 
4.3. ‘We shall not ride’, ‘We shall not write’, ‘We shall not buy’: The Great Boycott 
Season of 1979-1980 ................................................................................................... 184 
4.3.1 Pasta, Textbooks and Clipcards: The Boycotts of 1979-80 ......................... 185 
4.3.2. Issues without Race and Class Boundaries: Explaining the Emergence of 
the Great Boycott Season ...................................................................................... 189 
4.3.3. Shaping Protest: Political Space, Activist Networks and Repertoires of 
Action in the Boycotts ........................................................................................... 193 
4.3.4. The Limits of Shared Grievances: Race, Class and the Mixed Success of the 
Great Boycott Season ............................................................................................ 197 
4.4. From Bread and Butter to Banners and Rallies: The Rise and Fall of the 
Organising Tradition in Cape Town 1980-1985 ...................................................... 199 
4.4.1. Bread and Butter: Civil Society in Cape Town 1980-1982......................... 201 
4.4.2. Banners and Rallies: Civil Society in Cape Town 1983-5 .......................... 206 
xi 
 
4.5. The Limits of Organisation: Race, Class and the Constrained Social Base of 
Activism 1980-85 ....................................................................................................... 217 
4.6. Conclusion: Race, Class and the Limits of Organisation ................................. 234 
Chapter Five Differentiation within Revolt: Youth and Student Politics 1985-7 ...... 237 
5.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 237 
5.1.1. Structure, Violence, Organisation and Differentiation: Revolt in Cape 
Town ....................................................................................................................... 239 
5.2. Unrest and Revolt: South Africa and Cape Town 1985-1987 .......................... 244 
5.3. Insurrection and Transformation in Progressive Organisation ...................... 249 
5.4. Books, Bombs and Continuing Quiescence: Differential Responses to 
Township Unrest in Cape Town 1985-7 .................................................................. 264 
5.4.1. Adult Disengagement: Continuity of a Trend ........................................... 265 
5.4.2. Aspiration, Organisation and Realism: Student Politics in 1985-7 ........... 266 
5.4.3. The Rationality of Radicalism: Youth Politics in Guguletu and 
Bonteheuwel 1985-7............................................................................................... 279 
5.5. Conclusions: Race, Class and the Myth of Youth Revolt ................................. 289 
Chapter six From Conflict to Negotiation: Five Transitions amidst the Shifting 
Terrain of Progressive Activism 1988-1994 ................................................................. 291 
6.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 291 
6.1.1. Current Literature and Argument .................................................................. 293 
6.2. Civil Society in South Africa and Cape Town: 1988-1994................................ 298 
6.3. Explaining Transition: Local Experiences of National Change ....................... 317 
6.3.1. Youth Decline: The Nationalisation of Politics .......................................... 318 
xii 
 
6.3.2. Coloured Disengagement ........................................................................... 322 
6.3.3. Political Opportunities: The Civic Movement, from Weakness to Strength
 ................................................................................................................................ 326 
6.3.4. Bonteheuwel: Transition and the Growth of Factionalism ....................... 330 
    6.3.5. Student Strength .......................................................................................... 335 
6.4. Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 338 
Chapter Seven An Apartheid Inheritance: Continuity, Change and Moral Economy 
in Civil Society since 1994 ............................................................................................ 341 
7.1. Introduction: Democratisation and Civil Society Transformation ................. 341 
7.2. From Protest to Passivity: The Decline of Anti-apartheid Organisation ........ 344 
7.3. Political and Civil Society in Post-Apartheid Cape Town .............................. 350 
7.3.1. Political and Institutional Transformation ................................................. 350 
7.3.2. Guguletu: Quiescence and Occasional Complaint .................................... 353 
7.3.3. Bonteheuwel: Public Discontent and the Collapse of Residential Civil 
Society .................................................................................................................... 360 
7.4. From Mass Action to Mass Inaction: Explaining the Decline of Apartheid Civil 
Society ........................................................................................................................ 364 
7.4.1. Civic Silence: Guguletu and the Benefits of Quiescence ........................... 367 
7.4.2. Bonteheuwel and the End of Aspirational Activism ................................ 375 
7.5. The Moral Economy of Collective Action and Political Practice in Guguletu 
and Bonteheuwel: The Continuing Salience of Differential Discrimination and 
Post-Apartheid Reconfiguration .............................................................................. 381 
7.5.1. Guguletu: Insiders, Outsiders and the Distribution of Resources ........... 383 
xiii 
 
7.5.2. Bonteheuwel: Holding on to Coloured Preference ................................... 387 
7.6. Conclusions ......................................................................................................... 389 
Chapter Eight Conclusion: A Tale of Two Townships ............................................... 395 
8.1. Introduction: How, Why and What Changed? ................................................ 395 
8.2. Political Opportunities, Resources and Rationality Revisited ........................ 397 
8.2.1. Resources ...................................................................................................... 397 
8.2.2. Ideas and Ideologies .................................................................................... 399 
8.2.3. Political Opportunities ................................................................................ 401 
8.3. Race, Class and Collective Action ..................................................................... 406 
8.3.1. The Apartheid Class Ceiling ....................................................................... 407 
8.3.2. (Im)moral Economies? ................................................................................. 411 
8.3.3. The Mediating role of Race and Class ........................................................ 413 
8.4. Conclusion........................................................................................................... 414 
8.5. Last Thoughts ..................................................................................................... 415 
Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 417 
Literature: Books, Refereed Journal Articles and Government Papers and Statistics
 .................................................................................................................................... 417 
Primary sources (Chronological) ............................................................................. 430 
Newspaper Articles ............................................................................................... 430 
Material from Archives ......................................................................................... 432 
Personal Communications and Observations ..................................................... 440 
Appendix A: Methods and Methodology ................................................................... 441 
Introduction ............................................................................................................... 441 
xiv 
 
Research Questions ................................................................................................... 442 
Methodology ............................................................................................................. 443 
Selecting a Case Study Approach ........................................................................ 443 
Defining the Field of Study .................................................................................. 445 
Methods ..................................................................................................................... 450 
Qualitative Data Collection: Sources ................................................................... 451 
Qualitative Data Collection: Limits...................................................................... 456 
Quantitative Data Collection ................................................................................ 458 
Quantitative Data Collection: Sources ................................................................. 459 
Quantitative Data Collection: Sources – Strengths, Weaknesses and Limitations
 ................................................................................................................................ 460 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 462 






Glossary of Abbreviations Used 
 
ANC   African National Congress 
ANCWL  African National Congress Women’s League 
ANCYL  African National Congress Youth League 
AZAPO  Azanian People’s Organisation 
BAAB  Bantu Affairs Administration Board 
BC   Black Consciousness 
BCA   Bonteheuwel Civic Association 
BISCO  Bonteheuwel Interschool Congress 
BMW  Bonteheuwel Military Wing 
BYM   Bonteheuwel Youth Movement 
CAHAC  Cape Area Housing Action Committee 
CAYCO  Cape Youth Congress 
CLPP  Coloured Labour Preference Policy 
COSAS  Congress of South African Students 
COSATU  Congress of South African Trade Unions 
DBAC  Disorderly Bills Action Committee 
xvi 
 
DEC   Department of Coloured Education 
DET   Department of Education and Training 
FCWU  Food and Canning Workers Union 
GAA   Group Areas Act 
GEAR Growth Employment and Redistribution 
strategy 
Joint SRCs  Joint Student Representative Council 
LAGUNYA Langa, Guguletu and Nyanga 
MK   Umkhonto we Sizwe 
NECC  National Education Crisis Committee 
NP   National Party 
NSM   New Social Movement 
PAC   Pan African Congress 
PTSA  Parent Teacher Student Association 
RDP   Reconstruction and Development Programme 
SACOS  South African Council of Sport 
SACTU  South African Congress of Trade Unions 
SANCO  South African National Civic Association 
xvii 
 
SASM  South African Student Movement 
SAYCO  South African Youth Congress 
SAIRR  South African Institute of Race Relations 
SRC   Student Representative Council 
TOSCO  Township Student Congress  
UCT   University of Cape Town 
UDF   United Democratic Front 
UDM  United Democratic Movement 
UWO  United Women’s Organisation 
UWC   University of Western Cape 
UWCO   United Women’s Congress 
WCCA  Western Cape Civic Association 
WECSCO  Western Cape Student Congress 
WECUSA  Western Cape United Squatter Association 








A Note on Terminology 
 
The apartheid system of rule that predominated in South Africa from 1948 until 
1994 was predicated upon the division of the population into racially defined 
groups. Each of these groups – whites, Africans, Indians and coloureds1 - was then 
incorporated within the apartheid political economy in a differential way. Whilst 
this will be discussed in greater detail later, it is important to note that apartheid 
provided for, as far as possible, the complete social and residential separation of 
racial groups away from the workplace. An individual’s racial group also played a 
central role in distinguishing their life chances. Laws restricted the best employment 
opportunities for whites, whilst coloureds and Indians were privileged relative to 
Africans.  
Whilst many in the progressive political movements sought to reject the artificiality 
of apartheid classifications, a process which is well exemplified in the adoption by 
Black Consciousness activists in the 1970s of the term black to describe all non-white 
South Africans, be they African, coloured or Indian, this did not prevent racial 
classification playing a significant role in individuals’ lives. Being white under 
apartheid was a very different experience to being coloured, which in turn was 
different to being African. Outside of the progressive movements many people also 
internalised apartheid classifications as, for example, those defined as coloured 
came to see themselves as having a shared coloured identity.2  
In the post-apartheid period racial group still plays a significant role as a predictor 
of economic status. Similarly, the experience of the ‘new’ South Africa and a feeling 
of African domination of the ANC amongst the minority racial groups has led not to 
                                                   
1
 „Coloured‟ was the term used to refer to all those South Africans of mixed heritage who were 
considered neither white, Indian, nor African. 
2
 Jensen, S, Claiming Community – Negotiating Crime: State Formation, Neighbourhood and Gangs 
in a Capetonian Township, PhD Thesis, (Roskilde, 2001) 
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a decline in racial identity, but in some cases to its amplification.3 Indeed these 
classifications are also commonly employed by members of South African society to 
describe themselves and others. This does not mean that such identities subsume all 
others; however they are sufficiently salient to still have descriptive value. It is for 
this reason, not the unquestioning acceptance of apartheid conceptualisations of 






                                                   
3
 Erasmus, Z & Pieterse, E, „Conceptualising Coloured Identities in the Western Cape Province of 
South Africa‟, in (ed.) Palmberg, M, National Identity and Democracy in Africa, (Pretoria, 1999), 
p.171 
Map 1 (Overleaf). Location of areas studied. A, highlights the location of Cape Town within the Western 
Cape and South Africa. B, shows greater Cape Town. The two areas of study (Bonteheuwel and Guguletu) 
are outlined and shown with red dots. C, shows the 2005 Cape Town City ward boundaries, with the 
colours representing the majority racial population groups:  Coloured (Bonteheuwel),  Black African 
(Guguletu),  White,  Indian/Asian,  uninhabited,  Multiple races. D shows a detailed street map 








Introduction: Race, Class, and Collective Action 




This thesis examines the emergence and evolution of ‘progressive activism and 
organisation’ between 1976 and 2006 in two townships (one coloured and one 
African) within the City of Cape Town. In doing so it compares both how activism 
has changed over time (including as a result of democratisation) and how it differed 
between and within these two communities. 
 Whilst at heart an empirical study of activism it seeks to move 
beyond the specificities of the cases studied to also draw broader 
conclusions about the nature and causes of collective action and 
organisation. Drawing on both social movement and class theory it aims to 
tackle the fundamental question of the relationship between structure and 
agency - why do people act and what defines the form of action they take? In 
addressing this question it accepts much of the current thinking within social 
movement theory that points to the importance of the broader political 
context and the resources available to individuals in shaping the emergence 
and success of social movements and protest. However, it also demonstrates 
that understanding how the broader context influences action provides only 
half the picture.  
Activism in the two cases studies was not defined simply by the 
resources and opportunities available to activists and communities, as the 
same context was experienced and acted upon by individuals in very 





two cases can only be understood by accepting that reactions to 
transforming context are mediated by their interactions with the broader 
political economy and people’s positions therein. Black society within South 
Africa was not homogenous and a range of cleavages existed which 
fragmented people’s responses to the broader political and economic 
context.  The same opportunities were not experienced universally by people 
of different races, ages and levels of education. Similarly, experiences of 
urbanisation and access to state services also varied. These cleavages created 
different reactions because people had different material interests and were 
drawn into activism for different reasons. Political opportunity alone cannot, 
therefore, adequately explain collective action or social movements. 
Consequently, this thesis argues that political opportunities can be 
seen to define the field within which collective actors mobilise, but the 
content and extent of that mobilisation can only be understood through 
studying the social differentiation within this field. Apartheid reproduced a 
complex range of social and economic relations and these relationships 
helped determine people’s responses to similar circumstances. Drawing on 
theories of class which recognise the importance of peoples’ positions within 
the state’s distributional networks (citizenship), experiences and 
expectations of social mobility and the impact of historical experience of 
class formation on expectation (moral economy) it shows how differences in 
race, education, age and labour market position all interacted to pattern 
activism in the case studies. Struggles in Cape Town throughout the period 
1976-2006 were not dualistic conflict between classes, races or between the 
oppressed and forces of global capital, nor were they mechanistic responses 
to the opening and closing of political space. They were complex coalitions 
of competing and collaborating class forces which were defined by the 
underlying nature of the city’s political economy and which emerged in 






1.2. Thesis Rationale  
 
When I started work on this thesis I did not have a clear theoretical position that I 
wanted to test. Instead I started from the position of wanting to understand how 
organisation and activism had developed and evolved in the City of Cape Town 
since the re-emergence of opposition to apartheid in 1976. However, I hoped to 
move beyond this empirical study to see what the South African experience could 
add to current understandings of collective action. There were therefore three main 
motivations behind the choice of study. 
The first motivation for this study comes from the fact that despite being the home 
of South Africa’s parliament and the country’s third largest municipality Cape 
Town has attracted limited attention in studies of the anti-apartheid movement and 
protest during the 1970s and 1980s outside more general texts dealing with the 
period.1 This thesis therefore addresses a gap in current empirical knowledge. A few 
published studies do deal with aspects of grassroots politics in the area, for example 
Josette Cole’s work on the Crossroads squatter camp, Ineke van Kessel’s work on 
the community newspaper Grassroots, Maseko’s study of the Cape Area Housing 
Action Committee (CAHAC), and Bundy’s study of student/youth protest during 
the 1985/6 unrest.2 However, there is no study of anti-apartheid activism in the 
formal African townships. Crossroads was a squatter community, CAHAC only 
operated in the coloured communities, Bundy only studies the coloured student 
                                                   
1 See for example: Seekings, J, The UDF: A History of the UDF in South Africa 1983-1991, (Oxford, 
2000); Lodge, T & Nasson, B, All, Here, and Now: Black Politics in South Africa in the 1980s, 
(London, 1991); Hirson, B, Year of Fire, Year of Ash. The Soweto Revolt: Roots of a Rebellion?, 
(London, 1979) 
2 Cole, J, Crossroads: The Politics of Reform and Repression, 1976-1986, (Johannesburg, 1987); Van 
Kessel, I, “Beyond our Wildest Dreams” : the United Democratic Front and the transformation of 
South Africa, (Charlottesville & London, 2000); Bundy, C, „“Action, Comrades, Action!”: The 
Politics of Youth-Student Resistance in the Western Cape, 1985‟, in (eds.) Wilmot, J  & Simons, M, 
The Angry Divide: Social and Economic History of the Western Cape, (Cape Town, 1989), pp.206-
217; Maseko, S, „Civic Movement and Non-Violent Action: The Case of the Cape Areas Housing 





reaction and, whilst ostensibly a non-racial paper, Grassroots was overwhelming 
dominated by coloured activists and focused on the coloured communities. 
Furthermore, there is no existing study of the events of 1976 in the city in any 
community and there is also no study of student or youth politics outside of the two 
boycott periods of 1980 and 1985/6. Whilst the boycotts were important,3 much 
organisational effort was expended outside these periods and, particularly after 
1986, the Western Cape student movement was perhaps the strongest in the 
country.  
The second motivation for this study comes from a broader questioning of existing 
methodologies employed to investigate activism in South Africa across the whole 
period of this study, which can be seen to revolve around three key concerns: the 
false division between apartheid and post-apartheid activism, the failure of an 
organisational approach to catch the multi-facetted and interlinked nature of 
activism and the failure of a ‘big events’ approach to allow for a full understanding 
of South African activism and provide a framework for comparisons over time. 
Firstly, whilst post-apartheid activism in Cape Town has seen 
considerable attention, with a range of works focusing both upon the 
transformation of apartheid organisations in the city and the development of 
new social movements, most of these studies contain a similar weakness. 
Namely, whilst some are high quality4 they rarely ground their analyses 
within a broader historical context and tend to treat apartheid and post-
apartheid periods as analytically distinct.  
                                                   
3 Molteno, F, 1980: Students Struggle for their Schools, (Centre for African Studies, Cape Town, 
1987); Bundy, C, „Action Comrades, Action...‟ 
4 In this regard the work by Seekings and Oldfield stands out. See, for example, Oldfield, S, & 
Stokkes, K, Building Unity in Diversity: Social Movement Activism in the Western Cape Anti-
Eviction Campaign‟, A case study for the UKZN project entitled: Globalisation, Marginalisation and 
New Social Movements in post-Apartheid South Africa (Durban, 2004); Seekings, J, „No Home for 
Revolutionaries: The Structures and Activities of the South African National Civic Organisation in 
Metropolitan Cape Town, 1996-97‟, Urban Forum, 9/1, 1998, pp.1- 35; Cherry, J, Jones,  K & 
Seekings, J, „Democratisation and Politics in South African Townships‟ in, International Journal of 





This is revealed most clearly in post-apartheid studies in which the 
new social movements protesting against service delivery are seen as simple 
reactions to the adoption by the ANC in 1996 of its ‘neo-liberal’ Growth 
Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR) for economic growth, 
which included a focus upon cost recovery for services. These studies often 
make no reference to how new social movements relate to earlier traditions 
of mobilisation, despite considerable evidence of continuity with the 
apartheid period.5  
The second concern emerged whilst I was researching for an MSc in 
2003. In South Africa many studies of activism specifically focus upon 
individual organisations or forms of organisation such as the civics, the 
youth or the women’s movement. However, whilst examining the civic 
movement in Cape Town it became clear that though I had limited my 
investigation solely to civic campaigns, activists did no such thing and their 
involvement was just one aspect of a far broader interaction with civil 
society structures. For example Daphne King – a leading figure in CAHAC – 
was during this period also involved in the United Women’s Organisation, 
the Young Christian Workers, teaching literacy to domestic workers, study 
groups at UWC and a progressive Teachers Action Committee.6 My study 
also showed, as have others, that whilst such organisations were able to 
mobilise large numbers at specific periods of time, at other times 
participation rapidly declined.7 This led to a questioning of the extent to 
which an organisationally based approach to activism could accurately 
capture the complex dynamics at work. For example, as will be seen with 
regards to Bonteheuwel in chapter five, the collapse of one form of 
                                                   
5 For a well argued rejection of this approach in the case of the Treatment Action Campaign see: 
Mbali, M, „TAC in the History of Patient-Driven AIDS Activism: The Case for Historicizing South 
Africa‟s New Social Movements‟, in (ed.) Gibson, N, Challenging Hegemony: Social Movements and 
the Quest for a New Humanism in Post-Apartheid South Africa, (Trenton & Asmara, 2006), pp.129-
156. See also chapter seven.  
6 Interview with Daphne King, May 2003, Cape Town 
7 Seekings, J, „Civic Organisations in South African Townships‟, in (eds.) Moss, G, & Obery, I, South 





organising (in this case the civic) accompanied a transformation in the nature 
of activism (in this case realignment towards a violent youth politics) and an 
examination of who remains active through this transition may have 
considerable significance. However, without combining an analysis of the 
civic, alongside an examination of youth politics, such trends are wont to be 
overlooked. Similar trends are also apparent post-apartheid. Some of the 
literature has specifically focused upon the novelty of the new social 
movements and their opposition to the ANC.8 However the evidence 
presented here (chapter seven) shows how people involved in the new social 
movements are often also involved in the less confrontational civics and 
some are even ANC members. It is clear, therefore, that people use a range 
of channels through which to address their interests and the success of new 
social movements is often linked to the failures of other methods of 
representation.9 An approach which simply focuses upon the new 
movements, neglecting other methods of organising, offers no means 
through which to elucidate these links. 
 The final methodological issue relates to the tendency amongst many 
studies to focus predominantly on ‘big events.’ An example already 
mentioned is the coverage of student politics in Cape Town, which is 
restricted to the 1980 and 1985/6 boycotts. Due to their prominence this is 
understandable; yet such a ‘snap shot’ can ignore the complex processes 
which provide the bedrock on which mobilisations are built. Focusing on 
high profile events also runs the danger of missing the fact that, despite 
academic interest in mobilisation and struggle, most South Africans 
remained inactive with regards to political struggles most of the time. 
Studies therefore show why in certain circumstances people became 
amenable to collective action but fail to discuss why in the face of 
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considerable discrimination many South Africans remained quiescent.10 
Indeed, the limited coverage of anti-apartheid activism in the Western Cape 
during the 1980s is in part a response to the fact that activism was less 
marked than in other areas and the area was peripheral to the central 
developments in the country’s economy. 11 Yet explaining why people 
remain quiescent, or why they only become mobilised in certain 
circumstances, shines considerable light upon both collective action in 
general and specifically in South Africa.  
 The third and final motivation for this study was theoretical. As 
Seekings noted in a recent review of studies of apartheid activism, most 
studies of anti-apartheid activism have been overwhelmingly empirical and 
have not brought in broader social and political theory.12 There is therefore 
scope for research which seeks to investigate experiences in South Africa 
within the context of the broader debates and theories surrounding collective 
action. 
 Overall, therefore, despite a range of studies looking at collective action in 
South Africa there remains considerable scope for a work which will plug gaps in 
current coverage whilst addressing some of the methodological and theoretical 
issues outlined above. It is this which this thesis aims to achieve. In order to succeed 
in its goals it will utilise a historical, comparative, geographical, case based 
methodology. Namely, it will study the evolution of civil society activism over the 
last thirty years in two townships – Guguletu and Bonteheuwel – in the Cape Town 
area of South Africa. In doing so it will not restrict its focus to either single 
                                                   
10 The exception to these rule is Jeremy Seekings‟ thesis: Seekings, J, Quiescence and the Transition 
to Confrontation: South African Townships, 1978-1984, PhD Thesis, (University of Oxford, 1990) 
11 James, W G & Simons, M, „Introduction‟, in (eds.) James, W G & Simons, M, The Angry Divide: 
Social and Economic History of the Western Cape, (Cape Town & Johannesburg, 1989), p.vii 
12 Seekings, J, „Whose Voices? Politics and Methodology in the Study of Political Organisation in the 
Final Phase of the “Struggle” in South Africa‟, South African Historical Journal, 62/1, 2010, pp.7-28. 
As Seekings notes, there one study does exist which sets out an intention to apply theoretical 
understandings to the South African context. However, despite a detailed introduction sketching out 
much of the theory, the empirical data is presented primarily as narrative and it is not used to 
comment on broader theoretical debates. See: Bozzoli, B, Theatres of Struggle and the End of 





organisations or events but will instead aim to elucidate the changing forms of 
organisation and activism in which residents of these two communities, and the 
broader city, involved themselves across the full thirty years under investigation.  
The choice of Cape Town and the cases selected, which include a formal 
African township, will fill current gaps in the empirical record of activism in South 
Africa. The focus on activism within a community and across time will provide data 
which can interrogate the distinctions between apartheid and post-apartheid 
periods that dominate many modern studies. Finally, this study will also seek to 
locate its explanations within the broader theoretical literature dealing with how 
and why people organise collectively and in doing use the Cape Town experience to 
interrogate current understandings of collective action and organisation. 
 
1.3. Research Questions and Thesis Coverage 
 
Drawing on the above I developed some research questions to guide my study and 
defined the boundaries of this thesis. The main research question was: 
 
 How and why did people involve themselves in progressive organisation and 
action at the local level in Cape Town and how did this change between 1976 
and 2006? 
 
Beneath this I defined some sub-questions which would provide me with the 






 What form did progressive organisation and activism take? 
 Who was involved in progressive organisation and activism (what was the 
social base of organisation and activism)? 
 Why were people involved in progressive organisation and activism? 
 Why did progressive organisation and activism take the form it did? 
 How and why did organisation change (or not) over time? 
 
Having settled on my research questions I also had to define the limits of what I 
was studying, specifically what did and did not constitute ‘progressive collective 
action and grassroots organisation’. I decided on a broad definition of the field of 
study to include those organisations, protest events, and activists that are locally 
based, insomuch as they organise themselves within local communities and devote 
an amount of their time to addressing issues which arise at the level of the 
community; yet at the same time see the local issues that they address as being 
interlinked with, and only solvable by, redress through and/or transformation of, 
the broader political order. Such politics can therefore be seen as ‘grassroots’, as 
they focus at the local level, and are based within local constituencies. However, 
they are also ‘progressive’ in so far as they also attempt to impact upon the political 
process.13 
Once the broad focus of my research had been decided upon I then 
needed to define my methodology. I decided to use a case study approach to 
answer these questions as this would allow me the context within which to 
                                                   
13 This definition broadly aligns itself with Charles Tilly‟s definition of a social movement as „a 
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publicly visible demands for change in the distribution or exercise of power, and back those demands 
with demonstrations of support‟ see: Diani, M, & Bison, I, „Organizations, Coalitions and 
Movements‟, Theory and Society, 33, 2004, p.281. However rather than focusing on social 
movements at a national level as Tilly and others have done, this study restricts itself to those 
organisations and activists that operate in a field of contestation that is geographically bounded at the 





understand the shifting organisational forms and social base of activism. I 
settled on the coloured township of Bonteheuwel and the African township 
of Guguletu as the case studies I would examine. A more detailed discussion 
of the reasoning behind this approach is available in appendix A but the 
main reasons for selecting the cases are discussed below. 
 The selection of one African and one coloured community was deliberate 
and emerged from a desire to provide a context in which forms of activism could be 
related to the impact of the communities’ different social, economic and political 
conditions under apartheid (see chapter two) and their different historical 
development. Within this framework Guguletu was chosen as the African case for 
three reasons. Firstly, whilst the nature of the community has changed over time 
Guguletu was, and has remained, primarily a township of formal housing units 
with some areas of hostel accommodation. As apartheid studies of Western Cape 
Africans have concentrated upon squatter politics, neglecting Africans with legal 
residence rights within the cities, it was felt that to include a formal housing area in 
the study would help address current imbalances in the literature.14 Secondly, it 
represents a relatively standard formal African township in Cape Town, or what 
Yin would call a ‘typical case.’15 During apartheid Guguletu had a range of civil 
society organisations operating, some of which gained a degree of prominence, as 
well as experiencing a degree of protest and violent confrontation. However, the 
level of mobilisation was not exceptional or always sustained. In this way it 
represents many townships – including all the formal Capetonian townships – 
where activism did exist but was sporadic and only occasionally significant. 
Furthermore, its post-apartheid experience aligns broadly with trends throughout 
the country. After 1994 its civic organisations went into decline in a pattern that was 
replicated throughout South Africa.16 It has also experienced some protest 
surrounding service delivery, but again it has not stood out as a hotbed of 
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radicalism. It is therefore hoped that an examination of the dynamics at play in 
Guguletu will contribute to broader discussions of activism and protest both in the 
city and the country.  
 Whilst Guguletu was selected for its typicality, Bonteheuwel was selected in 
part for its uniqueness. Bonteheuwel was built in the 1960s to house coloureds both 
relocated under the apartheid government’s group areas removals and those moved 
from the squatter areas which existed across the city. As an area of rental housing it 
was dominated predominantly by working class coloureds. Consequently it was in 
many ways typical of the new housing schemes built throughout apartheid for 
coloured people in the area to the South East of Cape Town known as the Cape 
Flats. However, despite having a similar socio-economic profile to many other 
townships Bonteheuwel gained a reputation during apartheid for political activism 
and militancy. Perhaps most well known in this respect were the activities of a 
group of radical youth known as the Bonteheuwel Military Wing (BMW) in the mid-
1980s and the large number of people from the area who became involved in the 
ANC’s military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK).17 However, Bonteheuwel was also 
central in non-violent campaigns, including being the launching venue for 
CAHAC’s 1981 maintenance campaign. It was this history of militancy which led to 
Bonteheuwel’s selection and the reasons were twofold. 
 Firstly, many coloured areas of Cape Town experienced only limited 
organisation and involvement in political activism during the 1980s and sustained 
mobilisation amongst coloured communities was rare.18 As a result it was necessary 
to select an area in which there was actually something to study and Bonteheuwel’s 
profile made this possible. The second reason for selecting Bonteheuwel emerged 
                                                   
17 The activities of the BMW will be discussed later in this thesis but it is worth noting here that they 
received individual treatment in the deliberations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Also 
worth noting is the large number of people from Bonteheuwel involved in MK activities in the 
Western Cape. For example, two MK operatives from Bonteheuwel were killed in shootouts with the 
police in the late 1980s whilst another was killed attempting to detonate a limpet mine at the 
magistrates court in Athlone.  
18 Staniland, L, Struggling for Community: Civic Activism in the Coloured Townships of Greater 





from the first. If organising was particularly successful in Bonteheuwel why was 
this the case and what light can this shed on the limited mobilisation elsewhere? A 
further aspect of Bonteheuwel’s history also endeared itself to this study for whilst 
the area was noted for its militancy in the 1980s subsequently it was little different 
from any other coloured township. Just as coloured communities across the city 
rejected the ANC in 1994 so did the people of Bonteheuwel. Furthermore, its 
radicalism in the 1980s was transformed by a collapse in civil society structures 
post-1994. The collapse of progressive organising in an area once famed for its 
vibrant civil society activism allows, therefore, for a thorough examination of the 
post-apartheid dynamics which have affected civil society in coloured communities. 
Further details of the two townships are given below. 
 
1.3.1. Setting the scene: Guguletu and Bonteheuwel 
Guguletu and Bonteheuwel lie adjacent to each other about 20 kilometres to the east 
of Cape Town city centre along the N2 motorway on the windswept Cape Flats. 
Separated by a railway line and the N2 these two townships have stood since the 
1960s when the apartheid state started building residential housing for coloureds 
and Africans in the city to both reduce overcrowding in the existing residential 
areas and implement its plans for racial segregation (see map 1 p. xxi). 
Bonteheuwel was the first coloured, state rental township, to house people 
being forcibly removed under the group areas act. People from the recently declared 
white areas such as Claremont and District 6 moved alongside people from the 
many coloured squatter communities that dotted the city at this time. The housing 
that greeted them when they arrived was simple, single storey matchbox housing 
with asbestos roofs, although the township was electrified and plumbed. From these 
simple homes workers commuted into Cape Town to work as domestic workers in 
the homes of wealthy whites and in the city’s restaurants and hotels, as plumbers 
and construction workers in the city’s building sites, and as factory workers in the 





 With only three roads in and out of the township Bonteheuwel was built 
around a central shopping area and had three secondary schools, Arcadia High, 
Modderdam High and Bonteheuwel High. In 1980 it had a population of around 
45,000, of which nearly half was aged 18 or under, and an unemployment rate of 
around 6%.19 As the population expanded duplex houses were built in the 1970s in 
the backyards of existing homes, although overcrowding and poverty was still rife. 
Interestingly, unlike other coloured townships where large numbers of flats were 
built Bonteheuwel remained a low rise township of individual houses. 
During the late 1980s Bonteheuwel experienced the upgrading of its facilities 
as the state sought to tackle political militancy through state spending. Roads were 
tarred and facilities upgraded. This gradual upgrading continued into the 1990s as a 
multi-purpose centre was built with money from the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme and moving into the 2000s a police station was built. 
However, Bonteheuwel remains a poor community bursting at the seams. The back 
yards of many formal houses house people living in shacks made of corrugated iron 
and wood. Democratisation also brought with it an explosion of crime as, 
particularly in the late 1990s, gangsterism took a deep hold on the community and 
led to many deaths. Drug abuse and alcoholism are also commonplace and the 
coming of crystal meth to the Cape Flats was a particular concern whilst I was 
conducting my fieldwork.  
Like Bonteheuwel, the African township of Guguletu is also located on the 
Cape Flats. Before the increasingly harsh implementation of coloured preference 
policies in the 1960s Cape Town’s African population had been expanding and 
Guguletu was built, along with Nyanga, to house people who could not be 
accommodated within existing housing at Langa. Like Bonteheuwel most houses 
were single story matchboxes, although there was limited electrification and 
plumbing and the roads were dirt tracks. Guguletu also housed several company 
hostels, which were physically and administratively separated from the formal 
                                                   





township, and were the homes of migrant workers from the Eastern Cape. Guguletu 
also came to be bordered by squatter camps (most notably KTC and Crossroads) 
during the 1970s as the African population of the city was swelled by illegal 
immigration.  
The complete segregation of Africans from white society and the operation 
of apartheid policies in the Western Cape meant that the African population of Cape 
Town was employed in predominantly low paid and unskilled work. Africans went 
from the townships to their place of work and back home at night. Recreational 
facilities were minimal, restricted to the municipal beer halls that helped subsidise 
the running of the townships, and illegal shebeens. Schooling provision was also 
limited. Whilst Bonteheuwel had three high schools for a single township there 
were only three high schools for all the Africans in Cape Town before the mid 1980s. 
These were Langa High and in Guguletu I.D. Mkhize and Fezeka High. 
In 1980 Guguletu recorded a population in the census of around 75,000, of 
which 40% were 18 or younger, and unemployment was about 7%. However these 
figures need to be treated with caution as the presence of many Africans in the city 
illegally makes them difficult to confirm.  
Guguletu saw little upgrading under apartheid, although some private 
housing was built in the township’s northern edge during the late 1980s as the state 
introduced leasehold rights for Africans. Schooling also expanded to cope with the 
growing youth population. However, it was not until the 1990s that any large scale 
developments were launched in the township. Democratisation has seen 
considerable development in Guguletu. Most of the township roads have been 
tarred, a new shopping centre has been built, and street lighting installed. Large 
private houses have sprung up amongst the state built matchboxes and bars and 
restaurants have opened. However, like Bonteheuwel, Guguletu too 
overwhelmingly a poor community. Back yard shacks abound, as does crime, 





However, despite being poor and full of social problems neither Guguletu 
nor Bonteheuwel are sad places. Children play in the streets, go to school, cry and 
are loved. People drink and fight but they also dance and laugh. People buy new 
kitchens and decorate their homes. Indeed there is an edginess and immediatism to 
life in the Cape Flats that is a far cry from the electrified fences and franchise 
restaurants of the city’s Victoria and Albert waterfront. Amongst the poverty I 
found a real welcome which will stay with me well beyond the completion of this 
thesis. 
 
1.4. Theories of Collective Action 
 
Before moving to consider current interpretations of collective action and struggle in 
South Africa, the existing broad theoretical approaches to activism will be outlined. 
The study of collective action and social movement theory can be split into two 
schools of thought which place focus on either the dynamics that push people into 
activism, or the dynamics that pull people into activism. Firstly, there are theories 
that focus on how the broader political, resource and ideological context pulls 
people into activism by changing the costs and likely benefits of protest and 
organisation for individual participants. Secondly, there are a group of theories that 
focus upon how the broader social structure and social cleavages influence activism 
by creating the underlying interests and identities that push people into activism.  
Whilst these strands are sometimes presented as theoretically distinct, they 
are not mutually exclusive. Theories surrounding how a group organises to pursue 
its interests, how it reacts to its political context and the resources it employs, 
presume the existence of collective interests; an understanding of the interests 
underlying mobilisations are therefore essential. Inversely, whilst group interests 
and social cleavages may exist aside from their articulation through collective 





identities assume an active form and in doing so the broader constraints placed on 
action by the political system and the resources available to groups become crucial. 
As Oberschall argues, a full understanding of why people act collectively demands 
an understanding of the social change that sits beneath activism, the beliefs and 
values that motivate people to act, the resources available to enable people to act 
and opportunities within the broader political context that make action more or less 
appealing.20 
 
1.4.1. Political Opportunities, Resources and Rationality  
In the study of social movements and political mobilisation a central area of 
attention has been the impact of the broader institutional and resource context on 
the emergence, form and success of social movements. Drawing upon rational 
choice theories what unites these interpretations is a presumption that because 
inequality is endemic in all societies, and because societies with similar economic 
structures have very different histories of mobilisation and activism, the underlying 
motivation driving people to protest cannot be located within the social structure 
alone, but must instead be a consequence of the costs and benefits of organisation.21 
Consequently they focus not so much upon why people mobilise (although they 
recognise that organisation and activism must build upon some form of social 
cleavage, cultural symbol or dense social network)22, but how they mobilise: i.e. the 
circumstances under which individuals coalesce into collective social actors and the 
reasons why some groups manage to mobilise, whilst others do not.23 The posited 
rationality of social actors is taken as a given and it is therefore presumed that 
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involvement in collective action will only occur when these rational actors conclude 
that they have more to gain than to lose by involving themselves in a social 
movement.24  
However, whilst there is a general agreement upon the rationality of 
individuals, there are differing focuses regarding the factors which are seen as 
central to turning individuals into collective actors. Three sub- trends within this 
broader school of social movement theorising can therefore be identified. These can 
be classified as resource mobilisation, political opportunity structure and framing 
theories. 
 Starting from the presumption that most people have grievances which 
could lead them to participate in collective action, resource mobilisation theorists 
seek to identify the resources which social movements need and use in order to 
mobilise such individuals, the presumption being that if people have the resources 
to mobilise around a social problem they will do so. 25 A range of different resources 
have been identified. These include: the emergence of leaders with sufficient 
political experience to organise individuals around their collective grievances, 
provide a coherent vision to unite them, and effectively project those grievances 
outwards to both potential participants and those in power;26 the need for the 
existence of ‘solidarity networks’, or links between different organisations and/or 
individuals as the means through which social movements are organised and 
spread;27 and, on a more basic level, the possession of material resources such as 
money and transport. Other less obvious resources are also highlighted. For 
example, media coverage has been identified as particularly important as it is 
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26 Zirakzadeh, C E, Social Movements in Politics: a Comparative Study, (London, 1997) p.12 





through the dissemination of information that potential participants become aware 
of the fact that social movements with relevance to their situations exist.28 
 The second approach influenced by rational choice scholars can be classified 
under the broad heading of political opportunity structure theory. Unlike resource 
mobilisation theorists, political opportunity structure theorists focus upon factors 
external to the social movements and see their existence and form as intimately 
linked to the political and institutional environment in which they operate and the 
opportunities, or lack of opportunities, that this provides. As Tarrow argues: 
If collective action is a form of politics, then as in conventional politics, there must be 
a set of constraints and opportunities that discourage this kind of behaviour and 
lead it in certain forms rather than others.29 
 
 A range of political opportunities have been defined as affecting activism, 
some of which apply only to democratic societies, others which can be universally 
applied. The ‘openness’ or ‘closedness’ of the polity is often seen as significant. If the 
political process is open and responsive to competing viewpoints then social 
movements are considered unlikely to emerge, as there is little need for collective 
action to access or influence the policy making process.30 Whilst at the opposite 
extreme, unwillingness by the state and elite groups to tolerate social movements 
tends to lead to repression, which if effective closes the political system to influence 
and stifles social movement success. However, repression can also be seen to enable 
social movements if it is ineffective and seen as illegitimate, as it can reveal the 
vulnerability of the state to collective action and enhance feelings of injustice.31 
Another important element of political opportunity theory is the concept of cycles of 
protest, or ‘opportunity spirals.’ This focuses on the way in which protest often 
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builds as the first movements and protests to emerge demonstrate the possibility of 
activism, whilst simultaneously reducing the costs of activism by having gone first. 
This draws more people into protest and organisation, which further reduces the 
costs of action and increases the likelihood of success. In this way activism forces 
open increasing political space for itself.32 
 The final theory within this broad approach is framing theory. This argues 
that a crucial element of any successful social movement or incidence of collective 
action is the emergence of shared explanations of injustice which can unite people 
behind common action. Benford and Snow, in their discussion of the ‘frames’ that 
are used to mobilise people behind collective action, argue that all such action relies 
on the existence of shared understandings of a social problem alongside agreement 
on who is to blame. It also relies on a proposed solution to this problem alongside a 
set of strategies for putting in place this solution. They also argue that the 
effectiveness of the frame to draw people into action relies upon how empirically 
credible it is (i.e. how well it explains people’s experiences) and how central the 
target of the claim is to people’s lives. 33 
All these theories provide useful insight into collective action and, as will be 
seen, resonate with empirical studies of South African activism. Unfortunately, 
however, they also have their limitations. Firstly, these theories have struggled to 
provide generalisable explanations for the growth of collective action and social 
movements. Whilst explanations based on class and social structure struggle to 
explain different forms of mobilisation in societies with similar class structures, 
rational choice theories struggle to explain why people act differently across or 
within countries with similar political structures or similar access to resources. As 
Meyer notes, ‘political opportunities for organising can change dramatically—and 
differentially—for groups within the same movement, as authorities respond to the 
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range of groups that comprise a social movement.’34 Because no single political 
opportunity or resource can be seen to impact universally on collective action there 
has been a tendency amongst these theorists to simply add to the factors which are 
considered political opportunities.35 Similarly, as framing theorists themselves have 
noted, effective frames may be crucial to the growth of activism but they cannot 
operate unless they resonate with people’s day-to-day experiences, and these 
experiences are often linked to the underlying social structure.  
Overall, the problems of identifying unifying themes which impact equally 
on activism has led to some of the central theorists in the field querying the search 
for a singular explanatory framework and instead focusing individually upon the 
‘smaller-scale causal mechanisms’ (such as the presence of elite support, media 
sympathy, financial resources and so on) which contribute to contentious political 
action and which vary in presence and form across both space and time.36 Whilst 
this is undoubtedly a sensible approach to the clear weaknesses that have emerged 
from their attempts to construct overarching theories, it is a far cry from a broad 
theoretical framework which could be applied universally to understand activism.  
The value of these theories, therefore, exists less in their ability to provide an all 
encompassing explanation for collective action and mobilisation, and more in their 
explanations of specific processes and their importance.  
 
1.4.2. Social Structure and Action 
The second significant approach to the study of collective action considers how the 
identities and interests around which people mobilise relate to the underlying 
structure of society and the impact of the transformation of that structure. The most 
significant of these has been the study of the relationship between economic 
position or ‘class’ and social action. Whilst class is commonly perceived as a 
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division based upon occupation or status, within the Marxist and Weberian 
traditions that have dominated much social theory it is in fact seen as more than a 
simple hierarchy. Instead, many social scientists argue that social classes represent 
demarcated social groups based around shared social relations. For Marxists, class is 
defined around an individual’s relations at the point of production – i.e. whether 
they own the means of production or produce surplus value which is expropriated 
by capitalists. For Weberians the precise divisions are less clear. However class is 
generally defined by shared life chances in terms of economic interests and the 
ability of individuals to possess goods and opportunities for income within the 
labour market. Class, therefore, reflects one’s position in the labour market and all 
components making up this position including not only property but also skills and 
education.37  
Whilst defining groups based on economic relations has descriptive value, 
class analysis moves beyond defining social classes to theorising how they relate to 
social action. At the heart of any class analysis, therefore, is the belief that in some 
way the social relations that define and demarcate classes also influence people’s 
behaviour. This is most apparent in orthodox Marxism, which sees human 
consciousness as reflecting the material conditions of society and therefore seeks to 
both read off and predict social action based on individuals’ relationships to 
production. Weberian analyses, although denying the primacy of class as a 
causative factor in social behaviour, also still aim to see how it relates to social 
action.38 
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1.5. Organisation and Activism in South Africa and 
Cape Town: Current Understandings 
 
A wide range of studies have been undertaken on South African activism, 
providing different explanations for the emergence, trajectories and forms of 
activism that have developed. However, whilst defuse they can be relatively 
easily divided into two groups: explanations of anti-apartheid activism and 
explanations of the emergence of post-apartheid social movements. 
Furthermore, whilst rarely explicitly stated, many of these explanations do 
relate to the broader debates around activism sketched above and can be 
considered in this light. 
 
1.5.1. Activism and Apartheid 
Under apartheid much of the opposition to apartheid was located within civil 
society. Unsurprisingly, therefore, research has been focused upon civil society 
organisations and the mobilisation they accompanied. Studies have been produced 
focusing specifically upon civil society organisations at the local level, such as the 
women’s organisations, youth movements, student’s associations and civic 
associations under apartheid. 39 Specific examples of apartheid era mobilisation and 
conflict have been examined40 and a range of case studies of individual movements 
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produced.41 Focus has also been brought to bear upon the national organisational 
structures, particularly the UDF.42 
Taken together these studies provide several different answers to the 
fundamental research questions guiding this thesis. On the question of who became 
involved in activism the questions unsurprisingly vary over time and space, with 
ongoing debates around the extent to which the anti-apartheid struggle was able to 
spread from particularistic local struggles to create mass support. For example, 
during the 1976 uprising debates exist over the extent to which the revolt moved 
beyond school pupils to garner the support of the wider adult community. 43 
Moving into the 1980s the picture becomes more complex as the terrain of struggle 
widened to include trade unions in the work place44, students45, out of school youth 
on the streets46 and even elderly residents.47 Furthermore, the intensity of struggle 
has also been shown to have varied geographically. In 1976 rioting started in Soweto 
before spreading elsewhere; in 1980 boycotts broke out first in Cape Town; in 1984 
unrest started in the Vaal Triangle before spreading to the Eastern Cape and it was 
not until late 1985 that Cape Town became engulfed. Similarly, the strength of 
organisation varied. In the early 1980s there was considerable organisation in the 
coloured communities of Cape Town, however by the time the United Democratic 
Front had launched in 1983 this has been seriously weakened48 and from 1984 
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onwards the focus of activism shifted from to the African Townships where 
struggles over rents and within the schools saw the emergence of sustained revolt.49 
 Moving from the ‘who’ to the ‘why’ of activism it is interesting that the 
complex pattern of activism over time and space has not always been reflected 
within interpretations of this period. Broadly speaking these interpretations can be 
drawn into four broad categories. The first sees activism as a simplistic political 
struggle for political rights. The second and third approaches are more closely 
aligned to theories that seek to uncover the underlying structural causes of action, 
although they differ in their focus with one defining activism in dichotomous terms 
as either a simple class or race struggle and the other locating activism in a more 
complex structural crisis that led to diffuse, yet overlapping grievances, which 
broadly coalesced into a challenge to the apartheid state. Finally, the fourth 
approach sees activism as a result of the changing opportunities for action and is 
most closely aligned to political opportunity and resource mobilisation theories.  
The first broad approach sees activism at this time as a simplistic response to 
stark political inequality; discrimination, by denying blacks equal political rights 
was so unjust that it necessarily drew people into conflict.  For example, Hopkins 
and Grange’s study of the 1976 unrest dismisses the idea that student protesters 
were driven by opposition to apartheid education policy and instead locate their 
actions in an explicitly political desire for liberation.50 Similarly, writing in the mid-
1980s Brewer argued that because Africans had reached the stage where they were 
not willing to trade material gain for a continued denial of political rights, the anti-
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apartheid struggle was clearly political and was not a response to material 
hardship.51 
The second approach, which locates activism primarily in dualistic race or 
class divisions, shares with more politicised interpretations the view that apartheid 
necessarily created protest because of the depth of its injustice, however the material 
consequences of inequality are given more weight. Hirson views race as the main 
division in South African society and sees activism originating with this simple 
cleavage.52 Swilling argues that although the UDF played a major role in 
strengthening opposition to the apartheid state by providing a unified political 
centre the driving force of resistance was still located within struggles from below 
which came from residents’ ‘abysmal urban living conditions’. These unspecified 
poor conditions then led to demands for political change as people realised that 
only with political change could their basic economic needs be met.53 Martin Murray 
puts forward a similar interpretation for the whole period under consideration here. 
He argues that 1976 to the mid-1980s represented an ‘unbroken chain of events’ 
which ‘reinforced the growing polarization along race and class lines.’54 By 1984 he 
sees this as having created protest hat had  ‘deeper roots in working-class 
dissatisfaction *than 1976/80+’ and he argues that the civics that had grown up 
during the early 1980s were able to translate the grievances of residents ‘into a 
broad political assault on all oppression and injustice in South Africa.’55 This protest 
was, at heart, rooted in an organic crisis of capitalism that heightened popular 
struggle that was ‘anti-capitalist.’56 
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 Whilst providing attractively simple explanations of anti-apartheid activism, 
these arguments suffer from considerable weaknesses as they struggle to explain the 
heterogeneity of struggle in action. If the struggle was an inevitable result of 
political injustice then all people should be protesting all of the time. Similarly, if 
this was a simplistic class or race struggle rooted in an organic crisis of apartheid 
then why did responses vary over time and space? As van Kessel argues: 
The idiom of struggle, in which all the oppressed are lumped together into the 
underclass or the fighting masses, paints an exaggerated picture of the homogeneity of 
black South Africa and the revolutionary fervour of black South Africans. It ignores 
the cleavages- economic, social, cultural, ethnic, generational and gender- within 
black Society.57 
 
Furthermore, these interpretations also suffer from the fact that detailed case studies 
have often shown that protest was neither political nor necessarily based in overtly 
class or raced based identities. Seekings’ study of the Vaal, for example, has show 
that protest against the local state was defensive rather than revolutionary, both in 
the grievances that underlay it and the political procedures that participants used.58  
The final two approaches to apartheid activism seek to tackle this diversity 
in their explanations.  Whilst still focusing in part on national change, several 
authors have developed interpretations which highlight the fact that underlying 
nationwide challenge was the simultaneous development of local struggles that, 
whilst becoming both organisationally and ideologically drawn into a national 
movement, remained grounded in the local political economy and/or shifting 
political opportunities. 
 A range of studies have noted the heterogeneity of the anti-apartheid 
struggle and the very different social groups, forms of protest and actions that it 
consisted of. Ineke Van Kessel describes a community newspaper produced in Cape 
Town by young, educated, politicised activists.59 Jeremy Seekings has undertaken 
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extensive studies on the civic organisations that emerged across the country in black 
townships and shown how many participants in civic struggles became involved, 
‘because of their pragmatic reformism, not their ideological radicalism.’ 60 Similarly, 
Colin Bundy studied student/youth unrest in Cape Town in 1985/6 and found a 
group driven by a distinct ‘generational consciousness,’61 as did Van Kessel in her 
study of the youth in Sekukhuneland,62 whilst in 1976 Hirson located amongst 
student activists a clear student identity and a rejection of interaction with 
uneducated youths.63 
Drawing all these studies into a single narrative of protest is problematic as 
most of these studies have tended to draw out the specific conditions that lay 
behind individual protests. However, at their heart is a recognition that these 
protests were part of a larger crisis of apartheid, resulting from its inability to 
sustain economic growth amid recession and rapid urbanisation, but that this crisis 
was experienced differentially. For example the considerable student involvement 
in activism is often explained as a consequence of the intersection of the urban 
black youth population with economic crisis as an expanding school population was 
denied both quality education and, as the country entered economic crisis, 
employment after matriculation.64 
 Because these studies see diversity as the one of the central elements of anti-
apartheid protest, albeit conditioned by a broader structural crisis, they tend to see 
the emergence of political struggle not as a simplistic class or race struggle, but as an 
(often fragile) coalition of interests. As van Kessel says with regards to the 
development of grassroots organisation in the 1980s: 
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The formation of community organisations was predicated upon the assumption 
that township residents shared a commonality of interests... For a short period 
during the 1980s the lack of social differentiation within the townships and the 
communal experience of repression from outside produced the conditions in which 
community organisations were successfully formed and maintained. The experience 
of repression and disenfranchisement also meant that mobilisation was less likely to 
occur along the lines of social class. However, once these commonalities receded the 
viability of the community organisations also declined.65  
 
However, whilst generally highly insightful, as a result of their focus on local 
dynamics and cases these studies tend not to move beyond explanations of 
particular incidences of protest or particular forms of organisation to theorise more 
about the more generalisable dynamics driving protest. 
The final theme in studies of apartheid activism, whilst not rejecting the 
importance of underlying structural conflicts, focuses on the fact that activism did 
not simply emerge from these conflicts, but was also influenced by the broader 
political, and ideological context. Indeed, several of the studies which focus on local 
patterns of activism also highlight the importance of the political context in shaping 
the style, form and development of this activism. Whilst rarely explicitly citing 
political opportunity theory, these interpretations draw on its central themes to 
explain the presence, or absence, of activism.  
Repression is often seen to have played a major role in the emergence, or 
absence, of activism. A common explanation of the lack of protest before 1976 is that 
repression was so severe that it had effectively closed down all available space for 
organising and activism. Therefore whilst people may have been discontented, they 
were too scared and had little space within which to challenge. 66 Inversely, 
repression has also been used to explain why activism re-emerged in South Africa 
as the violent action of the police in suppressing protests is seen to have forced 
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people into opposition by exposing the violent and unjust nature of the state, 
creating common grievances and forcing people to respond. 67 
 The second major factor that is seen to have provided the political space and 
resources for activism is the emergence of organisations focused on challenging 
apartheid. Organisations are seen to have provided the networks that allowed 
people with similar ideas and experiences to come together and effectively organise 
their responses;68 the ideologies and ideas that framed protest in a way that was 
understandable and attractive to participants;69 and to have transformed diffuse 
protest with specific demands into a coherent challenge to state power.70 As Jeremy 
Seekings argues with regards to the United Democratic Front (UDF): 
Neither the UDF nor ANC could claim the credit for the formation of street 
committees and other manifestations of people’s power. These were primarily a 
response to conditions on the ground, shaped by deep rooted traditions of localised 
self-government and self-help. But the UDF and ANC played a central role 
formulating and organisational strategy of people’s power, both at a conceptual 
level and in terms of co-ordination and networking. The UDF provided 
organisational and conceptual links between disparate localised struggles and 
overall struggle for national political change, and thereby greatly boosted local-level 
developments.71 
 
Interestingly, where activism was weak or non-existent a lack of organisation is also 
used as an explanation. Hirson, for example, saw the failure of the Soweto uprising 
to spread into a broad assault on state power as a result of ineffective organisation.  72  
Both repression and organisation are also seen, as well as being causes in 
their own right, to have fed into a wider expansion of political opportunities for 
activism by making apartheid seem challengeable. Just as the repression after 
Sharpeville closed down political space, the emergence of organisations, protests 
                                                   
67 Bundy, C, „”Action, Comrades, Action!”...‟, p.211 
68 Seekings, J, The UDF: A History... 
69 Carter, C, „Community and Conflict...‟, p.131 
70 Houston, G F, The National Liberation Struggle... , pp.6&22;  
Seekings, J, „The Origins of Political...‟, p.68 
71 Seekings, J, The UDF: A History..., p.170 





and challenges are seen to have slowly built a context within which people felt they 
could challenge apartheid.73 
Finally, shifting relationships between the state and black South Africans are 
also seen to be significant. Seekings’ study of quiescence and protest in the African 
townships of the Vaal was a key text in the development of this approach, and was 
later to form the basis of several articles. His argument also reveals the interaction of 
political opportunities with a deeper economic and structural crisis.  Seekings based 
his thesis on the view that people’s actions were heavily influenced by cost benefit 
calculations which mean that people who weigh up the costs of potential action, 
with the possibility for redress through the system, often accept a system in practice 
even if it is grossly unfair and illegitimate.74 He therefore locates the shift to protest 
in changes within local financial relations and the political processes that mediated 
these. He argues that the devolution of powers to African community councillors 
and the promotion of township upgrading, whilst demanding that all such 
upgrades be self-financing, led to large increases in service charges and rents amidst 
considerable poverty. This caused the councillors to become seen as a cause of 
urban poverty and therefore their delegitimation in the eyes of their constituents. 
This delegitimation then provided the backdrop within which opposition to 
apartheid policies converged. When the government reacted to protest with 
repression these popular grievances became further politicised and attention shifted 
increasingly upon the need to access central political power.75  
Turning to Cape Town similar themes to those sketched above can be 
identified in studies of apartheid era activism. Coloureds have been incorporated 
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into universal narratives of the struggle as a conflict between blacks and whites with 
Goldin, for example, seeing the boycotts of 1980 representing a turning point as 
coloureds began to see their future as one with Africans. 76 Other studies, which 
have acknowledged the limited support by coloureds, particularly older coloureds, 
for progressive activism, have focused on political opportunities such as: mass 
demoralisation as a result of the forced removals and the removal of the franchise;77 
an historic absence of progressive political organisations; and the limited 
involvement by the coloured population in radicalising labour struggles.78 
Ideological divisions, which are seen to have undermined strong organisation are 
also cited79, as is social conservatism as a result of religious orthodoxy.80 Finally, 
Ineke van Kessel’s more subtle study of Grassroots shows the limited social base of 
activism in the province and how racial and generational divisions influenced 
activism,81 whilst Seekings makes reference to the importance of different group 
areas, experiences and educational systems in hindering the effective building of 
non-racial activism.82 
 
1.5.2. Activism after Apartheid: Decline of the Old, Rise of the 
New (Social Movements) 
Moving into the post-apartheid period work has been done to explain the impact of 
democratisation upon civil society organisations that emerged in opposition to 
apartheid,83 and to examine the growth of new forms of organisation and protest, 
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specifically the New Social Movements (NSMs).84 Like interpretations of apartheid 
era activism many of the themes from broader social movement theory can be 
located within the studies of post-apartheid activism. Studies of the demobilisation 
of existing civil society post-apartheid tend to explain this as a consequence of the 
declining need for civil society organisation due to a changed political context and 
declining access to resources. In contrast, studies of NSMs tend to locate their 
emergence in post-apartheid material concerns.  
A range of scholars have looked at the move away from civil society from 
1990 onwards and have sought to explain it as a result of shifts in the political 
opportunity structure and declining access to resources. Two strands exist within 
this broader framework. The first focuses on the fact that political transition reduced 
the attractiveness of civil society as a mechanism for achieving collective and 
individual goals. Cherry et al, for example, argue that the decline in political society 
is a direct result of the increased faith in political society as people now have new, 
more effective channels, for seeking redress.85  
The second strand of interpretation explicitly rejects the view that people are 
not organising within civil society because of the increased responsiveness of the 
post-apartheid state (i.e. the increased openness of the political system to people’s 
views) and instead locates decline in the closedness of the post-apartheid political 
system and the decline in resources available to civil society. Specifically, it sees the 
decline in activism as a result of explicit political decision making which has sought 
to close down the space for civil society to operate in. This trend is particularly 
prominent amongst those authors who characterise post-apartheid South Africa as a 
neo-liberal state which delivers little for its poorest citizens. Because these authors 
see little real change with the end of apartheid the reason for decline cannot be 
characterised as a result of a conscious choice by people to move away from 
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activism because their goals have been met. Post-apartheid quiescence has, 
therefore, to be a result of either a sort of false consciousness in which people have 
placed undue faith in the ANC and its discourse as a national liberation 
movement,86 or because the ANC dislocated civic leaders from the masses by 
offering them positions, wealth and power and has therefore undermined their 
strength 87 This view also echoes resource mobilisation and framing theories, as at 
its heart is the argument that people were, and still are, ready to protest. They just 
need an appropriate vehicle to lead them and ideology to draw them into action.88  
 Moving from the decline of apartheid era civil society to focus on the 
development of protest and activism outside of the old progressively aligned 
organisations more focus is placed on the relationship between post-apartheid 
material hardship and action, particularly the relationship between service delivery 
and protest. Within the study of NSMs two approaches emerge. The first sees 
participants in NSMs as rational actors, drawn into protest by poor living conditions 
and a calculation of the costs and benefits activism can deliver. As such these 
integrate both structural explanations for hardship with an understanding of the 
role that the broader political context has on action. The second is more simplistic 
and sees NSM activism as a more radical and politicised challenge to the state 
emerging from the clear inequalities and injustices of post-apartheid South Africa.  
 Patrick Bond is one of the more fervent supporters of the view that the 
emergence of NSMs represents a clear and political challenge to an unequal and 
unjust status quo. He argues, for example, that the growth of NSMs represents the 
generation of a ‘coherent ‚independent left‛’ which has emerged from the 
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hardships of post-apartheid South Africa.89  Even amongst authors who 
acknowledge that underlying most social movement activism are day-to-day 
struggles for basic service provision the very fact that people are protesting is seen 
to represent a political challenge to the state. Miraftab and Wills argue that social 
movements of the poor are somehow by their very nature involved in creating a 
citizenship concerned with ‘civil, political, social and economic rights.’90 Gibson 
argues that because these movements concern themselves with basic human needs 
such as land, food and housing they express a ‘new humanism’ and their very 
existence challenges the fact that there is no alternative to capitalist globalisation.91 
Barchiesi also identifies a clear link between poverty and politicised protest. 
Specifically, he sees a link between the poor living conditions and poverty of the 
‘multitude’ of the poor and the development of a challenge to state policies which 
have defined a ‘radical critique’ of the ANC to the left of the ANC and its alliance 
partners.92 
 In contrast to these views stand an increasing number of studies that locate 
the new forms of activism within the more complex motivations of poor people 
struggling for everyday survival and challenge the idea of a coherent underclass 
reacting to the hardships of modern day South Africa. In this respect the work of 
Oldfield is particularly significant as it shows how local movements can often be 
exclusionary and unjust. For example she studies the ‘door kickers’, who illegally 
occupied houses intended for other (equally poor) people and mobilised to keep 
themselves in the houses and others out. 93 Similarly others, such as Egan and Wafer 
and Ballard et al have pointed out that there is no core narrative running 
throughout protests that are in many ways driven by local and particularistic 
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goals.94 A key division, therefore, exists within studies of post-apartheid protest, 
which mirrors the division within studies of apartheid era activism. Was this action 
unified, political and purposeful and driven by a coherent social group universally 
suffering hardship, or was it driven by more complex and overlapping identities 
and structural cleavages beyond the control of activists and ideologies?  
Finally, it is worth noting that whilst interpretations of post-apartheid 
transformation differ, almost all maintain agreement that the post-apartheid period 
differs qualitatively from the apartheid period. Radical critiques of the ANC tend to 
locate this difference in the adoption of GEAR by the ANC government in 1996 
which both created protest by including, amongst other things, a movement 
towards cost recovery for service provision and sheared the bond between the poor 
and the ANC. Desai for example argues that it was the adoption of cost recovery 
policies by the government that drove conflict and created repression.95 Similarly, 
Dwyer sees a direct correlation between the adoption of GEAR and protest: 
Ultimately, the major cause of tension between the government, labour, and people 
in organisations like the CCF [an NSM in Durban], is linked to GEAR and the 
consequences of GEAR policies on the life of CCF participants.96 
 
Interestingly, this distinction even emerges amongst more subtle interpretations of 
post-apartheid transformation. By locating post-apartheid quiescence within faith in 
political society Cherry et al explicitly link civil society decline to national and local 
political change. Similarly, whilst Oldfield recognises the complex local dynamics 
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that drive activism these are seen to be exclusively the result of the interaction 
between local communities and post-apartheid state forms.97 
 
1.6. Towards a Theorised Understanding of South 
African Activism: Race, Class and Rationality 
 
The discussion so far has highlighted the key themes in explanations of activism in 
South Africa and collective action more generally. Studies of South Africa have 
revealed the importance of political opportunities, resources and ideas in the 
emergence and evolution of activism.  They have also revealed differing views of 
the relationship between structure and agency. Put simply, there exists a division 
between those studies which see protest as an almost inevitable response to material 
hardship and political inequality, and those that seek to provide a more nuanced 
view of the relationship between structural cleavages and political action, located in 
local conditions. Interestingly, however, especially given the importance of class as 
an analytical category in South African economics and historiography, the 
theoretical treatment of the relationship between class and action, particularly under 
apartheid, has remained relatively underdeveloped. Specifically, whilst a consistent 
theme in many explanations of activism has been to reject simple explanations of 
struggle based purely on race or class, less work has been done to consider how the 
activism emerging from the complex social milieu identified at the local level relate 
to the broader functioning of the apartheid political economy and its accompanying 
class structure. As this thesis progresses this will be seen to be a particular omission, 
as involvement (and lack of involvement) in activism in both Guguletu and 
Bonteheuwel will be shown to have been heavily conditioned by people’s position 
within the political economy. Furthermore, this relationship to the political economy 
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will be seen to have been located within identifiable structural cleavages, albeit 
more complex cleavages than those suggested in simplistic race and class 
interpretations of struggle. 
The remainder of this chapter, therefore, will seek to develop a framework 
that will allow local reactions to material deprivation and political discrimination to 
be considered in relation to the broader context of the structural cleavages within 
the apartheid and post-apartheid political economy. It will start by discussing 
existing understandings of class in South Africa, including the relationship between 
race and class, and their use in current explanations of activism. It will then discuss 
theories that highlight the importance of consumption and moral economy in 
explaining action, using these to address some of the weaknesses in using 
traditional class analysis to understand South Africa. Finally, it will conclude by 
drawing together these class theories with theories highlighting the broader 
opportunity and resource context, to provide an explanatory framework which will 
be considered throughout the thesis. 
  
1.6.1. Class in South African Scholarship 
The class structure of apartheid society has received considerable attention in 
academic discussion, and there have also been studies of how this has transformed 
post-apartheid. However, studies of activism have not consistently considered the 
outcomes of these debates in their explanatory frameworks. 
Class has a long pedigree as an analytical category through which to 
understand the nature of apartheid. During the 1970s the opposing concepts of race 
and class formed the polls around which academics and activists congregated in 
attempting to explain the nature of South Africa’s social, economic and political 
milieu. Focusing upon the relationship between apartheid labour policies and the 
country’s economic growth a range of scholars sought to show that apartheid policy 





stunted economic growth or a central element, via the creation of a ‘cheap labour 
supply’, in capitalist accumulation.  
Early interpretations of apartheid from what was to become crudely known 
as the ‘liberal’ camp pointed to the fact that apartheid, by placing restrictions upon 
the free movement of labour, inhibiting people’s occupational mobility in terms of 
their race rather than their ability, and restricting the opportunities for skills 
acquisition by a predominantly migrant African workforce, increased the cost of 
labour, created skills shortages and ultimately damaged South Africa’s economy.98  
However, faced with South Africa’s rapid economic growth in the 1960s, 
which it was argued was second only in the world to Japan, a group of scholars 
writing primarily from a Marxist perspective began to question the dysfunctionality 
of apartheid for capitalist growth.  Whilst different nuances emerged within this 
‘radical’ camp their core focus was the fact that because apartheid laws forced 
Africans into migratory, semi-rural, existences in which urban employment and 
residence was temporary, many of the cost of the reproduction of labour were 
displaced to the rural homelands. In this way much of the cost of reproducing the 
labour force was displaced from wages within the urban capital economy onto rural 
agricultural production and rural African social structures. This allowed capitalists 
to pay lower wages and these low wages formed the basis upon which South 
Africa’s economic explosion in the 1960s was based.99 
Interestingly, however, whilst the Marxists and liberals took opposing 
positions in terms of the function of apartheid, in many ways their interpretations 
led to similar treatments of social differentiation within the African population. For 
liberals Africans were oppressed because they were African, whilst for the radicals 
Africans were oppressed because of their centrality in the capitalist mode of 
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production. However, in both cases all Africans were seen to experience the same 
forms of oppression and few early liberals or revisionists questioned whether racial 
or class exploitation actually impacted differently on different sections of the black 
population. 
Ultimately, the caricatured liberal and radical positions represented two 
ideal extremes and as such increasingly came under attack from the realities of 
apartheid in action. The fact that restrictions on the free market did not stunt 
economic growth and the fact that concessions were made by apartheid ideologues 
to economic realities eroded the viability of the pure liberal argument.100 Similarly, 
the over simplistic understanding of apartheid as the handmaiden of capital fell 
down in the face of the constraints placed on economic growth by increasing skills 
shortages – in part a result of job reservation and influx control policies – as the 
apartheid economy moved into the late 1970s. In the light of these transformations 
more nuanced understandings developed regarding the purpose of apartheid and 
its relationship to race, class and capital. 
It was realised that by focusing almost exclusively upon the migrant labour 
system and the removal of urban residence rights from Africans interpretations of 
apartheid oversimplified the position of Africans within South Africa’s political 
economy. As Rich pointed out with regards to discriminatory policies in the 1910s 
and ‘20s, liberals tended not to investigate the consequences of racial discrimination 
on the ground, instead focusing simply upon its lack of economic logic. Similarly, 
radicals, by focusing upon the use of the reserves as centres for political control and 
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the reproduction of cheap labour, failed to elaborate the position of Africans within 
the white areas and economy beyond their role as migrants.101  
The role of urban Africans was therefore increasingly examined and it 
became clear that apartheid legislation created considerable differentiation not only 
between racial groups, but also within them. Whilst apartheid classified all Africans 
as temporary residents, in its implementation it actually created two legally distinct 
classes of urban Africans. Influx control legislation made an explicit distinction 
between temporary migrants who could only remain in the urban areas for more 
than 72 hours if they were in employment, and Africans who, because they were 
born within the urban areas, had worked there for an extended period of time, or 
through marriage, were allowed to remain in the cities indefinitely with or without 
employment. Drawing upon these distinctions led Hindson to argue that rather 
than simply creating a cheap labour force apartheid was best understood as 
reproducing not one, but two African labour forces: a temporary migrant 
population, predominantly working in unskilled occupations and paid low wages 
subsidised by agricultural production, and a proletarianised urban population 
which was reproduced purely within the context of the capitalist economy.102 
Furthermore, he argued that these urbanised Africans gained preferential access to 
state services such as housing and to both employment in general and more skilled 
occupations in particular.103 
Deborah Posel pointed out problems within Hindson’s simple urban-
migrant dichotomy by showing how a whole range of factors such as age, 
education, gender, ethnicity, social capital, language and employer preferences all 
impacted upon Africans’ positions within the labour market.104 However, in doing 
so she did not so much reject the importance of apartheid influx control legislation, 
as demand that the mediating role of other factors be considered. For example, she 
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showed how employers refrained from employing young urban Africans because 
they were felt to be cheeky and workshy, preferring instead migrant labourers who 
would work harder for lower wages. However, in explaining this her analysis 
returns to the fact that migrant labourers, due to their need for employment in order 
to access the cities, were willing to do almost any job, whilst urbanised Africans 
were happy to remain unemployed or give up jobs with poor pay and conditions as 
to do so would not see their removal to the rural areas.105 
 Whilst apartheid created divisions between people classified as members of 
the same racial group it also created divisions between people of different racial 
groups. The economic and political superiority of whites, as guaranteed by 
legislation, is the most stark and well known example of this. However, between 
whites and Africans sat those South Africans classified as Indian and coloured. The 
contours of coloureds’ positions within apartheid’s political economy will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter two. However, it is worth noting that many of 
the legislative controls on Africans, such as influx control, did not apply to 
coloureds and Indians. Similarly, whilst prevented from entering many occupations 
by discriminatory legislation, coloureds and Indians were permitted access to a 
greater range of jobs than Africans and were allowed, albeit in segregated group 
areas, permanent rights of residence within the cities.  
 Interestingly, whilst attempts to identify the class structure of the South 
African economy were central to radical scholarship, attempts to relate class and the 
divisions within the black communities to political action within South Africa are 
less apparent. Wolpe and Legassick, in their re-evaluation of the cheap labour thesis 
do note that the divisions between the urban and rural areas hold within them the 
possibility of growing division within the black working class and relate this to 
conflicts that emerged between township youths and migrants during the 1976 
uprising,106 a position that was later shared by Ruth First. 107 Similarly, Seekings 
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argues that during the unrest of the mid-1980s choices over tactics and approaches 
to struggle often coincided with educational divisions within the youth.108 Goldin’s 
study of coloured identity also noted how the articulation of a coloured identity 
represented a move by coloureds to maintain their economic positions in reaction to 
growing African immigration into the Cape around the turn of the twentieth 
century. However, he concludes that by the 1980s this coloured identity had 
evaporated as a political force as coloureds had come to see their future as 
intimately linked to that of Africans.109 
Whilst noting the fact that class cleavages within the black population had 
the potential to influence responses to apartheid, the overall interaction between 
class, race and social action has remained relatively untheorised. Indeed, as seen 
earlier, explanations of political identities in South Africa tend to use descriptive 
concepts such as youth, student and race and where class is used as it tends to be 
conflated with race. This is not particularly surprising in a society where labour 
market and productive relations were cut across by state maintained racial 
discrimination. In South Africa an individual’s class position, insofar as this meant 
that they owned the means of production or produced surplus value for a capitalist, 
had far less impact upon their life chances and experiences than the racial group 
stamped in their pass book. Consequently, focusing upon class in its Marxist 
incarnation offered little explanatory power.110 
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1.6.2. Class, Citizenship, Consumption and Education 
Whilst class as traditionally formulated cannot provide an overall explanation for 
action and identity in South Africa the central argument of this thesis is that there 
are clear links between peoples’ positions within the political economy, their 
identities and how they perceive their interests. Race may have played a key role in 
defining peoples’ life chances, yet as Hindson and Posel have shown, apartheid 
discrimination was not experienced uniformly within races. Similarly, young black 
South Africans may have suffered greater exposure to unemployment than their 
parents, but this exposure was not the same for all youth. Indeed, as will be seen in 
chapter two, as grand apartheid collapsed opportunities expanded for certain 
sections of the black population, in spite of growing unemployment and recession. 
This thesis will therefore show that whilst class alone cannot be seen to be 
the only determinant of activism in Cape Town, socio-economic relations are crucial 
in explaining collective action. As Edna Bonacich argues, whilst many societies have 
marked ethnic and race divisions, these divisions do not reflect deeper ‘primordial 
identities.’ Instead, these racial divisions and the decision to mobilise on national, as 
opposed to class grounds, are intimately linked to the interests of the different 
classes within the separate racial groups.111 Bonacich’s key focus in South Africa is 
the pact between the imperial (i.e. white) bourgeoisie and imperial (white) 
proletariat in the exploitation of the colonised (black) proletariat in which they both 
benefited.112 However, whilst accepting that in South Africa the proletariat was split 
in terms of race between black and white and the differential interests these groups 
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had, this thesis will argue that a full understanding of the apartheid class structure 
needs to move beyond a black and white understanding of race and class to 
understand how apartheid policy and the differential impact of discrimination 
within and between the black population groups led to a range of different 
proletariats which were integrated into relations with the state, and each other. In 
doing this, this thesis draws on sociological theory which points to the importance 
of peoples’ positions within the state’s distributional networks (citizenship), their 
experience of social mobility and the impact of racial policies in inhibiting or 
promoting that mobility (trajectory) and the impact of historical experience on 
expectations (moral economy). 
As a result of the growth of new forms of political mobilisation in post-
industrial Europe from the mid-1960s (such as the growth of gender, race and 
student based social movements) alongside the decline of traditional class based 
organisations (such as political parties and trade unions) the centrality of class as 
defined at the point of production in explaining collective action has increasingly 
been reconsidered. Furthermore it has also been shown that class was not always 
the pre-eminent cleavage even in industrial societies. For example, in his excellent 
study of protest in 19th century Paris Gould shows how, in spite of the 
predominance of class based discourse, the participants in the Paris commune of 
1871 came from a wide range of occupations and it was an identity based in 
geographical proximity and urbanisation which united them, not their class 
positions.113The recognition that class was not the only, or even the main, 
determinant of behaviour led to a range of studies which sought to reassess the 
relationships between class and social action. There is little space to investigate the 
full range of views here. However, two important aspects of this reassessment have 
particular relevance for South Africa. 
                                                   






The first development was the growing recognition that people’s life chances 
were not simply defined by their occupation, but also by their relationship to, and 
the actions of, the nation state. In the context of the developed world the growth of 
new political identities and social movements expressing these identities was often 
located in the post-war growth in welfare provision and the role that the minimum 
standard of living this guaranteed had in reducing class conflict and allowing 
people to concentrate on interests beyond the workplace. Writing from a post-
Marxist position, Resnick and Wolff make the point that whilst production creates 
wealth, much of this wealth is transferred from capital to groups who do not 
themselves own the means of production. In order to understand social 
stratification it becomes necessary, therefore, to also consider these ‘subsumed’ 
capital flows and the ways in which they benefit and disadvantage people.114 
Furthermore, with the growth of welfare states since the second world war it has 
been realised that many people owe their livelihoods not to their ability to produce 
and earn but to their rights to access state provided income and services and that 
many people in the west – such as the unemployed and low paid – would be unable 
to provide their existing standard of living without state help.115  
Recognising the importance of state intervention – or citizenship benefits – in 
securing people’s livelihoods has been mirrored by a focus upon the social 
cleavages thus created. The idea of ‘transfer classes’ as groups who are defined by 
their position as recipients of state transfers rather than through their relationship to 
either production or the labour market has been put forward. Even amongst those 
in employment it has been suggested that state provision creates divisions and 
different interests. Focusing upon the growing withdrawal of the British state from 
welfare provision Saunders argued that rather than class being the main 
determinant of inequality in the UK, it was one’s dependence upon state services, or 
position within relationships of consumption, that was significant. Specifically, he 
                                                   
114 Resnick, S A, & Wolff, R D, Knowledge and Class, (Chicago & London, 1987) 
115 Sitton, J F, Recent Marxian Theory: Class Formation and Social Conflict in Contemporary 





claimed that those who could provide privately for their own needs were privileged 
in comparison to those who had to rely on state services and that this privilege was 
such that it created structural divisions which in turn accounted for political 
behaviour.116 
Whilst the extent to which these ‘consumption’ cleavages structure social 
action has been questioned, the recognition that state provision can structure group 
action and identity cannot be easily dismissed.117 Indeed, the importance of state 
welfare services and their impact on collective identities is well represented in the 
literature on South Africa’s white working class. This shows how preferential state 
treatment lay at the heart of the compact between the white working class and 
capital and the corresponding quiescence of white labour.118 However, despite the 
recognition of state welfare intervention in black communities its impact on 
collective identity has remained relatively unexplored, despite differential responses 
within the black population to political activism. 
The second important modification of class analysis is located in the growing 
understanding that even if one accepts that workplace relations are crucial to 
explaining identity, it is difficult to reduce experiences of the workplace to one’s 
current position within the labour market. This has two dimensions. Firstly, there is 
the need to recognise the potential for social mobility within the workplace. 
Secondly, there is a need to consider the life trajectories of people alongside their 
workplace position. 
Regarding social mobility, it has been argued that for many class position is 
not permanent and class identities are consequently mediated by future 
expectations. An individual may be in a working class occupation but if he believes, 
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and the workplace structure provides the possibility, that in future he will enter a 
different occupation he is in a very different position to an unskilled worker who 
has little likelihood of advancement. This has always been considered in Weberian 
class analysis, which considers the importance of education and skills in defining 
class, as education is often seen as the most important determinant of social 
mobility. However, other factors are also significant in this respect, such as mastery 
of the correct cultural codes necessary for certain occupations.119 
Regarding life trajectories, it has been noted that people’s perceptions of 
their current situation are often structured by the historical development of that 
situation. Whilst the son of a manual labourer may experience appointment as a 
clerk positively, the son of a teacher or lawyer may experience this negatively. 
Similar dynamics also need consideration beyond the workplace. For example, a 
poor rural South African may experience the provision of a small one roomed house 
as positive, whilst a wealthy South African who has to move to a similar house due 
to changed circumstances would most likely experience this negatively. 
Consequently it has been recognised that two individuals in the same social class 
may have very different identities and attitudes which are not deducible simply 
from their class positions.120  
Particularly valuable in this regard is the development of the concept of 
‘moral economy.’ Rather than simply arguing that people respond to economic 
factors, theories of moral economy argue that such factors are mediated through the 
existence of shared beliefs and values. Writing about the emergence of riots in the 
18th century England Thompson claims that rather than simply relating riots to 
hardship in a form of ‘crass economic reductionism’ they instead need to be 
understood through examining their ‘legitimizing notion’ or morality. He goes on to 
say: 
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By the notion of legitimation I mean that the men and women in the crowd were 
informed by the belief that they were defending traditional rights or customs; and, 
in general, that they were supported by the wider consensus of the community. On 
occasion this popular consensus was endorsed by some measure of licence afforded 
by the authorities. More commonly, the consensus was so strong it overrode motives 
of fear or deference.121 
 
However, a moral economy does not exist in isolation from economic factors, 
but can be intimately linked to them. In his study of peasant protest in South East 
Asia Scott shows how people’s expectations of, and reactions to, landlords, 
including their propensity to riot,  were closely related to the historical nature of 
crop production in different areas which shaped people’s views of how landlords 
should behave.122 Understanding that historically developed value systems rooted 
in processes of class formation have an impact in conditioning reactions to current 
transformations shows again that whilst class needs to be reconsidered as a uniform 
causal factor, broader structural factors are crucial in influencing the development 
of a shared beliefs and values, as well as providing the context in which such values 
form the basis of mobilisation. 
If the link between structure and agency cannot simply be reduced to a 
mechanistic link between productive relations and action then how is it best to be 
understood? Pierre Bourdieu provides an interesting view. Rather than simply 
defining individuals’ social position by their relationship to the means of production 
he instead deploys the concept of a three dimensional space that he calls the social 
field.  Position in this field is defined by ownership of different sorts of capital (as 
outlined by Bourdieu). For example, he makes a distinction between economic 
capital (money) and cultural capital (predominantly education).People with large 
amounts of economic or cultural capital are middle class, yet because of their 
different forms of capital they are in different positions in the social field, and 
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represent different class fractions.123 In turn, proximity within the social field 
represents people with similar life experiences and social relations and this forms 
the basis for identifying social groups: 
[As] sets of agents who occupy similar positions and who, being placed in similar 
conditions and subjected to similar conditionings, have every likelihood of having 
similar dispositions and interests and therefore of producing similar practices and 
adopting similar stances.124 
 
Gould echoes this looser definition of interest groups as people with common 
experiences and positions in his work on France. For example, he notes that whilst it 
was geography not class which formed the common identity behind the Commune 
this political identity drew its strength from the fact that people experienced a 
similar set of social relations as a result of their shared physical location. It was this 
shared experience which in turn made the political identity articulated effective.125  
 
1.6.3. Race, Class and Collective Action in a South African 
City 
Accepting a looser definition of class allows for an integration of social class as 
traditionally defined with the other social cleavages outlined above, namely those 
based around citizenship and trajectories, and their articulation within different 
moral economies. The central argument presented herein is that the interests and 
identities of people in the two communities under investigation were heavily 
informed by the different ways they were integrated into the apartheid political 
economy in terms of their class, their rights derived from citizenship (i.e. what the 
state did and did not provide) and their life trajectories, both actual and potential 
(i.e. their experiences of, and potential for, social mobility).  
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The different position of people within the apartheid political economy led 
to very different identities and interests within and between the black population 
groups which influenced action. Coloured South Africans received some citizenship 
benefits in the form of housing provision and welfare payments. They were also 
privileged in the labour market relative to Africans. However, they were also 
disadvantaged in comparison to white South Africans. For those coloureds with 
high levels of education the artificial ceiling on advancement saw an increasingly 
realisation that apartheid was restricting their potential for personal advancement. 
In contrast, for coloureds that relied on citizenship benefits such as welfare 
payments, and were employed in jobs in which they were protected from 
competition by discrimination against Africans, a more ambiguous relationship 
with apartheid emerged. Similar dynamics also emerged within the African 
communities. Older Africans with urban residence rights had little formal 
education, were protected from competition for employment by migrant labourers 
and had limited access to welfare transfers, most notably housing. In contrast, 
younger Africans were increasingly well educated and experienced an even more 
severe ceiling on advancement than coloureds. This led to a strong opposition to 
apartheid amongst young urban Africans and more general quiescence amongst the 
older African generation. These cleavages were reflected in the social base of 
activism in the Western Cape. Older residents, both African and coloured, were 
involved in activism only in exceptional circumstances. In contrast it was a young, 
educated, elite that drove protest throughout this period.  
However, these social cleavages alone cannot explain why activism occurred 
at some times and not others. To understand this it is also necessary to understand 
the broader political opportunities and resource context. The interests and identities 
set by apartheid interacted with the broader resource and political opportunity 
context, and this  set limits to and defined the ways in which these interests were 





It is also important to recognise that because quiescence relied not only on 
violence and repression, but also an acceptance of the benefits of the apartheid 
distributional structure, moral economies emerged to accompany quiescence. 
Poorer coloureds came to see themselves as more deserving than Africans and came 
to conceptualise their interests as opposed to those of Africans. Similarly, urban 
Africans developed identities that placed themselves above migrants and squatters 
from the Eastern Cape in a mirroring of apartheid discrimination. These moral 
economies then acted to reinforce distinctions derived from the underlying social 
structure as coloureds refused to support Africans and Africans turned against 
squatters more often than they did the state. Moving into the post-apartheid period 
these collective identities continue to have considerable salience. Post-apartheid 
protests have rarely emerged in response to a lack of provision; instead they have 
emerged because of what people see as unfair provision. Interestingly, the criteria 
used to judge fairness are a mixture of apartheid-era distinctions based on 
insider/outsider cleavages and new identities that have coalesced in similar ways 
around post-apartheid distributive mechanisms, such as council ward boundaries, 
as it appears that shifting patterns of distribution are slowly remaking the apartheid 
social field. 
 
1.7. Thesis Structure 
 
This thesis comprises of eight chapters. As is already clear chapter one 
introduces the central arguments and cases, reviews current literature and 
sketches the methodology used.  
Chapter two comprises of a predominantly quantitative analysis of 
the changing nature of distribution between Africans and coloureds in the 
Western Cape within both the labour market and by the state (in welfare and 





communities in Cape Town which are later shown to correspond to differing 
responses to discrimination. It shows how under apartheid poorer and less 
skilled coloureds did receive benefits from their position within apartheid’s 
discriminatory hierarchy, but that these benefits became increasingly eroded 
from the mid-1980s. In contrast it demonstrates that better educated 
coloureds experienced an artificial ceiling on advancement under apartheid 
which has slowly disintegrated with its abolition. With regards to the city’s 
African population it shows how educated Africans were subject to a similar 
artificial ceiling to coloureds, which also eroded as state policy deracialised. 
It also reveals the complex relationship between poorer Africans and the 
state, which led people to receive some benefits from their urban insider 
status under apartheid. Post-apartheid, however, the erosion of these limited 
benefits is seen to have been more offset by the broader deracialisation of 
service provision. 
 The thesis then discusses and explains activism chronologically in 
the two case studies between 1976 and 2006. Chapter three deals with the 
unrest of 1976. It shows how in Cape Town 1976 was a reaction to an 
opening of political space caused by the outbreak of unrest in Soweto that 
resonated amongst the city’s student population. However, it remained at 
heart a student movement driven by collective experiences within the 
schoolyard that did not chime with broader black society which was 
integrated into relationships with apartheid that discouraged protest. 
 Chapter four is crucial in underpinning one of the central views of 
this thesis – that whilst political opportunities are important for action, in the 
absence of widely felt structural contradictions action cannot emerge simply 
because there is political space. Specifically, it shows how during the early 
1980s activists, particularly in the coloured communities, put considerable 
efforts into building organisation and providing space for people to 





structural grievances these activists were unable sustain organisation and 
activism and whilst the public displays of support for progressive 
organisations during this time were impressive, the depth of this support 
was limited.  
Chapter five then examines the unrest period of 1985/6. It locates the 
emergence of protest within a similar dynamic to that of 1976 – the opening 
of political space as a result of protest elsewhere. However, unlike 1976 
growing recession is shown to have created a two tier response. Young 
educated blacks, both coloured and African, became drawn into protest 
because of the continued restrictions placed on their advancement within the 
labour market. However, less educated youths were also drawn into revolt 
as even the limited opportunities offered by apartheid began to collapse with 
economic recession and mass unemployment. 
Chapter six then examines the transition from apartheid between 
1988 and 1994. It looks specifically at how different groups reacted to this 
transition – African students, civic associations, the radical youth, coloured 
activists and the coloured population more generally. It shows how class 
cleavages that had conditioned different responses during the struggle 
against apartheid conditioned differing responses to the opening of political 
space that accompanied the unbanning of the African political movements 
and how these different reactions reflected not only the new political 
opportunities but also more deep rooted class interests. 
Chapter seven looks at activism post-apartheid and shows how 
continuity and change within local distributional relationships have 
continued to define popular reactions to the state and politicians. It shows 
how coloured support for the National Party, the previous party of 
apartheid, depends not on simple racism but the impact that deracialisation 
has had on the distribution of scarce resources and the intersection of this 





the African communities relies upon the way in which the political system 
allows for the distribution of resources on the grounds of political loyalty. 
The thesis concludes with chapter eight that draws together the key themes, 





Chapter Two  
Apartheid Policy, Structural Transformation 
and the Shifting Contours of Differential 
Discrimination (1948 to 2006) 
 
2.1. Introduction: Race and Class in South Africa 
 
The central plank of National Party (NP) policy when it won the 1948 election was 
racial separateness, or ‘apartheid’. Over the next two decades legislation was 
introduced transforming this loosely defined concept into a system of regulation in 
which someone’s racial group, as defined through legislation, became central to 
their life chances and choices. This included regulating where people could live, 
who they could marry, what jobs they could do and for what wage.  
Two interpretations dominated early discussions of the purpose of apartheid 
which can be crudely defined as the ‘race’ and ‘class’ positions. Race interpretations 
saw apartheid as a system of racial privilege which restricted the free market and 
damaged economic growth.1 Conversely, class positions saw apartheid as beneficial 
(if not vital) to the growth of capitalism in the country as a result of the downward 
pressure coercion and the migrant labour system placed on wages.2 
However, neither the pure race or class interpretations provided a complete 
explanation of the functioning of apartheid. The interpretation of apartheid as a 
cheap labour system homogenised the African experience and did not investigate 
                                                   
1 Horwitz, R, The Political Economy of South Africa, (London, 1967); Houghton, D H, The South 
African Economy, (London & N.Y., 1967) 
2 Wolpe, H, „Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power: From Segregation to Apartheid‟, Economy 
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internal differentiation which emerged from the right of some, but not all, Africans 
to reside in the cities on a semi-permanent basis.3 These texts were also quiet on the 
position of coloured and Indian South Africans who were granted an intermediate 
status under apartheid. 
Consequently re-evaluations of the relationship between race and class, and 
between racial exploitation and discrimination began to emerge. During the mid 
1970s several studies investigated the position of coloureds and how they benefited 
and suffered from discriminatory legislation.4 However, possibly because of the 
radicalisation of scholarship following the Soweto uprisings and the fact that some 
studies suggested coloureds were receiving benefits from their position under 
apartheid little research in this field was subsequently produced.5 The position of 
Africans was also re-examined. Hindson showed how apartheid, despite its rhetoric, 
actually produced an African working class highly differentiated by its access to 
urban labour markets.6 Posel added further weight to the view of apartheid as a 
complex system of intertwined relations, rather than a dichotomous system of race 
discrimination, when she showed how the final shape of apartheid was actually the 
outcome of considerable conflict in which resistance by Africans and employers was 
as significant as any apartheid grand plan.7 
Acknowledging that under apartheid race and class were not codetermining 
and that apartheid institutionalised cleavages within as well as between racial 
groups leads to two questions. Firstly, how were different non-white groups 
disadvantaged and advantaged under apartheid? Secondly, how did the ending of 
                                                   
3 Hindson, D, Pass Controls and the Urban African Proletariat, (Johannesburg, 1987) 
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Occupational and Social Change Among Coloured People in South Africa: Proceedings of a 
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apartheid impact upon these non-white South groups?  In line with the focus of this 
thesis, this chapter seeks to answer these questions for Africans and coloureds living 
in the Western Cape by examining changing state policy and its interaction with 
economic transformation between 1948 and 2006 in the two key areas of welfare 
provision and the labour market. 
Through its analysis it builds up a picture of ‘differential discrimination’ 
operating along three axes. Firstly, race played a key role in determining people’s 
access to the labour market and citizenship benefits, such as welfare. Whites got 
more than coloureds, who got more than Africans. Secondly, whilst apartheid was 
predicated upon racial classification Africans with the right to remain semi-
permanently in the cities had greater access to the labour market and welfare than 
Africans resident in the homelands who could only work in the cities as migrant 
labourers. Finally, the impact of racial discrimination was also mediated by class 
and educational cleavages. To present a simplified picture, the ordering of people 
by race, rather than ability, meant that for black South Africans who were most 
educated and most able apartheid created a ceiling beyond which they could not 
advance, as to do so would lead them into competition with the less educated and 
less able members of the racial group above them. Conversely, for blacks who were 
the least educated or lacking skills, apartheid functioned to protect them from 
competition from those classified below them. 
Post-apartheid the removal of racially discriminatory legislation has 
unsurprisingly seen a shift from race to class as the basis for distribution. The 
impact of this has been to remove the ceilings at the top and bottom of apartheid’s 
race categories. This has seen blacks with skills and education experience rapidly 
rising standards of living as the ceilings have been removed, but it has also seen 
negative impacts amongst those blacks who were protected by apartheid 
discrimination. 
 To demonstrate these arguments this chapter starts by examining the nature 





Western Cape Africans and coloureds within the labour market since the 1970s and 
finishes with a discussion of how the distribution of state transfers in terms of 
housing and welfare grants has changed. A range of primary and secondary sources 
have been used to develop the analysis in the chapter. For more details on the 
methodology and strengths and weaknesses of these sources see appendix A. 
 
2.2. Restrictions, Reform and Abolition: The 
Changing Contours of Racial Policy in South Africa 
1948-2006 
 
In 1948 the National Party did not have a clear plan of how to implement apartheid. 
However, by the late 1950s legislation had been introduced which had created one 
of the most racially segregated states in the world. Central to apartheid was the 
physical segregation of individuals and the differential granting of rights on the 
basis of race. In 1950 the government passed the Population Registration Act which 
provided for the classification of all South Africans into 1 of 4 racial groups: whites, 
Indians, Africans and coloureds. In the same year the Group Areas Act (GAA) was 
also passed, supplemented in 1955 by the Group Areas Development Act. These 
divided South Africa into racially exclusive spaces for occupation by the different 
population groups and allowed for the expropriation of land and forced removal of 
individuals to make this possible. This racial patterning of physical space was 
crucial for apartheid as it would have been impossible to implement many of 
apartheid’s broader policies, such as segregated services, if communities were 
racially integrated.8  
Whilst the GAA had the potential to apply to Africans, African urban 
residency was controlled by other legislation which built on policy predating the 
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Second World War. In 1921 Colonel Stallard summed up the government’s position 
on urban Africans, which was also to form a central plank of apartheid thinking: 
The native should only be allowed to enter the urban areas, that are essentially the 
White Man’s creation, when he is willing to enter and to minister to the needs of the 
White man and should depart therefrom when he ceases to minister.9 
 
Before 1948 this policy had been pursued by the provision of rural reserves for 
Africans and had been only partially enforced. However, in power the NP 
transformed the reserves through their homelands policy. This policy stipulated 
that the reserves were to become ethnically defined self-governing territories and all 
Africans were to become citizens not of South Africa, but of their designated 
homeland. Conversely, all Africans in white South Africa were to become 
temporary, without permanent residency rights.  
In 1955 the government expanded the 1945 Native (Urban Areas) 
Consolidation Act to African women, bringing all Africans under the pass system. 
This linked the right to reside in towns directly to employment and was policed by a 
system of passes, the possession of which was necessary to avoid removal to the 
rural areas. Africans were also denied the right to own property outside the 
homelands. Consequently, until the late 1970s, nearly all urban African housing was 
provided by the state and African areas were under the direct administration of 
local agencies of the central state.10 
 Apartheid also restated racial divisions within the labour market. Job 
reservation and the ‘colour bar’, which reserved specific occupations for whites, had 
been challenged during the boom years of the Second World War. However once in 
power the NP reaffirmed its commitment to these policies and issued a series of job 
reservation determinations in the manufacturing industry. At the same time laws 
such as the 1953 Industrial Conciliation Act were introduced. This made strikes by 
                                                   
9 Cited in Western, J, Outcast Cape Town...,, p.290 
10 McCarthy, J, „Local and Regional Government: from Rigidity to crisis to flux‟, in (ed.) Smith, D M, 






Africans illegal and limited their workplace representation to works councils, rather 
than trade unions. 
Although apartheid ensured the predominance of whites within South 
Africa’s political and economic life, legislation also differentiated within and 
between South Africa’s black groups. Unlike Africans, coloureds and Indians were 
recognised as permanent urban dwellers and were not subject to the same 
restrictions in the urban areas. They were also allowed to move freely and own 
property, although only within those areas defined by the GAA. Coloureds and 
Indians could also occupy higher positions within the labour market than Africans, 
were allowed to organise in trade unions and were granted, albeit at a lower level 
than whites, access to resources such as pensions and welfare grants. Spending on 
coloured and Indian education was higher than on Africans, although lower than 
whites.11 
Apartheid also discriminated within non-white groups, specifically the 
African population. Whilst all Africans were considered temporary urban residents, 
in practice legislation created clear distinctions between urban insiders and 
outsiders. Under section 10 of the 1945 Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 
Africans were granted rights to permanent urban residence in certain circumstances. 
These became known as section 10 rights. These rights allowed for permanent 
residence in urban areas for people who: a) had lived in a specific urban area since 
birth; b) had worked continuously in the urban area for one employer for 10 years, 
or several employers for 15 years; and c) the wives or children under 18 of those 
qualifying under a) and b). All other Africans’ rights to urban residence were 
heavily curtailed. Those working as migrant labourers were granted section 10 (d) 
rights. This permitted them to remain in the urban areas only for as long as they 
were employed and their families were not permitted to reside with them. All other 
Africans were only allowed to be in the urban areas for 72 hours at a time. Those 
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caught overstaying this period were liable to arrest, fines and forced relocation to 
the homelands. 12 
 Finally, whilst apartheid applied throughout South Africa, it was within the 
Western Cape that racial hierarchy found its strictest legislative embodiment. As the 
only region where Africans were a minority the Western Cape was designated an 
area of coloured preference. In 1955 the secretary of Native Affairs, Eiselen, outlined 
the aims of this policy:  
Briefly and concisely put our native policy regarding the Western Province aims 
ultimately at eliminating natives from this region.13  
 
The Coloured Labour Preference Policy (CLPP) was adopted in 1955. All businesses 
in an area to the west of what became known as the Eiselen Line were forbidden 
from employing Africans unless they could show it was impossible to secure 
coloured labour for the position. Simultaneously, it was decided no further housing 
was to be built for Africans and their numbers were to be periodically reduced, until 
they were removed entirely from the area.14 
During the 1950s and 1960s the South African state put in place a framework 
of discrimination that became known as ‘grand apartheid.’ From the mid 1970s this 
‘grand apartheid’ was increasingly challenged by first economic, and later political, 
dynamics. From 1973 economic growth began to stall. Whilst recession was linked 
to global factors such as the oil crisis, apartheid itself was beginning to impact 
negatively. Policies capping the occupational and educational advancement of non-
whites caused a growing skills shortage, leading to capital intensification and an 
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increasing reliance upon semi-skilled workers and machine operators, rather than 
skilled (white) artisans assisted by unskilled (black) labourers. This limited the 
efficiency of capital whilst the collapse in demand for unskilled labour led to 
growing black unemployment and an artificial suppression of internal demand.15 As 
the economy began to struggle the government also faced a resurgence of black 
political opposition following the 1976 Soweto riots. By the mid-1980s politically 
motivated stayaways, boycotts and unrest had become commonplace. 
In response to these changes apartheid policy began to be reformed. In the 
economy the government relaxed labour market restrictions and sought to tackle 
the skills shortage. Job reservation became obsolete. There were no declarations 
made between 1972 and 1976 and by 1984 reservation had been almost completely 
abolished.16  This led to the effective ‘floating’ of the colour bar, as whites were 
retrained and absorbed into higher paid managerial and supervisory jobs, whilst 
increasing numbers of non-whites were allowed to undertake semi-skilled work.17 
Training and education was also expanded for non-whites to provide skilled labour 
for the economy. In 1972 the government removed regulations which had seen 
spending on African education in the urban areas linked to levels of African 
taxation. This saw the ratio of African to White educational spending close for the 
first time since the introduction of Bantu education, from 18:1 in 1971-2 to 15:1 in 
1975-6.18 This was accompanied by the encouragement of vocational training for 
non-whites, such as when the government in 1976 began to offer 100% tax rebates 
on training costs for coloureds.19  
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The government’s position on influx control also began to be revised. 
Released in 1979 the Riekert Report reflected the government’s economic and 
political concerns post-Soweto. Riekert argued that the skills shortage could be 
addressed by tightening influx control to force all Africans without with Section 10 
(a) and (b) rights into permanent seasonal employment, whilst allowing those with 
such rights increased security and leasehold rights within the cities. The ultimate 
aim of Riekert was the reform of apartheid to provide a residentially and politically 
stable and prosperous African population which could be trained to fill the 
increasing number of semi-skilled positions, whilst displacing poverty and 
unemployment to the homelands.20 
Whilst some aspects of Riekert were implemented, such as the granting of 
leasehold rights to Section 10 (a) and (b) Africans – a move which actually predated 
the report. However Riekert was ultimately abandoned.21 From 1983 South Africa 
entered a period of deep recession which saw declining labour recruitment in the 
rural areas and a corresponding growth in illegal immigration into the cities as 
people sought employment outside legal recruitment channels. Government 
struggled to check this immigration and shack settlements mushroomed throughout 
the country.22  
The breakdown of effective influx control undermined the enforcement of 
insider/outsider distinctions and state policy changed again. In September 1984 the 
government abolished the CLPP and simultaneously extended an earlier policy of 
granting Africans the right to own property on a 99-year leasehold into the Western 
Cape.23 Then, on the 1st July 1986 influx control was formally abolished. The 
Restoration of South African Citizenship Act returned South African Citizenship to 
those South Africans who qualified by virtue of birth, descent or naturalisation and 
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the Black Communities Development Amendment Act granted Africans full 
property rights in urban areas. This did not represent a complete liberalisation of 
apartheid. Separate group areas were maintained and those South Africans who 
were deemed citizens of the independent homelands were theoretically to be denied 
access to the urban areas. However, in practice the abolition of the pass system 
meant many Africans whose presence would have previously been illegal were able 
to remain in the urban areas.24 
Then, in 1990, came the beginning of the end of attempts to maintain 
apartheid in the face of economic decline and political pressure. F.W. DeKlerk 
announced the unbanning of the African political movements and began the repeal 
of racially discriminatory laws. This reform was completed after 1994 when the 
ANC came to power in the country’s first democratic elections and introduced 
many policies to empower previously disadvantaged groups. Welfare spending was 
equalised, labour market discrimination abolished and residential segregation 
ended. Service provision has also become increasingly targeted at the poor with the 
provision of means tested housing subsidies and township upgrading projects. 
Policies have also been introduced to expand black economic ownership of 
businesses and encourage the hiring of non-whites. 
 
2.3. Shifting Patterns of Discrimination in the South 
African and Cape Town Labour Market, 1976-2006 
 
The economic impact of Apartheid on coloureds and Africans and their position in 
the labour market was complex and mediated by both racially discriminatory 
legislation and intra group cleavages. For many coloureds (particularly manual 
workers in the urban areas) the apartheid period, at least until the early 1980s, 
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represented a growth in prosperity and access to new occupations, whilst racial 
discrimination provided artificial protection from African competition. Conversely, 
the erosion of directly discriminatory policies coincided with a decline in economic 
fortunes, as competition and recession accompanied falling wages and growing 
unemployment. However, there were also many coloureds disadvantaged by 
apartheid and its privileging of whites. For these coloureds, particularly the 
growing number of students leaving school with matric certificates or gaining 
degrees at university, apartheid placed an artificial ceiling upon achievement. For 
this group the erosion of discrimination was therefore experienced very differently 
as a time of rising opportunities. 
African labour market outcomes were also patterned by race and class. 
Under apartheid coloureds (and Indians) tended to monopolise new occupational 
opportunities, a pattern enhanced in the Western Cape by the CLPP. However, the 
growing skills shortage did see urban Africans experience access to new 
occupations and wage growth, whilst Africans with section 10 rights were protected 
by apartheid’s displacement of unemployment into the homelands. However, as 
with coloureds, those Africans with higher levels of education were prevented from 
competing for more skilled posts. The removal of discrimination from the mid-1980s 
also had a mixed impact. Levels of unemployment began to accelerate, including 
amongst urban insiders. However occupational mobility also expanded and those 
Africans in work, particularly those with high education levels, could move into 
higher paid jobs. 
 
2.3.1. Expanding Opportunities beneath the Race Ceiling: the 
Coloured Labour Market before 1984  
Within apartheid ideology it was coloureds (and Indians) who were best placed to 





mid-1970s as they moved into new occupations ahead of Africans.25 These growing 
opportunities led to three significant changes for coloureds before the mid-1980s. 
Firstly, coloureds increasingly moved into semi-skilled, skilled and artisanal 
professions and away from unskilled occupations. Secondly, because of this upward 
mobility and general skills shortage, coloureds experienced high wage growth. 
Finally, the demand for skilled and semi-skilled labour and the privileging of 
coloureds over Africans led to relatively low levels of coloured unemployment. 
More generally, however coloureds still had relatively low incomes and for those 
coloureds with higher levels of education the opening of new opportunities did not 
remove the clear barriers for their participation in the labour market at a level 
consummate with their skills. 
Whereas under early apartheid artisanal positions were reserved almost 
wholly for whites, during the 1960s and 1970s coloureds began to form an 
increasing percentage of the skilled workforce. By 1975, 41% of construction artisans 
and 13% of all manufacturing artisans were coloured.26 This was even more 
pronounced in Cape Town where, in 1974, coloureds outnumbered whites in many 
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Table 2.1: Number of apprentices by Industry in Cape Town 25.7.197427 
Industry Coloureds Whites Coloured % of 
apprentices  
Total 
Building 1656 175 90 1831 
Furniture 216 5 98 221 
Motor 296 828 26 1124 
Metal Engineering 471 705 40 1176 
Jewellery & 
Goldsmith  
19 5 79 24 
Hairdressing - 106 0 106 
 
This process also occurred in semi-skilled and white collar positions. Whilst the 
number of coloureds in unskilled positions between 1965 and 1985 barely changed, 
the number of coloureds in semi-skilled and artisanal jobs doubled and in semi-
professional and white collar jobs the numbers tripled. 28 These changes are 
confirmed in a study by Moll which showed how coloureds had moved from 
predominantly unskilled occupations in 1960 to predominantly semi-skilled 
positions in 1980, whilst the percentage of coloureds in the higher occupational 
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Table 2.2 Occupational Breakdown of Male Coloured Population Group by Year29 
Occupation (%) 1960 1970 1980 
Managerial and Professional 0.1 3 6 
Technical and supervisory 0.4 1 3 
Sales 1 4 3 
Clerical 2 7 6 
Service 7 5 4 
Craft, Operator 20 30 37 
Transport Operator 5 5 8 
Labourer 66 44 33 
Total 100 100 100 
 
Coloured women also saw expanded occupational opportunities at this time, with 
many moving out of unskilled employment, such as domestic service, into semi-
skilled manufacturing jobs.30  
Alongside occupational advancement, coloureds also saw income growth 
and relatively low unemployment. During the 1960s, whilst starting at a low level, 
the wages of coloureds rose at 4.6% per annum. This was the largest expansion of 
wages of any racial group and saw the wage gap between coloureds and whites 
decline.31 Despite a slight dip during the late 1970s, as a result of recession, personal 
income per capita for coloureds continued to grow until the mid 1980s (graph 2.1). 32 
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Before the 1980s coloured unemployment was also low. The 1970 population census 
registered coloured unemployment of only 1.7% and unemployment, particularly 
for coloured men, remained relatively low compared to later trends until the mid 
1980s (graph 2.2). 33 
 
 
                                                   
33 South African Population Census, 1970. Data for graph taken from: South African Central Statistics 


























































Graph 2.1: Change in Personal Income 


























































Graph 2.2: Official Coloured 










These relatively low unemployment rates appear to be linked to apartheid policies 
which encouraged the hiring of coloureds. Lemon points to the fact that as a result 
of the CLPP between1962 and 1973 the number of coloureds that were employed by 
South Africa’s state departments and municipalities increased by 82%. He also 
showed that in Cape Town the share of non-white private sector jobs taken by 
coloureds increased from 77% in 1962 to 82% in 1973 and that in manufacturing 
coloureds comprised 95% of the entire workforce.34 Coloured unemployment was 
also reduced by large scale government employment within the Department of 
Coloured Affairs and by the fact that the growing number of skilled and educated 
coloured youths being produced by an expanding education system was being 
absorbed by a still growing economy. The overall role of the state in keeping 
unemployment low was such that in 1976 Beinart concluded that: 
 
It would seem that the government is using the public sector to minimise coloured 
unemployment in the same way it was used, and is still being used, to protect 
unskilled whites.35 
 
However, whilst coloureds saw occupational and wage advancement before 
the 1980s, this did not mean discrimination was nonexistent. In general wages 
remained low. In 1970 4/5ths of coloureds had incomes below the poverty datum line 
for sole earners of multiple households. 36 Similarly, a study in 1980 of income levels 
amongst coloured households in eight areas around Cape Town found up to half of 
coloured families earned under the minimum household subsistence level.37  The 
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general story for coloureds at this time, therefore, was one improving occupations 
and wages within an overall context of continuing poverty. 
However, not all coloureds had the same experience of apartheid. Those 
coloureds suffering some of the most significant discrimination were those with the 
highest levels of education. These coloureds experienced an occupational and wage 
ceiling through which they were unable to progress because to do so would place 
them in direct competition with whites. This ceiling was maintained and 
experienced in several ways. High educational requirements were placed upon 
coloureds if they wished to move into apprenticeships. The industrial relations 
mechanisms allowed white trade unions in closed shop agreements to restrict entry 
of racial groups into their professions. Formal job reservation, whilst limited in the 
occupations it affected, created an impression amongst employers that certain job 
grades were to be reserved for whites. Finally, a range of other legislation indirectly 
created discrimination, such as the demand that separate facilities such as toilets 
and canteens had to be provided for different racial groups.38  
The impact of apartheid policies is revealed in the pattern of coloured 
earnings taken from the 1980 population census (graphs 2.3, 2.4, 2.5).39 The graphs 
compare personal income distributions by age and education as reported by 
working coloureds living in urban areas of the Western Province. When the graphs 
are compared it can be seen that for all educational groups the youngest age band – 
those aged 15-24 – earn the lowest wages and the income distribution shifts up the 
scale for people aged 25-34. For the next age group, those aged 35-44, however, 
income distribution moves slightly higher for those with less than standard 8 
education and considerably higher for those with standard 8 education. However, 
                                                   
38 Moll, P, G, „The Decline of Discrimination...‟, p.293 
39 Graphs based on analysis of Census 1980 data for the Western Province area of South Africa. This 
area is smaller than the present day Western Cape Region and excludes the Southern Cape, but 
includes Cape Town and its surrounding area (the data collected varies relatively little compared to 
national income distributions for coloureds). 
 Only cases where an individual was working and reported an income (including if the reported 
income was 0) were included for analysis. Because income in the census was provided in bands it has 






for coloureds with matric there is almost no change in income distribution and this 
is the same for coloureds with matric aged 45-54. The fact that people with matric 
education saw little increase in earning power after age 24-34, but those with 
standard 8 did, suggests that there was a wage ceiling through which matric 
educated coloureds could not progress – they could go so far but further 
promotions were not possible because these higher paid jobs were reserved for 
whites. In contrast, for people with standard 8 education the labour market 

























Graph 2.4: Income by Age Band for Western Province 
Urban Areas: Employed Coloureds With






Income: 1 = R50,000 in 1991 Prices









Graph 2.3: Income by Age Band for Western Province 
Urban Areas: Employed Coloureds With





















Overall, therefore, coloureds had mixed experiences within the apartheid 
labour market before the mid-1980s. For many wages and opportunities were 
expanding, in part as a result of apartheid policies. Indeed, the transformation 
during this time period was such that Moll claimed, not unduly, that between 1970 
and 1980 young coloureds had experienced a decline in their overall level of 
discrimination.40  However, for coloureds with the highest levels of education 
apartheid placed clear limits on advancement. The overall experience for coloureds 
within the labour market before the mid-1980s was, therefore, of simultaneous 
advancement and curtailment mediated not simply by race, but also education. 
 
                                                   
40 Moll, P, G, „The Decline of Discrimination...‟, p.305 









Graph 2.5: Income by Age Band for Western Province 












2.3.2. Insiders and Outsiders: the African Labour Market 
before 1984  
Just as coloureds experienced rising wages and occupational opportunities as the 
apartheid labour market transformed before 1984, so too did many Africans. 
However, whereas coloureds were treated as a single group within apartheid, 
Africans were internally differentiated on the basis of their legal right to remain and 
work within white South Africa. These internal divisions, alongside differences in 
education, played a crucial role in determining whether individuals were able to 
take advantage of the expanding opportunities that the gradual deracialisation of 
apartheid was offering. Put simply, Africans with Section 10 (a) and (b) rights were 
better placed than Africans without such rights in apartheid’s labour market and, 
simultaneously, were also protected from having to compete with such Africans for 
employment. However, like with coloureds, those Africans with higher levels of 
education were particularly discriminated against. 
Due to the expansion in semi-skilled employment and African education in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s most Africans entering the labour market at this point 
did so at a time of expanding occupational opportunities and rising real wages.41 
Hindson estimates that between 1969 and 1985 the number of Africans in skilled 
and semi-skilled positions doubled from 1 to 2 million, making these the 
numerically superior section of the African working class. 42 These conclusions are 
supported by Crankshaw, whose study of data collected by the South African 
manpower surveys reveals that whilst the number of unskilled Africans working in 
unskilled labouring positions remained relatively constant under apartheid, 
increasing from 805,411 in 1965 to just 935,762 in 1990, the number of semi-skilled 
African machine operatives more than doubled from 682,148 to 1,378,416.43 
                                                   
41 Seekings, J, & Natrass, N, Class, Race, and Inequality..., p.106 
42 Hindson, D, „The Restructuring of Labour Markets in South Africa: 1970s and 1980s‟, in (ed.), 
Gelb, S, South Africa‟s Economic Crisis, (Cape Town, 1991), p.230 





Alongside, and in part a result of increased occupational mobility, Africans 
also saw growing wages and it is estimated that real African wage levels doubled 
between 1975 and 1982.44 Whilst the levels of growth were to fall slightly during the 
recession of the 1980s, particularly in the construction industry, real income for 
Africans, both per capita and in terms of wages, experienced notable growth 
throughout the apartheid period (Graphs 2.6 and 2.7).45  
 
 
                                                   
44 Jones, S, „The History of Black Involvement in the South African Economy‟, in (ed.) Smollan, R, 
Black Advancement in the South African Economy, (Johannesburg, 1986), p. 16-18 
45 Data for graph 2.6 taken from: Van Wyk, H de J, National Personal Income of South Africans..., 








































































































Graph 2.7: Average Annual African 








However, whilst overall Africans experienced increasing wages and occupational 
advancement this was not uniform. As more opportunities in skilled and semi-
skilled work were opening up there was a converse decline in the relative demand 
for unskilled labour. This led both to rising levels of unemployment and falling 
wages in unskilled occupations, despite overall wage growth.46 As Crankshaw 
argued: 
[T]hese dual processes of upward mobility and unemployment did not affect all 
Africans in the same way. The changing structure of demand meant that unskilled 
workers were increasingly worse off than more skilled African workers both in 
terms of unemployment and lower wages.47 
 
This growing differentiation interacted with, and compounded, the 
insider/outsider differentiation created by apartheid. Firstly, urban insiders came to 
dominate the better jobs within the labour market. Semi-skilled positions needed a 
more educated and stable workforce and as urbanised Africans were not liable to 
removal to the rural areas they came to be preferred in the new semi-skilled jobs.48 
Because Africans with section 10 rights were allowed to remain in urban areas, even 
without employment, they were also able to avoid the worst occupations and could 
seek out better wages and working conditions. Examining the findings of the 
Riekert Commission and research undertaken by management in the metal 
industry, Webster suggested that urban Africans in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
avoided certain jobs, particularly the most arduous manual work.49 Conversely 
migrants, whose urban residence depended upon their possession of employment, 
were willing to do poorly paid and unpleasant jobs to gain access to wages 
unavailable back home.50 
                                                   
46 Seekings, J, & Natrass, N, Class, Race, and Inequality..., p.160. It is worth noting that from the 
early 1980s unskilled wages began to rise again as the new trade unions started to have an impact 
upon wage levels. 
47 Crankshaw, O, Race, Class and the Changing Division of Labour..., p.95 
48 Ibid., p.110 
49 Webster, E, Cast in a Racial Mould..., p.204 
50 Possel, D, „Curbing African Urbanisation in the 1950s and 1960s‟, in (eds.) Swilling, M., 





Secondly, unemployment was displaced to the homelands as migrants were 
dismissed before urban Africans. This also reduced competition for employment 
and therefore the downward pressure that would have occurred on their wages had 
a free labour market existed.51 This benefit for insider Africans was recognised by 
Natrass and Seekings who noted that: 
Late in the apartheid era, deracialisation meant that the growing urban black 
population became the partial beneficiaries of a distributional regime premised on 
the social exclusion of large number of unemployed people in rural areas.52 
 
However, just as with the coloured population, whilst Africans saw rising 
incomes and job mobility before the mid-1980s, to characterise this as a positive 
experience even for Section 10 (a) & (b) Africans would be excessive. Putting aside 
the political and social discrimination Africans experienced, wage rises and 
occupational mobility took place from a very low starting point. Furthermore, 
whilst there was some advancement as strict job reservation was dismantled, 
apartheid continued to severely limit the occupations Africans could undertake. 
Indeed, for Africans this discrimination placed a lower ceiling on advancement than 
it did for coloureds. For example, Crankshaw notes that whilst between 1965 and 
1975 Africans moved into semi-skilled positions, very few were able to move into 
artisan positions. 53 
Overall, therefore, those Africans granted section 10 rights were put in an 
advantageous position compared to other Africans as influx control, the growing 
demand for more skilled labour and rising unemployment all made it increasingly 
difficult for non-urban Africans to gain access to the urban labour markets. 
However, even for Africans with Section 10 rights this advantage placed them 
below the other racial groups, with coloureds and Indians moving into many of the 
more skilled positions and whites still experiencing considerable advantage.  
                                                   
51 Seekings, J, & Natrass, N, Class, Race, and Inequality..., pp,139-4 
52 Ibid., p.164 





Whilst Africans throughout South Africa experienced considerable 
discrimination at this time, apartheid policies in the Western Cape disadvantaged 
Africans more than elsewhere and their experiences within the labour market before 
1984 were therefore different to those in the rest of the country. The CLPP provided 
few opportunities beyond unskilled work for Africans, even those with education or 
Section 10 rights. Consequently there was no clear divide between urban and rural 
Africans in the labour market. However, because unemployment affected migrant 
labourers before Africans with Section 10 rights, insider Africans were insulated 
from rising unemployment before the mid-1980s in a way they would not have been 
had there been a free labour market. 
Hubbard’s study the Cape Town labour market presents a range of evidence 
to suggest Africans in the city were not experiencing the expanding opportunities of 
elsewhere. Surveys of employers revealed that the CLPP caused problems for 
employers seeking to recruit and promote Africans; many Africans with standard 8 
education were being employed in unskilled positions where their education was 
not used; and opportunities for upward occupational mobility were restricted, 
primarily limited to the teaching professions.54 This picture was confirmed in 
Goldin’s study of 20 medium and large employers in the Western Cape, employing 
between them approximately 22,000 workers. He showed how, in comparison to the 
picture nationwide, the vast majority of Western Cape Africans were still employed 





                                                   





Table 2.3: Occupation by Race, 198355 
 Unskilled Semi-Skilled  Skilled Managerial 
Africans 87 % 7 % 6 % - 
Coloureds 25 % 54 % 18 % 3 % 
Whites - 22 % 33 % 45 % 
 
This interpretation is supported by data from the 1980 census (graphs 2.8 
and 2.9).56 In 1980 Africans with standard 8 education had an earnings distribution 
that was slightly higher than Africans with less than standard 8 education. However 
wages were still low, concentrated at the bottom of the wage band. Equally, whilst 
the wages do move up for the older age bands, this movement is relatively limited 
across the age range and is most notable between 15-24 and 25-34 and is less notable 
between ages 25-34 and 35-44. This suggests that for Africans with Standard 8 
education, like for coloureds with matric, there was a wage ceiling that was reached 
early in life and beyond this there was little opportunity for advancement. 
                                                   
55 Goldin, I, The Poverty of Coloured Labour Preference: Economics and Ideology in the Western 
Cape, SALDRU Working Paper no.59, (Cape Town, 1984), p.46. These figures were confirmed by a 
survey of African Cape Town township residents in which 82.5% of people in employment reported 
working in unskilled work: Ibid., p.65 
56 Graphs based on analysis of Census 1980 data for the Western Province area of South Africa. This 
area is smaller than the present day Western Cape Region and excludes the Southern Cape, but 
includes Cape Town and its surrounding area. Only cases where an individual was working and 
reported an income (including if the reported income was 0) were included for analysis. Because 
income in the census was provided in bands it has therefore been normalised along a scale of 0-1 with 















Graph 2.8: Income Distribution of Africans With Less than 
Standard 8 Education Living In the Urban Areas 
of the Western Province by Age Band (1980)
 15 - 24
 25 - 34
 35 - 44
%































Graph 2.9: Income Distribution of Africans With Standard
8 Education Living In the Urban Areas of the 










Interestingly, in the Western Cape, insider status appears to have done little 
to mediate the impact of labour market discrimination as section 10 rights had little 
impact upon wages for Africans. The graphs below (2.10 and 2.11) show the 
different income distributions of employed Africans who reported an income over 
R0 in the Western Province region of South Africa for Africans aged 25-34 
depending upon birthplace. Whilst this is not an exact substitute for section 10 
rights, nearly all Africans born in the Western province would have qualified for 
such rights, whilst few younger Africans born elsewhere would have done so.57 
These graphs are interesting because they show Africans born within the Western 
Province, regardless of education, were more likely to be on low wages than those 
born outside the province.  









Graph 2.10: Income Distribution for Working Africans aged 
25-34 living in the urban areas of the Western 
Province with less than Standard 8 Education by Birthplace 
(1980)
 Born in Western Province
 Not Born in Western Province
%
Income: 1 = R50,000 in 1991 Prices
 
  
                                                   
57 This group has been used for comparison because the oldest African in this age group would have 
been born after the introduction of influx control and the CLPP in 1955. For these Africans, therefore, 
it would have been very unlikely that they could have qualified for section 10 rights unless they were 













Furthermore, education also appears to have almost no impact on the incomes of 
people born and working in the Western Province (graph 2.12) as the wage 
distribution is similar for Africans with, and without, standard 8 education, apart 
from a slightly higher proportion of Africans with standard 8 education at the top of 
the distribution.








Income: 1 = R50,000 in 1991 Prices
 Standard 8
 Less than Standard 8
Graph 2.12: Income Distribution for Working Africans born 
and living in the urban areas of the Western Province aged
25-34 by level of education (1980) 
 









Graph 2.11: Income Distribution for Working Africans aged 
25-34 living in the urban areas of the Western Province
with Standard 8 Education by Birthplace 
(1980)
 Born in Western Province
 Not Born in Western Province
%





There is no clear explanation of these phenomena. It is possible that the 
larger proportion of low wages amongst Africans born in the Western province was 
as a result of part time work, which migrants would not have been eligible for, or 
because migrant domestic servants would have lived in the white areas, whilst 
section 10 domestic servants may have commuted and lived in the townships. 
However what it does clearly show is that Africans with Section 10 rights in the 
Western Cape did not experience the same advantages within the labour market as 
have been noted in national studies, even when they had education. It is not 
unreasonable to conclude, therefore, that whilst Africans across South Africa 
experienced a low ceiling on advancement, in the Western Cape this was far lower 
than elsewhere. 
The benefits of Section 10 rights in the Western Cape under apartheid were, 
therefore, even more limited than elsewhere. However, one area where insider 
status had some impact was access to employment. Data from the 1980 census 
shows that unemployment amongst people born and living in the Western province 
stood at 12.1%. Whilst relatively high, there was almost no competition for work 
from Africans born outside the province, as unemployment amongst this group was 
just 1.2%.58 This suggests a relative success of state policy preventing Africans 
without section 10 (a) & (b) rights being in the city legally without employment 
(although it s difficult to assess the extent to which illegal squatting was eroding 
this). Therefore, whilst this did not result in a low unemployment rate for urban 
Africans it is possible that had a free labour market existed unemployment could 
have been higher.59 
 Overall, therefore, Africans in the Western Cape, even with section 10 (a) & 
(b) rights, benefited little from the changing division of labour under apartheid. 
                                                   
58 Data taken from 1980 population census. 
59 It is important to note that using census data at this time to track the fortunes of Africans without 
section 10 rights is problematic because it is unlikely that Africans illegally present in the area would 
be willing to present themselves to census enumerators, especially as the common experience of 
government officials was one of pass rates and forced removals. However, at the very least the data 
shows that unemployed Africans without Section 10 rights could only be in the city illegally and 





Although increasing numbers of semi-skilled occupations were opening up in the 
Western Cape it was coloureds, not Africans, who benefited. Wages remained low, 
chances for occupational advancement limited and the vast majority of Africans 
remained employed in unskilled occupations. However, in one respect apartheid 
still provided some benefit for those Africans who could claim urban residency, for 
it prevented the presence of unemployed Africans without such rights. 
Furthermore, the fact that most Africans in the Western Cape worked in low paying, 
unskilled positions, would have meant that this protection was particularly 
valuable, as their lack of skills meant they could be easily replaced with other 
workers. 
 
2.3.3. Deracialisation, Unemployment and Growing 
Differentiation: the Coloured Labour Force 1984-1990 
In 1984 the CLPP was repealed and in 1986 influx control was abolished. No longer 
were coloureds guaranteed preferential access to employment and all urban 
dwellers, coloured and African alike, became exposed to increasing competition 
from migrants from the rural areas. However, alongside increased competition, this 
was also a time of expanding opportunities as increasing numbers of occupations 
became available to non-whites. The impact of this was an inversion of the 
dynamics of the previous period as people who had been most restricted by 
apartheid, notably more educated blacks, were able to take advantage of these new 
opportunities whilst, conversely, those who had benefited from the artificial 
tightening of the labour supply began to suffer as they were exposed to competition 
for positions and wages.  
Overall coloureds suffered from the removal of discriminatory legislation. 
The economy entered recession in the early 1980s and employment declined in 
relative and absolute terms in many industries between 1980 and 1985. Before 





downturn; after their abolition this protection was removed. Graph 2.13 shows 
change over time in the total number of coloureds employed in four key 
industries.60 In all four industries the absolute numbers of coloureds employed 
between 1980 and 1985 rose, despite an overall fall in employment in all but one of 
these industries. Even in construction the rate of employment growth for coloureds 
outstripped the average. The fact that increasing numbers of coloureds were 
absorbed into industry at a time when hiring was declining suggests that within the 
labour market, before 1985, they did not experience the full force of the growing 
unemployment crisis.61 
Further evidence to support the fact that coloureds were insulated from rising levels 
of unemployment before 1985 comes from an analysis of the proportion of the 
                                                   
60 Data taken from Statistics South Africa, South African Statistics 2000, (Pretoria, 2000), p.74 
61 As coloureds were concentrated in the Western and Northern Cape, which had a different industrial 
base to elsewhere in South Africa, it is possible that these figures in part represent the nature of the 
recession rather than absolute protection for coloured workers. However, what is undeniable is that at 
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Graph 2.13: Employment over Time 





overall workforce that was comprised of coloureds (graph 2.14). 62 Between 1977 and 
1985 – a period when unemployment rose – coloureds came to make up an 
increasing proportion of the overall workforce. Again, the fact that coloureds took a 
rising proportion of overall employment at a time when overall employment 





 However, whilst before 1985 coloureds experienced protection from the 
growing recession, subsequently they were particularly hard hit. In an inversion of 
the trend between 1980 and 1985, the period between 1985 and 1991 saw absolute 
employment rise across most economic sectors, yet coloureds experienced either a 
decline in total employment or, where employment did rise, it did so slower than 
the overall rate (graph 2.13). Similarly, the coloured percentage of the overall 
workforce also declined, falling back to 11% in 1989 (graph 2.14), showing that, as 
employment levels picked up after the mid-1980s, coloureds were less likely than 
average to move into these new positions.  
                                                   
















Just as discriminatory policies impacted differently upon different coloureds 
so did their removal. Graph 2.15 shows the unemployment rate amongst coloureds 
aged 15 to 24 in 1980, 25 to 34 in 1991 and 35 to 44 in 2001 living in urban areas of 
the Western Cape.63 Whilst not exact, it roughly represents the changing fortunes of 
a single age cohort over time. 
 
Graph 2.15 reveals that between 1980 and 2001 coloured unemployment 
increased most rapidly for people with less than Standard 8 education, least rapidly 
for people with matric and declined for people with degrees. People with lower 
levels of education were, therefore, most affected by the rising unemployment that 
accompanied deracialisation. Unsurprisingly given these trends, the shedding of 
jobs after 1985 hit unskilled coloureds particularly badly. Graph 2.16 shows changes 
in the numbers of coloureds and Africans working as unskilled labourers over 
time.64 The experience of unskilled labourers before 1985 appears to fit the model 
                                                   
63 Data was used from the 1980, 1991 and 2001 population censuses. The ILO definition of 
unemployment was used and cases were only included where respondent was reported as coloured. 
For the 1980 census people living in urban areas of the Western Province region of South Africa were 
used. For the 1991 Census urban areas of Development Region A were used. For the 2001 Census 
urban areas of the Western Cape were used. All these areas cover a roughly approximate geographical 
area, apart from the Western Province, which excluded the Southern Cape. However, analysis of 
Western Province data for coloureds alongside national data showed there was little variation with the 
nationwide picture.  



























Graph 2.15: Unemployment Amongst Coloureds Living in Urban 
Areas of the Western Cape Aged 15-24 in 1980, 25-34 in 1991, and 
35-44 in 2001 by Education 








that would be expected if the government was using influx control and coloured 
preference policies to protect coloureds from competition from Africans. After the 
onset of recession in the late 1970s the number of coloureds employed in unskilled 
work continued to rise, whilst the number of Africans fell, suggesting that within 
the context of a falling demand for unskilled employment coloureds were preferred 
over Africans. However, from 1985 the picture changes dramatically and the 
number of unskilled coloured workers falls faster than Africans, reaching a low in 
1987. Subsequently coloured and African unskilled employment shows comparable 
variation. This suggests that after the removal of influx control and preference 
legislation in the mid-1980s, coloureds were removed from unskilled positions at a 
faster rate than Africans as competition increased, then once the removal of 
coloured preference policies had worked through the labour market Africans and 
coloureds began to have similar labour market experiences. 
 
 
Unskilled coloureds were not the only group to suffer from the removal of 






































professions. Changes in the distribution of coloureds across the labour market are 
shown in graph 2.17.65 This shows how the number of skilled coloureds expanded 
rapidly between 1965 and the mid-1980s. However, after 1985 the number of 
coloureds in these occupations fell markedly. 
In contrast, the number of coloureds employed in grades requiring higher 
levels of education continued to expand rapidly, with the number of routine white 
collar workers and semi-professional workers, expanding even during the recession 
(graph 2.17). Furthermore, it would appear that the ceiling on incomes that existed 
in 1980 began to be eroded as the income distribution for coloureds with matric 





                                                   
65 Data taken from: Crankshaw, O, Race, Class and the Changing Division of Labour... 































Graph 2.17: Changes in Overall Employment of Coloured Workers 















Overall, therefore, the removal of influx control and the coloured labour 
preference policy accompanied a marked change in the position of coloureds within 
the labour market. Coloured predominance within positions that did not demand 
educational qualifications began to wane and coloured unemployment rose. 
However, for those coloureds with higher levels of education, unemployment rose 
far slower and people were able to move into a widening range of occupations. This 
overall transformation is perhaps best reflected in the changing income distribution 
within the coloured population (graph 2.19).67 Between 1980 and 1991 the 
distribution of coloured incomes widened considerably with growing numbers of 
people reporting wages at the top and bottom of the income distribution and a 
consequent growth in inequality.  
                                                   
67 Analysis based on the personal income of all coloureds reporting an income and classed as 
employed or self-employed in the 1980 and 1991 population census. Incomes were reported in bands. 
Prices were normalised to 1991 levels and new bands defined to be as close as possible to each other 
across the data sets. A Lorentzian curve was fitted to the data to show income distribution. The Half 
height width of the two curves was 0.18723 for the 1980 data and 0.29731 for the 1991 data, revealing 
a considerable increase in the distribution of incomes over the time period. 








Graph 2.18: Income by Age Band for Employed Coloureds 


























Income: 1 = R50,000 in 1991 Prices
 
Overall, therefore, the removal of apartheid discrimination was not 
experienced uniformly. Opportunities for coloureds in unskilled and skilled 
positions (those where they were most protected by apartheid legislation) declined. 
However, new opportunities arose for coloureds in occupations they had formerly 
been unable to access. Deracialisation did not, therefore, represent a universal 
upturn for coloureds. Instead it increasingly differentiated the coloured population 
on the basis of education and skills. 
 
2.3.4 Unemployment, Inequality, Education and Opportunity: 
The African Section 10 Labour Force in the Western Cape, 
1984-1990 
Africans with longstanding urban residence appear to have experienced similar 
changes to coloureds during the 1980s. Unfortunately data to analyse the specific 
experience of Africans outside of census years does not exist, as Section 10 status 





censuses in the Western Cape can be used to get a broad picture of changes during 
this period (graph 2.20 and 2.21).68 








Graph 2.20: Income Distribution for Africans aged 
25-34 living in theurban areas of the Western 
Province (1980) and Development Region A (1991)
with Standard 8 Education
1980
1991 (Not Born in RSA)
1991 (Born in RSA)
%










                                                   
68 Data taken from 1980 and 1991 censuses. Areas used for comparison are the Western Province 
region of South Africa in 1980 and Development Region A in 1991. For 1991 Africans have been 
divided into people born in the Republic of South Africa as then defined (i.e. white South Africa), and 
people born in the homelands. The use of people aged 25-34 (people who were born after 1955 and 
therefore after the introduction of influx controls) means that all people born in the RSA would have 
qualified as section 10 (a) & (b) rights holders, whilst few of those born outside would have. 
 







Graph 2.21: Income Distribution for Africans born in the
RSA and living in the urban areas of Development 










Just as with coloured workers there was a growth in the proportion of 
Western Cape Africans reporting incomes at the top and bottom of the income 
distribution between 1980 and 1991, revealing a growing internal differentiation that 
suggests both increased access to higher paying occupations and falling wages for 
people in less skilled positions. Simultaneously, the data also suggests that there 
was increased occupational mobility for people throughout their working life. 
Whereas in 1980 age had only a minimal impact on wage distributions for Africans 
(graph 2.9), by 1991 the incomes of Africans with standard 8 educations did increase 
with age (graph 2.21). That this is not simply the result of the increasing levels of 
educational attainment, particularly at matric level, driving down wages for those 
with lower achievement in the younger age group is demonstrated by the fact that 
increases in income are apparent between the 35-44 and the 45-54 age band, whereas 
in 1980 there was little clear difference between the 25-34 and 35-44 age band. 
Furthermore, by 1991 a clear distinction had emerged in the wage distributions of 
Africans that had been born within the urban areas of South Africa (those who 
would previously have qualified for Section 10 Rights) and those who were born 
within the former homelands, with Africans from the homelands being more likely 
to be receive lower incomes.  
 Data on unemployment also confirms this growing differentiation, and 
shows that people with the least skills experienced the most marked downturn in 
fortunes in the late 1980s. The relationship between education and deracialisation is 
particularly illustrated by the changing employment fortunes of Western Cape 
Africans who were aged 15-24 in 1980 (graph 2.22).69 For this group there was 
actually a decline, albeit from a high level, in unemployment between 1980 and 1991 
                                                   
69 Data was used from the 1980, 1991 and 2001 population censuses. For the 1980 census people 
living in urban areas of the Western Province region of South Africa were used. For the 1991 Census 
urban areas of Development Region A were used. For the 2001 Census urban areas of the Western 
Cape were used. All these areas cover a roughly similar geographical area, except the Western 
Province which excluded the Southern Cape. However, the CLPP meant it was unlikely large numbers 
of Africans would have lived in the Southern Cape in 1980. 
The graph shows the unemployment level over time amongst Africans born in and living in the 
Western Province (1980), Development Region A (1991) and the Western Cape (2001). This 






for those with standard 8 and Matric level education, whilst unemployment for 
people without standard 8 education grew substantially – a finding which runs 
counter to the general picture of South Africa as experiencing rising unemployment 
throughout the period. 
 
 
The fact that young Africans with better educations experienced a fall in 
unemployment during a period in which both nationally and locally overall 
unemployment rose suggests that the removal of discriminatory legislation 
coincided with improving occupational opportunities for young South Africans 
with the education to take advantage of the removal of coloured preference policies. 
Conversely, the large increase in unemployment amongst Africans with low levels 
of education suggests that deracialisation, by increasing competition from other 



























Graph 2.22: Unemployment Amongst Africans Born and 
Living in Urban Areas of the Western Cape Aged 15-24 in 
1980, 25-34 in 1991, and 35-44 in 2001 by Education 









2.3.5. Changes in the Apartheid Labour Market 1984-1990:  
the Role of Discriminatory Legislation 
Between 1980 and 1990 both Africans and coloureds with low levels of education 
experienced declining access to employment. Unfortunately data is not available on 
the changing occupational distribution of Section 10 Africans, but for coloureds it is 
also clear that in those occupations where apartheid legislation created incentives to 
employ coloureds (notably manual occupations) the removal of discriminatory 
legislation accompanied a corresponding decline in employment. Conversely, in 
those occupations where apartheid restricted employment, the removal of 
discrimination saw expanding opportunities. Whilst it cannot be conclusively 
proved that the removal of apartheid legislation was responsible for these 
transformations, the changes in the labour market closely mirror what could be 
expected given the shifting legislation. Furthermore, even if legislation was not the 
key driver of these changes, people experiencing rising or declining opportunities 
were doing so within a broader context of the deracialisation of state policy.# 
 
2.3.6. Equal Opportunities in an Increasingly Unequal 
Society: The Post-Apartheid Labour Market 
The end of apartheid, whilst of considerable political significance, has seen 
continuity with the late apartheid labour market. The ANC government has looked 
to a high productivity, high wage plan for economic growth, which it has partially 
achieved. However, it has failed to reverse high levels of unemployment and has 
continued to favour capital intensive industries.70 Furthermore, the opening of the 
economy to international competition has placed increased pressure upon national 
industries, further contributing to unemployment. Unemployment has affected all 
population groups both nationally and in the Western Cape but has particularly 
                                                   





affected people with limited education and skills. Conversely, the final removal of 
apartheid restrictions has actually accompanied expanding occupational mobility 
for black South Africans with the right skills and education. Overall, therefore, this 
period has been one of equalising access to opportunities within the labour market 
as skills and education have started to replace race as key for people’s employment 
prospects. However, simultaneously, the labour market itself has seen an overall 
growth in inequality as the gap between those in and out of work, and those with 
and without skills, has widened.  
For coloureds the post-apartheid labour market has been characterised by 
three dynamics: rising unemployment, growing intra-group inequality and a 
continued decline in employment within manual occupations.  Unemployment 
amongst coloureds nationally has risen markedly from around 12% in 1996 to 
around 17% in 2004 and during the same period from around 10% to nearly 15% in 
the Western Cape.71 However, unemployment has not affected all groups equally, 
with education playing a role in mediating access to employment. Graph 2.23 shows 
unemployment amongst coloureds aged 25-34 in urban areas of the Western Cape.72 
It is clear here that whilst unemployment has expanded for all coloureds in the 
region, those with the least education have been particularly badly hit. 
 
                                                   
71 Data from the October Household Survey and Labour Force Survey. 
72 Data taken from 1980 and 1991 censuses. Areas used for comparison are the Western Province 






Alongside the continued importance of education for employment, the decline in 
the manual coloured workforce (i.e. jobs not requiring education) noted during the 
late 1980s has also continued (graph 2.24).73  
 
 
                                                   































































































Graph 2.23 Unemployment by Education and Year for Coloureds 






















 Alongside rising unemployment and decreasing employment opportunities, 
wages for lower earning coloureds have also fallen. Table 2.4 provides a breakdown 
of the mean income for coloureds reporting a salaried income living in urban areas 
of the Western Cape by income decile between 1997 and 2004.74 Overall there is little 
fluctuation in mean real wages for all coloureds, except for a slight rise in 2001 and a 
sharp drop in 2003. However this hides a picture of increasing differentiation. Apart 
from coloureds in the lowest decile there has been either very small increases in real 
wages of 2 percent or less, or falls, for the lowest earning 70% of coloureds, whilst 
for the top decile wages have risen 23%. This suggests that alongside rising 
unemployment, the wages of coloureds not in the highest paid jobs have also 
decreased post-apartheid. 
Table 2.4: Mean Coloured Incomes in 2000 Prices by Race Specific Decile (Urban Areas of 
the Western Cape) 
 1997 2000 2001 2003 2004 Change 
1997 - 2004 
1st 4034 3157 4932 4497 4405 9% 
2nd 8046 7675 8767 7755 8193 2% 
3rd 11134 10410 12024 10015 10154 -9% 
4th 13993 13882 14444 12387 12533 -10% 
5th 17479 16291 17231 14750 15290 -13% 
6th 20105 18833 20176 17543 18193 -10% 
7th 21826 21748 23526 20317 22331 2% 
8th 26014 27476 28409 24888 27444 5% 
9th 34581 36154 38476 33348 36732 6% 
10th 63115 77112 79530 59282 77595 23% 
Total 23421 23601 25267 19554 23401 0% 
 
                                                   
74 The data for this was taken from the October Household Survey and Labour Force Survey. Only 
cases where specific incomes were provided were used to perform the calculations. The deciles are 






Like coloureds, Africans have seen growing unemployment and opportunity 
coexisting post-apartheid. Similarly, employment has come to depend even more on 
education and intra-racial inequality has grown. By 2000 it was estimated that 
Africans comprised between 25 and 31% of South Africa’s top income decile and 
between 55 and 61% of the second, in comparison to only 9% of the top decile and 
22% of the second in 1991. However, this social mobility has not been universal, and 
many Africans have experienced falling incomes and access to wages as 
unemployment has continued to grow and new job creation has been limited.  75 
Data from the Western Cape mirrors national patterns. The histograms 
below show normalised income distributions of working Africans living in the 
Western Province and Southern Cape regions of South Africa in 1980 and the 
Western Cape Province in 2001 (graph 2.25). For working Africans in the Western 
Cape mean wages have risen by about 50% in real terms. However, this growth has 
been accompanied by an expansion in the gap between lowest and highest earners.76 
 
                                                   
75 Seekings, J, & Natrass, N, Class, Race, and Inequality..., p.306-8 
76 Data was taken from the 1980 and 2001 population surveys. Prices were normalised to 1991 levels 
and 7 new bands defined to as close as possible to each other across the data sets. These 7 bands were 
used as the basis for calculations. Africans not working were excluded from the calculations. 
The histogram for 1980 shows a very tight distribution of wages, reflected by its standard deviation of 
just 0.07166. Whilst, in 2001 the distribution is far broader, with a standard deviation of 0.15133, over 
double its value in 1980. 
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Graph 2.25: African Income Distribution by Year in the 
Western Cape, 1980 and 2001 
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Whilst wages grew between 1980 and 2001 much of this growth occurred 
amongst high earners (see table 2.5). If mean and median incomes are calculated for 
working Africans it becomes clear that whilst the mean income for working Africans 
has nearly doubled, the median wage has risen by only about 10% in real terms,. 
Furthermore, if the mean and median incomes are calculated for all Africans aged 
15+, regardless of employment status, the growth in mean income between 1980 and 
2001 falls considerably, whilst , the median income plummets in real terms to just 
R1517.  
Table 2.5: Mean and Medium Wages for all people aged 15+ calculated by income 
band mid points in Urban Areas of the Western Cape by Population Group and 
Work Status in 2000 Prices77 
 1980 Mean 1980 Median 2001 Mean 2001 Median 
African 
Working 
12241 11333 21345 12502 
African Total 8713 7843 9087 1517 
 
The collapse of the median African income in the Western Cape points to the 
growing African unemployment which has left a large proportion of the population 
with no income. By 2001 African unemployment stood at around 50% if people who 
have given up looking for work are included. Interestingly, it also appears that 
longstanding urban residency no longer impacts upon unemployment in the 
Western Cape. An analysis of the 2001 census reveals that unemployment amongst 
Africans both born and living in the Western Cape was running at 51%, and was 
only slightly higher for Africans born outside the area at 52.8%.78 Instead, age and 
                                                   
77 Ibid. 
78 Analysis of the Census 2001 data set. Unemployment based on an expanded definition including 






education were far more significant in affecting access to employment than 
birthplace.79 
 The conclusions which can be drawn for Africans post-apartheid are similar, 
though not identical, to those regarding coloureds. The removal of discriminatory 
legislation has allowed Africans to move into increasingly well paid jobs and to 
move up the occupational ladder, leading to increasing wages for those able to take 
advantage of these new opportunities. However, there has been a corresponding 
decline for those Africans who were privileged as urban insiders during apartheid 
unable to take advantage of these opportunities. This is starkly revealed in the 
explosion of unemployment that has taken place amongst all Africans in the 
Western Cape. 
 
2.4. Beyond Employment: Apartheid, Discrimination 
and Welfare Transfers 1948-2006 
 
As Natrass and Seekings note, assessing the changing nature of discrimination in 
South Africa demands not only a consideration of the labour market, but also 
(re)distribution through welfare spending and taxation.80 As much collective action, 
both apartheid and post-apartheid, coalesced around service provision the changing 
distribution of state spending is of particular relevance to this study. Two areas of 
state service provision are used here to present a snapshot of changing state 
strategies of distribution – social welfare grants and housing provision. Social 
welfare has been selected because it is one of the starkest examples and one of the 
easiest measures of how state priorities and discrimination translate into policy, 
                                                   
79 1980, 1991 and 2001 censuses. Urban areas of the Western Province (1980), Development Region 
A (1991) and Western Cape (2001). 
80 Natrass, N, & Seekings, J, „Democracy and Distribution in Highly Unequal Economies: The Case 





privilege and discrimination. Housing has been chosen because, in the face of 
considerable shortages, it remains a highly contentious political issue. 
 
2.4.1. From Race to Universality: Changing Pattern of 
Redistribution through Welfare Payments 
Whilst labour market discrimination was complex, depending not simply upon 
racial classification but factors such as education and demands from business, social 
security provision under apartheid was defined directly by the government and 
was, until 1993, related simplistically to racial classification. Similarly, unlike in 
employment, where structural advantages gained under apartheid (such as superior 
education) continued to confer advantage after the ending of discrimination, 
changes in social welfare were immediate. Whilst a range of social grants were paid 
by both apartheid and post-apartheid governments, two areas of welfare spending 
are examined here. Firstly the old age pension – a non contributory pension paid to 
all people aged over 65 – and secondly child support grants. These two grants have 
been chosen because they are widely received, means tested and non-contributory. 
Consequently, they involve considerable redistribution to large numbers of poorer 
South Africans. 
 Social security is one area where the apartheid state’s preferential treatment 
for coloureds, especially during the 1960s and 1970s, is obvious and where the 
ending of this preference, particularly for those coloureds on low incomes with 
children, had a dramatic impact. Equally, the limited social assistance for Africans 
until towards the end of the apartheid period, and the subsequent expansion of 
welfare provision in both terms of numbers, and for some benefits value, was a 
notable gain for Africans. 
The state pension was introduced in 1928 as a means tested grant and whilst 





child maintenance grants, first introduced in 1937.81 However, these grants 
specifically excluded Africans, and when the pension was extended to Africans in 
the 1940s, it was at a considerably lower rate than for other groups. This pattern of 
provision was to continue under apartheid. Through the 1960s to the early 1980s 
welfare provision was expanded for coloureds whilst Africans were excluded from 
maintenance payments and continued to receive only a limited pension.  It was not 
until the late 1980s that deracialisation of state policy saw declining provision for 
coloureds and a converse increase in provision for Africans. These changes were 
compounded post-1994 as welfare payments became standardised for all South 
Africans regardless of race. 
The maximum value of the old age pension payable to coloureds increased 
until the early 1980s in both real terms and in relation to the pension paid to whites 
(table 2.6). At the same time, per pensioner spending grew considerably in real 
terms. From the late 1980s, however, the value of the coloured pension fell, whilst 
the value of the African pension was increased (graph 2.26). 
Table 2.6: Annual Maximum Pension by Population Group in Rand: 1960-198382 
Year Whites 2000 Prices Coloureds 2000 Prices % White Pension 
1960 254.4 8480 87 2900 35.4 
1970 394 10103 183.8 4713 46.6 
1983 1824 11329 1116 6932 61.2 
 
                                                   
81 Seekings, J, & Natrass, N, Class, Race, and Inequality..., p.83 
82 Abedian, I, „Economic Obstacles to Black Advancement‟, in (ed.) Smollan, R, Black Advancement 






The same trend is replicated amongst coloured recipients of the state 
maintenance grant. Before 1998 the state provided child support via a means tested 
grant paid to mothers, supplemented by a payment for the first and second child, 
until the child turned 18. Whilst the level of payment was racially defined, 
coloureds were eligible for the grant and it provided a relatively generous income. 
Graph 2.26 shows the average income per coloured claimant of the state 
maintenance grant between 1962 and 1992. As with the old age pension, until the 
early 1980s state payments to the lowest income coloureds expanded rapidly, whilst 
after this the value of grants fell. Unlike coloureds, Africans were excluded from 
maintenance grants until 1993.  
The ending of apartheid saw continuity rather than change in trends within 
welfare provision. In 1993 the government equalised payments between racial 
groups and the state pension and maintenance grants became available to all. 
Initially this had a limited impact upon coloureds as the equalising of grants simply 
involved the uprating of payments and an extension of certain existing grants to 

















































































Graph 2.26: Mean Income Per Recipient of 
State Welfare Grants:  1961-1992 











state pension was limited, and has to some extent been reversed in recent years. 
However, changes to child welfare grants have been drastic (graph 2.27). In 1998 the 
state maintenance grant system was replaced with a new child support grant. 
Whilst the motives behind this decision are complex and open to debate, the impact 
upon mothers who had been receiving state maintenance grants was not. Unlike the 
maintenance grants, which were paid until the child reached 18, the child support 
grants were initially introduced only for children aged under 10, subsequently 
expanded to include all children under 14. The level of the grant was also lowered. 
In 1997 a single mother with one child claiming a state maintenance grant could get 











































Graph 2.27: Maximum Income per Recipient of 
State Welfare Grants 1993-2004 
Old Age Pension 
Child Support for a Mother 





The impact of changes to the welfare system varied by race and coloureds 
were particularly badly affected. In 1994 nearly 60% of all welfare grants were paid 
to coloured families, and only 20% to African families.83 If the number of coloureds 
receiving grants  is compared to the number of coloured women likely to have 
children it appears that around 1 in 14 coloured families with children received this 
income in 1991 (table 2.7). 
 
 
Table 2.7: Coloured Recipients of the state Maintenance 
Grant: 1960-199484 
Year Number of Recipients % of Women aged 16 to 55 
1960 6632 - 
1965 12222 - 
1970 20969 4.5 
1975 30537 - 
1980 48504 7.1 
1985 53213 6.6 
1991 63514 7.3 
 
For many Africans, however, the equalising of grants since 1993 and the 
provision of child support have been positive experiences. Whilst Africans 
experienced the stagnating of state pensions in the late 1990s and early 2000s, this 
came after the considerable increases which took place at the end of apartheid. 
Similarly, whilst those Africans claiming state maintenance grants for their children 
would have had similar experiences to coloured claimants, very few Africans were 
receiving this grant; in 1994 a total of 200,000 children and 150,000 mothers were 
                                                   
83 Seekings, J, & Natrass, N, Class, Race, and Inequality..., p.360 





receiving state maintenance grants, in July 2003 the number of child support grants 
being paid had expanded beyond three million.85 
Africans and coloureds, therefore, have had opposite experiences of state 
welfare provision since 1948, particularly if pensioners are excluded from 
consideration. For coloureds the early and mid-apartheid period was a time of 
expanding state assistance, whilst apartheid’s last years represented a contraction 
which accelerated after 1994. Conversely, whilst welfare provision under early 
apartheid was highly prescribed, the late and post-apartheid periods saw 
considerable financial gains for many Africans as welfare payments were increased 
and access expanded.  
 
2.4.2. Forced Removals, Shortages and Race Privilege: 
Housing under Apartheid 
Estimating the extent of the housing shortage and housing provision in South Africa 
under apartheid is difficult. Many Africans living in the urban areas were doing so 
illegally, whilst legally resident Africans and their families often existed in 
situations of extreme overcrowding. Government policy in the urban townships also 
forbade the construction of informal housing, even in the backyards of existing 
properties. Whilst this did not prevent the explosion of squatter settlements and 
backyard housing, these dwellings were never officially recognised. Nor were 
illegal residents likely to show up in large numbers in government surveys. 
Therefore a wide range of official sources, census and survey data and estimates 
have been used to try to piece together the changing nature of housing provision in 
South Africa and the Western Cape. 
 Whilst apartheid housing policy permitted coloureds to live within the 
urban areas this did not translate into the provision of adequate housing for all. 
Indeed, housing shortages and overcrowding were, and still are, widely 
                                                   





experienced. By the early 1970s the shortage of coloured housing was hard to 
ignore. The 1970 census reveals that the mean number of people per room 
(excluding bathrooms and garages, but including kitchens and other outside rooms) 
in coloured households in formal housing stood at 2.0644 and that if kitchens were 
excluded this figure rose to 2.9954. Furthermore, large numbers of coloured people 
were living in informal housing and squatter settlements. Whilst exact figures are 
unavailable estimates, most of which were based in Cape Town, concur on the 
extent of the problem. In 1972 Cilliers estimated that there were 173,388 coloureds 
living in squatter conditions in and around Cape Town, a figure which represented 
22.6% of the city’s total coloured population. 86 Similarly, a report issued by the Cape 
Town Divisional Council in 1974 provided a figure of 175,000 coloureds living in 
squatter conditions in the Cape Peninsula.87 The number of coloured shacks 
registered in Cape Town between 1976 and 1982 also remained relatively constant at 
around 27,000.88 
This housing problem, particularly in the Western Cape, was compounded 
by the forced removal of large numbers of people as a result of group areas 
legislation. Central to the collective memory of oppression amongst the coloured 
people of Cape Town, group areas proclamations saw not only minority 
communities removed from areas such as Claremont in the Southern Suburbs, but 
also the rezoning of inner-city areas which were home to large numbers of coloured 
people, most notably District 6.89 The impact of the Group Areas Act was 
considerable. Horner has estimated that between the mid-1960s and early 1980s, 
261,332 coloureds were moved under the legislation. According to the 1980s census 
this represented approximately 30% of the total coloured population.90 
Consequently, the state had to expand housing provision for the people it was 
                                                   
86 Cited in Lemon, A, Apartheid: A Geography..., p. 127 
87 Western, J, Outcast Cape Town..., pp.179-185 
88 Horner, D, (ed.), Labour Preference, Influx Control and Squatters: Cape Town Entering the 1980s, 
SALDRU Working Paper 50, (Cape Town, 1983), p.7 
89 For an in depth study of the impact of the Group Areas Act on a coloured community see: Western, 
J, Outcast Cape Town... 





removing. In 1975, when many of the group areas removals had already been 
completed, there were 18500 coloured families on the waiting list for economic 
housing in Cape Town and 5700 waiting for sub-economic housing.91 However, in 
1976 Lemon calculated that if segregation and relocations were to be continued then 
a further 10,000 houses would have to be built just to house people being removed 
from the white areas, many of whom already had accommodation.92 
However, whilst housing provision for coloureds under apartheid was 
limited, and the implementation of the Group Areas Act brutal, evidence exists that 
many coloureds saw growing access to housing under apartheid, and much of this 
was a result of state funding. The apartheid government constructed large new 
housing estates with both economic and sub-economic units for rental to people 
with differing incomes throughout the country, a trend which accelerated after 1983 
when the tricameral parliament prioritised started spending in visible areas, such as 
housing and education.93 Furthermore, the amount of money spent on coloured 
housing was disproportionate to their overall share of the population.94 Census data 
reveals the improving access to housing for coloureds. It is difficult to estimate the 
number of coloureds living in informal housing, as censuses did not explicitly 
enumerate such dwellings until 1991. However, it is possible to count the number of 
households enumerated as living in formal dwellings and their household size 





                                                   
91 Ibid. p.9 
92 Lemon, A, Apartheid: A Geography..., p.74 & p.128 
93 Parnell, S, „State Intervention in Housing Provision in the 1980s‟, in (ed.) Smith, D M, The 







Table 2.8: Coloured Households by Housing Type95 
Year 1970 1991 
Flats and Houses 337606 536668 
Total Recorded Population 2050937 2929354 
People per House 6.07 5.46 
Mean Household Size of 




Table 2.8 shows that between 1970 and 1991 the number of coloured households in 
formal flats and houses increased by nearly 200,000 whilst the number of people per 
house decreased.  National Building Research Institute figures also confirm this 
pattern. In 1986 they provided statistics that suggested that some inroads had been 
made into the coloured housing shortage, with 62,000 houses built for coloureds 
between 1980 and 1985. Within this context the housing shortage was reported to 
have declined from just under 52,000 units, to around 44,000 units.96 
The same trend is apparent in the Western Cape. Large scale government 
expenditure on housing estates in areas such as Atlantis and Mitchells Plain did 
reduce the housing shortage for coloureds.97 If figures on coloured squatting in the 
1970s are compared with data from the 1991 census the impact of apartheid house 
building programmes for coloureds is revealed – 27,000 coloured shacks were 
registered in Cape Town between 1976 and 1982, however in the 1991 census only 
5542 shacks with coloured household heads were reported in the whole of what was 
then called development region A, a geographical unit roughly comparable to the 
present day Western Cape. Similarly, the 1991 census reported only 20,888 and 
83,878 coloureds living in shacks in development region A and the whole country 
respectively. 
                                                   
95 Data taken from the 1970 and 1991 South African Population Censuses 
96 Kentridge, M, Housing in South Africa..., p.6 





For Africans apartheid housing provision was undeniably inadequate, even 
for those with urban residency rights. House building in the urban areas was frozen 
during the late 1960s and 1970s, with the intention that housing would be built in 
commuter towns on the borders of the homelands.  This led to growing housing 
shortages and overcrowding amongst urban Africans which continued into the 
1980s.98 Housing data on Africans before 1991 is patchy. However estimates from 
the 1980s provide some indication of the level of the crisis. In the same 1985 survey 
which reported a declining coloured housing shortage it was estimated that the 
urban African housing shortage had more than doubled to 583,000 units. Similarly, 
the 1991 population census showed that 23.5%, of Africans in urban areas outside 
the homelands were living in shacks.  
Africans in the Western Cape experienced even less provision than Africans 
elsewhere. Ünterhalter calculates that between 1972 and 1980 the African 
population in the Western Cape increased by 62.9%, from 108,360 to 183,360.99 
However, between 1966 and 1976 not a single house for Africans was built. Access 
to housing, therefore, was only possible through reallocation of existing dwellings. 
Whilst in the late 1970s policy shifted slightly, the impact was miniscule. In 1977 the 
official shortage of housing units for (legal) Africans stood at 1700. Despite this 
there were only 5 Houses built and 9 hostels converted to 18 family units in the 
whole year. The situation worsened moving into the 1980s in spite of increased 
building.  By 1981 the legal housing shortage had risen to s 7135 family units and 
1000 hostel beds.100 
The African housing shortage was further compounded by the presence of 
large numbers of Africans in the Cape Town area illegally. In 1981 Piet Koornhof, 
Minister of Community Development, claimed that 85,436 Africans in Cape Town, 
                                                   
98 Mabin, A, „The Dynamics of Urbanisation Since 1960‟, in (eds.) Swilling, M, Humphries, R & 
Shubane, K, Apartheid City in Transition, (Cape Town, 1991), pp.38-9 
99 Ünterhalter, E, Forced Removal..., p.87 
100 Ellis, G, „Africans in the Western Cape 1900 to 1982 : A Chronology‟, in (ed.) Horner, D, Labour 
Preference, Influx Control and Squatters: Cape Town Entering the 1980s, SALDRU Working Paper 





or 42% of Cape Town’s entire African population, were there illegally.101 These 
Africans had no formal right to housing and were liable for arrest if discovered. It is 
not unreasonable, therefore, to presume that they represented an unrecorded 
demand for housing which dwarfed that presented in official government statistics. 
Indeed, the African housing shortage in Cape Town is perhaps best measured by 
the explosion of squatter camps, in spite of government repression, in areas such as 
Modderdam in the 1970s and Crossroads and KTC moving into the 1980s. This was 
of such proportions that as early as1977 it was estimated that 51,000 Africans were 
squatting in Cape Town.102 
However, whilst all Africans experienced the housing shortage legal status 
did help define access to housing. Limited census data from 1980 hints at how 
significant Section 10 (a) and (b) rights were in this respect. Of those Africans 
enumerated in the Western Province area of South Africa and reporting their 
birthplace as magisterial districts within the current Western Cape, 86.5% reported 
living in formal housing, flats and huts and 0.9% in hostels. However, of those 
Africans born outside the Western Cape only 28.5% were reported as living in 
formal housing, flats and huts and 17.5% in hostels – and many, if not all of these, 
would have been people who would have qualified for urban rights in spite of being 
born elsewhere. Whilst it is impossible to know where the remaining Africans, most 
of which were classed as living in ‘other’ dwellings in the census were residing, 
clearly urban insider status was closely related to access formal housing. 
By the 1980s, therefore, housing shortages for Africans had reached crisis 
proportions. Faced by growing opposition and unable to provide for the housing 
demand the state, from the late 1970s, turned increasingly to the private sector. This 
included both extending of leasehold rights to Africans to allow them to build their 
own houses, and in the 1980s selling rental properties to sitting tenants. This led to 
                                                   
101 West, W, „Influx Control in the Cape Peninsula‟, in (ed.) Horner, D, Labour Preference, Influx 
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an increasingly market driven housing policy. Khayelitsha, the new township built 
for Africans on the outskirts of Cape Town from 1983 onwards, provides an 
example of this change. Initially 5000 core rental houses were built. However, rather 
than expand rented provision two new housing options were made available. 
People could either buy a site and service area, where basic services such as water 
and sanitation were provided but the construction of a dwelling was left to the 
resident, or they could buy formal housing built by private companies and for sale 
at a market rate.103  
It has been argued that as policy changed in the 1980s so did the relationship 
between urban insider status and housing access. Crankshaw exemplifies this with 
his view that the move away from influx control and towards private provision led 
to fundamental shifts in the spatial composition of apartheid cities and the 
distribution of housing to Africans therein. He argues that the removal of state 
subsidies meant that it was mainly the African middle class and the upper working 
class which could afford the new privately built homes. Conversely, many poor 
Africans and unskilled and semi-skilled workers, lacking access to the limited stock 
of state provided housing, formed the majority of residents in the squatter areas that 
developed at the edge of the cities and around the site and service sites. In this way 
the growing differentiation within the labour market came to be reflected within the 
spatial composition of the townships.104 
                                                   
103 Oliver-Evans, C, Employment and Urbanisation..., p.15 





Evidence from Cape Town both supports and contradicts this interpretation. 
Graph 2.28 shows the percentage of Africans living in informal housing in 
development region A in 1991 according to income and whether they were born 
within areas designated as white South Africa, or in the homelands.105  
 
 
Three trends are apparent. Firstly, access to housing amongst people who 
historically qualified for section 10 rights has decreased considerably, with 36.9% of 
all Africans born in white South Africa living in shacks, compared to the 86.5 % 
living in flats and houses in 1980. Secondly, whilst former urban insiders have less 
access to housing than previously, they are still noticeably privileged in relation to 
                                                   
105 Data taken from the 1991 Population census. Population bands are as reported in 1991. Only 
Africans reported as living in urban and semi-urban areas of Development region A, aged 15-65, were 




































































































































































































































































Graph 2.28: % of Africans in the Urban Areas of 
Development Region A (Aged 15-65) Living in 
Shacks, Huts and Backyard Shacks by Individual 
Income Band and Birthplace (1991)
%
Annual Income






immigrants in all income brackets. Finally, income plays only a limited role in 
defining access to housing for both categories of Africans except amongst the 
highest income bands, and its impact appears to be more significant for people born 
outside of white South Africa than within. A similar picture appears if housing 
access is analysed in terms of income deciles (table 2.9). There is a general 
correlation between income decile and presence in informal housing for immigrants 
into Cape Town. However, for people born within white South Africa this 
relationship is less clear and only becomes apparent for those in the 8th and 10th 
deciles. This shows how the access to housing granted under apartheid continued to 
play a central role in mediating the impact of market driven reforms upon those 
people who had been urban insiders. 
Table 2.9: Proportion of Africans aged 15-64, living in Urban areas of Development Region 
A in informal housing by African Income Decile and Birthplace (1991).106 
Decile No 
Income 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Born 
outside RSA 
69.9 73.9 71.6 70.2 - 66.1 - 53.3 53.3 - 41.5 
Born within 
RSA 
36.2 37.5 43.1 36.6 - 32.0 - 35.1 24.1 - 23.3 
 
 
2.4.3. From Race towards Class and State Provision to 
Privatisation: Housing after Apartheid 
The ending of apartheid saw the removal of restrictions on the mobility and 
residence of all South Africans. It has also seen the government seek to expand 
housing access through a subsidy scheme in which all South Africans fulfilling 
certain income and family size criteria became eligible for a one off housing subsidy. 
                                                   
106 The above table includes all Africans reporting an income and registered as living within 
development region A of South Africa in the 1991 census. The income deciles were derived from 
bands and therefore do not represent a neat 10% split of cases. The income deciles represented are 





This subsidy can be used either to contribute towards buying an existing property 
or to lay claim to newly built subsidy housing.107 
Clearly, however, the housing shortage will take many years to clear and 
therefore whilst the subsidy system in theory provides equal access to housing for 
all, in practice decisions have to be made regarding where housing will be built and 
who will benefit. The City of Cape Town’s Housing Allocation Policy, adopted in 
2004, provides an example of the complexity behind how such decisions are made 
in practice. It outlines three criteria through which people may be selected for 
housing: as a member of a community targeted for housing upgrading; as a person 
on the housing waiting list; and as a person specifically identified by the 
municipality (usually as a result of being moved from elsewhere).108 However, there 
is no prioritising of these different categories. Indeed, it is recognised that even 
though there are waiting lists these have been poorly maintained and are difficult to 
integrate as they were composed for different racial groups under apartheid.  
The impact of the deracialisation of housing policy mirrors changes in both 
the labour market and welfare provision. Coloureds in general have seen a small 
decline in access, although this has not affected those wealthy enough to take 
advantage of the free market. Section10 Africans have seen improving access, 
although this has also been accompanied by growing provision for people born 
outside Cape Town. 
Between 1996 and 2001 there was an increase in the number of coloured 
households reported living in formal housing of some description, with  649,265 
coloured households in flats and houses in1996 and 793, 565 in 2001. However, this 
does not represent an overall improvement if population growth is considered, as 
only 87.8% of households were in formal housing in 2001, compared with 88.9% in 
1996. Statistics from the household and labour force surveys also suggest that the 
                                                   
107 Oldfield, S, „The Centrality of Community Capacity in State Low-Income Housing Provision in 
Cape Town, South Africa‟, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 24/4, December 
2000, pp.859-60 





post-apartheid period has been one of a slight decline in formal housing occupancy 
for coloureds (see table 2.10).  
 
Table 2.10: Proportion of Coloureds living in Shacks, Huts and Backyard Shacks, 
1993-2005109 
Year 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 
% 2.3 4.1 4.3 6.2 7.2 6 6.9 
 
 However, just as changes in the labour market were mediated by factors 
other than race, so too are changes in housing provision. Graph 2.29 compares the 
proportion of informal households by overall household income band in 1996 and 
2001 for all coloureds living in the Western Cape.110 What becomes clear is that 
income plays a key role in defining access to housing. Whilst not surprising, this 
relationship strengthened between 1996 and 2001. All coloured income bands, 
except the no income band, have seen a decreasing proportion of households in 
informal housing. However, this decrease is greater for those in the higher income 
bands than the lowest (excepting the unusual growth in informal housing in the 3rd 
and 2nd highest bands which may be an anomaly caused by the small amounts of 
households falling in these categories). Interestingly, the number of households 
reporting no income has grown considerably between 1996 and 2001 from 5.4% of 
all coloured households to 9.4% and it is this group which has increasingly moved 
into informal housing. 
 
 
                                                   
109 Data taken from: October Household Survey: 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999. Labour Force Survey: 
September 2001, September 2003, March 2005. 
110 Data taken from, 1996 and 2001 population censuses, all household with a coloured head of 
household were used in 1996 and all households where the majority population group was recorded as 

















It appears, therefore, that like changes in the labour market and with welfare 
provision, post-apartheid transformation has had the largest negative effect on those 
coloureds most reliant upon state support and subsidisation. Whilst housing 
provision for coloureds has only slightly worsened since 1994, it is the (increasing 
number) of people with low or no incomes that have suffered most from this 
change. 
 
Whilst coloureds have experienced a slight decline in access to housing since 
the end of apartheid, housing provision for Africans has expanded. National 
comparisons between 1991 and the post-apartheid period are difficult to make, as 
the 1991 census excluded the homelands. The situation in the Western Cape, 
however, is easier to assess because no part of the province was ever a homeland. 






































































































































Graph 2.29: Proportion Of Coloured Households Living 
 in Shacks, Huts and Backyard Shacks by  
Household Income Band in Urban Areas of the Western Cape
1996 and 2001
%








Table 2.10: % Of African Households in Shacks and Backyard Shacks by 





All Africans 59.4 65 50.4 
 Household Head Born in RSA (1991) or 
Western Cape (2001) 
40.4 - 25.6 
Household Head Born Elsewhere 68 - 58.6 
 
However, within the context of an ongoing housing shortage apartheid insiders are 
still privileged in their housing access. People born outside the Western Cape are 
more likely to be housed in informal housing than those born within the area (graph 
2.30).112  
                                                   
111 Data from the 1991, 1996 and 2001 population censuses. 













































































































































Graph 2.30: % Of African Households in the Urban Areas of 
the Western Cape Living in Shacks, 
Huts and Backyard Shacks by Household Income 
Band and Birthplace 2001
%
Income
 Born in Western Cape
 Not Born in Western Cape
 
In all income bands people from outside the area are less likely to be formally 
housed than Africans born in the Western Cape. Indeed, Africans born in the 
Western Cape with no income are more likely to be in formal housing than people 
from outside with a household income of up to R18,000. However, whilst birthplace 
correlates with housing access, income is also important, with access improving for 
both groups as incomes increase. If this is compared to the data from 1991 (graph 
2.28 and table 2.9), which revealed only a very limited correlation between income 
and formal housing access, particularly for Africans born within the Western Cape, 
it becomes clear that whilst housing access has improved it has done so in a way 
that has seen access expand most rapidly amongst more wealthy Africans. Graph 
2.31 compares changes in housing access by income for all African households in 
urban areas of the Western Cape in 1996 and 2001 (unfortunately data was not 
collected on birthplace in the 1996 census). It clearly reveals that although the 
proportion of Africans living in informal housing has decreased across the board 
(unlike for coloureds) income has mediated the extent to which this improvement 





the R96,001 - R132,000 & R132,001 - R192,000) presence in informal housing has 
dropped markedly. However, for those in the lower brackets this drop has been less 
pronounced. It would appear, therefore, that those on lower income have been less 











































































































































Graph 2.31: % Of Coloured Households Living in Urban Areas 
of the Western Cape in Shacks, Huts and Backyard 
Shacks by Household Income Band: 1996 and 2001
%




2.4.4. Race, Class and the Continuing Legacy of Apartheid 
Discrimination in Housing Provision 
Overall, the picture of housing provision since 1948 has been of an incomplete move 
away from race as the key determinant of access, towards income. Under early 
apartheid the state provided and regulated access to housing in line with apartheid 
principles. Coloureds were moved out of white areas and into new segregated 
housing estates, but overall provision for coloureds expanded. In contrast, Africans 
were treated as temporary urban residents and housing provision stagnated. As 





changed and the state withdrew from housing provision. This saw the start of a 
trend that was to be continued post-apartheid – the growing importance of income 
in securing access to housing. However, whilst post-apartheid income is 
increasingly important for securing access to housing, apartheid has left a clear 
legacy. Summarising evidence from the Western Cape presented above, whilst 
nearly 70% of African households with no income and household heads born 
outside the Western Cape in 2001 were living in informal housing, this figure falls to 
around 40% of zero income households with an African head born within the 
region, and only about 22% of zero income coloured households.  
 
2.5. Conclusion: Race, Class and Differential 
Discrimination 
 
Whilst apartheid is often stereotyped as dualistic system of exploitation based upon 
the division of white and black this study has revealed a complex system of 
privilege and discrimination in which South Africa’s non-white population 
experienced considerable internal variation. Non-whites were split into racial 
groups and treated differentially on this basis, whilst Africans were further 
differentiated by influx control legislation. However this was not all that affected 
people life chances. Racial discrimination interacted with socio-economic cleavages, 
creating complex contours of privilege and discrimination. For all blacks apart from 
those living in the homelands apartheid provided access to state resources and 
economic opportunities which were conditional upon their presence in the 
apartheid hierarchy. Coloureds received better housing, welfare provision and 
labour market opportunities than Africans, whilst Africans with section 10 rights 
received more that migrants. Conversely, however, blacks were also discriminated 





 Within this context, the way in which blacks interacted with apartheid was 
heavily mediated by individual characteristics. For coloureds and section 10 
Africans with low levels of education apartheid discrimination actually protected 
people from competition for resources and employment by people below them in 
the hierarchy. In contrast, people with greater education and potential life 
opportunities did not need this protection. Instead apartheid created ceilings 
artificially restricting their advancement. 
With the gradual erosion of apartheid these artificial barriers have been 
removed and this has had a differential impact within and across the different race 
groups. For those of all races previously inhibited by apartheid’s artificial ceilings 
the removal of discrimination has opened up new opportunities and seen growing 
wealth and access to services such as housing. For those with less education the 
picture has varied more by race. For Africans increased competition for 
employment has come from mass immigration from the Eastern Cape and 
unemployment has rocketed. However, housing provision and state welfare 
assistance have both improved, even if recent immigrants are able to share in this 
provision. In contrast working class coloureds seem to have suffered particularly 
notably from deracialisation, although on most indicators they still fare 
considerably better than Africans. Increased competition for skilled and unskilled 
manual work has seen job opportunities for coloureds without education decline. 
The value of state welfare grants for the poorest coloureds has fallen and, whilst 
housing provision has increased in absolute numbers, the proportion of coloured 
households living in informal accommodation has crept up slowly.  
 Overall, therefore, whilst race has played a central role in patterning life 
chances in South Africa, alone this is not sufficient to explain discrimination and 
inequality. Race interacted with a complex terrain of class, education and internal 
differentiation to produce very different experiences amongst different groups of 
black South Africans depending where they were positioned in relation to 





nature of collective action in apartheid and how it relates to the changing patterns of 











































Race, Class and Revolt: The Student Uprising 




In June 1976 school pupils in the township of Soweto marched to protest against the 
introduction of Afrikaans as the language of instruction for half of all secondary 
school subjects. Confronted by unarmed protesters members of the South African 
Police Force opened fire and, in the first act of what was to become nationwide 
unrest, the students rioted. This unrest spread rapidly, first through the Rand 
before, in August, Cape Town was engulfed.  
Considerable focus has been placed upon the demographic, organisational 
and political developments preceding and influencing the development of unrest in 
Soweto. However, the Cape Town context was unique. In Soweto Black 
Consciousness (BC) organisations and ideologies intertwined with events, whilst in 
Cape Town they were marked by their absence. Furthermore, Capetonians were 
uniquely affected by the Coloured Labour Preference Policy. This chapter aims, 
therefore, to draw into focus the specific experience of the 1976 uprising in Cape 
Town whilst relating its findings to broader debates surrounding Soweto. 
This chapter challenges three positions within the literature on 1976 – 1) that 
the events of 1976 were primarily political and universal in content, rather than 
immediate and student centred, 2) that the failure of the students to gain consistent 
adult and migrant worker support was a failure of student strategies, rather than 
representing an unwillingness on behalf of adults to challenge the state, and 3) that 





and coloureds.  It does this by showing that the events of 1976 in the city were at 
heart a highly fragmented and student driven response to the opening of political 
space brought about by the riots in Soweto and the state’s failure to contain them, 
which not only failed to create inter-generational and cross race cooperation, but 
were operating in a context which made such co-operation highly unlikely.  
Students became drawn into the unrest because Soweto and its aftermath 
expanded political space and provided an opportunity to challenge an education 
system that was both unjust and failing to deliver. This led to the unrest developing 
in a manner which was both dominated by students and which articulated demands 
that were firmly grounded in the student experience. However, more generally the 
social base for a more general revolt was lacking. Before 1976 adults in both 
Bonteheuwel and Guguletu had been drawn into ambiguous relationships with 
apartheid by the functioning of the apartheid political economy and the way in 
which access to resources locally were distributed. Consequently, when unrest 
broke the broader black population had little to gain and much to lose through 
engaging in protest. Furthermore, the differential impact of apartheid across and 
within the different racial groups prevented coherent narratives of change and plans 
of action from developing, even amongst the students. Pressures within apartheid 
education had built up in different communities but they were mediated by both 
race and class and the emergence of revolt did not reach across these boundaries.  
This chapter starts by outlining the current debates that exist around the 
events of 1976. It then moves to a discussion of the forms of civil society that existed 
in Cape Town before 1976. It shows that there was little progressive activism in 
coloured and African communities at this time and, more importantly, that the 
forms of organisation that did exist demonstrate ambiguities in the relationships 
between older black Capetonians and the apartheid state rooted in the functioning 
of apartheid’s discriminatory and distributional regime. Accepting that there was 
little organisational impetus behind the outbreak of unrest the chapter then 





intersection of clear schoolyard grievances with an opening of political space as 
events in Soweto made change appear possible and the reactions of the police 
pushed people into retaliation and boycott. Finally, it considers the progression of 
the unrest and demonstrates how its development was patterned by the differential 
experiences of apartheid within and across the city’s black communities. Students 
remained at the heart of events because apartheid education gave them a clear and 
immediate focus for protest. In contrast adults, and particularly African migrants, 
remained alienated from activism as challenging apartheid at this time had little to 
offer to people beyond the schoolyard. 
 
3.2. The Uprising of 1976 in Current Literature: Student 
Revolt or Universal Revolution? 
 
Academic literature on 1976 has focused on three interrelated features of the 
uprising. Firstly there has been a focus upon the relationship between organisations 
and the uprising: were the events of 1976 planned and what role did political 
movements and ideologies (both the banned liberation movements and Black 
Consciousness organisations) play in events? Secondly the activists themselves have 
been investigated: was 1976 simply a student phenomenon or did it draw support 
from throughout black society? Thirdly the role of structural conditions has been 
considered: was the uprising a response to a growing crisis of apartheid rule as 
represented by a deepening recession and the growth of an increasingly educated 
African youth, or was it simply a consequence of misguided education policy and a 
heavy-handed police response?1 
                                                   
1 For a range of interpretations on these questions see: Mafeje, A, ‘Soweto and its aftermath’, 
Review of African Political Economy, 5/11, 1978, pp.17-30;  
Glaser, C, ‘‛We Must Infiltrate the Tsotsis’: School Politics and Youth Gangs in Soweto, 1968-





Whilst divergent in their focus these debates contain at their core the 
underlying question of whether 1976 represented at one extreme a spontaneous, 
particularistic student revolt or at the other a universal political assault on state 
power. Opinions on this question are diverse, but coalesce around three broad 
positions. Firstly, it has been argued that the events of 1976 represented a politicised 
uprising which drew large numbers of Africans from across society into a sustained 
challenge to state power. Hopkins and Grange argue that amongst students 
schooling issues took a back seat to demands for political change, even before the 
revolt broke out, and that Soweto represented a clearly defined political challenge to 
the state.2 In a more nuanced analysis Brooks and Brickhill acknowledge that 
students were at the centre of events but, pointing to the valorisation of liberation 
movement figures by the students and the formation of the Black Parents 
Association, have argued that whilst there was a shaking off of deference amongst 
the youth during 1976 this was not a rejection of the political heritage passed down 
from their elders. Instead, by fighting the state the students were the vanguard of a 
more universal struggle, gaining a widespread sympathy from the community at 
large which allowed them to ‘assume sustained leadership of a struggle that 
developed through several phases and over much wider ground.’3  
In contrast, the second position argues that underlying conditions were right 
for a broadening of struggle but a failure of student strategies prevented uprising 
becoming a universal and sustained challenge to state power. Specifically, it is 
argued that apartheid was so discriminatory it created a predisposition amongst the 
black working class towards oppositional political activity. Therefore, failures to 
broaden the social basis of the uprising had to be a result of deficient student 
                                                                                                                                                
Response’, Review of African Political Economy, 5/11, 1978, pp.93-100; Hirson, B, Year of Fire, 
Year of Ash. The Soweto Revolt: Roots of a Rebellion?, (London, 1979) 
2 Hopkins, P & Grange, H, The Rocky Rioter Teargas Show: The Inside Story of the 1976 Uprising, 
(Cape Town, 2001), p.66 
3 Brooks, A & Brickhill, J, Whirlwind Before the Storm: The Origins and Development of the 






organisation and the lack of a coherent political message. This approach is perhaps 
best illustrated in the work of Hirson, who argues that: 
It was as if the recognition of the importance of the workers in any struggle 
remained a theoretical construct [for the students] that could not be made concrete. 
And if that is the case, it could only be because the young students were not able to 
make organisational contact with real flesh-and-blood workers in industry.4 
 
The final position agrees that 1976/76 was a student uprising, but explains its 
limited social base on cleavages within the black population. Several authors have 
pointed to the fact that it was schooling policies – notably the rapid expansion of 
secondary education and the decision to implement Afrikaans as a language of 
instruction – that were the main causes of the uprising.5 Building on this it has been 
argued that students had a unique experience of apartheid and consequently there 
was no clear basis upon which a student/parent/worker action could be formed. 
Ruth First argues that seeing the working class as a group simply waiting to be 
activated into revolt ignores the complexity of class in South Africa and the fact that 
different black groups, notably the migrant workers, had different interests.6 Glaser 
makes a similar point in his study of relations between students and gangsters in 
Soweto during 1976, arguing that as an educated elite the students had little in 
common with most township youth. Therefore, whilst during the uprising these 
groups occasionally cooperated, this was fraught with tension and their different 
experiences, organisational forms and goals served to ultimately keep the two 
groups separate.7  
 
                                                   
4 Hirson, B, Year of Fire, Year of Ash..., p.253, Italics mine;  
See also Mafeje, A, „Soweto and its aftermath‟ ...  
5 Hyslop, J, „School Student Movements and State Education Policy: 1972-87‟, in (eds.) Cobbett, W 
and Cohen R, Popular Struggles in South Africa, (Sheffield, 1988) 
6 First, R, „After Soweto...‟, p.95 





3.3. Armchair Revolutionaries and Old Timers: The Dearth of 
Radical Politics in Cape Town before 1976 
 
In Soweto the 1976 uprising was preceded by the development of new forms of 
organisation (particularly within the schools) and the growth of Black 
Consciousness (BC).8 However, in Cape Town civil society before 1976 was 
quiescent and politicisation constrained.  
Black Consciousness and linked organisations had virtually no presence in 
either the African or coloured schools in the Western Cape. There was only one 
branch of the BC South African Student Movement (SASM) in a coloured school in 
the Athlone area of the city, none in the African schools, and BC organisation was 
weak throughout the city.9 There was also little BC involvement in community 
projects – a hallmark of their activities elsewhere. As Johnny Issel, one of the city’s 
leading BC activists at this time remarked of attempts to build such organisations, 
‘people were not very interested in these things.’10 Activists from other ideological 
tendencies had similar experiences. Neville Alexander, working from a 
revolutionary Trotskyite position, formed a socialist study group and became 
involved in setting up self-help groups, most notably the creation of a purchasing 
co-operative in the squatter camp of Vrygrond. However, whilst the study group 
continued, the co-op was abandoned due to the amount of organisers’ time it 
consumed.11  
The ANC was also inactive. ANC organising within the coloured 
communities had a limited history and there is no evidence of coloured ANC 
activism in the period immediately preceding 1976. Even in the African townships, 
where there were activists – mainly ‘old timers’ who had cut their political teeth in 
                                                   
8 Ibid.,  pp.301-323 
9 Johnny Issel Interviewed by Jeremy Seekings, 12/3/1992, Cape Town; Interview with Oupa 
Lehulere (1986) reproduced in: Khanya History Programme,  Students and the Struggle for Freedom 
in South Africa 1976-2006, (Johannesburg, 2006), p.46 
10 Johnny Issel, interviewed by Jeremy Seekings, 12/3/1992, Cape Town 





the 1950s – these activists were mainly involved in underground work, maintaining 
links with the exiled liberation movements and identifying people to send abroad 
for military training: ANC involvement in civil society before 1976 was non-
existent.12  
 Rather than being dominated by radical activists civil society in Cape Town 
at this time was dominated by organisations with a quiescent approach to the state 
and its policies. This did not mean that African and coloured civil society 
necessarily provided support to apartheid, however it did mean that before 1976 
open challenges to state policy were limited. 
In the coloured areas there was organised opposition to apartheid within 
both civil and political society, yet this opposition operated in a way that allowed 
rhetorical opposition to coexist alongside forms of activism that demanded little 
active support. This opposition was split between the Labour Party, which sought 
election to apartheid bodies in order to undermine them from within, and the Unity 
Movement, which opposed any collaboration and promoted boycotts of apartheid 
institutions.  
The Labour Party drew its strength from electoral politics. Unlike Africans, 
coloureds had no homeland. Consequently mechanisms existed for political 
representation, which the Labour Party dominated. It was organised as an 
exclusively coloured political party and, despite a brief flirtation with BC in the 
early 1970s, remained focused upon organising and promoting the interests of 
coloureds, rather than all non-white groups.13  However, whilst the Labour Party 
sought election to government bodies it used its involvement in these institutions to 
oppose them from within, rendering them unworkable.  
                                                   
12 Interview with Mildred Leseia, 4/9/2006, Parliament, Cape Town;  Interview with Mountain 
Quembello, 25/7/2006, Guguletu;  Interview with Wilson Sidina, 31/10/2005, Guguletu 
13 Goldin, I, Making Race: The Politics and Economics of Coloured Identity in South Africa, (London 





In contrast to the Labour Party the Unity Movement rejected all involvement 
in apartheid’s ‘dummy bodies’ and boycotted apartheid elections. It espoused a 
position which came to be classed as ‘ultra-left’, rejecting co-operation with whites, 
arguing for working class dominance of the struggle and promoting a policy of non-
collaboration in order to render apartheid unworkable.  
The Unity Movement’s strength was within the schools and the sports 
movement. Unity Movement teachers were involved in running after school 
discussion groups and study sessions and providing political education for pupils. 
Indeed, many people who were to become key figures in the anti-apartheid 
movement in the Western Cape had their first experience of political discussion and 
activism through the Unity Movement.14 The Unity Movement also had 
considerable influence within the South African Council of Sport (SACOS). Set up in 
1973 to facilitate sporting cooperation between communities in opposition to the 
government’s organising of sport along racial lines SACOS practiced non-
collaboration by organising non-racial sporting events, bringing together teams 
from across both the region and the country. 
However, whilst both the Unity Movement and the Labour Party opposed 
apartheid and could exert influence they did not encouraged open or mass  
opposition to the state or its policies. Unity Movement teachers provided political 
education but, in the period before 1976, never encouraged their students to 
organise to oppose unpopular policies either within or beyond the schools. Indeed 
schools with strong Unity Movement traditions were often the least active in 1976.15 
Similarly, the Labour Party confined its opposition to electoral politics. 
In the African areas open political organisation was forbidden and civil 
society was dominated by township based organisations concerned with the 
immediate challenges of urban living. Very different forms of community 
organisation dominated in the areas of the townships which housed section 10 (a) 
                                                   
14 Trevor Manuel, Interviewed by Jeremy Seekings, 4/7/1992, Johannesburg 





and (b) residents, those that housed migrants and those that housed squatters. 
Indeed, it was not until the mid-1990s that the residential organisations representing 
these different communities united. As the focus here is the formal township of 
Guguletu the organisations and networks which were operating in the squatter and 
hostel areas will not be discussed.16  
Two forms of organisation are considered here because of the key role they 
played in ordering community responses to the local state and their continuing 
salience throughout the following three decades. These are the street committees 
and resident’s associations. Whilst both street committees and residents association, 
or ‘civics’ as they were to become known, are most often associated with growing 
opposition to apartheid during the 1980s, similar structures existed in Cape Town in 
1975.  
The street committees were, and still are, locally based organisations 
composed of local residents organised together within a street. Elected by the 
street’s residents these committees are normally made up of a chair, vice-chair, 
secretary and treasurer, sitting in an executive committee of around ten. Whilst their 
precise roles have varied over time and in different areas of South Africa, in Cape 
Town at this time they were concerned primarily with regulating residents’ 
behaviour and seeking to make the townships hospitable environments. 
The street committees developed in Guguletu soon after its formation and 
were widespread. Nearly all people interviewed in Guguletu said that street 
committees existed in their streets and residents remember street committees 
existing when they first occupied their houses in the 1960s and early 1970s.17 The 
role of the street committees during this period was primarily dispute resolution 
and tackling petty crime. Dispute resolution involved calling people, often fighting 
                                                   
16 For a discussion of the nature of internal organisation of the hostel areas based on research 
performed in the township of Langa during the early 1960s see: Wilson, M & Mafeje, A, Langa: A 
Study of Social Groups in an African Township, (Cape Town, 1963) 
17 Interview with Guguletu street committee chair, 9/11/05, Guguletu;  Street committee members (4 
& 5) interviewed by Rebekah Lee, 2000/2001; Street committee member (1) interviewed by Rebekah 





family members, to street meetings, asking them to explain their situation and 
adjudicating on disputes. As one respondent, recalled: ‘*T+hey would intervene if 
there was a family crisis, sorting that problem and bringing peace together.’18  
Central to the functioning of the committees was also crime prevention. Activities to 
regulate crime varied, with some committees simply calling offenders to meetings, 
whilst others sometimes dealt out physical punishment.19  
The street committees also provided linkages between local residents and 
apartheid administrators. Street committee members would represent individuals in 
their dealings with the local authorities. In Guguletu a street chair addressed the 
administration board on behalf of a woman who had received an eviction notice due 
to complaints about her behaviour. In this role the street committee sought to both 
reconcile the resident with the members of the community who were unhappy with 
her behaviour, and simultaneously represent her to the local authorities.20  
The second form of organisation were the residents’ associations. A number 
of different organisations emerged during the 1960s and 1970s to represent the 
interests of residents of Guguletu. As early as 1962 there is evidence of a Nyanga 
West Civic Association (NWCA) operating in the area that was to later be renamed 
Guguletu, complaining to the Administration Board about flooding at the train 
station.21 There was a Coordinating Civic Council, which it appears was formed in 
the early 1970s as a coordinating body for a range of organisations operating in the 
African townships.22 An organisation called the Guguletu Residents’ Association 
(GRA) also emerged in 1975 out of the pre-existing Guguletu Community Services 
Association.  
                                                   
18 Interview with Participant in backyard housing movement, 19/4/2006, Guguletu 
19 Street committee members (4 & 5) interviewed by Rebekah Lee, 2000/2001. The interviewee 
recalls the operation of the committees during the 1960s 
20 Letter from the Director of Labour and Community Services to Argus Action, „Complaint by Miss 
Monica Ngesi of D-442, Nyanga‟, 1p., typed, ss, A4, 21/6/1974, CTAR, AWC 2/18, NY8/30/1 
21 Letter from A. Noapi of the Nyanga West Civic Association to „Dear Sir‟, 1p., typed ,ss, A4, n.d, 
CTAR, AWC, 2/2, G7 
22Letter from the Acting Secretary of the Co-ordinating Civic Council of Langa, Guguletu and Nyanga 





Just like the street committees, the residents associations were concerned 
with making the lives of Guguletu’s residents more bearable, primarily through 
regulating the local community and passing on community concerns to the 
authorities. The importance of these activities was made explicit as early as 1967 in 
the constitution of the Guguletu Community Services Association. This stated its 
aims as: 
a) To assist the authorities concerned with the administration of the Guguletu 
township by serving as a liaison between them and residents. 
b) To devise ways and means of (assisting the authorities in) combating juvenile 
delinquency and eliminating undesirable elements. 
c) To assist the authorities by encouraging residents in the promotion of social, cultural 
and recreational activities.23 
 
Similar views were also put forward in the constitution of the GRA: 
The purpose of the association shall be to:- 
(i) unite the residents of the 4 sections of Guguletu into one common body for 
the purpose of fostering closer relationships by the exchange of 
residential/citizenship experiences, views and knowledge among members. 
(ii) uphold and maintain the just claims of the residents by negotiating through 
recognized (sic) channels of communication with the Bantu Administration 
Board. 
(iii) enlighten the residents to the broader principles about the Urban Bantu 
Council policies.24 
 
In liaising with the authorities the residents’ associations also sought to 
perform a role as quasi local governments. The GRA was organised around the 
principle that ‘every man or woman, boy or girl, who is resident of Guguletu shall 
be a member of the GRA’.25 It also sought to provide for elections of officeholders 
and to draw feedback through mass meetings (although the extent to which these 
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operated openly is unclear). As such it strove to operate not simply as a voluntary 
organisation, but as a reflection of the collective will of the whole community.  
It is difficult to assess the strength of the African residents’ associations; 
however it would appear that their presence was relatively wide. Although not 
uniform across the township, at least some street committees in Guguletu were 
linked into the GRA. The GRA’s constitution suggests it operated as an umbrella 
body for street committees as it gave its executive committee power to look into any 
complaint made with regards to ‘any officer, member, street or section in its 
jurisdiction.’26 Furthermore, an interviewee specifically recalled that when he first 
moved to Guguletu the street committees were known as ‘Guguletu Residents.’27  
Civil society in both the coloured and African communities of Cape Town 
before 1976 was quiescent. However, apartheid was characterised by the denial of 
political rights, poor quality services and in many coloured and all African 
communities, poverty and low wages. Questions arise, therefore, over why the 
regime was not more openly opposed. The traditional explanation for this has been 
that quiescence was a function of repression and a collective memory of the failure 
of the protests of the late 1950s and early 1960s. There can be little doubt that this 
played a role. After Sharpeville many activists were imprisoned and those who 
remained were hindered by government banning orders and the fear of being 
informed upon. Activists also experienced problems in learning new ways to 
organise once the mass action of the 1950s was no longer feasible.28 Consequently 
political positions were rarely articulated in the open and radical political 
organising was eschewed.  
 However, this is not a sufficient explanation for quiescence. There was clear 
cooperation between widespread community structures and apartheid 
administrators in African communities which cannot be explained away as a result 
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of fear and disorganisation. Furthermore, coloured organisations – which had a far 
broader scope for action – were timid in their opposition. Any explanation of 
quiescence, therefore, needs to move beyond a simple assertion of the constraining 
effects of state power to consider the complexity of relationships between the 
apartheid state and its black populations. 
In the African communities civil society quiescence was linked to the 
relationships which emerged from the nature of administrative control in the 
townships and community responses to the constraints and opportunities this 
presented. Specifically, a symbiotic relationship emerged between local government 
and civil society organisations based around the distribution of limited resources. 
This relationship encouraged Africans to cooperate with, rather than challenge, state 
power. 
Whilst limited in quantity– particularly in the case of housing – local 
government in the townships (the Bantu Affairs Administration Board (BAAB)) 
controlled resources such as housing leases and trading permits.29 However, despite 
having this control their knowledge of the African population was administering 
was highly circumscribed. There were no electoral mechanisms for the 
representation of Africans until the late 1970s and administrative information was 
often missing or incomplete. For example, the BAAB was at times unsure about who 
was resident in the properties they let and who was eligible for such housing when 
it became available, with the housing archives containing complaints from people 
being charged rent for housing they are not occupying and complaints of people 
illegally occupying housing units.30 
 Whilst the local administration was struggling with a lack of administrative 
data local residents were constructing organisations to negotiate the hardships of 
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urban life. Street committees initially emerged in response to the failure of the 
apartheid state to provide adequate services in the townships. For example the focus 
upon dispute resolution and informal policing filled a gap produced by an absence 
of effective state policing.31 Similarly, residents’ associations developed to fill the 
void left by the absence of formal mechanisms for representation and consultation 
with the local state, which regulated many elements of Africans’ day-to-day lives. 
The constitutions of these organisations made specific reference to their roles as 
channels of ‘liaison’ between the authorities and township dwellers and one of the 
first community councillors noted explicitly that, ‘these bodies filled the vacuum 
which had arisen as a result of the dissolution of the Urban Black Council.’32 
 However, gaps and failings in apartheid administration did not necessarily 
lead to a quiescent civil society. Seekings’ study of the radical civic associations in 
the 1980s, which challenged not only unpopular policies but also apartheid, argues 
that these organisations were the result of similar dynamics to those described 
above: specifically the implementation of unpopular policies and the lack of 
legitimate channels of representation through which to oppose them.33 
Consequently the quiescent nature of African civil society in this period needs 
further explanation. The key to such an explanation lies in the symbiotic 
relationship that emerged between the African civil society organisations and 
apartheid administrators. The BAAB needed mechanisms to interact with and 
administer local communities; at the same time interaction with the BAAB provided 
concrete benefits for civil society organisations’ members and activists. Civil society 
organisations were therefore granted quasi-representative and administrative 
functions in return for their cooperation. 
                                                   
31 Street committee members (4 & 5) interviewed by Rebekah Lee, 2000/2001, , see also „Images of 
punishment in the People's Courts of Cape Town 1985-7 - from Prefigurative Justice to Populist 
Violence‟ in (eds.) Manganyi, C and Du Toit, A, Political Violence and the Struggle in South Africa, 
(London, 1990), pp.342-3 
32 „Minutes of the Third General Meeting of the Cape Town Community Council Held in the Fezeka 
Hall on Thursday, 8th November 1979 at 15h00‟, 32p., typed, ss, A4, 08/11/1979, CTAR, PACG 204, 
3/2/10/3, p.2 
33 Seekings, J, „Civic Organisations in South African Townships‟, in (eds.) Moss, G & Obery, I,  From 





The acting head of the BAAB in 1978 revealed the role that the residents associations 
played in providing a channel of communication between the board and the 
residents when he noted that: 
It is impossible for him to go out and speak to every individual in the townships, 
therefore the board has to rely to a great extent on the co-operation of civic 
associations.34 
 
However, in relying upon local civil society the BAAB devolved a series of de facto 
powers to these organisations. Residents associations and street committees 
assumed responsibilities for identifying and legitimating people to receive state 
resources. The Nyanga West Civic Association was responsible for providing letters 
of assistance to people registering for houses in Guguletu during its early 
occupation.35 They were also allowed to directly nominate people to receive 
preferential treatment. For example, at a meeting held in 1963 with BAAB officials, 
the Civic Association requested priority for its membership for newly constructed 
housing and whilst not all were accommodated the board agreed to house 5 
members and the Association provided a list of names to this effect.36 
At the extreme such networks could also be used to generate profit. 
Members of the Nyanga West Civic Association appear to have sold ‘assisting 
letters’ to help people register for houses in the mid-1960s.37 This process continued 
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throughout the 1970s. For example, in 1979 a woman made a complaint to the 
housing board in which she stated that she had approached a member of the 
Guguletu Residents’ Association because ‘she is acquainted with officials and is 
known to help blacks obtaining houses.’ She had given her R20 and a bottle of 
whisky; she also gave R60 to be passed on to an official of the BAAB. Interestingly 
the complaint was not focused on the solicitation of the bribe, but on the 
individual’s failure to deliver.38 
Within Guguletu, therefore, whilst repression played a role in generating 
quiescence it, quiescence was also generated through the function of the local 
political economy and distributive networks. There were clear incentives for 
cooperation with the state and these moulded a residential civil society and local 
political practice that was cooperative rather than conflictual.  
Civil and political society in the coloured communities was less collaborative 
than in the African areas, but in spite of its rhetorical commitment to opposing 
apartheid rarely involved itself in active opposition to the state or its policies. 
Explaining coloured civil society during this period is complex. However, it appears 
that for most coloureds apartheid offered some benefits and that before the late 
1970s many coloureds actually experienced improving standards of living, whilst 
simultaneously experiencing political disenfranchisement. Consequently, coloureds 
developed an ambiguous relationship with the state that reflected their intermediate 
position within the apartheid hierarchy.  
Mohammed Adhikari makes the point that throughout the twentieth century 
coloured politics was dominated by an ambiguous relationship to racial 
discrimination. Whilst coloureds were generally opposed to the discrimination they 
experienced, their intermediate status in racial hierarchies also gave them privileges 
they were cautious about risking.  Consequently, a major focus of coloured political 
activity revolved around ensuring they were not entirely excluded from the system: 
                                                   






Because their assimilationist aspirations were thwarted and their intermediate 
position gave Coloured people significant privileges relative to Africans, the basic 
dynamic behind the assertion of Coloured identity and the main thrust of mobilizing 
(sic) politically as coloured people was to defend this position of relative privilege.39 
 
This dynamic finds echoes within several studies of coloured politics during 
this period. For example, it has been argued that one of the reasons that (radical) 
Unity Movement politics appealed to middle class coloureds was that non-
collaboration allowed opposition to apartheid without taking risks which could lead 
either to imprisonment, or in the case of the main bulwark of the Unity Movement – 
teachers employed by the state – unemployment.40 Similar positions are present in 
studies of broader coloured attitudes. For example in the mid-1970s it was reported 
that coloureds were ambivalent about job discrimination, because whilst it 
prevented their advancement, it simultaneously protected them from African 
competition.41 
It must also be recognised that although apartheid was restraining 
advancement for some, during the 1960s and early 1970s it was also delivering 
notable benefits for others. As shown in chapter two, the late 1960s and early 1970s 
saw a marked expansion of employment opportunities and income for coloureds 
with, for example, coloured per capita disposable income rising in real terms by 
over 4% per year between 1965 and 1975. Access to state services such as housing 
was also increasing. Many activists interviewed in Bonteheuwel remarked that their 
parents had moved into the area from squatter camps and it had been a positive 
experience.42 
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Within this context quiescence appears unsurprising. Political discrimination 
and poverty did exist and many people opposed this discrimination. However, 
people’s immediate experiences also included day-to-day improvements in the 
quality of living and there appeared little to gain by openly challenging apartheid. 
Consequently many coloureds articulated their opposition to apartheid through 
political and civil society organisations that allowed them to express opposition 
without demanding radical action. 
It is also worth noting that for those coloureds worst hit by apartheid social 
engineering – the victims of the group areas removals – the consequence of these 
policies probably also contributed to a lack of radical challenge. Dense social 
networks are often vital for the formation of organisations as they provide the 
contacts through which people come together to share problems and organise.43 
However, strong social networks were absent amongst people recently moved. 
Western’s study of the group area removals reveals how there was little community 
cohesion in the new townships as peoples’ networks were torn asunder when they 
moved into environments where they knew no-one. 44 Without such bonds it would 
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3.4. Students before 1976: Discontent without Action 
 
While apartheid administration and discrimination tied many Africans and 
coloureds into ambiguous relations with the state there was one section of the 
population which was insulated from many of the benefits of apartheid, whilst 
being affected disproportionately by the discriminatory aspects of apartheid 
legislation. These were the young, and increasingly educated, school pupils.  
 Both coloured and African secondary schooling had undergone considerable 
expansion immediately before the outbreak of unrest in Soweto.45 However, whilst 
South African blacks were becoming better educated they were not always able to 
translate this into improved employment, earning opportunities and life 
experiences. As shown in chapter two, apartheid strictly limited opportunities for 
both Africans and coloureds, especially by placing ceilings on possible achievement 
for those with the best education. The impact of this was well recognised at the time. 
In its evidence to the Cillié commission the Cape Western Region of the Institute of 
Race Relations reported that because of the CLPP: 
On the whole they [youth] have attained higher educational standards than their 
parents, yet are precluded of making use thereof. The Cape Western Region of the 
Institute [of Race Relations] has records of a very large number of [African] 
matriculants who found no employment but as labourers; of qualified women 
primary school teacher who were unable to obtain teaching positions and were 
either unemployed, or working as domestic servants, chars or ‚tea girls.‛46  
 
Similar restrictions were also felt within the coloured communities. A series of 
essays were written by pupils at Alexander Sinton High School on the uprising and 
its causes and were made available to the commission into the riot. One of the 
themes within these pieces, written by young, generally middle class coloureds, was 
the limitations that apartheid placed upon their personal achievement: 
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Even when having a standard ten certificate a so-called [coloured] is not able to 
obtain a proper job< it is unfair that the poor white should be placed above the 
upper class coloured.47 
 
 Alongside the restrictions placed on achievement by apartheid there was 
also dissatisfaction at the quality and form of schooling that was provided. In the 
African schools the Afrikaans language policy was universally despised from the 
moment it was introduced. Few teachers, let alone pupils, were proficient in 
Afrikaans and its introduction had a huge impact on the schooling experience. In 
Soweto it was protests against this policy that were the catalyst for the riots and 
whilst in Cape Town it did not create such an immediate reaction, it was still 
experienced as a clear barrier to educational attainment. One pupil recounts how 
their teacher used to teach from two books: reading out the Afrikaans text, but using 
the English text to teach herself.48 Suddenly many subjects became inaccessible and 
the potential for academic success appeared to evaporate. The words of one pupil 
echo the general hatred for the new policy and its impact on attainment: 
*T+his Afrikaans. I hated it< Even at school, the math, we were doing it in 
Afrikaans, the geography we were doing it in Afrikaans. Lets say for a child that 
didn’t grow up in an Afrikaans place, it’s killing her or him, so we didn’t want that 
Afrikaans language, we just wanted our own, our own language and English to be 
the second language.49 
 
The picture in the coloured schools was more variable. The quality of coloured 
schooling was higher than for Africans. There was also considerable variation in the 
quality of education and facilities between coloured schools. However, in general 
there still existed considerable discontent about both the quality of facilities and the 
curriculum. For example, in the wake of the uprising the schools in Bonteheuwel 
issued a list of ten grievances, the first four of which were: 
1. The system of coloured education and the policy of apartheid. 
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2. The lack of compulsory education for coloured people. 
3. The lack of facilities at the coloured schools. 
4. The lack of good sportsgrounds and playgrounds at the schools and in the 
residential areas. 50 
 
Similarly, as one Alexander Sinton pupil said: 
I myself, speaking for the majority is dissatisfied with the education. We haven’t the 
proper facilities but it is expected of us the (sic) produce results, without it being 
proved to us that what we are learning is of very much importance to us. 51  
 
On the verge of 1976, therefore, education and its outcomes were far from 
perfect in both coloured and African schools. Furthermore, there was an awareness 
of this amongst school pupils. However, radical organising was absent amongst 
school pupils, just as it was amongst adults. Grievances alone cannot, therefore, be 
seen as the sole driver of action. Before discontent could become action it was 
necessary for the way the students conceived of their situation to change. This 
occurred in 1976 when events in Soweto began a process of expanding people’s 
horizons for action that was to lead to protest, violence and unrest.  
 
3.5. Students in Revolt: The Unrest of 1976/7 in the 
Western Cape 
 
In June 1976 civil society in Cape Town was heterogeneous and quiescent. In the 
African areas the spread of BC ideas had been limited, the schools were quiet and 
residential civil society was dominated by organisations which on occasions 
cooperated with apartheid governance structures. Furthermore, whilst veterans of 
the 1950s struggles remained their presence was faint. In the coloured areas the two 
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main coloured political forces, the Labour Party and Unity Movement, did express 
opposition to apartheid. However, their forms of activism, with the notable 
exception of the sports movement, did not involve the use of civil society as a 
sphere in which to mobilise people to oppose the state.  
 It is not surprising, therefore, that as Soweto burnt in June and July 1976 the 
townships of Cape Town stood quiet. In the initial aftermath of June the 16th there 
was sporadic but limited action. A demonstration took place at the University of 
Cape Town (UCT), the staff association at the coloured University of the Western 
Cape (UWC) declared their support for the people of Soweto and there were 
isolated incidents of stoning and arson in the African townships. However, this was 
followed by what the government sponsored inquiry called ‘an ominous lull’,52 and 
no unrest related violence was reported in the Cape Peninsula during July 1976.53 
This lull ended in August. On the 29th July students at UWC resolved to boycott 
classes for a week in sympathy with Soweto. Following from this on the 4th August a 
demonstration of about 1000 students took place during which stones were thrown 
and the next day the law faculty building was heavily damaged by fire. Then, on the 
11th August, school children from Cape Town’s three African high schools staged 
demonstrations against Bantu education and the use of Afrikaans in teaching. Just 
as in Soweto these demonstrations were forcibly dispersed and protest turned to 
widespread rioting, with 16 people shot dead.54 The rioting continued the following 
day. Government buildings such as the BAAB offices and the beer halls were 
singled out for destruction. African pupils also commenced a boycott of their 
schools. Arson attacks at coloured schools throughout the city also occurred, 
including in Bonteheuwel, and the first protest by coloured pupils took place at 
Belgravia High.55 The following week saw simmering unrest in the African 
communities as the school boycott continued and sporadic protests at coloured 
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schools throughout the city. Then, on the 23rd August pupils at the three high 
schools in Bonteheuwel staged a protest which was dispersed by police using 
batons and tear gas. Over the next two days clashes between police, pupils and 
residents within Bonteheuwel escalated and on the 25th August police opened fire 
into a crowd of protesting pupils from Arcadia Senior Secondary school, killing 
Christopher Truter, the first coloured causality of the riots. These riots marked the 
start of widespread coloured involvement in violence and during early September 
clashes between pupils and the police affected many of the coloured areas of Cape 
Town.  
From these beginnings more concerted action coalesced. In the coloured 
areas the unrest, though short lived, was intense and by October, after which little 
rioting or protest was reported, 57 coloureds had been killed throughout the 
Peninsula.56 Coloured workers, alongside Africans, also took part in a two day 
stayaway on the 15th and 16th of September and on several occasions coloured pupils 
travelled to the centre of Cape Town to stage demonstrations. African pupils also 
staged marches and protests in the city centre, although on different days. 
In the African areas the school boycotts continued into the New Year. Initial 
opposition to the beer halls expanded to a widespread campaign against the sale 
and consumption of alcohol. Shebeens were visited by students and told to close or 
be burnt down. Cars were stopped and searched for liquor and people were ordered 
not to drink. Around 100 shebeens were destroyed in Cape Town during this 
period.57 Then in December, with the campaign against liquor being continued and 
augmented by calls for a period of mourning over Christmas, clashes took place 
between migrant workers housed in hostel accommodation in Nyanga, and 
apparently assisted by the police, and school pupils and residents of the formal 
townships. Squaring off against each other across the main road separating the 
hostel compounds from the township a series of attacks took place with houses 
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burnt down and people assaulted.58 This violence reached its crescendo over 
Christmas when 26 Africans were killed in fighting.59 Following this African 
students instituted a boycott of examinations in the New Year. However, by the 
time postponed exams were held in March 1977 schooling in the African areas had 
returned to normal. 
 
3.5.1. Following Soweto: The Outbreak of Revolt in Cape 
Town 
The uprising in the Western Cape was intimately linked to the events on the Rand, 
but differed considerably in both in its emergence and development. Unlike Soweto 
politicisation and organisation were limited in Cape Town before the riots. 
However, similar grievances did exist. Socio-economic transformation was creating 
a small but rapidly expanding African secondary school population which was just 
as inconvenienced by the government’s Afrikaans language policy as the students in 
Soweto. Coloured school pupils also had experience of poor quality schooling and 
limitations on their future prospects. As a result the events in Soweto resonated in 
Cape Town. Existing grievances became amplified at the same time as the 
possibility of collective action became more real – Soweto made people believe they 
could and should act. Finally, when people did act the state response escalated, 
rather than controlled, protest as the violent suppression of protests transformed 
relatively amorphous demonstrations loosely directed against aspects of apartheid 
into violent confrontations which put state transformation firmly on the agenda. 
However, whilst the state quickly assumed a central focus in the minds of 
rioting students a lack of broader politicisation and leadership, combined with 
considerable social distance between the students and other residents, meant that as 
the unrest proceeded it did so as an almost exclusively student affair. The discourse 
of change articulated was intimately linked to student experience and adult support 
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for the students was inconsistent and rather than representing common cause with 
their demands was instead generated by the excessive actions of the state and its 
law enforcement agents. 
In 1976 education and its outcomes were far from perfect in both coloured 
and African schools. However the move to open protest and revolt did not simply 
reflect these grievances. Indeed, without both the action of the students in Soweto, 
alongside the highly confrontational actions of the riot police, Cape Town’s students 
would most likely have finished 1976 as they had begun it.  
 Literature on collective action points to the importance of the ‘political 
opportunity structure’ in defining its extent and nature; in order to act people need 
to believe that action is both possible and worthwhile.  60 In this regard the events in 
Soweto fundamentally transformed South Africa’s political landscape and played a 
major role in the unrest in Cape Town. In the period before Soweto pupils opposed 
to the introduction of Afrikaans, but acquiesced. However, in the space of a few 
days the situation transformed from one in which the apartheid state and education 
system appeared unassailable to one in which its ability to control its population 
was called into question. Every day events in Soweto and other townships made the 
front pages of the city’s newspapers and the realisation that the state was struggling 
to contain the protests led to a growing belief that action both could and should be 
undertaken. New forms of action were put on the menu and educational issues 
were given considerable exposure. The impact in the African areas was dramatic: 
Ever since that occasion of June Sixteenth on our way to school< we will buy 
newspapers< You could see the pictures of kids who are beaten and all that 
brutality, so all of us in the *train+ carriage will analyse what’s happening. And 
many sentiments would be expressed that you are sell-outs in Cape Town. What is 
happening in other provinces is not happening [here], and yet you are affected. We 
all don’t want this Afrikaans. But nothing is happening in Cape Town. That would 
be happening, daily discussion, day after day.61 
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In the coloured communities Soweto also made an impact, particularly at 
UWC. Faced with the escalation of unrest UWC students began to discuss events 
and assess how they could contribute. On the 30th July a week long boycott of 
classes was started in solidarity with Soweto. Regular symposiums and small-group 
discussions were held where topics such as ‘the community and solidarity’, ‘the 
individual and the group’ and Black Consciousness were discussed.62 The strong 
focus of Black Consciousness on community involvement led students to make 
contact with communities beyond the university and ‘to move towards the black 
man on the street.’63 As a result a pamphlet entitled ‘UWC-Soweto’ was published 
and distributed throughout the country.64A decision was also taken for students to 
visit communities to expand the basis of activism and a mass meeting of students 
resolved: 
That we< make an ardent attempt to mobilise the community so that we can 
broaden our front and thereby be more effective as a pressure group.65 
 
Students from UWC visited schools throughout the Cape Peninsula and helped to 
organise and coordinate student protests. In Bonteheuwel itself three girls from 
UWC visited Modderdam Senior Secondary on the day before the protests began.66 
Students also visited Bonteheuwel High.67 
In the coloured high schools there is little evidence of mobilisation or discussion 
before the arrival of the UWC students, at least in Bonteheuwel. However, when the 
UWC students brought their message they were able to tap into pre-existing 
educational grievances within the schools. A student at Bonteheuwel High 
described the protests as beginning, ‘education wise, *as+ we were not happy with 
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things that happened at school.’68 He then goes on to say how the organisers of the 
first action linked the situation in Soweto, where students were made to learn in 
Afrikaans, to the fact that the content of coloured schooling was heavily prescribed 
by the government: 
[W]e had a few students that said look it here, our brothers and our sisters in Soweto 
is busy with the uprising. Why, why don’t we support them? That the government 
can’t describe to us what subject we must take and what is good for us in education. 
We must be able to, to tell them look here. This is the kind of education we want.69
  
 
Another student talked of the resonance Soweto had for coloured children who 
experienced poor educational standards at school every day: 
[T]he notion of being black was perceived to be people from Soweto and up there. 
Yet very many of the issues that they were engaging with, we were confronted with 
lack of text books, lack of labs in school.70 
 
Within the context of educational discontent and the ongoing events in Soweto 
protest seemed justified, possible and worthwhile. 
However, open revolt in Cape Town was not simply a consequence of 
educational grievances, but the transformation of peaceful protest in light of state 
repression. Pupils in both Guguletu and Bonteheuwel both organised public 
protests inspired by Soweto which were violently disrupted by police. It is a moot 
question whether the pupils would simply have returned to school after their 
protests had they not been confronted by riot police. Similarly, the extent to which 
responses other than repression were possible within the apartheid state apparatus 
as it existed is also doubtful: although as will be seen the events of 1980 suggest that 
lessons had been learnt. However, this aside, it is clear that a violent police response 
to pupil demonstrations played a major role in transforming protests into riots.  
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Repressive action by the authorities operated to fan rather than restrict 
action within Cape Town. Authors have pointed to the importance of repression in 
stifling the emergence of collective action and revolt by increasing the individual 
cost of protest.71 However, it has also been recognised that considerable dangers 
exist in resorting to repressive action, as repression can provoke outrage and 
thereby further heighten opposition.72 Also, by denying mechanisms through which 
people can express demands and have them addressed repression makes 
oppositional activity more necessary if such demands are to be considered.73 Both 
these trends are apparent in the events which unfolded in Cape Town in 1976. 
 The role of police action in driving people into violent action and 
transforming vague notions of discontent into clarified opposition to white rule is a 
near universal theme of participant’s recollections of the riots. Before the riots strong 
beliefs about apartheid were not central to student consciousness and it was 
Afrikaans, educational discontent and sympathy with Soweto, not political change, 
which caused people to act. However, once the police intervened everything 
changed. Over-reaction by the police in provoking rioting was a central theme in 
much testimony to the Cillié commission.74 This is supported by student testimony. 
The following, from a student at Fezeka in Guguletu, reveals how once the police 
had intervened trepidation dissolved and students embraced violent action: 
I remember quite reluctantly following the march< We were going to Langa High 
School but we got stopped by the police in drizzling weather and there was, of 
course, the normal thing – teargas, raids beating shooting< The afternoon after the 
march was dispersed, the whole thing burst into flames here in Cape Town. One 
was swept into that whole trend of running around the location, stone throwing, 
burning etc. A whole night of this intense activity which I just got swept into. It just 
seemed natural to go along with the tide – no profound questioning of the issues at 
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stake, and whether one should participate or not. That question was never a 
question at all. After one followed the march, it ceased to be a question at all.75 
 
Similar experiences were also evident in Bonteheuwel:  
*T+here was a demonstration and we refused to go to class and then < we just saw 
the whole [school] was surrounded by this burley policeman with this caspirs and 
all that. And we stood then, we thought to ourselves, hey what’s gonna happen 
now? I mean we are students, we are 15, 16 years old. And they gave us a time of 
three minutes to disperse. And we just refused. We just stood there. And the next 
moment they charged into the school with teargas and batons and they start hitting 
us and the students just scampered. The whole place full. And some was taken to 
police stations, some was shot and< some of us was badly beaten. And from that 
day we. Everyday we decided there’s no education now. We gonna fight the 
injustice. 76 
 
Or in the words of another participant, ‘The main reason I got involved was they 
killed somebody right in front of my face.’77 
Repression also transformed collective identities within the City. 
Klandermans argues that one of the key elements precipitating collective action is 
the creation of politically relevant collective identities which define a social group 
with common interests and an outside agent which needs to be affected in order to 
realise those interests:  
What then does make collective identity politically relevant? The answer to this given 
in the literature on social movement participation is the following: collectively 
defined grievances that produce a ‘we’ feeling and causal attributions that denote a 
‘they’ which is held responsible for the collective grievances are needed for 
transferring routine ingroup-outgroup dynamics into political conflict.78 
 
Repression, by bringing the full weight of the state down on protesting students, 
helped create these ‘we’ and ‘they’ dynamics. There is little evidence of violence 
preceding police action. However, the response of the security forces to protest was 
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of such ferocity that it closed off the possibility of peaceful protest and caused 
widespread resentment. In turn this resentment focused attention not simply on the 
educational system, or even the situation in Soweto, but the illegitimacy of the 
regime. 
  
3.5.2. Unrest in Progress: A Student Protest 
The initial outbreak of violence in 1976 was centred at the schools and was a 
consequence of the interaction of student grievances, the examples set by Soweto 
and heavy-handed police action. However, in itself this does not rule out the fact 
that once the riots began they could have become transformed into a broad assault 
on state power. Yet, an analysis of the development of the riots in both case studies 
reveals that not only did they start as student protests, but they remained student 
protests. This student-centricity operated at several levels. Firstly the organisation, 
actions and grievances articulated during the unrest were all heavily conditioned by 
the experience of the school yard. Secondly, the students not only failed to 
consistently mobilise adults, but also explicitly defined themselves in opposition to 
their parents. Finally, after initial support based on revulsion at the action of the 
police, adults themselves began to distance themselves from the students and their 
activities.  
By the beginning of September both the African and coloured communities 
had become involved in violent conflict with the police and many schools were on 
boycott. This move, from protest to revolt, transformed student and community 
action. Soweto had made action appear possible; this action created a new political 
context. Protest had spread, authority had broken down and the government had 
become a central target for angry students. It became necessary, therefore, to 
organise, formulate demands and coordinate action. However, the revolt had 
started in the schools and was precipitated by a mixture of educational discontent 
and police violence. It therefore lacked both a clear leadership and a coherent 





that as the students sought to come to terms with their rapidly transforming 
circumstances they did so on an ad hoc basis and primarily through an articulation 
of an identity and demands that were grounded in a particularistic school student 
life experience. The actions of the apartheid state had brought into stark reality the 
need for political transformation whilst its failure to effectively repress had made 
this transformation appear possible. However, there was no blueprint for this future 
society. Students therefore looked to their own experiences for how to make a better 
future and in doing so they articulated a vision which, in many ways, represented a 
negation of the hardships of student life.  
The demands articulated during 1976/7 in both communities reveal the 
student centrism of the uprising as well as the diversity of the student experience in 
Cape Town. During riots the overwhelming political iconography was from the 
Black Consciousness movement, with black power salutes and slogans dominating 
protests. However, a closer examination of student demands reveals not a 
theoretical approach to political change but an iteration of day-to-day grievances 
reflecting the immediate experiences of Cape Town’s school children.  
Students from the Bonteheuwel schools issued a statement to the press 
which revealed the parochial nature of many of the demands being put forward. In 
this they listed their main grievances: 
1. The system of coloured education and the policy of apartheid. 
2. The lack of compulsory education for coloured people. 
3. The lack of facilities at the coloured schools. 
4. The lack of good sportsgrounds and playgrounds at the schools and in the 
residential areas. 
5. The general behaviour of the police during the unrest in the Black areas. 
6. The interference by police in demonstrations on school grounds which were 
not forbidden. 
7. The taking into custody of fellow students. 
8. The attitude of White teachers on the staff. 
9. The inconvenience allowance given to white teachers at Coloured schools is 
seen as an insult. 
10. The silence of the Cape Teachers’ Professional Association during the 
unrest.79 
                                                   





Apart from a broadly defined opposition to the policy of apartheid all these 
grievances were related to schooling issues or the immediate experience of the 
students during the rioting.  Furthermore, they were strong on what was being 
opposed, but they lacked any articulation of what a better society would look like. 
Of particular interest is the focus on the inconvenience allowance, which was paid 
to white teachers working in coloured schools. This suggests involvement by UWC 
students as unequal pay for teachers was a major issue in coloured universities 
where one of the few occupations for educated coloureds was in teaching.  
The location of student demands within day-to-day experience is 
highlighted by the variation in demands between schools. In the essays produced at 
Alexander Sinton opposition to job reservation was a common theme, but was not 
mentioned in Bonteheuwel. Alexander Sinton was a school in a middle class area of 
the city and these demands represented an opposition to apartheid rooted in the 
experiences of middle class children who, despite their academic success, were 
being held back by apartheid discrimination. In contrast, in Bonteheuwel it was the 
immediate quality of schooling which was articulated in their protests.  
In the African schools demands were similarly located within local 
conditions and the student experience and consequently differed from those in the 
coloured schools. During the unrest students at Langa High issued a statement in 
which they spelt out their main grievances. These were Bantu education, having to 
pay for school books, the poor state of African schools, the actions of the riot police 
and the fact that blacks were unable to share the wealth of whites. The statement 
concluded with immediate demands; these were the freeing of detainees, free 
education and ‘equal job, equal pay.’80 No link was made between immediate 
student hardships and broader political transformation and apartheid was not even 
mentioned.  
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 However, whilst student demands predominated in interactions with the 
authorities students themselves were becoming increasingly militant. The 
temporary weakening of coercive state power at the local level created a context in 
which students began to seek more profound change. Students began to articulate 
wider demands such as the release of political prisoners.81 They also increasingly 
demanded political transformation. However there was no clear plan for how to 
achieve this and whilst rhetoric and action escalated it did so in a way that 
continued to be heavily conditioned by student experiences and which did not draw 
together a coherent, universal, narrative of change: 
*I+n 1976, democracy was posed at the level of abstraction< the attitude was that we 
didn’t want Afrikaans, we didn’t want Bantu education, we wanted equal education 
and then we wanted to be free – one man one vote – and it just went on and on.82 
 
You know when you are student who didn’t have any ideology, you know for us it 
was just we don’t want Afrikaans, ‘we want to be free’< I remember my own 
perception, it really meant, you know, we threw stones, we burn everything, and the 
whites are going to get scared and I’m going to have a house in Constantia.83 
 
With no theorised means through which to approach change and limited links 
beyond the schools militancy predominantly focused upon symbols of apartheid 
power and barriers to change at the local level. The Cillié commission noted that 
whilst there were occasional demands for the release of political prisoners, most 
focused on people detained during the unrest and did not link to ANC and PAC 
prisoners.84  
Unrest in the African areas lasted far longer than in the coloured 
communities and consequently developed more sustained activities. The most 
sustained of these actions was the campaign against drink. Amongst the first targets 
of the riots were the schools and buildings owned by the BAAB, most notably the 
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beer halls. However, this quickly shifted to a focus upon drink generally within the 
community. Attacks were launched on shebeens and individuals who consumed 
liquor. Peoples’ breath was smelt and if drunk their mouths were washed out with 
soap.85 This was significant because whist the beer halls represented a state presence 
within the community, the shebeens were not and the broader campaign against 
drink targeted neither the state nor the education system. Yet, it consumed perhaps 
the most energy during the unrest. Self-interest was undoubtedly a factor for some 
people and there are stories of people stealing and selling, rather than destroying, 
alcohol. 86 There is also evidence that rival shebeen owners used the unrest to put 
their competitors out of business. However, the focus upon alcohol was far more 
than this. It was an attack by young, well-educated students, on a potent and 
immediate symbol and cause of much of their hardships. Alcohol was regularly 
identified as a cause of their parents’ quiescence. However, it was also seen as a 
cause of hardship in itself: 
Look at what liquor has caused to our people: Red eyes, lazyness (sic), their families 
have broken down, rotten smell out of their mouths, jelly paunches and muscles, 
colour of their skins has changed, death, became hoboes, they show their private 
parts to children, fight and kill one another for the reason, divorce, dirty words out 
of their mouths, so-called babalas [hangovers] and their (sic) is no law in their 
families. Live like animals. Now do you see the works of liquor.87 
 
The campaign against alcohol was, therefore, not only an attack on state power, but 
also an expression of student discontent with the behaviour of their parents, friends 
and neighbours. In this way it would appear that for many students from 1976 the 
remaking of their own communities was seen as the first and most accessible stage 
on the road to freedom. 
Just as the grievances articulated during the uprising developed from 
student experience, so too did the organisations which coordinated protest and 
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made decisions. There is no evidence of formal organisation driving protest. Nor is 
there any evidence of shared ideological understandings amongst the students in 
either case study. Instead students built organisation on local experience in an 
attempt to understand and organise their situation. This is of particular interest 
because of the focus on BC organisation and linkages within the studies of the riots 
in Soweto. It is also significant because it suggests that collective action can emerge 
in the right conditions even when organisation and networks are absent. 
The nature of organisation during the uprising was linked to the fact that 
revolt was in large part a reaction to events beyond the communities. Pupils had not 
been mobilised around a single line or with a single goal in mind, but had instead 
been thrown headfirst into opposition by developments on the ground. 
Consequently there were no structures through which events could be coordinated 
and ordered, and a lack of people with authority to speak on behalf of the students. 
There was also no prevailing ideology or iconography. At the organisational level 
this meant that students looked around and used what was available.  
In the coloured areas organisation revolved around the exiting Student 
Representative Councils, successful school students, people from UWC and the 
churches. In the African areas the riots persisted longer and the situation was more 
complex. There were no existing structures and little interaction with other groups 
and therefore students looked inward for inspiration. However, the absence of both 
organisation and ideology meant that there were no structures or beliefs that people 
could link themselves to in order to claim leadership status. Every student’s opinion 
was therefore valid and consequently the students met collectively in mass 
meetings.  
In the coloured schools students looked to existing organisations and 
networks to provide representation once unrest had started. Many schools already 
had SRCs and these became significant in the unrest. The Cillié commission cites 





Although the aim of the council of the Salt River High School was to bring about 
better co-operation between teachers and pupils, it soon exceeded the scope of its 
normal activities. The council held meetings without the principle’s consent; it 
conducted a poll among pupils on whether examinations were to be written or not; 
and its members incited pupils to boycott classes.88 
 
Similar events also occurred in Bonteheuwel. At Modderdam an SRC existed prior 
to the uprising. This dealt with school issues but in 1976 transformed into a more 
political body.89 In Bonteheuwel the riots also saw a rise to prominence of 
individuals who already had status within the schools as a result of their academic 
or extracurricular activities. At Arcadia High, for example, one of the main 
leadership figures was a well-known 800 and 1500 meter runner.90  
This is not to say that there were no linkages made beyond the schoolyard. 
However, these were rare and whilst they introduced broad concepts such as black 
power into the protests they left little clear ideological content in their wake. There 
is little evidence of formalised contact between school children and working adults 
apart from ad hoc church meetings. There is evidence of linkages with UWC and in 
Bonteheuwel pupils formed a body with university students which helped provide 
structure to the protest by arranging meeting and drawing up demands.91 However, 
as was seen in the grievances expressed by students, this did not lead to the 
adoption of a broader vision to guide action, though it may have brought certain 
demands from the universities into the classroom. It is also important not to 
overestimate the level of organisation. No new coloured student organisations 
emerged during 1976 and experiences within the schools reveal only limited 
coordination of activities: 
*W+e were not activists at the time, we didn’t even totally, fully understand what 
was happening. It was more knee-jerk kind of responses of these, so still in a semi 
unorganised way people were called to meetings, because people wanted to 
understand what the hell is happening. But even then there was no< organised 
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structures within the area itself, it was going up, staying there for a few months and 
then it was the end of the year and this fizzled out.92 
 
A lack of organisation predating the unrest was even more marked in the 
African schools and the almost complete absence of school level organisations saw 
pupils in the African townships develop a different approach to those in 
Bonteheuwel. Whereas Bonteheuwel pupils were able to draw on existing, albeit not 
political, networks African students had almost no organisational resource at all. 
There was no open political organisation in any of the African schools before the 
first protests were called, and there were not even apolitical representative 
structures, such as SRCs. The initial action appears to have been coordinated by a 
small group of pupils, possibly acting with encouragement from underground 
members of the banned liberation movements. 93 However this organising was 
clandestine and most pupils report that the first they were aware of the 
demonstrations on the 11th August was when they were told to keep their books at 
home the day before.94 Indeed, there is to this day a lack of awareness amongst 
many participants about who called the demonstrations. As Zoliswa Kota, a current 
ANC MP who was to become a leading figure in progressive politics in the city 
before leaving the country in the mid-1980s said: 
I can say even today I still didn’t know where it came from< But we heard that< 
there was a meeting that was held in the forest at some point and that that meeting, 
that meeting that took place previously in that particular forest came up with these 
particular leaders. And I still [am] very much now in the dark in terms of who are 
the face in the forest [laughs]. But it was clear there was some kind of leadership.95 
 
This lack of an ‘organisational pre-history’, as one student put it, meant there were 
no existing means to coordinate action. In Soweto organisation built on the links 
which had preceded, and indeed played a role in precipitating, protest. In 
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Bonteheuwel students turned to existing organisations and networks. In Guguletu 
African students faced with a need to respond to their circumstances simply came 
together as a mass. 
Throughout the uprising African pupil organised predominantly through 
daily mass meetings of all students, usually on the school field outside I.D. Mkhize 
high school. There were no permanent office holders and a new chair was elected at 
every meeting.96 Individuals did assume central roles in guiding discussion and 
suggesting campaigns and like in Bonteheuwel these were often students who had 
existing profiles within the schools.97 However, this did not negate the mass based 
process of decision-making. This was highlighted in a meeting between students 
and representatives from the Bantu Education Department when it was demanded 
that officials met not with representatives, but with all 3,000 scholars.98 The Chief 
Director of the BAAB also confirmed this lack of leadership when he explained to 
the Cillié commission that, ‘So-called leaders have no control [and simply] try to 
please the audience.’99 Such a reflection is significant because government officials 
and politicians were torn with paranoia about the influence of subversive elements 
guiding opposition; the recognition that such incitement was absent strongly 
supports an interpretation of highly amorphous organisation. 
In certain circumstances smaller, more organised, groups formed, usually 
linked to specific forms of action. One group which gained considerable exposure 
was the ‘Comrades Movement.’ The Comrades Movement was held responsible for 
several arson attacks on schools in the Langa area and several people were arrested 
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and tried.100 However it is difficult to gauge its boundaries and whether it had an 
actual organisational form. Groups of youth and students were responsible for 
attacking policemen and burning down schools during this period and the police 
certainly believed that there was a student structure organising much of the 
violence during this period. However, the label may simply have come from the fact 
that students and youth involved in riotous activities referred to each other as 
‘comrades’. Indeed when interviewed in the Cape Times African pupils issued an 
explicit denial that such an organisation existed on exactly this basis.101 
The reasons why African students adopted a mass approach to organising 
are fourfold. Firstly a fear of repression appears to have stopped individuals from 
assuming leadership roles. Secondly, the absence of previous organising traditions 
was important. The lack of practical organisational experience meant there was little 
knowledge of how to create structured and delineated organisations and there were 
few pre-existing networks that could be developed. Furthermore, the lack of exiting 
leadership meant that unlike in Soweto, where students could claim leadership on 
the basis of political activities, relationships and knowledge predating the unrest, in 
Cape Town there was no ready-made leadership. Consequently, in a highly 
politicised situation all students had similar claims to leadership: 
The whole attitude was that we were all a leadership; therefore we could not expose 
any particular individual< This was unlike in Soweto where precisely because the 
leaders were the most advanced – chairmen, secretaries, and executive members of 
SASM< – they naturally assumed that leadership.102 
 
Thirdly, the existing networks that could have provided greater 
organisational structure to the pupils’ activities - including both the banned political 
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movements and other adult dominated organisations – were not heavily involved 
with the students. The lack of underground involvement in the unrest was in part a 
result of the nature of underground organising at this point. Some students did 
work with underground figures. At least one pamphlet was issued under the name 
of the ANC during the shebeen campaigns. Political discussions took place at the 
houses of ANC members after the riots had started where banned literature was 
handed out. ANC activists also recall contacting leading pupils within the 
townships and asking them to take certain lines and spread certain positions within 
meetings.103 However, the main focus of the underground was not to perpetuate the 
unrest and influence the direction of the protest, but to recruit people to leave the 
country for military training, with two ANC members, Mountain Quembello and 
Lumko Huna, tried and convicted on these grounds.104  
The final reason why students continued organising as a student mass was 
because they explicitly rejected the assistance of adults and offers of assistance in 
organising. The students refused to be represented by adults in dealings with the 
authorities, so whilst parents’ organisations were formed and negotiated with the 
education authorities, students insisted that they could represent themselves en 
masse and refused to let their parents speak on their behalf:105 This rejection of adult 
leadership extended to an unwillingness to take advice from adults, who were often 
seen as guilty in acquiescing to apartheid: 
[Y]ou know the revolt was a revolt against the state, but it was also a revolt against 
the older generations. How could they have tolerated this? So there was a strong 
anti-parents [feeling] and having sold out, and everything that went with them, 
whether it’s the ANC, whatever it is. It’s part of that sell out and tolerating apartheid 
and how can they.106 
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Evidence presented by the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) to the 
Cillié commission confirms this interpretation: 
Parents, teachers, clergymen, social workers and others of the older generation are 
unanimous and categorical in declaring that the children refuse to listen or to be 
influenced by them.107 
 
Furthermore, just as the students rejected the advice, assistance and authority of 
their parents, many of them also rejected the leadership of the exiled liberation 
movement, seeing them as part of a broader failure by the old generation to affect 
political transformation: 
I remember people like Oscar Mpetha, the old man, coming on board when we were 
students< and wanting to advise. And I remember we were saying no, no, no, no, 
you old people get out of the way. You didn’t do anything, it’s our turn now, we 
going to [be] free.108 
 
This is of particular interest because it shows just how divorced the students 
were from other residents in the township and broader ideological currents within 
South Africa. As well as constructing a narrative of transformation reflecting a 
distinctly schoolyard experience they also sought to exclude adults from the revolt 
they were constructing. The forms of organisation they adopted flowed directly 
from their schooling experiences and were conditioned not by broader ideas and 
ideologies.  
The final evidence of the fact that 1976 was overwhelmingly a student revolt 
was the fact that adults were only drawn into protest intermittently and migrant 
workers physically opposed the actions of the students.  
 Adults in all communities had sympathy with the school children, but their 
support was limited and quickly ebbed away. A stayaway called by the students on 
the 15th and 16th September was widely supported. Evidence submitted to the Cillié 
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Commission by the National Development and Management Foundation of South 
Africa and based upon talks with around 18,000 coloured employees found 
absenteeism within industry reached between 40 and 80%.109 Not only was general 
support for the strike high, but it appears to have been particularly supported by 
coloured women in the Cape’s clothing industry, where between 85 and 90% of 
workers stayed away.110 In the African townships there was also considerable 
support for the call for a period of mourning over Christmas.111 
At first glance this suggests that the social base of the uprising spread and 
that it assumed characteristics of a more general uprising. However, an 
investigation of the circumstances in which adults became involved reveals that 
their responses were conditioned less by sympathy with the students’ demands 
than by their revulsion at the actions of the police and that after the initial unrest 
their ongoing support was limited. In evidence presented to the Cillié commission 
the pastor of Bonteheuwel’s Dutch Reformed Church reported how, after the first 
protests in the area began on the 24th August, a large number of young people 
turned up at a youth meeting at his church. Because of the tension and the fact 
many of the people were not church members the elders of the church called the 
police. However, the next day Christopher Truter was shot dead and adults, many 
of whom had just the night before sought to keep the youth under control, ‘joined 
younger ones in throwing stones and jeering.’112 A similar story emerged in the 
evidence of Friar Mathew James of St. Anthony’s RC church in Langa. At a meeting 
held in his church on the 5th October there was general agreement that ‘there was no 
violence before the police came.’ It was also agreed that ‘Parents were not in 
sympathy at first, especially coloured, but were after *the+ shooting and beating.’113 
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However, adult support never moved beyond sympathy in the face of police 
brutality. As the unrest dragged on parents came to oppose, rather than support, the 
students’ actions and involvement in sympathy actions declined. After the well 
supported stayaway in September later calls for industrial action gained little 
support and in the African areas (coloured pupils had already returned to school) 
adults started to take active steps to encourage a return to normality. By January 
1977 both LAGUNYA (an organisation established by adults to negotiate with the 
education authorities at the height of the unrest) and the Cape Peninsula African’s 
Teacher’s Association were trying to persuade the pupils to return.114 
Adults, therefore, had little involvement in protest during 1976 and when 
they did so it was as a result of exposure to repression, rather than as agents seeking 
to articulate their own programme of change. Indeed, it appears that adults in Cape 
Town were drawn into the protests primarily in their role as parents. The strong 
support by coloured clothing workers for the September stayaway is particularly 
significant in this respect. In the more politicised period of the mid-1980s working 
class coloured women had low levels of union militancy and participation rates in 
political strikes. It therefore appears that the heavy handed police response to unrest 
drew coloured women, as mothers, into action which they both previously and 
subsequently eschewed. Such an interpretation is supported by the Cillié 
Commission. The Commission noted that even when it was young men, rather than 
school students, who were shot by the riot police the overarching narrative within 
the townships was of police violence being perpetrated against innocent children 
who were seen as helpless victims of the violence.115  
Finally, it is also important to note that there were groups of Africans who 
had little sympathy for the students, even in the face of repression. These were the 
African migrant workers. December 1976 saw a series of fights between school 
pupils, youths, township residents and migrant workers, with 29 people killed 
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between the 25th and 27th December. This conflict emerged after pupils declared a 
Christmas of mourning and migrant workers refused to participate. The students 
forbade celebration and the buying of presents and clothes.116 In a continuation of 
the shebeen campaign drink was also forbidden. However, migrant workers 
ignored these demands and fighting ensued; both sides agreeing that conflict 
erupted when students attempted to remove liquor from a car owned by 
migrants.117 
This incident rapidly expanded into open conflict between the two 
communities. Township residents of all generations became drawn into this fighting 
and highly adversarial group identities solidified around residential status: 
The comrades stated in a pamphlet that the migrants were not to come into the 
residential area of the permanent inhabitants; if they would not keep out of this area, 
they should go back to their homelands. In another pamphlet, they were ordered to 
leave the peninsula before a specified time.118 
 
Whilst peace was eventually negotiated African migrants in Cape Town never came 
to support the actions of the students.  
 
3.6. Conclusion: Race, Class and Revolt: Differential 
Discrimination and the Student Uprising of 1976/7 
 
It has long been argued that the students struggled to consistently expand their 
campaign beyond the schoolyard, even in Soweto where links with adults were 
more established.119 This has been confirmed in the preceding discussion, as it is 
apparent that in its demands, organisation and social base the uprising of 1976/7 in 
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Cape Town represented particularistic student experience, not a universal political 
challenge.  
However current explanations of this student centrism are not always 
convincing. It is clear that the revolt itself emerged from the intersection of student 
demands, inspiration from elsewhere in South Africa, and the violent response of 
the police. It is also true that a lack of organisational contact and parochial demands 
contributed to keeping students and adults apart. In Soweto there is clear evidence 
that migrants who had physically opposed to the students came on board in a later 
stayaway after the students had visited them and explained their situation. 
However, the view that black disunity is explained predominantly in this fashion is 
less convincing. Adult support of students was always intermittent and selective 
and eventually dropped away. Furthermore, whilst students from a range of 
backgrounds were united by the fact that they all acted during the uprising, there 
was much variation in when how and why they acted. In the African schools the 
calls were for free education and the scraping of Afrikaans; in working class 
coloured schools facilities and educational quality were demanded; whilst in the 
middle class schools many students focused on job reservation. Furthermore, there 
was no joint action between students from the different communities. African and 
coloured students organised marches to Cape Town’s city centre, but never on the 
same day, a fact which brings into question the idea that 1976 represented a 
transformation in the relationship between Africans and coloureds.  120 Similarly, 
apart from during the September stayaway, high mortality rates in coloured and 
African communities never coincided.121 
In explaining the variable responses to the events of 1976 the differential 
impact of apartheid discrimination provides an effective starting point. Within the 
context of generally rising educational standards and attainment the 
implementation of discriminatory policies was impacting all black secondary 
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students in a negative way. Consequently, despite very different experiences of 
discrimination the focus upon educational issues brought about by the events in 
Soweto, alongside common exposure to police repression, unleashed broad, albeit 
highly diffuse, opposition to the state and its apartheid policies within Cape Town’s 
school going youth. When the events of 1976 made change appear possible, it met a 
ready audience: 
[W]e thought the battle was over and we just have to succumb to be domestic 
servants forever. You see. But we were clear that moment that this has to change.122 
 
Yet beyond a common opposition to apartheid the differential impact of 
apartheid implanted cleavages within and between the black population groups. 
Many pupils became drawn into protest, but stratification within the school going 
youth played a central role in defining the nature of the uprising. The differing 
demands presented by different schools reflected the fact that racial and class 
divisions led blacks to experience the education system very differently. Middle 
class coloureds generally received a good education and their concerns were 
therefore less on the quality of education and more on their chances beyond the 
schools. Working class coloured schools were less well equipped and attainment 
was lower, hence facilities and educational quality predominated. In the African 
schools Afrikaans was the major issue and this was the consequence of a policy 
targeted only at Africans. Socio-economic differentiation was reinforced by the 
physical segregation of apartheid. Students had no social contact across the 
apartheid enforced colour line and rarely met. Even in 1977 few contacts had been 
made and as one coloured activist said, ‘Guguletu was a foreign place to us.’123  
In contrast apartheid discrimination created less urgency and greater risks 
for challenging apartheid amongst older Africans and coloureds than it did for their 
children. The heavy reliance of all African and many coloured adults on the state for 
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services such as housing combined with the precarious position that many of them 
held within the apartheid labour market to discourage them from involving 
themselves in the uprising. That this played a role in adult quiescence was 
supported by evidence supplied by the South African Institute of Race Relations to 
the official inquiry into the unrest. Analysing the social basis of the uprising they 
concluded that, ‘men who live with their families in family accommodation, who 
are gainfully employed, usually do not get involved in township unrest – they have 
too much to lose.’124 
This dynamic was even more pronounced amongst the city’s migrant 
African population – so much so that it led them to actively oppose the actions of 
the students. Most existing interpretations of the conflict between migrants and 
urban Africans have focused upon the role of the police in encouraging the migrants 
to attack the residents and a large amount of evidence appears to confirm 
cooperation between police and migrants.125 However, distrust between the two 
groups was an intermittent feature of township life well before 1976: a fact which 
suggests that the conflict of Christmas 1976 had roots deeper than simple 
manipulation by the police. As early as 1966, at a meeting between the Guguletu 
Civic and Welfare Association and members of the BAAB, complaints were being 
made by township dwellers regarding the impact of the hostels on the community: 
It was raised by Mr. Myeki and supported by Miss Mgudlandlu that the Zones are a 
threat to the ‚Family Units‛ community. Young girls (some being scholars) and 
married women were enticed from school and homes by attractions found at the 
zones.126 
 
This complaint shows a clear hostility toward the migrant labourers amongst 
Africans with Section 10 rights. It also reveals the existence, well in advance of the 
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rioting of 1976, of clearly defined insider/outsider identities within with the minds 
of urban Africans.  
Rather than reflecting police incitement, therefore, the conflicts between the 
migrants and the formal housing areas can be seen to reflect longstanding 
differences between the two communities as a result of the very different 
experiences the two communities had of apartheid. While supposedly pawns of the 
police the migrants gave clear and convincing explanations of why they opposed 
the students. These reveal the irrelevance of the student struggle for the migrant 
workers and should not be ignored: 
At first the migrants did not take part in the rioting. They also refused to go on 
strike and did not attend the memorial service held on Christmas Day but, contrary 
to the Comrades’ order, celebrated instead. The reason they themselves gave for not 
participating was that they had come to the peninsula to work, to earn money and to 
return home with their money after their period of employment.127 
 
Apartheid laws meant that for most migrant workers their futures lay in the 
homelands. Also, if they were to be dismissed from work for striking they would 
automatically lose their rights to remain in the city. Migrants thus had little to gain 
and much to lose from supporting a programme of action which failed to address 
itself to their concerns. Furthermore, physical segregation reinforced social 
segregation. Migrants were kept in separate compounds and had few direct links 
with residents. They therefore had little firsthand experience of the repression and 
little personal contact with its victims: 
One of their [migrant] leaders said that they had not attended the [Christmas] 
memorial service because they were not going to mourn for people whom they had 
not even known.128 
 
The calls by the students were not, therefore, experienced as legitimate responses to 
state repression but as attempts to restrict and even endanger the precarious 
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livelihoods of migrant workers. That the use of coercion to enforce these calls led to 
violence cannot, therefore, be simply explained by police action. Instead the 
migrants were integrated into the apartheid political economy in a way which 
created very contrasting interests for them to those of the residents and students. 
 Overall, therefore, the uprising of 1976 in Cape Town needs to be seen as a 
response to opening political opportunities by a group of black South Africans 
uniquely disadvantaged by apartheid discrimination. This revolt was sustained by 
shared experiences of discrimination, and as the unrest unfolded violence, within 
the schoolyard. However, whilst strengthened by a shared student experience it was 
unable to transcend these bounds. Beyond the schools apartheid was not in crisis 
and people continued their daily lives, albeit in occasional protest at the brutality of 
repression. 1976 in Cape Town was neither a universal revolt against state power, 












From Bread and Butter to Banners and Rallies: 
The Changing Contours and Limits of 




As noted in chapter one, theories of collective action and organisation often point to 
the importance of resources and political opportunities for precipitating action. A 
central argument of this thesis, however, is that without deeper, coherent, concerns 
rooted in the social structure organisation and opportunity cannot alone create 
action. In Cape Town the period 1977-1985 provides strong evidence for this 
interpretation. In 1979/80, a series of boycotts broke out across the city drawing in 
people from across the black communities. This led to a period of organisation 
building which provided many of the resources seen as central to the development 
of effective activism. These organisations expanded political space by making action 
appear possible; they built links between activists campaigning on similar issues; 
they increased the intellectual and physical resources available to poor 
communities; they provided explanations that linked hardship to apartheid and 
sought to present the view that only through its removal could people achieve their 
goals. Furthermore, they did so in a context of considerable material hardship. 
However, these organisations failed. In the coloured communities, despite a 
successful election boycott in 1984, active involvement by adults in progressive 
organisation and activism was never sustained. A similar picture emerges in the 
African communities where popular participation, particularly amongst adults, 





In explaining this general failure of organisation, and the moments 
when activism did emerge, this chapter moves beyond the resources and 
organisations used by activists to look at how the apartheid political 
economy patterned protest and quiescence. It shows how effective 
mobilisation relied on moments of shared grievance to provide a social base 
for action. This happened throughout this period amongst an educated 
activist elite. A shared experience of poor education and thwarted life 
chances created a group of people who consistently sought ways to 
challenge apartheid. It also happened for a moment in 1979/80, when busfare 
increases and poor quality schooling became felt across race and class lines, 
creating a community of interest that could be mobilised by this emerging 
network of more politicised activists. However, more generally, the political 
economy constrained rather than supported activism. Whilst the activist elite 
had common experiences of oppression apartheid’s differential 
discrimination fragmented the black population on race and class lines 
making it difficult to construct a unified programme of action. Furthermore, 
the integration of blacks within Cape Town’s political economy encouraged 
quiescence more than protest. These two factors ensured that, a moment in 
1979/80 aside, progressive organisation and activism remained the preserve 
of an activist elite. 
Studies of activism (all focused in coloured and squatter communities) 
categorise activism between 1977 and 1985 in Cape Town into two periods: firstly, a 
period of intense grassroots mobilisation and organisation around bread-and-butter 
issues in the early 1980s; secondly, with the formation of the United Democratic 
Front (UDF), a time of more explicitly political mobilisation that successfully 
organised an election boycott of the tricameral parliament and gained considerable 
exposure, but was more distanced from the day-to-day concerns of residents.  
 However, whilst agreeing on periodisation, explanations for these changes 





exist can be divided broadly into three. The first interpretation, represented by 
Maseko, sees the emergence of organisation in the early 1980s as an organic 
response to a political system that did not provide mechanisms for meeting people’s 
demands. Because they were rooted in grassroots pressure from below these 
organisations were initially successful. However, over time the leadership came to 
believe that their bread-and-butter goals could only be met through political change. 
This caused a shift in focus to national political issues which alienated mass support 
and caused decline.1  
The second interpretation is provided by van Kessel in her study of the 
community newspaper Grassroots. She argues that activists became involved in 
community organisation not to address specific grievances, but as way to pursue 
political aims. ‘Grassroots’ organisation was dominated by young and highly 
politicised activists instilled with ‘vanguardism.’ This ‘vanguardism’ involved 
making people aware of the injustices of the apartheid system and using this to 
mobilise them into the struggle. Community issues were important only insofar as 
they were a tool for broader political mobilisation: 
[A]ddressing community issues was not an end in itself. Housing, transportation, 
and jobs were more likely to awaken an interest in the average township resident 
than the Freedom Charter or Marxist classics. But these bread-and-butter issues 
were a means to an end, stepping stones in a mobilization [sic] process against racial 
and class oppression.2 
 
Within this schema the move from grassroots to national organising was simply a 
result of changed circumstance, as the state’s reform strategy forced political 
considerations to the fore. Furthermore, whilst this led to an appearance of decline 
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in the level of popular mobilisation, at heart it represented little change. 
Organisation had always been dominated by an activist elite. 3 
The final interpretation sits between these two views and is represented by 
Gunnarsen. He argues that the key dynamic of this period was a move from 
politically minded activists acting as leaders directing popular struggles to an 
assumption of a role as organisers, organising people around their day-to-day 
hardships and taking the lead from the community. Activists were not simply 
seeking bread-and-butter improvements, but nor were they merely using such 
issues as one tactic amongst others – the very nature of activism was such that 
political leadership necessarily emerged from involvement in grassroots struggles: 
The space created by the boycotts [of 1980] and the frequent mass meetings was 
filled out by experiences with democracy. These experiments revised the landscape 
of leaders... In the new environment leadership was derived from followers, thus 
messing up the meaning of the concepts and invoking a new meaning. Increasingly, 
leaders followed followers and followers led leaders.4 
 
Furthermore, although recognising a shift in organising with the formation of the 
UDF and its need to rapidly respond to state initiatives, this is not seen to have 
fundamentally undermined the heritage of this period – the ability to undertake 
mass action around single issues – and he does not recognise a decline in 
organisation at this time.5 
At the heart of all these interpretations is the broader issue of the complex 
relationship between organisation and action. Maseko sees organisation as central to 
mobilisation and locates decline within organisational choices.  Gunnarsen sees 
organisation as a consequence of mass mobilisation, with leaders deriving their 
legitimacy from their followers. In contrast, van Kessel queries the extent to which 
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organisation ever created mass mobilisation beyond an educated elite, seeing 
organisation as a tool not a widespread community response. 
 This thesis broadly supports van Kessel’s interpretation – that 
organisation did not create mass mobilisation. In 1979 and 1980 organisation 
was limited, yet there was considerable protest. In contrast, the next 5 years 
saw little protest despite the deliberate building of organisation and 
campaigns. The high point of anti-apartheid organising after 1980 was not 
mass action, but an election boycott. This boycott, whilst successful, involved 
abstention rather than participation, was dominated by van Kessel’s 
vanguard and did not see mass mobilisation. However, this thesis moves 
beyond van Kessel’s work to show why organisation could not build 
activism. In doing this it shows the importance of the apartheid political 
economy. The fragmented nature of Cape Town’s black population made it 
difficult to develop programmes of action that could enlist widespread 
support. Furthermore, the functioning of apartheid in the city did not 
generally create widespread grievances in either the African or coloured 
communities. For much of this period, there was little pushing people to 
protest, and therefore little protest. 
However, accepting that organisation struggled to create mobilisation does 
not mean in the right circumstances it did not shape its development. Organisation 
provided a conduit through which contradictions could move from sporadic protest 
and discontent into a more explicitly political or widespread challenge to the state. 
This happened in 1980 as diffuse protests were brought together into a city-wide 
movement through links and ideologies that had developed since 1976; indeed a 
key difference between the events of 1976 and 1980 was the role organisation played 
in sustaining and channelling protest. Organisation also provided the vehicle 
through which the activist elite was able to organise, plan and sustain the tricameral 
boycott. However, what it could not do was bridge the gap between this elite and 





matter, but how far they mattered depended upon the broader structural context 
within which they were operating.  
To demonstrate the relationship between organisation and action at this time 
this chapter starts by outlining organisational development in the city before 
1979/80. It shows how, despite the emergence of tentative linkages, citywide 
progressive organisation remained limited. It then examines the events of 1979/80. 
Here it demonstrates how, despite organisational limitations, a momentary 
convergence of interests across the city’s black population caused popular support 
for boycotts to expand. A wave of protest then built as increasing numbers of people 
became drawn into protest.  
The chapter then sketches a broad narrative of events between 1980 and 
1985. The boycotts persuaded a group of activists that challenge was possible. These 
activists then set about building organisation around bread-and-butter issues to 
draw people into progressive politics and spread this challenge. However, these 
organisations ultimately failed and with the announcement in late 1982 of plans to 
reform the apartheid electoral system the focus of activists shifted from local 
communities to national political change. Finally this chapter considers why the 
attempts by activists to build organisation and mobilisation failed to widen the 
social base of activism. It shows how organisation was undermined by the 
fragmented nature of the city’s black population and by the fact that coloured and 
African adults, despite suffering considerable discrimination, were integrated into 
apartheid’s political economy in ways that encouraged quiescence and inhibited the 






4.2. Calm after and before the Storms: The Limited 
Impact of the Soweto Uprising on Progressive 
Politics 1977-9  
 
The events of 1976/7 are often assigned a central role in the re-emergence of 
opposition to apartheid.6 However, in Cape Town the development of activism and 
organisation before 1980 was limited. Formal progressive organisation, therefore, 
played a limited role in the outbreak of the 1979/80 boycotts, although networks and 
ideas influenced by Soweto were significant. 
Interviews in both cases reveal a ‘lull’ in activism after 1977 as individuals 
central to the uprising either left school and were absorbed into the economy (which 
had not yet moved into the doldrums of the 1980s)7 or in the absence of internal 
progressive organisation (due to the ongoing commitment to armed revolution by 
the banned political movements) went into exile.8 This lull meant civil society 
remained dominated by organisations maintaining relationships of cautious 
cooperation with the state.  
A clear example of the limited impact of 1976/7 in radicalising African civil 
society was the response to plans for limited local government for urban Africans. 
The 1977 Community Council Act established local councils for the African 
townships, but left the Bantu Affairs Administration Board (BAAB) (comprised of 
white officials) with ultimate authority, and was clearly located in a framework of 
separate development. However, African civil society responded to these proposals 
with initial engagement. This engagement included the Nyanga Residents 
Association, led by ANC stalwart Oscar Mpetha. Surviving letters reveal Mpetha’s 
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initial support for the councils,9 whilst another activist recounted that underground 
ANC activists received instruction from exile to involve themselves in the 
community council election, before later this position was reversed.10 The 
involvement of not only civil society, but also underground ANC figures, in plans to 
reform apartheid brings into serious question the view of 1976/7 as a turning point 
in the nature of political struggle in the African areas. 
In Bonteheuwel transformations are equally difficult to locate. There was no 
underground presence in the community and interaction with the local authorities 
continued to be characterised by limited cooperation and organised without 
political content or strategy. For example, in 1977 the council introduced an ‘infill 
scheme’ to build new housing on land including the backyards of existing houses. 
This was widely opposed as people were losing their backyards and the population 
of the township was increased without any expansion in local service provision. 
However, whilst in the 1980s such issues were to be taken up by organisations 
operating within an explicitly progressive political framework, at this time 
community discontent was channelled through the church, with the campaign was 
led by the Ministers Fraternal.  
However, whilst Soweto had a limited affect within broader communities, it 
left a mark on the minds of a younger generation, particularly students and ex-
students from the University of Western Cape. This consciousness interacted with 
other organisational developments, including the emergence of the independent 
trade union movement and the development of the non-racial sports movement, to 
create links across the city between like minded individuals. These linkages resulted 
in small scale organisational experiments, rather than mass action, but they were the 
foundations on which later organisations were built. 
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The late 1970s saw small scale initiatives within communities as people with 
common experiences of apartheid sought avenues to challenge inequality. One 
activist, who became involved in the United Women’s Organisation (UWO) and 
Cape Area Housing Action Committee (CAHAC) in the early 1980s, remembers 
being involved in several projects, mostly linked into white liberal and church 
organisations. This included attending the Young Christian Workers and helping 
with a Black Sash literacy project for domestic workers.11 In the case studies 
organisational experiments were also taking place. Students from UWC established 
a homework group for children in Bonteheuwel and a study group at the local 
library.12 Drama groups were set up in the African areas13 and at Fezeka High 
School a history society was established where students discussed politics and 
banned literature, including the Communist Manifesto.14 The South African Council 
of Churches ran winter schools teaching liberation theology and there was some 
discussion of Marxism.15 By 1978 a branch of the black consciousness inspired 
Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO) had been launched in Guguletu and in 
1979 a branch of the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) was launched in 
Cape Town.16 A ‘Peninsula Youth Association’ was also formed in Guguletu, to 
‘unite young people from the LAGUNYA17 townships.’18 The final organisational 
development of this period was the formation of UWO which started as an Ad hoc 
women’s committee in 1978 involving women who had been involved in the ANC 
before its banning. 19  
However, despite these developments the political landscape of 1979 was 
not radically different to 1976. None of these organisations attracted significant 
numbers of supporter and activism did not expand beyond a few individuals. There 
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were no campaigns led by progressive organisations and many of these fledgling 
organisations sought cooperation with the authorities. The Peninsula Youth 
Association, for example, specifically stated in correspondence with the BAAB that 
‘it is not a political body’ and that it aimed ‘to promote the interests of youth and to 
afford recognised means of communication between the youth and the peninsula 
authorities.’20 This period is therefore better understood as a time when individuals 
– mainly university students in the coloured areas and ANC old-timers and a few 
matric students in the African communities – began to seek new ways of 
understanding and challenging apartheid. In doing this they built linkages across 
the city, but they did so without any clearly theorised plan of action, and in many 
cases no clear ideology  
 
4.3. ‘We shall not ride’, ‘We shall not write’, ‘We shall 
not buy’: The Great Boycott Season of 1979-1980 
 
The period of protest in Cape Town between 1979 and 1980 is often referred to as 
‘the great boycott season’ as people in both coloured and African communities 
boycotted buses, schooling and consumer goods. More generally, it has been seen as 
a time when coloureds and Africans came together in a united cause against 
apartheid 21 and, particularly amongst school children, a moment of cognitive 
transformation as it became clear that material hardships could only be overcome 
through political change.22  
However, the evidence presented here suggests that rather than being a 
turning point in mass consciousness across the city, 1979/80 was located in a 
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particular historical moment. This moment saw grievances emerge which were 
universally experienced across the city’s black populations, regardless of race and 
class.  For a time, the city became united in action as these grievances provided a 
basis upon within which an emerging group of politicised activists, seeking ways to 
challenge apartheid, were able to organise and mobilise people. However, even as 
the boycotts spread, they began to unravel. Differences between the African and 
coloured communities undermined unity in action, especially as the costs of 
involvement rose. These divisions impacted first on the consumer and bus boycotts, 
where the causes of protest were of less significance to people’s daily lives. They 
then spread to the school boycott where the existence of separate education systems 
saw different state responses and consequently different reactions within the 
African and coloured schools.  
 
4.3.1 Pasta, Textbooks and Clipcards: The Boycotts of 1979-
80 
The start of the great boycott season can be traced to the Fattis and Monis pasta 
processing factory in Cape Town. After a group of workers were sacked in April 
1979 for trying to organise a branch of the Food and Canning Workers Union 
(FCWU) the whole factory came out on strike.  Whilst strikes were rare this strike 
was particularly unusual. On the 10th May a meeting attended by students from 
educational institutions across the city, including UWC and the coloured teacher 
training colleges, called for a boycott of Fattis and Monis products. This call was 
taken up by organisations at UCT and a Community Action Committee was formed 
involving organisations from throughout Cape Town’s black communities.23 
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 The boycott was highly successful, spreading nationwide. In Cape Town it 
was university and school students that undertook the majority of the community 
support work. Most boycott pamphlets were printed at UWC and it was UWC and 
high school students, supported by left wing students from UCT, who were key in 
most actions, such as the protest held on the 24th May when pupils from across the 
city invaded supermarkets and pulled Fattis and Monis products off the shelves. 24 
In Bonteheuwel students distributed pamphlets and parents who worked for Fattis 
and Monis and the unions addressed meetings in the area.25 In Guguletu the picture 
is less clear. There were no formal student organisations in the township. However, 
members of UWO supported the boycott and the Guguletu Residents Association 
was involved in the Consumer Action Committee. The boycott itself was widely 
supported. In November, 1979 the sacked workers were reinstated. 
 The next boycott to break out was the school boycott. This is widely believed 
to have begun in the coloured township of Hanover Park in April 1980, in protest at 
poor schooling conditions and the dismissal of teachers due to earlier protests. 
However there were intermittent protests and boycotts during February at both the 
Hanover Park schools. There was also a class boycott at Fezeka High in Guguletu on 
the 15th February over compulsory school uniforms, school fees and a lack of 
textbooks, leading some people to argue the boycott had its genesis in the African 
areas.26 Regardless of where the boycott started it was from April that it began to 
gather momentum, spreading through coloured and African schools.  
Whereas 1976 had seen students acting in isolation, without formal 
organisation and little political content, the 1980 boycott was more organised, 
brought together coloured and African schools, linked with non-student groups and 
involved a much clearer theorisation of the links between conditions in the schools 
and the broader apartheid context. In the words of one student involved in the 
boycott: 
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1980 is a student movement that understands the place of politics and understands 
the primacy of other social forces in... change.27 
 
Widespread support was received from parents and teachers. Parent Teacher 
Student Associations (PTSAs) were formed in the coloured areas, including 
Bonteheuwel, and a Parents Action Committee was formed in the African 
townships.28 Over 1000 teachers attended a meeting that expressed support for the 
boycott and the demand for a ‘single non-discriminatory, non-racial society in 
which no racially stratified education system can function.’ 29 Support was also 
expressed from black staff at UWC.30 At Bonteheuwel Senior Secondary School the 
situation became so serious the principle invited parents to a meeting to discuss, 
‘present pupil presence/absence from school and the critical position which has 
developed.’31 Similarly, in the African Townships 2000 residents attended a meeting 
held on the 25th May which elected 16 people to represent the students’ grievances. 
 Whilst in 1979 there had been little progressive student organisation, during 
the boycott effective organisation coalesced. A city-wide ‘Committee of 81’32 was 
established to represent and make decisions for all boycotting schools. 
Representatives from every school voted on decisions, with motions passed by a 
majority being implemented by all. Locally, each school elected a student 
representative council (SRC) which decided on the positions to take to the 
Committee of 81. In this way decision making flowed from discussions within 
individual classrooms, through the SRCs and into the citywide structure. 33 In 
coloured communities SRCs were represented directly on the committee. However, 
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in the African townships an intermediate body was formed, known as the Regional 
Committee, which represented African schools en masse on the Committee of 81.34 
 As well as transforming organisation, the boycott also saw a rapid spread of 
new ideas and ideologies. As the boycott progressed the iniquities of the education 
system began to be linked into apartheid as an economic system that was built on 
structurally entrenched cheap labour and inequality. In turn, these ideas led to a 
growing recognition of the need for alliances beyond the schools. This was clearly 
reflected in a key Committee of 81 publication: 
The wider and deeper the present boycott action has developed, the more we have 
become aware of one of the main lessons of 1976. This lesson was simply that we 
should not allow any serious action by black students to become isolated in the schools< If 
we allow the struggle to be isolated in the schools, we shall find ourselves 
complaining to and petitioning the anti-capitalist rulers for no more than repairs to 
apartheid buildings in apartheid ghettos and group areas< The condition of the 
ghetto schools and the gutter education are the outcome of the whole system of 
racist oppression and capitalist exploitation. 35 
 
In line with this greater focus on political change the students did not call an 
outright school boycott. Instead classes were replaced with awareness sessions 
where students watched videos about international political struggles and discussed 
politics and the events of 1976: 
We had the awareness campaigns from the morning until about 12, 1 in the 
afternoon... We had football, sport tournaments in the afternoon. To keep guys 
busy... But to participate in those games you must have been part of the awareness 
programmes.36 
 
Because of this greater focus on education, and restraint by the state, the 1980 
boycott was relatively blood free.  
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 Overall, however, whilst the schools boycott was widespread it was not, 
ultimately, successful. Furthermore, when it did end it did so in division and 
discord. Coloured schools suspended the boycott on the 30th July after just over 
three months amongst leadership divisions and a breakdown in discipline in the 
schools. 37 In the African areas the decision by the Committee of 81 to return to 
school was ignored and the boycott continued into 1981, before it finally fizzled out.  
The final two events of 1979/80 were the bus and red meat boycotts. The bus 
boycott was a response to plans to raise bus fares in the city. It started on the 2nd 
June, some 6 weeks after the students had begun their boycott. In its early weeks it 
was well supported in both African and coloured communities. Pickup points for 
commuters were arranged along with reduced taxi rates so that people could still 
travel to work. However, like the schools boycott, the bus boycott failed. It was in 
the coloured communities that the boycott first broke down, after six weeks, whilst 
African commuters stayed away far longer. The red meat strike also failed. Like 
Fattis and Monis the boycott was in support of dismissed workers, on this occasion 
from a meat processing plant. However, from the start this strike was not fully 
supported. Only 20 of 200 coloured workers came out on strike, compared to overall 
support of nearly 80%.38 Furthermore, the boycott of red meat did not inflict large 
scale loses on the company and was ultimately called off. 
 
4.3.2. Issues without Race and Class Boundaries: Explaining 
the Emergence of the Great Boycott Season 
Formal progressive organisation played no real role in the emergence of the great 
boycott season. As shown in section 4.2 progressive organisation before 1979 was 
limited in both communities, where responses to material hardships were 
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coordinated on an ad hoc basis. Instead organisation emerged as a result of the 
demands of action. The Committee of 81 was formed after schools were on boycott 
to coordinate protest, not create it. 39 The Consumer Action Committee was formed 
to organise a boycott after Fattis and Monis staff were on strike. PTSAs and the 
Parents Action Committee did not predate the boycott.40 Instead, all of the 
campaigns of this period emerged in response to immediate grievances which, 
whilst often supported and spread by activist networks, drew their strength from 
the fact they were experienced across race and class boundaries in a way that made 
widespread collective action possible.  
The school boycott provides the clearest example of limited organisational 
involvement, an initial lack of political content and the importance of collective 
grievances which allowed action to spread city-wide. As already noted there were 
no city-wide student structures before the boycott and its outbreak was firmly 
rooted in the poor conditions that prevailed within both African and coloured 
schools. The first set of demands drawn up by the boycotting students in April 
reveal how immediate grievances lay behind the boycott’s outbreak: 
 Schools to be allowed to have SRCs 
 No student be forced to wear uniforms or pay school fees 
 School buildings be repaired 
 Sufficient text books be delivered immediately41 
 
In the African High Schools conditions were particularly dire. In February 
1980 the South African Institute for Race Relations produced a confidential paper 
examining schooling in the African schools. This noted that here were around 50 
pupils in every class and so few text books that as many as 20 students had to share 
a single book.42 That it was the poor quality of schooling that caused protest, not a 
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clear desire to challenge apartheid, was confirmed by activists involved in the 
boycotts:  
[T]he 1980 boycott started with the problem of the school fees at Fezeka high 
school... we were... told to pay school fees before the end of February, for 
registration. Then out of a discussion of the students we felt that this is not correct 
now. Because some of our parents will not be able to pay, then if they have not paid 
then children were chased out of school... And it went further... in terms of the 
corporal punishment. So..., we were able now to influence within other schools 
around the common issues that were affecting students.43 
 
Whilst in the coloured areas schooling provision was better, conditions were still 
poor and again it was this which drove the boycotts. As one of the key figures in 
Bonteheuwel recalled: 
What started this thing was mostly that< We were fed up with the conditions at 
school itself. One, we were fed up with the teachers .We not getting quality 
teachers... No books < then the buildings has been vandalised... Cold during winter 
period. So there was this whole bundle of problems. But it was not restricted only to 
certain schools. It was a generic problem throughout the whole Western Cape< So 
then people started discussing these disparities, you see. 44 
 
These quotes are significant because not only do they reveal the importance 
of the poor conditions within the schools, but more importantly they highlight the 
fact these grievances were experienced collectively across the city. In Guguletu 
students worked with other schools around corporal punishment. In Bonteheuwel 
these grievances led to the participant discussing issues with people across the 
whole Western Cape. It was this commonality of interest, caused by the fact black 
schooling was poor everywhere, that allowed the boycott to spread rapidly from 
school to school. 
Similar dynamics are also apparent in the bus boycott. Again ad hoc 
organisation was established to co-ordinate protest, which focused on an issue of 
general concern and significant impact. As early as 1975 the City Council was 
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expressing concern over the impact that higher busfares would have on low income 
coloureds and was pushing for increased subsidies. 45 With far lower wages Africans 
were even more adversely affected. The issue of busfares was particularly sensitive 
because it was apartheid segregation that meant blacks had to live in townships 
with long commutes to their places of work. Increasing busfares, therefore, were 
experienced as a rising cost that was not only difficult financially, but was also a 
result of discriminatory policies that restricted people’s transport and living 
options.46 Like the schools boycott, therefore, moves to increase busfares impacted 
city-wide. It was this widespread discontent, and its location within broader 
experiences of discrimination, that made boycott possible. 
Whilst the schools and bus boycotts were located in significant material 
hardship, the consumer boycotts that started the boycott season were not. It is 
insufficient, therefore, to argue that material hardship alone caused protest. The 
following section discusses in more detail the role of organisation and political 
space in providing a context that supported action. However given its success, and 
the fact it appears to run counter to the general analysis offered in this thesis, it is 
worth considering the Fattis and Monis boycott in more detail here.  
The Fattis and Monis boycott appears to have drawn its strength from a 
combination of general opposition to the treatment of the striking workers, strong 
support amongst university and school students, and the fact that the existence of 
other brands of pasta made the boycott low risk. Whilst the absence of material 
grievances in the boycott appears to undermine the argument proposed here – that 
structural push factors were crucial to action – the failure of the red meat boycott 
suggests such a reading is only partly correct. At its heart the Fattis and Monis 
boycott was run by student activists and trade unionists. Trade unionists were 
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drawn in as a result of their organisational role, whilst many students came to the 
boycott whilst searching for broader ways to challenge inequality. The success of the 
boycott, therefore, lay less in the personal impact of the boycott across African and 
coloured communities, and more in the fact that a successful and widespread 
campaign was organised around a clear injustice which people could participate in 
for little personal cost. The fact that the red meat boycott failed, as people refused to 
sacrifice the eating of red meat for similar ends, shows how important the low cost 
of the Fattis and Monis boycott was and how, in the absence of deep felt grievance, 
many people would not make sustained sacrifices for the greater good. 
 
4.3.3. Shaping Protest: Political Space, Activist Networks and 
Repertoires of Action in the Boycotts 
Although the boycotts of 1979/80 were heavily conditioned by apartheid’s 
underlying structural contradictions, these contradictions alone did not alone 
determine the nature or success of protest. Two other dynamics played a crucial role 
in turning structural contradiction into sustained action. Firstly, there was the 
growing activist network which facilitated organisation, coordinated protest and 
framed injustice in a way that sustained involvement.  Secondly, this period also 
saw an expansion of political space as a lack of repression provided space for 
activism to emerge, which was then  pushed open as successive protests emerged, 
each of which further demonstrated the possibility of action.  
Whilst the boycotts emerged around material grievances their development 
into sustained challenge (and often their early unfolding) owed much to the 
networks of activists that had emerged over the preceding five years. Indeed, the 
emerging grievances and protests of this period provided many people who had 
been looking for a way to challenge apartheid a context for action that had 
previously been missing. In contrast to 1976 the boycotts of 1980 tapped into a 





ideological coherence which supported action and cooperation across the city. They 
also developed organisational networks that allowed for sustained decision making 
and the practical implementation of programmes of action. Whilst alone these do 
not account for the wider spread of the boycott (grievances were still important) 
without these linkages it is unlikely that the boycotts would have achieved the 
success they did. 
The Fattis and Monis strike emerged as a result of labour relations within the 
company. However, the boycott it spawned was the result of growing activist 
linkages across the city. The boycott was not organised by workers, but through 
student organisations and the non-racial sports movement.47 It also relied heavily on 
links within the Food and Canning Workers Union (FCWU). A list of some of the 
officials working in the FCWU, who helped implement the boycott locally, reveals 
the importance of politically minded activists in spreading the boycott. These 
included Virginia Engel, an activist in the Moravian Church and a former Black 
Consciousness activist at UWC; Athalie Crawford a white radical involved in 
student politics; Liz Abrahams, an ANC veteran, former Western Cape secretary of 
SACTU and member of the Federation of South African Women; Oscar Mpetha, 
another ANC veteran and a central figure in township politics who helped bring the 
boycott to the African areas; Norma Gabriel a civic activist who was at this stage 
linked into Neville Alexander’s group; and Johnny Issel a former Black 
Consciousness activist who became a key figure in Congress politics in the province 
and was responsible for establishing the community newspaper Grassroots. 
Likewise, the bus and school boycotts and the formation of the Committee of 
81 relied on informal networks of progressive individuals. Initial meetings around 
the bus boycott were organised by Johnny Issel.48 In Bonteheuwel the leadership of 
the school boycott was drawn into city-wide structures through links in the non-
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racial sports movement.49 Leaders of the boycott from other schools, including in 
Guguletu, recall how the links that later brought them into the Committee of 81 
were made at summer schools and through involvement in the Young Christian 
Workers and Young Christian Students. 50 The growth of protest and opposition also 
brought veterans of pre-1960s politics into the open. As individuals were drawn into 
campaigns, organisation and networks coalesced. The Fattis and Monis strike was 
the first time many activists who became central in the Western Cape Congress 
movement worked together; however many of the links formed in this campaign 
were used to organise the bus boycott and later the UDF 51 
These growing networks were crucial because they helped turn disparate 
grievances into sustained and theorised protests which had both aims and 
explanations for injustice. The Committee of 81 not only provided a vehicle for 
decision making but also published demands and spread views on why apartheid 
education was inferior. In turn these demands and discussion provided the rallying 
point for students, turning their general experiences of hardship into a defined set of 
aims and identifying ways of achieving those aims. By creating a narrative of 
protest organisation was able to rally people together. 
The growth of organisation also had more a more practical impact on 
organising, by providing the resources required to sustain and spread action. Many 
of the ad hoc organisations of this time linked African and working class coloured 
activists with white and middle class coloureds with ready access to the skills and 
material resources required in the building of organisation and spreading of protest. 
Many of the pamphlets published in 1979/80 were printed at UCT or UWC. 
Similarly, the organising of boycott meetings and pamphleteering at transport hubs 
depended upon activists with ready access to transport, money and communication 
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equipment. Whilst formal organisation, therefore, played little role in the great 
boycott season, informal networks were crucial to its unfolding.  
The second dynamic that transformed grievance into sustained action was 
an opening of political space. This opening of space was a result of three 
transformations. Firstly, unlike in 1976, repression was limited. Secondly, and 
related to the lack of repression, the repertoire of action employed, using boycotts 
and mass meetings, provided a low risk route into protest. As already discussed 
with regards to the Fattis and Monis boycott, people could protest by abstaining 
rather than acting. Finally, as the boycott season itself unfolded it forced open 
growing space for action. 1979/80 was not a single protest but a wave of interrelated 
protests, constantly building on what had preceded. 52 In the minds of many people 
the Fattis and Monis boycott showed that collective action was possible and could 
succeed and it was this that encouraged further protests. As each protest expanded 
so too did the bounds of possibility and this encouraged people to undertake and 
organise new protests.53 A student in Guguletu, for example, recounted how the 
school students were holding meetings which, when the red meat boycott broke out 
were then used to support the workers and how out of this a more explicitly 
politicised understanding of the student struggle developed.54 Equally, the tactics of 
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4.3.4. The Limits of Shared Grievances: Race, Class and the 
Mixed Success of the Great Boycott Season 
Although the Great Boycott Season saw some successes, particularly in drawing 
large numbers of black Capetonians into protest, most of the boycotts failed. This 
failure is significant because it reveals clear limits to black collective action in the 
city, even at a time when organisation and opportunity were supportive of such 
action. The boycotts relied on the articulation of universally experienced grievances. 
They collapsed when this universality could no longer be sustained.  
The clearest example of this was the schools boycott. Whilst for a time 
students united behind a programme of action, as the boycott progressed this unity 
could not be maintained. Divisions opened up along both race and class cleavages. 
Notes from the meeting in May 1980 at which the boycott was suspended reveal 
how in the coloured schools divisions emerged between those schools that wanted 
the boycott to end and those (including Bonteheuwel) who wished to escalate the 
action in an attempt to precipitate revolution.55 Within this debate class played a key 
role. In working class schools like those in Bonteheuwel, the students came to see 
the boycotts as part of a broader move for liberation, whereas in the more affluent 
schools the satisfying of specific educational demands was seen as sufficient to 
allow a return to school.56 In turn this reflected the different life chances of middle 
and working class coloureds. In the more affluent areas schooling and education 
was a vehicle for personal advancement. However, in areas where pass rates were 
lower and jobs depended less on high levels of education the demand for better 
schooling was subsumed under broader demands for transformation.57 Students in 
the working class schools also had less to lose as they relied less on education and 
delayed exam results were therefore less likely to impact on their life chances. 
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Divisions also emerged between Africans and coloureds. Key here were the 
very different conditions in the schools in the two communities, the existence of 
different education authorities and the social and physical distance between African 
and coloured students. The decision by African pupils to ignore the Committee of 
81’s decision to return to school reflects all three of these dynamics. Africans felt 
unable to return to school because they had received no redress to their demands 
(which whilst framed within the broader context of student protest included 
demands that related only to Africans). Furthermore, they were due to meet the 
Bantu education department to discuss their grievances they day after the 
Committee of 81, which was dominated by coloured schools, voted to suspend the 
boycott.58  
Similar divisions also emerged around the bus and red meat boycotts, where 
coloured support trailed of far quicker than it did in African areas. Again this was 
seen at the time as being a consequence of distance between racial groups and their 
different relationships with the state. For example, in accounting for the decline in 
coloured support for the red meat boycott the head of SACOS noted that: ‘the divide 
and rule policy of the government makes it difficult for the coloured people to 
identify with the Africans‛.59  
The great boycott season was a high point in the history of progressive 
organising in Cape Town. It was the first time that large numbers of black 
Capetonians had come together in protests that, whilst primarily linked to 
immediate grievances in the schools, factories and townships, also contained a 
significant strand of political challenge.  
 In accounting for the success of the boycotts, as well as their limits, a 
combination of material grievances, organisation and political opportunities were 
all of relevance. A lack of repression, activist networks and expanding belief in the 
possibility and efficacy of action all helped the boycotts emerge and develop from 
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disparate grievances into widespread protest. However, whilst these political 
opportunities and organisational resources played a key role in protest, their success 
was limited by the resonance of the campaigns they looked to support. Conditions 
within schools citywide were atrocious and inadequate schooling was linked to 
broader labour market discrimination, consequently support for the schools boycott 
was widespread. Busfare rises caused considerable hardship across communities 
and were seen as unfair, but were not as central to the lives of commuters as the 
daily schooling experience was to students. Protest was therefore widespread and 
sustained, but had limits.  The consumer boycotts were ultimately abstracted from 
most people’s lives and therefore, whilst there was considerable support for the 
Fattis and Monis boycott, once the costs of participation increased, as it did with the 
red meat boycott, support dropped away. 
Finally, returning to the picture of differential discrimination presented in 
chapter two, it is worth noting that whilst many of these campaigns appeared on the 
surface to be rooted in bread-and-butter issues, the most consistent supporters of 
these campaigns were university graduates and matric students, not those people 
most directly affected. The boycotts of 1980 showed that when grievances coalesced 
the actions of an activist elite could create action. However without such grievances 
action was hard to sustain.  
 
4.4. From Bread and Butter to Banners and Rallies: 
The Rise and Fall of the Organising Tradition in Cape 
Town 1980-1985 
 
In the wake of the great boycott season activist consciousness within the coloured 
communities of Cape Town was transformed. The development of protest across 





consciousness all worked to create a new layer of activists that both felt apartheid 
could be challenged and sought ways to achieve this. This activist elite sought ways 
to expand political consciousness and grow political struggle and, in the early 1980s, 
began to look to mass organisation within civil society as a mechanism for 
expanding popular support for progressive politics. 
 Working within a framework for action that aimed to create politicisation by 
organising people around their daily hardships this activist elite, still dominated by 
university students, set about building ‘grassroots’ civil society organisations across 
Cape Town. Considerable effort and energy was ploughed into drawing people into 
progressive organisation, where it was believed they would learn about the 
injustices of apartheid and through this realisation become progressive activists 
themselves. However, this approach to organising failed and organisation remained 
dominated by a young activist elite. Similarly, in the African communities there was 
little growth in activism during the early 1980s  
 Then, in 1982, the government announced plans to reform the apartheid 
constitution and draw coloureds into the national political system. This led to the 
creation of national organisation to oppose these changes and a shift in progressive 
organisation and activism at the local level, as it shifted focus from bread-and-butter 
issues to national political concerns. However, although the focus of activism 
shifted, the fundamental dynamics driving and shaping participation did not and 
mass participation remained limited to passive support. The same activist elite 
dominated organisation, although coloureds became increasingly joined by an 
African activist elite that was forming along similar lines. This section considers 
why this expansion of activism did not achieve its goal of widening the social base 
of protest. It does this by first outlining how civil society changed between 1980 and 






4.4.1. Bread and Butter: Civil Society in Cape Town 1980-1982 
The approach to progressive organisation and activism that dominated the early 
1980s can be broadly described as ‘the organising tradition.’60 In the coloured 
communities university students, graduates and veterans of the boycotts began to 
seek ways to extend the challenge to apartheid. In doing so they met with African 
veterans of the struggles of the1950s, absorbed ideas on collective organising from 
Latin America and Lenin and developed an approach to mass action focused on the 
building of local community organisation as a mechanism for drawing the broader 
community towards progressive politics. This approach was widely adopted 
throughout the coloured communities. In the African areas, despite more limited 
growth in progressive organisation, UWO adopted a similar approach.61 
At the heart of the organising tradition was a plan to link mass organisation 
and activity within civil society, based around bread-and-butter issues and day-to-
day concerns, into a broader campaign highlighting and ultimately challenging 
apartheid. The way this was to be achieved was to run campaigns on commonly 
held grievances, such as the cost of rent, but to simultaneously demonstrate that 
apartheid was the root cause of all these grievances. Once people realised they were 
not only poor, but poor because of apartheid, it was hoped they would become 
absorbed into a broader anti-apartheid opposition: 
[The goal of organising was to] take that opportunity [presented by the bread-and-
butter issues] to mobilise people around political issues, bigger political issues in the 
country. Using the bread-and-butter issues as the issue around which you can rally 
people. So yeah, from the leadership point of view it was a political move, but for 
the ordinary members it was about addressing the bread and butter issues in the 
community.62 
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Three forms of organisation emerged in progressive civil society during the early 
1980s, all of which were heavily influenced by the organising tradition. These were 
civic associations, youth organisations and the women’s movements.63 
Civic associations were geographically based organisations campaigning on 
issues affecting the local community, such as rent rises and the condition of the built 
environment. Whilst they had office holders, such as a treasurer and chair, 
involvement was primarily via participatory democracy practiced through mass 
meetings at which all residents were invited to attend and vote on decisions. Civics 
tended to be opposed to apartheid, though no clear ideology dominated, and 
engaged in non-confrontational protests and civil disobedience such as placard 
demonstrations, marches and petitions alongside organising local community 
events like plays and soup kitchens. 
 Initially civic organisations only operated in the coloured areas, including 
the Bonteheuwel Civic Association (BCA) which was launched in 1980. However, in 
May 1982 the Western Cape Civic Association (WCCA) was launched to cover the 
African areas (although it remained relatively weak).  Such was the growth of the 
civic movement that by 1982 it was estimated that 32 civic associations existed in 
and around Cape Town.64 At the same time as local civic associations were formed 
city-wide coordinating structures were also developed. The WCCA had several 
branches covering each of the LAGUNYA townships and eventually Crossroads. In 
the coloured areas umbrella structures, including the congress aligned CAHAC and 
the Unity Movement Federation of Cape Civic Associations, were formed to take up 
city-wide concerns.  
 The second major area of organising in this period was within youth 
movements. Again these movements were predominantly focused in coloured 
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communities. Coloured youth movements tended to emerge alongside civic 
associations to involve young people in activism, as civic issues were seen to be the 
concern of adults. The Bonteheuwel Youth Movement (BYM) was a typical youth 
movement of this time. It was formed after the 1980 school boycott by students from 
UWC, including involvement from Trevor Manuel, and during the early 1980s 
between 6 and 30 members regularly attended its meetings. It had a drama group, a 
history group and organised games for the youth and discos.65 It met every 
Wednesday and discussed explicitly political themes.66 It also arranged community 
events. For example, in June 1982 the BYM held a cultural afternoon, attended by 
more than 100 people. This involved a panel discussion on the role of youth and a 
series of plays.67 
 Moves to form a youth structure also took place in African areas. ANC 
veterans called several meetings to which key youth figures in the community were 
invited. These included people such as Themba Mpetha, Oscar Mpetha’s son, 
Whitey Jacobs, who was to become a key figure in the Cape Youth Congress and 
South African Youth Congress in the mid 1980s, and Oupa Lehulere, who became a 
central figure in ‘ultra left’ student university politics. However, despite these early 
moves, youth organising in the African townships remained weak, with activity 
confined to an interim committee which did not organise within the community.68 
 The final major organisational development of this time was the formation of 
women’s organisations. The United Women’s Organisation (UWO) - a non-racial 
organisation made up of women from all group areas – was formally established in 
1981 and became involved in campaigns such as starting a crèche in the townships, 
protesting against increases in the bread price, and protesting at rental rises.  A 
Women’s Front Organisation (WFO) was also launched, campaigning on a similar 
platform but based around activists in the Nyanga area. 
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Before 1983 the success of grassroots organisation varied by location and 
over time. In the African communities activism remained limited. The WCCA and 
the UWO ran a campaign against evictions in 1982 that did succeed in garnering 
community support for a boycott of the community councillors’ businesses. 
However, beyond this there was little African activism. The WCCA ran no other 
notable campaigns and youth organisation did not develop beyond an interim 
committee. Similarly, whilst UWO was able to expand its membership during this 
time from 125 in 1981/2 to 183 in 1983/4, its most high profile campaign of this time 
– a campaign and attempted boycott around bread price rises – ended in failure.69  
In contrast activism in the coloured areas saw initial success. Coloured youth 
organisation remained relatively constant throughout the early 1980s. However 
civic organisation saw considerable expansion in 1981. In Bonteheuwel the BCA 
during this period fought the council to get street lighting, opposed rent issues and 
set up a soup kitchen.70 A campaign to get a day hospital opened in the township 
was also run. Indeed, the BCA was one of the most active civics in the coloured 
communities. In 1981 it was meeting every Monday at 7.30pm.71 Furthermore, 
whereas most civics were organised solely through mass meetings, in Bonteheuwel 
the civic also used house and street meetings where neighbours met in small groups 
to discuss issues.72 
 City-wide CAHAC and its affiliates were also strong. CAHAC launched a 
maintenance campaign in 1981 to protest against the failure of local government to 
undertake repairs despite a service charge being levied on tenants specifically for 
this purpose. At this campaign’s inaugural meeting in Bonteheuwel, which was the 
focal point for much of the campaign’s organising, CAHAC was able to attract over 
1500 people.73 Overall this campaign saw over 7000 houses visited by activists and 
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started with a survey of 200 families.74 130 people also went to Cape Town to protest 
outside the Cape Town Civic Centre.75  
CAHAC also organised around rentals. In response to rent increases in 
December 1981 a Rents Action Committee was formed. This brought together 
CAHAC and its affiliates with organisations such as UWO and WFO, trade unions, 
and churches. A petition of over 41,000 signatures was gathered and mass meetings 
were held which at their height attracted an attendance of 2,000 people. CAHAC 
was able to put together a delegation to meet the minister of community 
development, Pen Koetzé, and put their demands to him in person.  
However, whilst there were high profile campaigns at this time by the end of 
1982 much grassroots organisation in the coloured communities had gone into 
decline. The rents we can afford campaign ended in failure when Koetzé refused to 
cede to the delegation’s demands and CAHAC could not agree a strategy for taking 
the campaign forward in the wake of limited community support for a rental 
boycott.76 This was the last large scale campaign run by the coloured civics. In June 
1983 CAHAC noted that whilst there had been considerable activity from 1980 to 
the end of the rents we can afford campaign after this ‘organisation nosedived.’77 
CAHAC also noted that whilst its aim had been to draw broad support from 
coloured society, as an organisation it remained dominated by a young activist 
elite.78 
The picture amongst local civic organisations is less clear. There is evidence 
of a general decline in the number of coloured civics and their activities. In 1983 
CAHAC had noted that many of its affiliates were weak or inactive.79 Similarly, 
CAHAC’s 2nd AGM, also held in 1983, stated with regard to its affiliates that: ‚lately 
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attendance has been very bad, with delegates arriving late and struggling for a 
quorum.‛80 Notes from CAHAC suggest that the civic in Bonteheuwel underwent a 
similar decline to the regional structures and other civics. Focusing on the campaign 
that was launched by the BCA to try to secure the building of a day hospital 
CAHAC noted that:  
In about June/July they embarked on a campaign to have the D[ay] hosp[ital] 
reopened, but to date the campaign has not climaxed. Instead of a weak 
affiliate/branch [i.e. Bonteheuwel] initiating a campaign of such magnitude, it could 
have been taken up by CAHAC.81 
 
However, in contrast to many areas not all civic organisation collapsed in 
Bonteheuwel. The campaign for a day hospital is testimony to the continued activity 
of civic activists. Similarly, activists from this time recount how they remained 
involved in a soup kitchen and helping with the running of an advice office. 82 It 
does appear, however, that like CAHAC the BCA remained predominantly an 
organisation of young activists. The maintenance campaign in 1981 was the most 
high profile campaign in the community, however even this did not widen support 
for the organisation beyond a relatively small activist core.83 
  
4.4.2. Banners and Rallies: Civil Society in Cape Town 1983-5 
The high point of grassroots organisation in the coloured communities was in 1981 
and from late 1982 the strength of the sectoral organisations that had previously 
emerged declined. Campaigns around grassroots issues ceased to be run and 
organisations were neglected. This decline coincided with the announcement by the 
government to reform apartheid to give limited political representation to coloureds 
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and Indians and the formation of the national UDF to coordinate protest against 
these proposals. As grassroots civil society declined, more political organisation 
expanded.  
The start of the decline in grassroots politics in the coloured communities 
began around the same time that the government announced plans to reform the 
apartheid political system. These plans were announced in May 1982 and included 
the further restriction of Africans without section 10 rights, alongside a de facto 
recognition of the permanence of Africans with section 10 rights in the white areas. 
However, most significantly, the government announced its intention to give Indian 
and coloured South Africans national political representation in an ethnically 
segregated tricameral parliament.  
 The impact of these changes on civil society was profound as the focus of 
both activists and their organisations shifted from the local to national level and 
from immediate hardships to the political system. The first organisation to respond 
to the Koornhof proposals, named after the cabinet minister who announced them, 
was the Federation of Cape Civic Association which began to hold meetings on the 
issue around Cape Town.84 Then, in September 1982 the Women’s Front called a 
meeting to discuss the Koornhof bills and it was at this that the Disorderly Bills 
Action Committee (DBAC) was formed.  
The DBAC brought together organisations from across sectors, communities 
and ideologies in Cape Town. These included the Federation of Cape Civic 
Associations, the left aligned Western Cape Youth League, progressive trade unions 
and the Congress aligned grassroots movements such as CAHAC, UWO, WFO, 
COSAS and the newly formed Cape Youth Congress (CAYCO). However, the 
DBAC did not last and in August 1983 the Congress aligned organisations, citing 
inactivity and ideological infighting, helped launch the nationwide UDF. Those 
organisations remaining within the DBAC, primarily leftist and Black 
                                                   





Consciousness groupings, formed the Cape Action League and became involved in 
their own national movement, the National Forum. When the DBAC and then UDF 
were formed they were intended to operate as fronts, bringing together 
organisations with an interest in opposing the constitutional reforms. Because the 
DBAC did not develop beyond a regional forum of organisations, and because the 
Cape Action League did not have a clear presence in either of the case study 
communities, their structures will not be outlined here. Instead focus will be on the 
UDF. 
The UDF was a front with structures designed to provide representation for 
affiliates rather than individual members. The theoretical grounding for the 
relationship between affiliates and the UDF was based on a two tier division of 
labour. Local affiliates were to keep organising locally on bread-and-butter issues, 
whilst the UDF drew together these organisations in a national opposition to the 
political system.85 The structures of the UDF in Cape Town were designed to reflect 
this division. In individual communities area committees were to be formed to 
coordinate the activities of all local affiliated organisations. Above the area 
committees were regions which included the Northern Suburbs, Southern Suburbs, 
City of Cape Town, Townships (representing the African areas) and the Rest of 
Townships (of which Bonteheuwel was a member). The regions reported to a 
Western Cape Regional Executive Committee. At each level representation was by 
affiliate, and activists could not have direct membership of the UDF.  In practice 
these formalised structures did not always operate as planned. Bonteheuwel was 
one of the first communities to establish an area committee, which remained active 
throughout the mid-1980s. However, in Guguletu no area committee was 
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established and instead a UDF Township area committee was set up which 
coordinated activities across the LAGUNYA area. 
This growing opposition to the constitutional reforms coincided with 
considerable change in progressive civil society. Firstly, the nature, style and focus 
of activism changed. Secondly, it coincided with a slow growth in the strength of 
student/youth politics.  Thirdly, it coincided with a continuing decline in strength 
and support for the coloured civics and ongoing indifference amongst African 
adults to progressive organising. 
Political plans to transform apartheid at the national level were mirrored in 
shifting priorities amongst progressive organisations and activists as campaigning 
moved away from bread-and-butter issues to the explicitly national and political 
issue of apartheid and the new constitution. The main campaigns of this period 
were not around rent, food prices or bus fares. Instead they focused on a boycott of 
elections to the new parliament and, in the African areas, of the local authorities. 
The most successful campaigns of this period were: the Million Signatures 
Campaign, launched in early 1984 by the UDF, which attempted to collect a million 
signatures in opposition to the Government’s reform; boycotts of the Black Local 
Authority Elections in the African areas; boycotts of the tricameral parliament.  
Because these campaigns relied upon widespread support but did not 
require consistent commitment – people could sign a petition and never involve 
themselves in progressive politics again – organisation and the nature of activism 
was transformed. Progressive politics, particularly in the coloured areas, shifted 
towards pamphleteering and publicity. In Cape Town the Million Signature 
Campaign was organised primarily through blitzes. These involved activists from 
across the City (both African and coloured) targeting individual communities and 
randomly knocking on doors. This was by far the most successful way of collecting 
signatures, but was done at the expense of the more careful conscientising and 
organising that had characterised earlier organising. Reporting in April 1984 the 





door, with activists spending an average of just six minutes per house.86 Talking 
during his trial for ANC activities an activist from Bonteheuwel recounted a picture 
of activism at this time which shows how the key UDF activities were to raise the 
profile of issues, rather than organise people around them: 
[T]he activities that we were mainly engaged in at that time was things like 
pamphleteering, posterising (sic)... You find that, I for example, in our youth group, 
we would sit down and make UDF T-shirts, we would make pamphlets and so 
forth.87 
 
Large rallies and public events became the other main method for 
campaigning. For example, in October 1983 a people’s weekend was held. To 
support this in the Western Cape around 1,000 T-shirts were produced and 3,000 
badges. 85,000 copies of UDF news were distributed along with 3,000 posters. As 
part of this 2,000 people attended a rock against the constitution event at UCT, 
whilst a church rally in Bonteheuwel ‘Christians against the constitution` was 
attended by over 1,500 ‘primarily church people who would not have attended 
other meetings’.88 Again, whilst able to mobilise large numbers of people, the focus 
on bread and butter issues of 1981/2 had become a thing of the past.  
The tricameral election boycott and boycott of African local authority 
elections supported by the UDF, Cape Action League and a range of other 
progressive organisations across South Africa was highly successful. Not only did it 
succeed in its aims, it also strengthened progressive organisation and activism. Only 
one in five eligible voters took in the tricameral elections.89 In the Western Cape and 
the case studies themselves the campaigns were equally effective. In the 
Bonteheuwel ward for the tricameral elections only around 8% voted, one of the 
lowest turnouts in the country. Support from coloured school students was 
particularly marked on Election Day when around 634,000 boycotted school, 
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although there was no labour stoppage in support of the boycott. 90 This clearly 
represented a failure of the government’s reforms to mobilise Indian, coloured and 
African communities behind the new apartheid dispensation. The UDF itself saw 
these outcomes as major successes for both the campaign and progressive 
organisation. An assessment of the Million Signature Campaign noted some 
weaknesses but concluded it had brought together and trained hundreds of activists 
and laid the groundwork for the anti-election campaign. The same assessment 
concluded that overall the UDF had developed activists, generated new activists 
and heightened the political climate.91  
The UDF in Bonteheuwel was particularly strong during this time. 
Bonteheuwel was one of the few areas to successfully establish an area committee. 
This area committee coordinated the activities of all progressive organisations in the 
township and brought together the BCA, the advice office, many local church 
organisations and the youth and student movements. Pamphleteering took place, 
activists were involved in the million signature campaign and the three 
Bonteheuwel high schools participated in the Election Day boycott. 
Alongside UDF activities student and youth organisation was consolidated 
in Bonteheuwel. The BCA continued to be led by the UWC activists who had 
established it, but their work was bolstered by young recruits from within the 
community. The Bonteheuwel Youth Movement was never a large organisation 
during this time, however its membership was sustained throughout the UDF 
period, and youth activists were heavily involved in UDF campaigns.92 
Bonteheuwel also saw a group of activists emerge within the schools. Whilst there 
was no Bonteheuwel branch of COSAS several students became involved with 
COSAS at a regional level. Furthermore, SRCs had existed in all the Bonteheuwel 
secondary schools since at least 1980.Consequently, the politicised students who 
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were linked into citywide student and UDF networks were able to organise around 
explicitly political activities in the schools. One activist, for example, remembers 
how in Bonteheuwel High during 1984 the SRC members would facilitate political 
awareness programmes on school: 
So we will corner an assembly and then in that assembly we will explain [political 
issues+< what the tricameral parliament is all about, what apartheid is all about, 
why we are in Bonteheuwel, what gutter education is all about.93 
 
 This politicisation in the schools was also facilitated by the development of a 
formal structure to link the three schools together. In 1984 the Bonteheuwel Inter 
School Congress (BISCO) was established by SRC members who were also involved 
in CAYCO and the BCA. BISCO was not to fully realise its potential as a 
coordinating structure until the unrest of late 1985, and remained the preserve of a 
relatively small group activist group at this time. However as an organisation 
BISCO did allow the schools to act together in protest around a range of progressive 
issues, such as supporting strikers from the nearby Epping industrial estate.94. 
In Guguletu the UDF was less significant as an organisation, possibly 
because its key focus was in the coloured areas and the tricameral parliament. 
However UDF structures were developed and Guguletu was part of the Township 
UDF area committee. 95 Youth organisation remained relatively underdeveloped 
before 1984, although the launching of CAYCO at a regional level was accompanied 
by the formal launching of two youth structures in Guguletu, a branch of CAYCO 
and LAGUNYACRO.96 However, after 1984 youth organisation began to expand, 
with links being made to underground activists and an explicitly political and 
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congress aligned position being spread in meetings. Like in Bonteheuwel formal 
membership of these organisations hovered around 20 people.97 
 The final area where organisation expanded during this period was within 
the African schools. In December 1983 the Guguletu/Nyanga branch of COSAS was 
reporting only 30 members and the Langa branch 14 members. Beyond the African 
townships there was only one other Cape Town branch, in Ravensmead.98 However, 
from 1984 the situation in the schools started to change. In August 1984 COSAS 
made a national call to students to build SRCs and this gave a major boost to 
organising. In Guguletu COSAS activists organised activities to support this 
campaign. 99 In some schools this led to conflict, most notably in the recently opened 
Crossroads 3 School. However, this conflict often acted as a rallying point and, 
between 1984 and 1985, SRCs were formed in most African schools.100 This surge in 
activism was partially reflected in political school organisation. As momentum built 
behind the campaign student politics began to expand. COSAS in Guguletu grew 
slightly in membership during this period, claiming around 40-60 members by early 
1985.101 1984 also saw closer links being built between the schools and more 
explicitly political youth organisations with members of  LAGUNYACRO , CAYCO, 
the Young Christian Students (YCS) and COSAS all being involved with meeting 
with students and helping them to mobilise.102  
However, whilst the UDF and its campaigns were expanding citywide 
networks and drawing in increasing numbers of young people, they were not 
changing the social base of activism, rather they were consolidating and expanding 
activism amongst already responsive groups. Local, grassroots organisation 
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representing black adults was either continuing to decline (in the coloured 
communities) or was still struggling to establish itself (in the African areas).  
The decline in civic organising noted earlier was not checked by the launch 
of the UDF and both the strength of CAHAC and its involvement in active 
campaigns remained subdued.103 Indeed, the extent to which coloured residents had 
become alienated from grassroots progressive organisation, and the fact that the 
UDF did little to create mass support for progressive action, is well represented in 
the fate of the 1984 campaign against busfare increases. In November 1984 CAHAC 
planned a campaign against rises in busfares. In keeping with the UDF’s ability to 
produce mass publicity over 100,000 campaign specific pamphlets and 85,000 other 
pamphlets and papers were distributed in just two days by around 2000 activists. 
Blitzes were held in those areas most likely to be affected by the boycott.104 
However, mass participation was not achieved. To keep conservative residents on 
board the bus boycott was designed to last only two days. However, an assessment 
of the boycott by the UDF noted that whilst some people did stay away, ‘there were 
many who did catch buses’ and in general the campaign was seen as far from 
successful.105  
In Guguletu the lack of civic activism continued and there was a lack of 
enthusiasm for UDF activities amongst both the civic association and the population 
in general, a fact which is particularly interesting because it undermines the view of 
African communities as necessarily more radical and politicised than coloured 
communities. The WCCA remained resistant to political messages and campaigns in 
spite of the involvement of underground activists in its structures and its affiliation 
with the UDF. The chair of the civic in Guguletu during this time argues that it 
remained focused on social problems in the community and avoided taking an 
openly political stand until the unrest of the mid-1980s:  
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You see when the UDF was formed, the UDF wanted us to change into a political 
organisation. Yeah. And I resisted that. Yeah. Because I felt that it was not time yet 
for the civic to become an overt political organisation. Although there was a word 
from the Lusaka, from the ANC that civic associations be formed. Yeah. I still felt 
that we should continue as a non-political organisation.106 
 
Indeed, the archival record suggests that at times the WCCA was in direct 
conflict with the UDF. In January 1984 a report back to the UDF revealed that the 
chairman of the WCCA in Guguletu had been encouraging people to go to 
Khayelitsha – a new township about 30 miles outside of Cape Town – in direct 
contravention of the UDF’s campaign against such a move. Similar tensions also 
revealed themselves in March 1985 when the chair sent a letter to the UDF 
complaining they had printed pamphlets in the name of the WCCA without 
consulting them. As a result they temporarily suspended their membership of the 
UDF. They also declared that the delegate that was currently representing WCCA in 
the UDF was not mandated to do so by the organisation.107  
 This discomfort with political campaigning was also reflected in township 
residents’ responses to the UDF. Whilst there was little support for apartheid in 
Guguletu, this was not reflected in open support for the UDF. The Million 
Signatures Campaign was particularly difficult to implement in the townships 
where activists reported ‘grave fears’ amongst residents that ‘slowed down 
collection substantially.’108 Whilst such fears were caused in large part by the 
oppressive nature of apartheid, they stand contrary to the idea of a highly 
politicised African township population. The experience of the women’s movement 
also backs up this interpretation. Like CAHAC UWO struggled to run a successful 
campaign around bread price increases in 1982, despite careful attention to the 
organising tradition. Furthermore, although activists report that their organisation 
remained strong even after the UDF had been formed and the focus moved to 
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political issues, archive evidence contradicts this view. 109 Table 4.1 shows how 
UWO’s recorded membership in Guguletu fell after the UDF had been formed. 
Similarly, in June 1984 UWO in Guguletu was reporting ‘very few active members’, 
whilst in KTC it had 15 active members and New Crossroads 6 or 7.110 
 




 1981-2 1983-4 1984-5 1985-6 1986-7 
Guguletu 125 183 72 55 91 
Athlone 23 16 0 0 0 
Woodstock 21 16 14 7 8 
Mitchells Plain 17 0 0 0 0 
 
Overall, therefore, it appears that they UDF struggled to engage people 
beyond an activist core, even as it achieved high profile success in the election 
boycott. Adult involvement in progressive politics was limited and although 
student and youth activism saw some growth, this was not widespread. The extent 
to which the UDF had failed to engage people beyond an educated elite in both 
African and coloured communities is perhaps best reflected in an assessment of the 
organisation by a UDF activist. A 1984 handwritten assessment of the UDF in the 
Western Cape from within the organisation noted that the UDF was ‘weak’, that 
‘people largely see the UDF as the educated youth’ and that a large silent majority 
remained untouched. Furthermore, it also noted that ‘where we have reached 
people *there has been+ very little content.’112 
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4.5. The Limits of Organisation: Race, Class and the 
Constrained Social Base of Activism 1980-85 
 
It has been argued that it was the shift from grassroots campaigns to national 
political organising that alienated the UDF from the black masses. However the 
chronology presented above shows this to be false. There was little organisation in 
the African communities even when the focus of progressive organisation was on 
local concerns; indeed, student and youth organisation actually expanded after the 
UDF had been formed. Similarly, whilst in the coloured areas there was a decline in 
adult mobilisation, this predated the shift to national political issues.  
It was not the shift from grassroots to political issues that weakened 
progressive politics in Cape Town what did prevent mass support for progressive 
politics at this time? This question is of particular interest because of the contrast 
between this period and the success of the great boycott season. Between 1980 and 
1985 progressive activists explicitly sought to mobilise people into action, first 
through campaigning and organising round grassroots issues and later through 
mass publicity campaigns around explicitly political aims. However, neither of 
these methods achieved the level of support that was attained in 1979/80 when 
organisation and theories of mass mobilisation were in their infancy. Why, 
therefore, did a period of intense organisational and ideological development have 
such limited results and what differentiated those people who became involved in 
activism from those who did not? 
 In answering this question it becomes necessary to distinguish between 
South Africans who felt apartheid discrimination most notably – van Kessel’s 
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vanguard – and those with more ambiguous relations with the state, particularly 
older blacks. Drawing on their experiences of disadvantage and the boycotts of 1980 
this vanguard came to understand political transformation as the key stepping stone 
to a better life. For them organisation was always a mechanism for challenging state 
power and they remained committed to the cause regardless of the circumstances. 
However, for the large majority of Capetonians involvement in collective action was 
selective and dependent upon the immediate costs and benefits it entailed; the 
organising tradition of the early 1980s recognised this and sought to use bread-and-
butter grievances to draw people into action. However, the apartheid state created 
deep fissures within the black population. This meant that few campaigns were able 
to define issues with the universal salience to draw large numbers of people into 
action. It also meant that people did not necessarily conceptualise hardship as a 
result of apartheid. Insider identities conditioned by apartheid channelled much 
conflict over the urban political economy into struggles between black groups, 
rather than between a united oppressed black mass and the state. In attempting to 
build a community of interest activists discovered race and class cleavages that no 
amount of planning or organising could overcome. Taken collectively, these barriers 
prevented organisation at this time becoming a broad progressive movement. 
At the heart of anti-apartheid activism during this period was a common 
experience amongst a group of educated young black Capetonians of material 
hardship and thwarted ambition. As noted in chapter two it was the highest 
academic achievers who were most affected by apartheid’s labour market 
discrimination and the artificial ceiling it placed on opportunities for this group and 
it was these Capetonians who dominated civil society at this time. An analysis of the 
social base of activism in the early 1980s shows how it was current and former 
university students that dominated the leadership of progressive organising in the 
two communities. During the schools boycotts it was students with the best 
academic or sporting records who were drawn into the SRCs and leadership 
structures. After the boycott in Bonteheuwel the civic and youth movement were 





university students and some high achievers within the schools. Similarly, within 
Guguletu many of the activists who formed the early youth movement were 
students at either UCT or UWC. Much of the early activity of the youth in Guguletu 
was supported by activists from the white National Union of South African 
Students.113  
The heavy presence of educated Capetonians within progressive 
organisation was a result of two interrelated dynamics. Firstly, apartheid 
discriminated most against young blacks, particularly university graduates who had 
education but few occupational opportunities beyond the teaching profession. 
Secondly, the experience of the great boycott season had a profound impact within 
the schools and universities as it demonstrated new ways of organising and saw the 
rapid spread of more political understandings of struggle. 
Crucial to the transformation of large numbers of young educated 
Capetonians from students to activists was a collective experience of disadvantage 
that became increasingly conceptualised in political terms. As discussed earlier, 
conditions within black schools were poor. There was also growing opposition to 
the restrictions that apartheid placed on people’ life chances after they left school, as 
shown by the opposition to gutter education not only because it was poor quality, 
but also because it was designed to prepare people for subordinate roles in the 
economy. 114 It was these grievances which lay behind the schools boycott and, 
despite the boycott’s ending, these grievances did not disappear. Furthermore, these 
grievances were experienced collectively by young people from very similar social 
backgrounds and with similar ambitions in life. This helped shape a collective 
understanding of inequality embedded within existing social networks. 
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The role that the combination of educational quality and labour market 
discrimination had in drawing people into progressive politics was reflected in 
discussions with activists of this time. The following interview with an activist who 
was involved in the Congress of South African Students in the early 1980s shows 
how students resented not only the very clear material deficiencies of apartheid 
education, but also the fact that as a system it simply prepared people to be ‘cheap 
labour.’ It also shows how it was through shared experience of these inadequacies, 
and discussions around them, that organisation began to coalesce:  
We didn’t have basic infrastructure, that is such as electricity. There were no ceilings 
in the classrooms, there was inadequate learner support material. There were also 
problems just about the curriculum itself. The extent to which it was not even 
preparing us to become professionals, but rather reservoir, reservoir for cheap 
labour. In school there was no sporting facilities. There were range of problems that 
we were experiencing. It is in that context that some of us began to be conscious of 
the fact that these groups do not have these facilities is not the making of our 
parents, but more a system that deliberately sought to deny black people access to 
adequate facilities and adequate education system... That’s how we got involved.115 
 
In a similar vein activists in Bonteheuwel recalled how educational issues and 
educational achievement were the cornerstone of their organising.116 
This growing recognition of the relationship between apartheid 
discrimination and personal disadvantage was compounded by a common 
experience of repression and conscientisation that was not shared by people outside 
the schools and universities. 1976 and 1980 had exposed many young blacks to the 
repressive nature of the apartheid state in a way that their parents had not been. 
This was most apparent in 1976 when the use of deadly force was widespread, but it 
also occurred in 1980 when the state clamped down on the activities of progressive 
organisation. Furthermore, 1980 exposed students to radical ideas that were 
disseminated through the boycott structures and which were confirmed by the 
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state’s reactions. Within these new networks shared understandings were formed.117 
The role of the schools boycott in transforming students political consciousness is 
clearly reflected in the publications of the Committee of 81, which consistently 
called for not only improvements in schooling but also made clear the role of 
apartheid in poor schooling outcomes: 
We start off from the premise that all our educational disabilities flows [sic] out of 
our political disabilities and our subordinate economic roles.118 
 
We can ask at this stage: 
Can we have non-racial education in a racial society? 
Can we have non-racial education in an exploitative society?119 
 
The fact that within apartheid educational institutions large numbers of 
people were exposed to the same experiences of poor education and living 
conditions, harsh home lives and frustrated ambitions, played a role in developing a 
specific student consciousness. The discussion of the formation of COSAS in the 
African schools above reveals how common experiences led to students talking 
together and coming to shared understanding in one school in Guguletu. Similar 
dynamics are also apparent in Bonteheuwel. One of the first activists to join the 
BYM recalls how the BYM was not only political, but also a social network bringing 
together people with similar life experiences.120 Another activist recalled how she 
found many people in a similar position to herself in the BYM and was able to 
expand her horizons and meet like minded people.121 It was this student 
consciousness that drove the young activist elite during the early 1980s and a belief 
in the need to end apartheid that drew these activists into organisation during this 
period, whether it was community structures or the UDF. 
 However, it is important to note that whilst experiences of poor schooling 
were widespread during the early 1980s it was a relatively small group of activists 
                                                   
117 Trevor Manuel, interviewed by Jeremy Seekings, 4/7/1992, Johannesburg 
118„“Manifesto to the People of Azania...‟ 
119 Ibid. 
120 Interview with Youth activist and BYM founding member, 10/5/2006, Cape Town 





that formed the basis of progressive organisation, a fact which stands in contrast to 
the rapid expansion of student/youth activism with the unrest of late 1985. 
Furthermore, this group of activists were united by their strong educational 
achievement, whether it was in the universities or the schools. Activism at this time, 
therefore, remained rooted amongst those people who were most severely restricted 
by apartheid. For those people in the apartheid education system more broadly the 
hardships of the early 1980s were not yet pushing people into action, perhaps 
because in spite of discrimination unemployment remained relatively low and 
opportunities still existed in the labour market. 
Whilst young activists during the early 1980s increasingly sought ways to 
challenge apartheid this enthusiasm was not shared by the older generations. In the 
coloured communities the organising tradition failed, whilst in the African 
communities it hardly got started. Similarly, the shift to the UDF did not see the 
majority of coloureds or Africans brought within progressive organisation on a 
consistent basis.  
Whilst the explanation for the growth of an activist elite at this time relies 
upon the existence of a politicised understanding of inequality and communities of 
interest that allowed people to be drawn into a single campaign against apartheid, 
the explanation of adult disengagement at this time relies on the converse. 
Progressive politics struggled to draw in large numbers of older Capetonians 
because whilst apartheid discriminated against black adults it did so in ways that 
did not lead to the politicisation of their hardships and could not form the basis for 
a uniform programme of action. 
In Guguletu there were three barriers to the expansion of progressive 
organising amongst older residents. Firstly, rental levels remained very low. 
Consequently, local government did not become politicised in the way it did in 
other South African townships. Secondly, the acute housing shortage combined 
with the construction of a new township at Khayelitsha created a release valve as 





continuing existence of divisions between residents with section 10 rights and those 
without (even after the abolition of influx control) restricted the level of support 
available for progressive organisations that sought to remove such distinctions and 
led to the conceptualisation of urban disadvantage as a consequence of challenges 
from rural outsiders, rather than because of state policy  
The first reason adult activism in Guguletu did not benefit from the growing 
focus on community issues was that there was little within the immediate 
residential political economy to challenge. Seekings’ explanation of the emergence 
of political mobilisation in the PWV area in the mid-1980s shows how financial 
pressures on township residents and the devolution of powers to African 
community councillors led to large increases in service charges and rents amidst 
considerable poverty. This caused the councillors to become seen as a cause of 
urban poverty and led to their delegitimation in the eyes of their constituents.122 
Seekings also argues that whilst in some cases councillors sought to resist rent 
increases they tended to cave in to demands from the administration boards.123  
The situation in Guguletu stood in direct contrast to this. Local councillors in 
LAGUNYA were well aware of the dangers of rental increases and the likelihood 
such moves could lead to protest. In 1982 they opposed increases put forward by 
the BAAB to site and service charges on the grounds that similar increases in 
Pietermaritzburg had caused unrest. 124 Similar reticence was reported throughout 
the whole decade and whilst the township was in clear need of upgrading and the 
provision of services to Africans was dire, no rental increases were implemented 
between 1978 and 1992.125 As a result rental rates in Guguletu were extremely low. 
Whilst comparable figures for the mid-1980s are not available, by 1992 the rental 
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and service charge levels were so low that it was estimated that for local 
government in LAGUNYA to become self sufficient they would need to be 
increased by 2000%.126 
 The consequence of such low rents was that the local authority did not 
become politicised. Local councillors were opposed by people within the 
progressive movement and there was opposition to corruption in the allocation of 
houses and business licences. 127  However, councillors’ actions rarely infringed on 
people’s immediate lives. The fact that there was little money either spent or 
collected within the township meant that there was little to mobilise people against. 
 The second barrier to progressive organising was the lack of resource 
provision within the township, combined with the growing provision of resources 
elsewhere in the province. In 1983 the state announced plans to build a new 
township on the Cape Flats, thirty miles from Cape Town at Khayelitsha. 
Simultaneously, the availability of existing housing within Guguletu and the other 
LAGUYNA townships almost completely dried up. Table 4.2 reveals the clear 
disjuncture between housing need and allocation.  
 
Table 4.2: African Housing Allocation in 1983.128 
 Langa Guguletu Nyanga 
Houses Allocated 1 3 0 
Applications for 
housing 
21 53 14 
Waiting List 1399 2177 760 
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Whilst it could be imagined that the desperate need for housing would lead to 
conflict between the state and residents it actually had the opposite effect. In the 
absence of housing in Guguletu there was a willingness to move to Khayelitsha. 
This willingness was in spite of a campaign by UDF affiliated organisations to resist 
any relocations. Indeed, this campaign noted that whilst people did not want to 
move they were moving because they ‘are desperate, they want houses.’129 
Consequently, because resources were scare within LAGUNYA there was no real 
conflict over their allocation; people who already lived in a house were catered for 
(and also paid little), whilst those looking for a house had to look beyond the 
bounds of the township. This apathy was made clear by several activists. One 
activist from the women’s movement recalled that, ‘in African communities. Very 
few of them wanted anything to do with politics. They accepted life as it was.’130 
Another civic activist recounted how difficult it was to organise people in the formal 
townships, in contrast to the squatter areas, arguing that, ‘the people in brick 
houses, they didn’t quite realise that they had problems.’131 
 This is of particular interest because it stands in contrast to the situation in 
the early 1970s discussed in chapter three, when there were still resources to be 
allocated and people were therefore involved in civil society that sought to access 
these resources. It suggests that far from causing action within civic society, an 
absence of distribution can actually lead to quiescence as people have little to 
organise around. It certainly suggests that hardship and poverty alone are not 
sufficient explanations for mobilisation. 
 The final factor inhibiting progressive organising was ongoing tension 
between Africans with section 10 rights and squatters from the Eastern Cape. 
African Capetonians did not in general support apartheid. However, the fissures 
apartheid created amongst Africans diverted conflict over resource allocation away 
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from the state. A consistent theme in residential township politics during the 1980s 
was ongoing conflict, both physical and rhetorical, between Africans with section 10 
rights and squatters. This was reported by activists from both the squatter 
communities and the formal townships and centred around insider-outsider 
identities and the rights that these gave to accessing resources:  
There were no good relations between people from the shacks, people from the 
hostels, and people from the established townships. Formal houses to say. Because 
there was that mentality that people in the formal houses are Capetonians. People 
who have got so called section 10 rights. And those that are staying in the hostels are 
contract workers. Those that are in the squatters are just people with no rights you 
see. And in the minds of the people in the established townships they are saying that 
people are taking their jobs and all that kind of an argument... it was a mentality you 
would find if you mingle communities of different stratas. You cannot mix areas of 
middle class area and lower class area. There will always be divisions among them. 
That was how it was. There were not very good relations.’132 
 
Generally people that were not part of the [progressive] organisation[s], they used to 
undermine people that were in the squatter camps... they are from the rural areas, 
they know nothing. They can do nothing. Even when... houses were built, they were 
denying that those houses were built for people from the squatter camps< because 
those houses looked good, [too] beautiful to be owned by the squatter camps.133 
 
The fact that Africans with section 10 rights conceptualised their access to resources 
as in conflict with squatters and migrants served to push conflict away from the 
state. It was also a clear consequence of the Coloured Labour Preference Policy and 
the operation of apartheid within the province. Prior to the breakdown of effective 
influx control Africans in the Western Cape had had priority access to services and 
resources, even if these resources were far from adequate. As influx control 
collapsed greater numbers of people started to place demands on resources within 
the city, just as the state’s ability to provide such resources was contracting. This 
pushed Africans with section 10 rights to conceptualise their hardships in terms of 
growing immigration into the City, rather than as a result of the privations of 
apartheid.  
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Like in Guguletu the dynamics restricting adult mobilisation in Bonteheuwel 
were linked to the apartheid political economy and the collective identities this 
precipitated. These dynamics operated on three levels. Firstly, coloureds were 
integrated into apartheid in a way which offered benefits as well as discrimination; 
consequently, whilst progressive organisation sought to demonstrate the benefits of 
opposing apartheid and campaigning against the state, many people relied on the 
state and progressive organisation could not deliver the same benefits. Secondly, 
particularly whilst the focus was on grassroots mobilisation, class divisions within 
the coloured population made it difficult for activists to construct a coherent 
narrative of change. Finally, moving into the UDF period, just as Africans conceived 
of their lack of resources in terms of a challenge from the rural areas, coloureds 
tended to see Africans as competitors rather than allies and this ‘race consciousness’ 
undermined attempts at building non-racial alliances.  
 The first barrier to coloured organising was that coloureds’ intermediate 
position under apartheid saw the state provide a range of benefits that were 
accessed through the articulation of apartheid identities. Being coloured in the 
Western Cape meant that people were able to access better quality housing than 
Africans, were more likely to be employed in higher skilled and higher paid 
occupations and were eligible for a range of state grants and handouts. All these 
benefits were recognised by older coloured residents and influenced their attitude 
towards progressive organisation.  
This ambiguous relationship with the state meant that the desire to challenge 
certain aspects of apartheid policy was tempered by what may be lost in doing so: in 
the words of a UDF assessment on organising in the coloured areas the ‘state 
strategy towards coloureds of cooption has led to conservatism.’134  This was one of 
the main reasons why the grassroots organisations of the early 1980s ultimately 
failed; many people were simply unconvinced of the case for opposition.  
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There was also the issue of patronage from the state, as the state worked on a divide 
and rule basis, so they would provide some social security for people, grants for 
people, and people were afraid to lose that, so that they weren’t willing to join an 
organisation in case they would lose those benefits.135 
 
 State patronage was a particular problem for coloured organising in the 
early 1980s because of a major theoretical weakness in the organising tradition. 
Activists sought to show how bread-and-butter demands could be met if people 
organised themselves to demand them. However, it was the state that controlled 
rental rates, hospital buildings and street lighting, not progressive organisations.136 
Consequently, when the state refused to make concessions organisations struggled 
to sustain activism.137 This was crucial for the decline of many civic organisations as 
it was a failure to deliver material benefits that was recognised as the largest barrier 
to successful organising: 
The concessions were very hard won and very few< you fought for everything. In 
fact our danger was how do we sustain the mobilisation, given the fact that we were 
not winning the concessions fast enough, because you were coming back to the 
community saying we’ve got nothing and they say. ‘What the hell, you guys are 
hopeless’138 
 
This dynamic intensified after the tricameral parliament started functioning, 
and increasing resources flowed into the coloured communities. The state stopped 
engaging with civic organisation and began to increase the supply of resources 
through tricameral politicians. Civic activists in Bonteheuwel recall how the state 
provided a range of benefits and subsidies which drew people into dependent 
relationships with apartheid administrators and tricameral politicians. Food parcels 
were distributed and large numbers of disability and child maintenance grants were 
paid, often with limited supporting evidence. Because of the low incomes in 
                                                   
135 Interview with Peter Gabriel, July 2004, Cape Town 
136 This is confirmed by the fact that the civics were most successful in those areas in which state 
structures had collapsed and the civics were performing some of the roles of local government. This 
placed them in a position to distribute some resources and therefore heightened their popular appeal. 
137 Seekings, J, 'Civic Organisations in South African Townships‟, p.228 





communities such as Bonteheuwel these state benefits played a significant part in 
people’s lives. Consequently they were highly valued and people were unwilling to 
risk them. By the time of the schools unrest civic organisation had fallen completely 
away in Bonteheuwel:  
[T]here was no civic activity at that time... Because those people that were part of 
the... tricameral parliament system, they...  won people over to support them<. 
money was given to them to spend in the areas they represented. And they could 
use it as they want to... I could hurt my finger somewhere and then I apply for a 
disability grant and I would get a disability grant and you would be my saviour 
because you came. I got a grant from you. And we had a child maintenance system 
at that time also in the country, which people abused. Anybody could just go them 
and tell them I’ve got 5 children... and they would provide the children cash every 
month... So that is how they won over the hearts and minds of the people in the 
area.139 
 
The second barrier to coloured organising was the fact that even had people 
been willing to risk their current position for a better future, the differential impact 
of apartheid made it difficult for activists to construct a clear narrative of what this 
future would look like. There was no single experience of apartheid discrimination 
and therefore no clear counter vision that could draw people into unified action. 
When the focus of progressive action was on bread-and-butter issues at the 
start of the 1980s involvement was hindered by internal differentiation within the 
coloured population. The organising tradition sought to unite people around their 
shared day-to-day grievances. However, such shared grievances remained elusive. 
Socio-economic and geographical divisions had a clear impact upon organisation 
and mobilisation at both the city and local level. People who owned their own 
homes and paid rates had different concerns to people who lived in council rented 
housing. Similarly, whilst in Bonteheuwel the need for a day hospital and 
maintenance were key issues, in Mitchells Plain, it was a lack of schooling and 
leisure facilities. As one activist, working in the Lotus River areas of the City, said: 
                                                   





It wasn’t easy. There were actual contradictions between the classes< between 
people who owned their own homes and paid rates, and those, the working class, 
who lived in council owned properties< so there were huge differences in the sorts 
of issues that were addressed.140 
 
As a result of this diversity progressive organisations in different 
communities took up different campaigns, each representing local conditions.141 
Whilst this allowed activists to build locally relevant campaigns it simultaneously 
prevented the creation of a universal platform of opposition. As early as 1982 
CAHAC was admitting that the diversity of the experiences of the coloured 
population was making it, ‘difficult to decide on a uniform action [that] can be 
successfully applied in all areas.’142 A CAHAC workshop held in 1983 attempted to 
understand why the civic movement was weak and unable to make a considerable 
impact. One of its central findings was that the various affiliates were involved in a 
diverse range of campaigns and had different priorities to both CAHAC as an 
umbrella body and each other.143 
The socio-economic diversity was even more problematic when the interests 
of different members of the community clashed and it became impossible to simply 
run separate campaigns for different groups. A prime example of this was reaction 
to government proposals to sell council housing to sitting tenants. Those who had 
the money to buy their houses were often enthusiastic, as they felt it would give 
them increased security. However, those who could not afford to buy the houses 
opposed the plan, particularly as it was to be accompanied by a rise in rents. This 
led to divisions within community organisations and whilst some civics did adopt a 
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position on the rises, the general approach was to explain the policy, but not 
campaign on it in either way.144 
Interestingly, whilst civic structures in Bonteheuwel did see a decline in 
support in the mid-1980s the BCA remained more active than civics elsewhere. 
Whilst there is only limited evidence from which to seek an explanation it is 
possible that this was a result of the limited socio-economic differentiation within 
the township. As the first council built township on the Cape Flats Bonteheuwel was 
a relatively homogenous community. There were at this time no home ownership 
areas and all the housing, excluding the infill scheme, had been built at the same 
time. Consequently, people in Bonteheuwel did have a relatively common 
experience of apartheid in a way that other more diverse communities did not.  
As the focus of progressive activism moved from bread-and-butter issues to 
an explicitly political rejection of apartheid the difficulties of creating a unified 
coloured progressive movement were compounded by the difficulties of selling 
non-racial political struggle to a group with an antipathy towards Africans that was 
firmly grounded with apartheid’s distributional networks. The unwillingness 
amongst coloureds to risk the benefits of apartheid was reinforced by the fact their 
access to resources was dependent upon their articulation of a coloured identity and 
the denial of rights to Africans. Interviews with activists revealed that creating a 
unified platform of action and drawing coloureds into progressive organising was 
heavily constrained by the impact of the coloured labour preference policy and a 
belief that improvements for Africans represented disadvantage for coloureds.  
This operated on two levels. Firstly, just as cleavages within the coloured 
communities made it difficult for united platforms of action to be forged, so 
divisions between coloureds and Africans made it difficult for joint campaigns to be 
sustained: 
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How do we deal with some of the issues that’s peculiar to a black area, a white area? 
In your area you might be more concerned about squatters< that problem’s 
completely foreign just across the railway line. Do we get caught up in all sorts of 
different campaigns? Am I able to mobilise half of Bonteheuwel to protest against 
squatters living on a field in NY130 [Guguletu]?145 
 
Very few campaigns during this period were truly non-racial insofar as they 
mobilised people around issues that applied equally to both Africans and coloureds. 
However, beyond this there was also little involvement by coloured activists in 
campaigns run in African areas, and vice versa.146 
However, racial cleavages did not simply making it difficult for 
organisations to campaign on common issues across the colour line. The fact that 
coloureds gained considerable advantages over Africans through their articulation 
of a coloured identity, and the fact that for many less educated and skilled coloureds 
the major risk to their livelihoods was not restrictions on taking jobs and resources 
currently allocated to whites, but the challenge from Africans for resources and 
employment, led to a clear race consciousness amongst poorer coloureds. This race 
consciousness was a major barrier to progressive organising: 
 
Coloured Labour Preference Act. That did create divisions. Because those 
unemployed Africans will see the coloureds that are getting the crumbs as being 
more privileged than them. And being envious of them. And those coloureds who 
are getting crumbs will look at these Africans as the ones who are taking little thing 
that they can get and naturally there will be tensions.147 
 
[Cape Town was not] very ripe for non-racialism in the sense that the pecking order. 
You would find that many people had the false consciousness in terms of coloured 
people, they are actually better than African people. So that could be one of the 
reasons< There wasn’t a class consciousness, the race consciousness was strong and 
it was actually in terms of the pecking order.148 
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This view that African advancement represented disadvantage for coloured was 
widely reported and was linked into the very clear patterns of discrimination that 
apartheid created. A common theme (as it was between section 10 Africans and 
squatters) was access to housing:  
If you look at the coloured community, particularly in your working class areas, 
they wouldn’t have loved to move away from the government. Because you see, to 
them whites were of the same kind of housing. There’s were better than ours. They 
had toilets inside and all the likes. And they sort of got better treatment than African 
people. And they, they saw themselves as better than us.149 
 
Employment and the division of labour were also sources of tension and these 
tensions led to many coloureds rejecting the idea of non-racial struggle inherent 
within the UDF: 
Working class people are bloody reactionary some times. Racist also. The building 
trade for example its clear. I mean the people who did the skilled work. The 
bricklayers and plasterers and painters and plumbers, they were coloured mostly. 
The people who mixed the dada by hand they were black. It was a division within 
the working class. And those guys were racist. So even though when they get home 
they hear the political story, ‘guys, there will be non-racialism’ it *racism+ comes out. 
It comes to the fore.150 
 
Well, once again, because the Western Cape is a coloured preferential area. In terms 
of jobs coloureds would say blacks are coming to take our jobs, they are coming 
from Transkei to take our jobs. That also was not something that was coming from 
organisations or leadership or whatever. It was something coming from the rank 
and file... coloureds regarded themselves as having privileges in the Western Cape 
and they were protecting their privileges.151 
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4.6. Conclusion: Race, Class and the Limits of 
Organisation 
 
The period between 1977 and 1985 in Cape Town shows in strong contrast the limits 
of theories of collective action and social movements that focus on the resources and 
opportunities for activism without also seeking to understand the underlying 
pressures that push people into protest. 
 In 1979/80 a series of boycotts emerged across Cape Town and the two case 
studies which were based not on strong organisation, but the intersection of 
material grievances in the schools and townships with emerging activist networks. 
It is clear that these boycotts would not have taken the form they did in the absence 
of the nascent activist networks that joined up and organised protest and helped to 
frame people’s grievances in a way that sustained action. However, it is equally 
clear that opportunities and organisation alone cannot explain the fate of 
progressive activism at this time. The boycotts broke down not primarily because 
political opportunities shifted, but because internal contradictions amongst the 
oppressed undermined the social base of activism.  
 The development of activism after 1980 confirms this interpretation. After 
1980 considerable effort was put into building strong progressive organisation and 
using this to spread activism into the black communities. However this organisation 
failed. Lying behind this failure was not an absence of hardship – both Africans and 
coloureds were poor and politically disenfranchised – but the fact that the apartheid 
political economy acted to undermine progressive activism. Both coloureds and 
Africans accessed resources through the articulation of identities that reflected 





behind them, prevented the building of both universalisable discourses of change, 
and practical programmes of action.  
 However, there was one group of black South Africans in the city who did 
increasingly become drawn into progressive organisation. These were the young 
and educated blacks who benefitted little from apartheid distribution and who 
experienced clear and immediate limits to their life chances. These were the activists 
who formed the backbone of progressive organisation and activism at this time and 






























By mid-1985 many areas of South Africa had already seen violent political unrest. In 
the Eastern Cape and Vaal Triangle youths were battling police, students had come 
out of school on boycott and in some communities civic associations were taking on 
the duties of local government as the state ability to administer the townships 
collapsed. Yet, in the Western Cape all was quiet. This was to change in the second 
half of the year as schools throughout Cape Town went on boycott, rioting took 
place in the streets, mass rallies became commonplace and a consumer boycott was 
launched. ANC activity in the city and province also escalated.  
Cape Town’s experience of unrest, whilst located within the broader national 
context, was unique. Rent and consumer boycotts that elsewhere broadened 
community support for the struggle were short-lived and a collapse of state 
authority never occurred.1 However, whilst the struggle in Cape Town saw limited 
adult participation organised student politics were perhaps the strongest in the 
country. After the initial unrest student representative councils (SRCs) were formed 
in most black schools and these SRCs came together in local and regional networks. 
These networks gave student politics in Cape Town a unique flavour – politicised 
and active, but with a heavy focus on education and centred within the schoolyard. 
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The extended boycotts that ultimately undermined student politics elsewhere never 
materialised. Violent youth protest also developed in both the case studies. Buses 
were burnt, local councillors attacked and barricades manned. The initial picture of 
mid-1980s in Cape Town is of a youth in revolt. 
However, whilst political struggle in Cape Town at this time was dominated 
by young people, this chapter will show how beneath the surface of a youth in 
revolt sat two very different struggles. On one side was a student protest. This was 
defined by the aspirations of an expanding school population that, despite 
achieving academic success, was experiencing a closing down of opportunities. The 
aims of this protest, whilst focused on apartheid, sought to simultaneously maintain 
and expand educational opportunity and tackle the immediate barriers to self-
improvement. On the other side was a youth protest. The participants in this protest 
had little education to fall back on and little to lose. For the youth, the messianic 
proclamations of the ANC and the emergence of violent repertoires of action created 
a political discourse and practice which provided meaning and benefits in the 
present, whilst offering a long-term egalitarian utopia in which their current socio-
economic disadvantages would be blown away. 
At heart these two protests, which sat uncomfortably alongside each other 
sometimes cooperating and sometimes conflicting, lay the broader unravelling of 
the apartheid political economy as unemployment rose and opportunity collapsed. 
Increasingly educated students could have neither their material nor political 
demands met by a system that continued to promote racial inequality, whilst poorer 
blacks and coloureds saw recession and economic decline pull away even the 
limited benefits apartheid had offered to their parents. As political opportunities for 
the articulation of these grievances expanded, particularly after the state reacted to 
protest with repression, these underlying contradictions coalesced into a period of 
unrest. 
However this was never a single protest. Indeed, beyond the divisions 





movement. In Guguletu student politics saw a continued demand for the resolution 
of immediate material grievances, such as text books and schooling numbers, 
alongside political transformation, because the quality of education remained poor. 
In Bonteheuwel, the focus of protest was primarily political. This represented the 
fact that coloured education did allow people to achieve academically, but beyond 
the schoolyard this education could not overcome broader discrimination in the 
labour market and society. However, like in 1980, experiences of apartheid 
produced simultaneous and overlapping discontent which permitted the building 
of a broad student movement. Amongst adults, however, the economic crisis of the 
mid-1980s did not sufficiently undermine the structural basis of quiescence. Indeed, 
growing recession did little to undermine the importance of insider status as 
competition for resources grew and unemployment rose. 
 
5.1.1. Structure, Violence, Organisation and Differentiation: 
Revolt in Cape Town  
Three broad overlapping themes are apparent in current interpretations of the move 
to unrest in the mid-1980s. Firstly, many authors locate unrest in local 
manifestations of a structural crisis of the apartheid state and economy. Secondly, 
state repression is seen to have moved people from disorganised protest against the 
immediate manifestations of this crisis to a period of violent revolt against the state. 
Thirdly, the development of organisation and ideology over the preceding decade is 
seen to have provided the networks and ideological coherence to change this revolt 
into a politicised challenge to state power. Within this broad field of study, 
however, interpretations vary. It is almost universally accepted that revolt and 
repression were key in the movement to violence. 2 However the role of 
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organisation, ideology and the structural underpinnings of the revolt are more 
contested. 
The strong presence of students and youth within the unrest has led to a 
focus upon the collapse of the apartheid schooling system and the labour market in 
pushing people into revolt. The expansion of education, combined with rising 
unemployment, is seen to have created a group of young black South Africans 
predisposed to political messages and sharing similar experiences of collapsing life 
chances. These students are then placed at the heart of unrest.  3 Hyslop, for example, 
argues that because Bantu education had existed for twenty years before it first 
caused protest, and these protests escalated as the government loosened the strict 
implementation of Verwoedian Bantu education, the schooling protest must be seen 
to represent a specific socio-political juncture, rather than a direct result of 
discriminatory policies. This crisis is located in the growing school enrolment, 
falling pass rates and collapsing job opportunities of the mid-1980s recession. 4 
Whilst students are often at the heart of unrest, several studies have also 
focused on the widened social base of the mid-1980s unrest, when compared to the 
protests of 1976 and 1980. Murray presents a simplistic view, seeing the unrest of 
1984 as a broad political challenge to state power with ‘deeper roots in working-
class dissatisfaction *than 1976/80+.’ He then proceeds to argue that the civics that 
had grown up during the early 1980s were able to translate the grievances of 
residents ‘into a broad political assault on all oppression and injustice in South 
Africa.’5. Seekings, in a more nuanced argument, demonstrates how in the 
townships of the PWV protest emerged from  the transformation in the local 
structural context over the preceding decade as growing social differentiation and 
moves to increase rent to unaffordable levels  led to a delegitimation of the local 
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authorities, leading to councillors (often corrupt and wealthy) becoming the target 
of protest. This interacted with growing student protest and state violence to 
coalesce into an overall challenge to the state with a broad social base.  6  
However interpretations of a universal revolt have also been challenged. In 
the coloured areas of the Western Cape Van Kessel detects not a broadening of the 
social base of progressive activism, but a widening gap between the youth and their 
parents.7 Taking this view further Bundy in his study of the township revolt in the 
Western Cape identifies at the heart of revolt not a universal challenge to state 
power, but a specific generational (i.e. youth) consciousness, located within in the 
defects of black education, the expansion of black schooling over the previous 
decade and the level of unemployment.8 Similarly Seekings shows how in the 
township of Tumahole, where rent rises did not politicise the local environment, 
older residents were not involved in initial moves towards protest.9 
Debates around the social base of the unrest feed into the final area of debate 
– the role of organisation and ideology. Authors who see this period as a broad 
national political challenge to the state also tend to see this challenge reflected in 
strong organisation which either helped precipitate revolt, or developed to lead it.10  
Conversely, in the Western Cape, the weakness of the anti-apartheid challenge has 
been explained by the lack of coherent organisation due to the ideological 
factionalism of the region.11 
In contrast, authors who locate protest in broader structural contradictions 
tend to see a more complex relationship between organisation and action. Seekings, 
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whilst acknowledging that the UDF had little involvement in the initial outbreak of 
the township revolt, when it was left ‘trailing behind the masses’, locates the 
importance of organisation at this time in its ability not to lead protest, but to 
provide the material and ideological resources and personal networks to locate 
isolated protests within a broader framework of anti-apartheid challenge.12 Such an 
interpretation is echoed by Hyslop in his study of the schools crisis. He argues that 
whilst student unrest emerged from conditions in the schools, COSAS played a 
central main role in transforming these spontaneous actions into a response with a 
national and political flavour.13  
 Drawing on data from the case studies this chapter will challenge two views 
within the current literature on the unrest sketched above. Firstly, it will argue 
against the view that the revolts of this time represented a unified challenge with a 
broad social base. It will be shown how in Cape Town the township revolt was, and 
remained, dominated by young people. However, in accounting for this it will also 
demonstrate that the township revolt of the mid-1980s was not specifically a youth 
revolt shot through with generational consciousness. Whilst it is clear that young 
people dominated the struggle in Cape Town it was not their age that drew them 
into struggle, but their experiences of apartheid discrimination, or to put it another 
way their class positions within the apartheid political economy. 
To demonstrate the importance of the apartheid political economy in 
defining the nature of the unrest in Cape Town this chapter will examine the two 
key forms of politics during this time – youth and student politics. It will also 
consider the continuing disengagement of adults from progressive politics. It will 
start by outlining a narrative of the unrest in Cape Town. It will then move to 
consider in more detail the reasons why adults, students and youths involved, or 
did not involve, themselves in action at this time. In doing so it will consider both 
the role of organisation and ideas, and the way that the apartheid political economy 
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  It will show how in both Guguletu and Bonteheuwel state repression again 
played a key role in the initial drive to protest. However, as the dust settled two 
overlapping but distinct struggles emerged, reflecting the very different education 
and life experiences of those most disadvantaged by apartheid. Firstly there was the 
student struggle, driven by the collision of rising education with apartheid 
discrimination that closed down people’s life chances. This student struggle was 
driven by a desire for a better future, rather than the absolute hardships of the 
present, and consequently combined a focus on political change with clear demands 
for immediate transformations to expand the opportunities available to its 
participants under apartheid. Secondly there was a youth struggle which stood in 
contrast. Dominated by a less educated youth which had seen an almost complete 
collapse in life opportunities the youth struggle was more utopian. Drawing on the 
repertoires of political action that were accessible to people without formal 
education it developed within a discourse of radical political transformation and 
military sacrifice which would lead to a new South Africa where all, regardless of 
their current hardships, would be catered for.  
Alongside this consideration of political struggle the role of organisation and 
ideology will also be considered. As in the earlier periods both will be seen to have 
played a key role in the struggles that developed. However, like in the early 1980s, 
the limits of organisation will also be apparent in the continued quiescence of older 
Capetonians. The interaction of the hugely expanded organisational networks 
developed in South Africa at this time with the political struggles of the students 
and youth was crucial to their scale and success. However, organisation and 







5.2. Unrest and Revolt: South Africa and Cape Town 
1985-1987 
 
As the campaign against the tricameral elections faded in late 1984 South Africa 
entered a new period of protest and unrest. This unrest eclipsed anything that had 
come before and was only put down through the declaration of two states of 
emergency and the detention of tens of thousands of activists. Starting in the 
townships of the Vaal Triangle, before spreading to the Eastern Cape and then 
nationwide, this unrest saw around 750 people killed in political violence between 
September 1984 and September 1985.14 This catalyst for this violence varied. In some 
areas it was rising conflict between residents and town councillors that led to 
protest; in others school boycotts caused unrest.  
This unrest was so severe that parts of South Africa became ‘ungovernable.’ 
As the state lost the ability to administer, many communities constructed their own 
forms of self-government or, in the parlance of the time, ‘organs of people’s power.’ 
The development of street and area committees and their interlinking into 
township-wide civic structures was pioneered in the township of Cradock but 
quickly spread.15 These street committees and civics became a central unit in the 
emerging quasi-autonomous township governance structures that replaced 
collapsing local government 16 alongside other structures such as ‘peoples’ courts 
which administered justice,17 advice offices and township anti-crime and clean up 
campaigns.18  
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  Alongside unrest there was a growing radicalisation of progressive politics. 
Seekings’ study of the UDF shows how after the election boycott failed to change 
state policy the organisation underwent a period of ‘introspection.’ However the 
unrest, which was not itself a result of the UDF’s actions, transformed its strategy. It 
no longer tried to build organisation and activism; instead it sought to represent and 
influence those struggles that had already emerged: 
Rather than organising at the grass roots in order to transform popular 
consciousness and prepare for subsequent political struggle, the UDF would involve 
itself in the existing political struggles being waged in the townships. And rather 
than struggling over the middle ground, it would harness the militancy of the most 
revolutionary sections of society.19 
 
This increased militancy and politicisation was reflected in the growing prominence 
of the banned political organisations, particularly the ANC. A range of 
organisations adopted the Freedom Charter and ANC iconography proliferated. 
COSATU adopted the Freedom Charter at its second congress in 1987, as did the 
UDF in June 1987. At the local level the flags of the banned movements were 
regularly unfurled, particularly as political funerals proliferated. 
In mid-1985 Cape Town appeared to have avoided the unrest unfolding 
elsewhere. However, in the second half of the year politics transformed as large 
numbers of Capetonians became drawn into revolt. The shift from quiescence to 
revolt happened rapidly and was driven by the actions of school and university 
students. On Friday 26th July 1985 10,000 students gathered at the UWC sport 
stadium to demonstrate against the state of emergency and show solidarity with 
students boycotting nationally.20 Then, on the 29th July, a school boycott was 
formally launched and a march on the same day in the African townships saw a 
student from Crossroads Number 3 School shot dead by police. From this time low 
level unrest simmered across the city.21 Coloured communities became drawn into 
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the action as meetings supporting the boycotts spread22 and a consumer boycott was 
launched.23 However, the key event in the outbreak of open and sustained revolt 
was a planned march to Pollsmoor prison on the 28th August. This march was 
violently dispersed by police and in its aftermath rioting spread across the 
peninsula and the school boycott escalated. 24 By the end of August 1985 most of the 
UDF Western Cape leadership had been detained under anti-terrorism legislation 
and street battles were commonplace in both African and coloured communities. 
The situation became so severe that on the 6th September Carter Ebrahim, Minister 
of Coloured Education, closed all coloured schools in the Western Cape.  
In the last three months of 1985 mass action escalated, predominantly 
focused around the schools.25 Coloured parents and pupils marched to reopen the 
schools in defiance of their closure and then returned on the 2nd October, one day 
after their formal reopening. In the African areas the boycott continued unabated. 
Then a city-wide call was made for pupils to boycott the summer exams by the Inter 
Regional Forum, a body representing 80 of the 110 black schools in the Cape 
Peninsula. The boycotts were well supported. Interviews with African activists 
reveal that in the LAGUNYA townships support was almost absolute26, whilst in the 
coloured communities only 2,000 of a potential 8,000 matriculants wrote exams in 
the city and overall 38,000 coloured students in the Western Cape did not write final 
exams in 1985. Some teachers became involved in the activism. In Arcadia High in 
Bonteheuwel the SRC was given support by teachers at the school and provided 
with a room to meet in. Similarly, in Bonteheuwel High at least one teacher was 
heavily involved in progressive politics, playing liberation songs in class and even, 
in 1987, sheltering the ANC guerrilla and former Bonteheuwel High pupil Ashley 
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Kriel in her home. Overall, 130 teachers were detained, suspended, dismissed or 
transferred during late 1985.27  
These school boycotts were both a reaction to, and cause of, escalating unrest 
that saw growing numbers of people killed in open conflict with the police and 
security forces. During late 1985 rioting and stone throwing became endemic and 
the air was often filled with tear gas and the acrid smoke of tyres burning on 
makeshift barricades. By the end of 1985, 87 people had been shot dead by security 
forces in Cape Town.28 In the coloured areas, including Bonteheuwel, most public 
opposition and street violence was undertaken by children still at school. However 
in the African areas unemployed and out of school youth became increasingly 
involved in running battles with the police as they began to identify themselves 
under the broad banner of the ANC and the Congress aligned youth movement, 
CAYCO. In Guguletu the unrest became widespread and threats against people 
involved with the state escalated to the point that four community councillors had 
resigned by the beginning of November,29 and in an attempt to regain control 
several hundred troops and police sealed off a section of the community and 
conducted house to house searches.30  
As the violence escalated public expressions of opposition to the state also 
grew. Mass meetings and rallies were held with speakers taking the platform to 
demand an end to violence and the abolition of apartheid. In turn these rallies 
became the focus of unrest as police sought to break them up by force. The most 
well attended events of this time were the funerals of activists killed by the security 
forces.  One funeral, of a Muslim student killed outside a mosque, fetched a crowd 
of around 30,000 mourners.31 Similarly, the funeral of the Guguletu Seven, activists 
                                                   
27 „Education Crisis 1985: Overview‟, UDF, 7p., typed, n.d, photocopy in author‟s possession, p.3 
28 Fullard, M, „The State and Political Struggle: Strategies of Repression and Resistance in the Greater 
Cape Town Area from 1985 to 1989‟, M.A. Thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2000, pp.44 & 51 
29 „4th Council Resignation‟, Cape Times, 4/11/1985 
30 „Soldiers, Police Surround Guguletu‟, Cape Times, 27/11/1985 






who were set up by a government informer and shot by apartheid security forces, 
attracted between 15,000 and 20,000 people in March 1986.32 
The state responded to the growing unrest through a mixture of repression 
and reform. Its immediate response was the extension of the state of emergency to 
cover 8 magisterial districts in the Western Cape on the 25th October and the 
banning, two days later, of over 100 organisations. As already noted, police raids 
were carried out in Guguletu in late 1985 and security forces were also regularly 
present on the streets of Bonteheuwel. The coloured schools were closed to prevent 
students using them as a base for organising and when they reopened security 
forces were ever present. When the end of year exams were sat in Bonteheuwel they 
were done so with security personnel armed with R1 rifles patrolling the corridors. 
Many activists were also detained or forced into hiding. Regional UDF 
leaders were the first to be detained but, as the emergency progressed and the 
second emergency was declared in 1986, increasing numbers of local activists were 
arrested. In Guguletu early detentions included youth activists, such as Whitey 
Jacobs, a key CAYCO leader in the township and the region. It also included people 
from the women’s and civic movements, such as Nomaindia Mfeketo. In 
Bonteheuwel few arrests were made in 1985, however the police started searching 
for known activists, such as Ashley Kriel, who had been a central figure in BISCO 
and CAYCO and who was also involved in the ANC underground. In December 
1985 he fled into exile.  
However, unlike other areas of South Africa where the school boycotts 
extended from months into years and state authority broke down, as events in Cape 
Town progressed students in the black townships returned to school. Furthermore, 
whilst incidents of unrest continued these were sporadic (albeit often fierce) rather 
than sustained outside of the squatter areas.33 The return to school and the decline of 
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street confrontation accompanied a shift in the nature of progressive politics. Direct 
conflict between security forces and township residents declined, although it never 
fully disappeared. Only 16 people were reported shot by the security forces in the 
whole city during the first 6 months of 1986.34 Instead violence became focused 
within black communities, specifically the African squatter communities. Coloured 
residents were rarely involved in these violent clashes. Residents of the formal 
African townships however did become involved. This was sometimes as a result of 
violence spilling over from the squatter areas into the townships and sometimes as 
direct participants in the squatter violence.  
 
5.3. Insurrection and Transformation in Progressive 
Organisation 
 
The impact of the unrest on organisation was profound. Student and youth 
organisation underwent rapid expansion. In Guguletu and Bonteheuwel SRCs 
became the key organising and decision making structures. In Bonteheuwel the 
decision to boycott exams was made by classes voting on the decision and sending 
representatives to the school SRC. 35 Coordinating structures were also developed to 
link schools together within townships.36 In Bonteheuwel BISCO brought together 
activists from all three secondary schools whilst the Joint SRCs (JSRC) was formed 
to represent all African secondary schools. These structures were modelled on the 
workplace democracy that had proliferated within the trade union movement, with 
meetings attended by school representatives. In turn, these representatives came 
with mandates from their individual schools: 
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COSAS was banned nationally. We then thought of the best way to close that gap 
was to establish, unlike ’76, an open forum of reps from different schools, and then 
get SRCs< we took that union imprint of workplace, shop steward, shop steward 
sending people to a branch executive. 37 
 
In1986 school level organisation was consolidated and in response to the growing 
repression and return to school activities were developed that could be sustained 
alongside continuing education. Outside the case studies most townships developed 
action committees similar to the Joint SRCs and BISCO. These committees began to 
meet regularly as part of the Western Cape Student Action Committee and later the 
Western Cape Student Congress (WECSCO). Like the school structures the regional 
bodies modelled themselves on the trade unions, with the local action committees 
sending representatives with mandates to regional meetings. 
The return to school and focus on organisation building was mirrored in 
campaigns. Rather than open conflict students began to focus on political education, 
transforming schooling and challenging the day-today injustices of apartheid. The 
key theme of this period within the schools was ‘People’s Education for people’s 
power.’ Students gained increased control over the curriculum and could still take 
students out of the school when required. One JSRC member remembers, for 
example, that during 1986 students would integrate political discussion into their 
day-to-day lessons and would also take one day a week to distribute pamphlets.38  
Student activists also organised campaigns that would maintain political 
pressure, but were executable under the state of emergency. In Bonteheuwel a 
campaign was run to secure promotion for students who had boycotted the end of 
year exams. Mass meetings of all 3 Bonteheuwel schools were called which mixed 
the demand for promotion with political messaging.39 In the LAGUNYA townships 
the students organised a rent boycott explicitly in support of their demands which, 
interestingly, did not get the backing of the WCCA, though they did get some 
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support from UWO. 40 Instead the impetus came from the students themselves, 
organised and implemented through the Joint SRCs: 
We then came to a decision< *W+e felt that you can’t have a permanent [school] 
boycott, we were not ready for that revolution... that was one of the discussions that 
we had... Was this boycott going to lead to a revolution... Therefore there was a need 
for continuity in terms of the so called normalisation< but what is it that we will do 
to ensure that we will keep the pressure, and this now must be [a] broader 
community project. And we then declared the rent boycott. That rent boycott took 
us [a] very very *large amount of work+< it was a good two to three months 
because we had to do door to door< But it was very successful because we were 
able to launch that rent boycott and it was sustained for about another six to seven 
months.41 
 
Parents were also drawn into organisation around the schools, with the formation of 
Parent Teacher Student Associations (PTSAs). In Guguletu the formation of PTSAs 
was particularly successful. A Joint PTSA, which mirrored the Joint SRC, became 
involved in the day-to-day running of many African schools. The strength of this 
structure was such that by 1987 a paper presented to the National Education 
Coordinating Committee noted that: 
The concept of PTSA is now firmly established and is at present growing even 
more< [D]uring the past year PTSAs have virtually replaced the Parent 
Management Councils within the DET [i.e. African] schools here in the Cape Town 
area.42 
 
PTSAs were also built in coloured communities, though not Bonteheuwel.  
The growth of strong organisation around the schools was a key feature of 
Cape Town at this time and marked it out from other parts of South Africa. SRCs, 
inter-school coordinating committees, PTSAs and city-wide student structures such 
as WECSCO successfully functioned throughout 1986 and into 1987. In both the case 
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studies student leaders were able to force changes to the curriculum. Material 
victories were also secured. The SRC at Bonteheuwel High was able to secure 
agreement that all students who boycotted their exams in 1985 would be promoted 
and in Guguletu PTSAs came to play a central role in running the Township’s 
schools. Such was the success of student politics in the City that the Western Cape 
was widely recognised as the strongest student region in the country after the 
banning of COSAS.43 
Alongside the development of schoolyard organisation the unrest in both 
Guguletu and Bonteheuwel also saw the rapid growth of a form of politics that 
drew its inspiration and repertoire of action from the banned political movement’s 
military activities and rhetoric and which sought opportunities to openly and 
violently challenge state power. 
In Guguletu there was a very clear division between student and youth politics. The 
radical youth operated under the broad banner of CAYCO and very few students 
were involved in its structures.44 The growth in participation in political action 
amongst the youth started during late 1985 when there was regular and open unrest 
on the streets. However, it continued, more clandestinely, through 1986 and 1987.  
Unrest transformed the role of the youth in Guguletu. Whilst there had 
always been a focus on the ANC and underground activities, unrest saw increasing 
participation in explicitly violent and insurrectionary activities. One MK 
underground activist recalled how during 1985/6 most progressive organisation 
ceased to function. CAYCO, therefore, became both the most proactive organisation 
in the community and increasingly focused on engaging the state. Underground 
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MK activists also developed growing influence, regularly meeting with key figures 
in the organisation, and providing them with direction.45 
The main campaigns of CAYCO in 1987 show how violence and political 
change had become central to youth activism. These included a ‘release Mandela’ 
campaign, supporting and (often violently) enforcing a consumer boycott, and a 
campaign against gangsterism. People’s courts were also established. Whilst formed 
to regulate crime as state authority broke down they became increasingly out of 
control and on occasions were used to punish people for political dissent.  46  CAYCO 
activists also began to focus attention on the squatter communities, where battles 
between conservative residents supported by the state and ANC aligned activists 
were escalating.47  
In Bonteheuwel the local branch of CAYCO also expanded, with meeting 
attendance growing from around 20 before the unrest to over a hundred.48 
However, unlike in Guguletu, CAYCO functioned as an organising and politicising 
vehicle for school activists, albeit with some participation from older and out of 
school youth, and was not the organisational fulcrum of violent opposition to state 
power..49  
Whilst CACYO did not play a central role in ungovernability in 
Bonteheuwel political violence continued. During the early unrest Bonteheuwel was 
not an area of particular radicalism.50 However, as unrest progressed it gained a 
reputation as a centre of militant action. The schools continued to be the flashpoints 
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for unrest. To cite just a few of the many examples from this period: in April 1986 
pupils tried to set fire to a van delivering concrete to Bonteheuwel Senior Secondary 
School; in May 1986 200 pupils were holding an illegal placard demonstration at 
Arcadia when police went into the school and found waste paper bins filled with 
stones and 47 placards were confiscated. Later that day 400 Bonteheuwel High 
School students burnt tyres and 300 pupils at Modderdam High stoned cars;51 in 
August 1986 a bus was burnt by pupils throwing petrol bombs.52 This level of 
protest and organisation continued well into 1987. In July 1987 Ashley Kriel, a 
former Bonteheuwel pupil who had left the country to join MK in exile, was shot by 
police at a house in Athlone. In response to this ‘several thousand’ pupils protested 
and at the main commemoration ceremony at Bonteheuwel Senior Secondary 
School, freedom songs were sung and placards supportive of the ANC were 
produced.53  
However, whilst the level of unrest distinguished Bonteheuwel from other 
coloured communities, its most unique feature was the development of a militant 
student youth that executed an unprecedented amount of violence and organised 
itself in a paramilitary fashion. Coming to be known as the BMW, or Bonteheuwel 
Military Wing, a group of students within Bonteheuwel sustained a campaign of 
violence well beyond that in any other coloured community.  
The events leading to the emergence of the BMW are highly contested.54 
However, on the basis of interviews undertaken with key protagonists during this 
time it appears that the BMW first emerged during May 1986 as a vehicle through 
which some individuals involved in UDF organisations could encourage, organise 
and direct some of the more militant school pupils within a context of heightened 
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politicisation and ongoing unrest. The catalyst for the formation of the BMW was a 
Free Mandela rally held in Bonteheuwel on 4th May 1986. At this rally attendees 
were given an ANC rosette. Everyone who attended was also given a copy of the 
January 8th statement and Johnny Issel, who was banned, spoke and quoted from 
the statement. Three people were delegated to organise the rally and to interpret the 
release Mandela campaign and out of their discussions they identified people on the 
schools that they wanted to politicise and encourage in their actions: 
On the forth of May we decided we unbanning the ANC and we all publicly 
displaying that... That committee then sat. We identified people at school and so on 
that we were going to< politicise.55 
 
Once organised these students started working within the schools, bringing people 
into their confidence and planning violent activities. In turn, through their links 
with the BMW, people in the UDF area committee were able to create unrest on 
demand.56 
Many of the activities undertaken by the BMW were similar to those 
undertaken by youth activists within Guguletu. Buses were burnt, policemen’s 
homes attacked and barricades erected in the streets. Such was the level of violence 
that in September 1987 Patrick McKenzie, Bonteheuwel’s tricameral MP, made a 
statement in which he claimed that ‘radicals in the area have made it 
‚unmanageable.‛57 This interpretation was supported by the trial of the surviving 
members of the BMW in late 1987 which saw the youths charged with over 300 
offences.  
 Whilst in both Guguletu and Bonteheuwel unrest accompanied a clear move 
towards more militant politics and a desire to challenge the state, as the unrest 
relented and activists sought to adapt to the new context disagreements over how to 
continue the struggle proliferated, particularly between youth and student activists. 
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In Guguletu the main fissure was between out of school youth which 
coalesced around CAYCO and in school youth organised by the Joint SRCs. 
Throughout this period these organisations had a tense relationship, punctuated by 
ideological division and on occasion physical confrontation.58 In Bonteheuwel the 
main division was between more militant school activists, broadly organised 
around the BMW, and activists operating within BISCO. However, unlike Guguletu 
where there was little interaction between the two groups, the relationships between 
the ‘moderates’ and ‘militants’ in Bonteheuwel were not consistently acrimonious, 
although tensions were ever-present. 
In Guguletu divisions predated the unrest and revolved around two themes. 
Firstly, there were differences over tactics. CAYCO was involved in clearly political 
opposition and, particularly during unrest, sought to actively promote violent 
opposition. In contrast school politics revolved around campaigns on day-to-day 
issues in the school, which intertwined, but did not prioritise explicitly political 
demands and unrest. An early example of this conflict occurred in 1984 when school 
pupils in Guguletu refused to leave school to assist the KTC youth in resisting 
forced removals, leading youth activists to attack one of the Guguletu schools.59 
These conflicts escalated with the unrest. The ANC’s call for ungovernability saw an 
immediatism seize the youth which had little room for the more careful 
organisation building and discussion of the SRCs. For example, a CAYCO pamphlet 
from 1986 talks of CAYCO: 
‘pu*s+hing ahead with the people’s struggle for LIBERATION< WE CALL ON THE 
YOUTH to step up MASS ACTION to bring nearer THE SEIZURE OF PEOPLE’S 
POWER IN THIS COUNTRY.’60 
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In contrast the school youth continued to promote organisation-building and did 
not accept that the apartheid state was about to collapse. In 1986 this led them to ask 
students to return to school - a call which was opposed by CAYCO: 
I’m sure it *was+ ’86... We asked the students to go back to classes< to reorganise 
themselves< but the ANC structures said no. There was a call, a call by O.R. Tambo 
saying lets make 1986 ungovernable. But we said no, we can’t make it ungovernable, 
we don’t have the proper way to control the students. Students were going back to 
look for jobs, others getting pregnant... So we need to call them back to order to 
organise ourselves< They were saying the Joint SRCs were not listening to the call 
from Lusaka. But they did not have the base< Why should student leaders listen to 
their leaders?61 
 
The above quote also highlights the second division. CAYCO sought and 
took leadership from the ANC in exile and within the community. In contrast, 
student activists represented a diverse constituency which was defined not by 
political commitment but by the fact they were students. Consequently they refused 
to unquestioningly reproduce political lines and there was a strong ideological 
diversity and ‘ultra left’ tendency within the student movement at this time. In 
another instance of this dynamic disagreements emerged over the political funeral 
of a pupil shot in July 1985. Congress activists wanted to organise the event but the 
students resisted because they felt it was the students who had made the sacrifices 
and this should be recognised: 
[T]he very first mass funeral in ’85. It was a big contestation as to who was going to 
lead that thing... we had claimed it because it was out of our own struggles and most 
of the victims were students, young kids. And it was a big, big thing. In fact we 
never imagined that how big it was. Because it would have reflected that the 
stalwarts of the ANC, if I may use the term, who were inside, were in control of the 
struggles. Whereas we claimed that we were in control, as young students at the 
time< and I suppose this was our non-sectarian attitude, that we are not going to 
give a platform to people who were not there when we were struggling simply 
because we know their credentials. We were going to get people who were part of 
the struggle, who were part of the campaigns that have subjected themselves to 
oppression and repression.62 
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This interpretation was also confirmed by CAYCO activists:  
They [the students] didn’t want to be under the umbrella of the African National 
Congress. It was a political interpretation of things. Which is why I’m saying to you 
these are the because they operating influenced by Neville Alexander operating 
from London, who was chased away from the ANC in exile. So there was those 
conflicts of ideas, in terms of understanding the way things should be done.63 
 
In Bonteheuwel divisions were not ideological as Congress dominated 
progressive organisations. However, divisions emerged over tactics between BISCO, 
who were building above ground organisation and representing a broad 
constituency, and the BMW, who focused on ungovernability. Again these divisions 
arose over the immediacy of revolution and the most appropriate tactics within the 
current environment: 
At BISCO level< ’86, ’87 there was a big issue between the militants and the 
moderates< The high school leadership that was responsible for the legal stuff, 
organisational stuff, education and training, support and so on. Sometimes felt that 
the militants were acting completely out of their political brief and putting them 
under pressure. Obviously the militants were saying ‚you guys are too slow. You sit 
in meetings, you talk a lot and read books. Now it’s to battle, it’s to war.64 
 
Whilst student and youth politics gained a new urgency as a result of the 
unrest there was far less of an impact on adult politics and organisation. Discourses 
of revolution drew heavily on the concept of working class leadership. However, 
the lack of adult involvement in progressive politics discussed in the chapter four 
was not reversed by the outbreak of unrest, though adults did on occasion became 
drawn into unfolding struggle as a result of the demands of their children.  
In general both coloured and African adults opposed the involvement of 
students and youth in politics. This was not always a rejection the anti-apartheid 
movement, with opposition often reflecting a concern for the people involved, or the 
repercussions of repression within the community. However, many activists do talk 
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of how their parents discouraged or explicitly forbade their involvement in political 
activism. As one CAYCO activist in Guguletu recalled:  
*My parents+ didn’t like my involvement in politics. *Laughs+ [But] I was convinced 
that I was actually doing the right thing< We had that understanding that our 
parents were afraid< So they ended up doing nothing, because they were saying 
‘why are you doing this, why are you doing this’. Go to school and after you have 
going to school (sic) go to work.65 
 
In Bonteheuwel parental opposition was reported in the majority of the interviews 
undertaken. One activist recalled how her mother saw her friends involved in 
politics as ‘the evil, as the devil’.66 It was also a common experience for activists to 
be banned from the family home because of political involvement67 and some 
parents would even inform on their children to the police.68 
Adults themselves were also rarely involved in progressive organisations. 
Across the city unrest saw a collapse in civic activism, with most civics either having 
no public campaigns, or ceasing to function completely.69 This was reflected in 
Bonteheuwel where the carefully built civic structure of the early 1980s stopped 
operating after the unrest started. 70 As the civics collapsed local issues became taken 
up by service organisations which were aligned with progressive politics, but 
staffed by paid employees.71 However, the extent of adult disengagement from 
progressive politics during this time in Bonteheuwel is best reflected by the fact that 
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despite it seeing considerable militant action at this time, there was no PTSA 
functioning in the community.72 
In Guguletu the WCCA, which was only ever intermittently active, collapsed 
under the weight of unrest and repression.73 The student called rent boycott was not 
supported by the civic and it played no role in its organisation, although individual 
civic activists were involved. The older residential organisations in Guguletu 
continued to function in spite of the unrest and in 1988 street committees were still 
communicating with housing officials in the same way as in the preceding decade.74 
Few street committees were involved in political action.75  
However, whilst adult organisation collapsed in both communities, more 
general support for political action differed markedly between Guguletu and 
Bonteheuwel. Mass responses to two forms of activism common during the 1980s, 
the political stayaway and rent boycott, reveal far more sympathy for political 
action amongst Africans than coloureds.  
Coloureds were consistently less supportive of political stayaways than 
Africans. A survey of large employers during a stayaway to commemorate Soweto 
in 1986 revealed that in the Western Cape 78% of African workers stayed away, 
whilst only 26% of coloured workers did so.76 Similarly a stayaway arranged by 
COSATU to mark Mayday in 1986 saw ‘considerably lower’ support in Cape Town 
than the rest of the country, with 51% of African workers staying  away, compared 
to only 2% of coloured workers. This disparity even existed in COSATU organised 
workplaces, suggesting the difference did not reflect the different pattern of 
unionisation amongst coloured workers, but a deeper antipathy towards political 
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action. Within COSATU organised workplaces coloured support only reached 31%, 
compared to 92% amongst Africans. 77 
Responses to rent boycotts also varied. A call for a boycott in Bonteheuwel at 
the height of the unrest failed. 78 In contrast, the 1986 student organised boycott in 
the LAGUNYA Townships attracted considerable support with rental collections 
declining during mid-1986 before returning to normal at the end of the year (table 
5.1 and 5.2). In Nyanga between March and September rental collections were far 
below average. In Guguletu the picture is less clear as records are missing. However 
a council report at this time reveals that the state was unable to deliver eviction and 
rent reminder notices as youths were confiscating them, suggesting the lack of data 
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Table 5.1: Rent owed and paid in Nyanga, March 1986 to July 1987.79 
Month Rent Owed Rent Paid Percentage of Rent 
Paid 
March 1986 30032.41 12931.14 43% 
April 1986 30032.41 4660.49 16% 
May 1986 30025.27 3996.63 13% 
June 1986 30025.27 4103.39 14% 
July 1986 30025.27 9997.36 33% 
August 1986 30025.27 12421.15 41% 
September 1986 30025.27 22952.02 76% 
October 1986 30003.31 27834.65 93% 
November 1986 29996.77 61585.65 205% 
December 1986 30716.77 30274.81 99% 
January 1987 30716.77 23611.06 77% 
February 1987 30704.44 29372.01 96% 
March 1987 30716.77 47458.66 155% 
April 1987 - - - 
May 1987 30662.08 33834.45 110% 
June 1987 30401 24571.02 81% 





                                                   





Table 5.2: Rent owed and paid in Guguletu, March 1986 to March 1987.80 
Month Rent Owed Rent Paid Percentage of Rent 
Paid 
March 1986 137406.51 127621.63 93% 
April 1986 - - - 
May 1986 - - - 
June 1986 - - - 
July 1986 - - - 
August 1986 - - - 
September 1986 - - - 
October 1986 137337.51 154529.38 113% 
November 1986 137164.34 149151.07 109% 
December 1986 137043.96 141845.07 104% 
January 1987 132215.31 12885.78 10% 
February 1987 136901.26 111914.54 82% 
March 1987 136492.89 184536.77 135% 
 
However, Guguletu’s rent boycott had limits and the mid-1980s did not see a 
sustained shift to conflict with the state around the urban environment. As the 
figures show, in late 1986 rental payments came to exceeded monthly charges, as 
residents started repaying their debts. This contrasts with other parts of South 
Africa where rent boycotts were sustained into the 1990s. It is also significant that 
the boycott was undertaken in response to a call by students, not by issues affecting 
adults as residents.  
The final development in this period was the rapid expansion in underground 
military activity. Before 1985 the presence of MK in the Western Cape was limited.81 
                                                   





In the African areas veterans of the 1950s maintained contact with the ANC in exile, 
whilst in coloured communities some links had been made between internal 
activists and MK in exile. However, armed activities in the province were rare and 
involved people infiltrated from exile, not people living within the country. By 1987 
this had transformed. Unrest radicalised many people pushing them into violent 
confrontation; simultaneously, underground networks mushroomed. The unrest of 
1985 changed into a period of rumbling violence which ranged from sporadic street 
unrest to explicitly military action, such as bomb attacks and sabotage. Activists 
linked into MK supported, provoked and sometimes explicitly mobilised the 
general unrest, whilst many militants were drawn into underground activities as a 
result of their actions.82 
 
5.4. Books, Bombs and Continuing Quiescence: 
Differential Responses to Township Unrest in Cape 
Town 1985-7 
 
The unrest of late 1985 opened a Pandora’s Box in Cape Town, making change 
appear possible whilst simultaneously demonstrating apartheid injustice. Into this 
space fell the organisations and networks developed over the previous five years, 
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allowing protest to be harnessed in a way previously impossible. However, whilst 
unrest and existing organisation provided the spark and initial framework through 
which protest was articulated, activism was transformed by the unique pattern of 
discrimination in the city. The extent people would go to to achieve change varied 
markedly, as did the view of the good society driving their actions. Consequently, a 
range of different organisations and identities coalesced with the political space 
opened by the unrest, informed by the differential impact of apartheid 
discrimination. The impact of this discrimination is considered here through the 
reaction of three different groups within the two case studies: students, youth and 
adults.  
5.4.1. Adult Disengagement: Continuity of a Trend 
In both Guguletu and Bonteheuwel the outbreak of unrest did not see a major 
expansion of progressive organisation or activism amongst older residents. This 
quiescence needs little explanation beyond that provided in chapter four as the 
same dynamics continued to function, in spite of the expansion of conditions 
conducive to political activism. Mass support could be generated in response to 
particularly harsh police action, as shown by the strong shows of support at funerals 
and the growing involvement of adults in support groups for detainees. However, 
in general, coloured adults continued to offer only lukewarm support for 
progressive action whilst Africans were supportive of specific instances of protest 
but did not get drawn into sustained protest as the local environment remained 
depoliticised.  
Two interesting points do emerge from this period, however, both of which 
reinforce the points made in chapter four. Firstly, despite the fact that student/youth 
protest was far more sustained in 1985-7 than it had been earlier, and the police 
response was equally brutal, coloured support for progressive action compares 
unfavourably with that recorded in 1976 and 1980. Support for the stayaways at this 
time amongst coloured workers averaged between 15 and 30% and was far lower 





of coloured garment workers. Similarly, boycotts, such as bus and consumer 
boycotts, saw falling levels of support as the decade progressed. This decline in 
support coincided with the growing collapse of apartheid discrimination and the 
growing Africanisation of the Western Cape. It is not possible to prove a direct link 
between these transformations and coloured disengagement from progressive 
political activism. However, it is the case that in 1985/6 with the country in recession 
and increased competition from the city’s growing migrant African population, 
support for progressive politics was less apparent than in the early 1980s.  
Secondly, this period reinforces the importance of the low rental levels in the 
African townships in depoliticising the urban environment. Studies of rent boycotts 
have shown that whilst they were often instigated to support political demands they 
could easily become self perpetuating, as people became unable to afford to pay off 
their arrears.83 However, as was revealed in the figures on the rent boycott in the 
LAGUNYA area, there was an overpayment of rent in both Guguletu and Nyanga 
after the boycotts had ended. The low rental levels meant that people were able to 
settle their arrears and therefore did not need to organise to defend themselves 
against eviction, or to negotiate with the local authorities. Throughout the township 
unrest, therefore, African adults became drawn into student struggles as parents but 
never became politicised through their personal hardship. 
 
5.4.2. Aspiration, Organisation and Realism: Student Politics 
in 1985-7 
In contrast to adult politics, between late 1985 and 1986 student politics 
rapidly expanded from scattered pockets of activism into a city-wide movement. 
State repression of peaceful protest caused a violent reaction in which students were 
heavily involved; this both politicised the state for students whilst the failure of 
repression demonstrated its weakness. This political space then interacted with the 
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grievances of black school students and the organisations and networks that had 
developed over the preceding decade. Rising levels of education and urbanisation 
led students to aspire for more, at the same time as economic recession, rising 
unemployment and the persistence of apartheid discrimination thwarted these 
aspirations. Organisations and ideologies also existed in a way they had not 
previously and these provided explanations for hardships and structures through 
which action could be organised and spread. Combined, these changes led to the 
development amongst school children in both Guguletu and Bonteheuwel of a 
collective understanding of their social, political and economic position within 
apartheid, linked into an organisational and ideological context which supported its 
articulation in action.   
The immediate cause of widespread student involvement in unrest was not 
the actions of progressive organisations, but the state security forces.84  In both 
communities activists recall how violence created anger and pushed people into 
fighting back, leading to a spiral of protest and violence. As one student activist in 
Bonteheuwel recounted:  
To see that [the actions of the police] It makes you angry... And then you go and you 
throw stones ... And then there’s retaliation from their side... And the police would 
come and they would shoot teargas and whatever and the kids would throw 
stones.85 
 
Surviving copies of a newsletter published at Manenberg Senior Secondary School – 
a draft produced before the Pollsmoor march and an edition published afterwards – 
show just how important violence was. The draft detailed an unenthusiastic 
response to ongoing calls for boycotts. However, after the march the situation had 
transformed with large numbers saying, as a result of the police action, ‘they will 
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collective action as it both reveals the vulnerability of the state and simultaneously expands people‟s 
feelings of injustice. See: Goldstone, J. „More Social Movements or Fewer? Beyond Political 
Opportunity Structures to Relational Fields‟, Theory and Society, 33, 2004, pp.346-7 





not stop boycotting until their demands are met.’86 Furthermore, because the 
violence was relatively indiscriminate, especially as it spread to the schools, it not 
only created a reaction amongst politicised students, but also developed a common 
experience of oppression that delegitimised state power for all students. This led to 
even conservative students being pulled into protest: 
The conservative element were calling for our expulsion... Because they were of the 
view... we were derailing their educational progress. But... as events unfolded... even 
those that were conservative began to see the light. Because, you know, I mean once 
the apartheid security forces decide to shoot they shoot randomly. So that the issues 
that we were raising began to make sense to them.... and they began to realise that it 
may be anybody’s turn to die unless you confront the system.87 
 
As well as pushing students into protest unrest broke down state authority, 
creating political space for action and the impression that apartheid was vulnerable. 
Following the outbreak of unrest Bundy identifies a clear militancy amongst 
students located in the belief that apartheid was about to fall which he calls 
‘immediatism’.88 Whilst Bundy may be overstating the case, the archival record does 
show that in late 1985, as the students began to win concessions, a sense of power 
was achieved that made them increasingly feel that transformation was possible and 
action was delivering results. A pamphlet issued by the Athlone Student’s Action 
Committee encouraged students to sacrifice their year’s schooling as the time was 
ripe for mass action:  
Yes the boycott is temporary. But we cannot end it now – not now we have the 
government on its knees< Can we afford to lose all the power we have fought for 
simply because we feel the boycott should end because of the exams? 89 
Similar views were also clear in Bonteheuwel and this played a key role in 
encouraging activists to continue organising. As one activist recalled:  
                                                   
86 „Manenberg SRC: The Official Newsletter of Manenberg Senior Secondary School SRC‟ Vol. 1, 
No. 1, 1p., A4, Typed with pictures, ds (4), August 1985, MA, CACE; Draft of „Manenberg SRC 
Newsletter‟ Vol. 1, No. 1, 1p., A4, card with typed sections attached, parts handwritten, ds (4), August 
1985, MA, CACE 
87 Interview with Nikita Vazi activist, 22/11/2005, Cape Town 
88 Bundy, C, „Street Sociology and Pavement Politics: Aspects of Youth and Student Resistance in 
Greater Cape Town, 1985‟, Journal of Southern African Studies, 13/3, 1987, pp.303-330 
89 „Who is in Charge of Our School – The Students or Carter‟, Issued by Athlone Students Action 





Being able to challenge the state constantly that’s what gave you the adrenaline 
rush... There was a realisation that< we could make this happen< we could bring 
the state down. And there was this energy that drove everybody.90 
 
This expansion of the possible took place in an environment relatively free from 
repression. In the Western Cape the UDF and its affiliates were still able to operate, 
despite low-level harassment. Even when the unrest escalated and the state clamped 
down on activism there was still, at least until the second state of emergency, space 
for student organisations to operate in and there were not mass detentions of 
student activists in either Bonteheuwel or Guguletu.91 
Whilst unrest opened political space and created an immediate reaction, 
alone it does not explain the consolidation over the next two years of a sustained 
challenge to the state. This sustained challenge owed much to progressive 
organisation, as school organisation and politicisation was sustained in a way that 
had not occurred in either 1976 or 1980. The roll of organisation in student protest in 
this period was similar in the two case studies. Progressive activists integrated into 
regional and national networks and inspired by developments elsewhere in the 
country organised events during late 1985 that led to the violent police crackdown. 
Once unrest exploded these networks and seasoned activists were then able to 
harness the energy unleashed and draw local struggles into a city-wide movement. 
Furthermore, the organisational and ideological development of the preceding five 
years provided frameworks that helped explained repression and present an 
alternative future around which students could mobilise.  
 With the outbreak of unrest, activists used their networks to organise rallies 
both within townships and, linking into the UDF, city-wide. They also coordinated 
and published demands, negotiated with the authorities, organised boycotts and 
took mandates to coordinating structures. This role of pre-existing organisation in 
channelling and sustaining the response to repression was recalled by activists in 
both communities. A former COSAS activist from Guguletu recalled how the careful 
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building of organisation in the period before the unrest meant that they were 
quickly able to organise students once the opportunity arose: 
Now a student by the name Sithembele Matiso was then gunned down by the 
apartheid security forces... we then instructed all activists to have meetings in their 
schools to discuss the matter. Obviously from our side we have already done our 
preparatory work and it was easier for us now because the death of this student has 
sparked off tensions.92 
 
Similarly in Bonteheuwel the spreading of unrest, organisation and the mass rallies 
that marked this period was facilitated through BISCO and the SRCs: 
At the beginning of the year [1985] I think it [BISCO] was almost inoperative< it 
was a couple of individuals... but< with the boycotts, because we had that 
structure< I think that was what set us apart from many other areas, was that we 
had a area coordinating structure for the three high schools already, so we could just 
fall back into that. Get our various representatives from our SRCs.93 
 
The crystallisation of protest into organised action also created new points of 
conflict which maintained confrontation. Activists organised protest and the state 
reacted, leading to further protest and increased organisation. One incident in 
Bonteheuwel, recounted by several activists, provides an illustration of how this 
took place:  
We picked up on issues as they came along. I’ll give you an example < There was a 
pastor called Pastor Kratz< *he+ got involved in the anti-apartheid movement. The 
government decided to deport him. We didn’t know him from a bar of soap in 
Bonteheuwel< *but+ the reason why he’s being deported is because of his anti-
apartheid stance< so we organised a bus. We filled up the bus... and we went to the 
airport the day he was being deported with our placards... Full well knowing we 
were going to be arrested< about 60 students.94 
 
Unsurprisingly the students were arrested and the trial of the activists then became 
a focus for action. As one of the students arrested recalled:  
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[W]e need[ed] media coverage. So we needed the students to support us < so we 
mobilised the students. We did it radically. We stopped a train at Bonteheuwel 
station where the conductors and the train driver had to wait. We put, most of the 
students from the three schools we put in that train and we went through to 
Bellville. I mean that train was full of students and they was singing and dancing 
and singing freedom songs.95 
 
Similar tactics were also used in Guguletu:  
Our [mode of operating] was to communicate a message that says lets go to the 
street and show them that we don’t want this system. Without saying throw stones. 
But we know that the strength of the message was such that it will motivate people 
to change the streets into the battlefields. So that’s how we used to operate in that 
period.96 
 
 The second role played by organisation was the articulation of clear 
narratives of protest that allowed students to understand unfolding events, and 
their discontent, as part of a broader movement which offered a better future. The 
regular workshops, videos and discussion groups of the early 1980s produced a 
group of activists with explanations for inequality which they used, and 
perpetuated, when organising responses to the ongoing unrest. Students came to 
see the end to apartheid and capitalism as central to their own future. The 
iconography and rhetoric of the banned political movements was ever present. 
People’s education classes, supported by the growth of progressive service 
organisations, taught students about racial capitalism and the need to overthrow the 
state to achieve true liberation. Furthermore, progressive organisation provided a 
whole repertoire of political action that was rapidly adopted by student activists. 
Students toyi-toyed and sang freedom songs passed down from the exiled political 
movements. In both Guguletu and Bonteheuwel students came to accept that for 
their immediate demands to be met the political system needed to be transformed. 
As the UDF argued in one of its internal discussion documents published a year 
before the unrest broke out in the City: 
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To say that the UDF has weakened organisations without qualifying that statement 
is incorrect. The ideological gains we have made has created a political climate 
where the possibilities of engaging in struggle have been heightened.97 
 
These ideological gains, whilst not immediately apparent, played a key role when 
unrest returned to the city.  
Although student politics in the mid-1980s were supported by organisation 
and ideology this is not sufficient to explain the strength of the movement for, as 
was noted in chapter four, strong organisation and ideology alone could not create 
protest. Two additional features of the city’s student population at this time were 
therefore crucial. Firstly, the intersection of the economic crisis with apartheid 
schooling created considerable (and widely shared) discontent. Secondly, this 
discontent came to inform both ideology and organisation, leading to the 
development of a form of politics that, because it reflected and represented the 
student experience was widely adopted.  
At the heart of student organisation in the mid-1980s was not simply 
political protest, but also the articulation of clear demands located within the 
student experience and a marked realism about what was achievable. Throughout 
1985-7 student activists issued demands to the authorities, using these to build 
support. Interestingly, political demands were just part (and in Guguletu often a 
small part) of the overall call to action. Instead activists focused on the immediate 
concerns of their constituency, a fact which led to different demands in Guguletu 
and Bonteheuwel but which helped sustain the student movement within the 
townships. 
In Guguletu pupils suffered from poor quality education, a lack of facilities 
and high school fees, as well as the immediate consequences of unrest. This heavily 
influenced their protests, as revealed in a list of demands issued by the Joint SRCs 
and the Parent’s Action Committee in late 1985 which demanded:  
                                                   






An end to the state of emergency 
Release of detained students 
Recognition of SRCs 
Age limits to be abolished 
St Francis School (for adults) be abolished because it is well equipped and is causing 
divisions within the students 
Exam fees to be decreased from R36 to R20 
Subsidising of transport fares 
Quota system must be abolished 
The building of more schools and technikons 
Free choice of academic subjects for all students 
Introduction of a free and equal education system.98 
 
This strong focus on educational issues is of particular interest because it 
suggests that pupils in the African schools did not see apartheid education as 
pointless. Indeed, combined with this desire for improved education was a strong 
belief in the value of education as a vehicle for personal advancement. The focus on 
people’s education and the rapid return to school within the African schools 
allowed pupils to continue education whilst protesting, ensuring their futures were 
not compromised. SRC members were also clearly focused on the need to achieve 
academically and set a good example. Amongst ordinary students education was 
also highly valued:  
[Students] themselves were viewing themselves as disciplined and as having a sense 
of purpose in life and that sense of purpose was to go through this inadequate 
education system.99 
 
When considered in more detail the focus on improved access to education 
was relatively unique and cannot be linked simply to rising unemployment 
amongst pupils, for if matriculating gave little hope of advancement a strong focus 
on education would be unlikely. Instead, the importance placed on the continuation 
of education alongside protest appears to reflect the nature of Cape Town’s political 
economy. The Coloured Labour Preference Policy had, before the mid-1980s, 
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seriously restricted African schooling in the Western Cape and its expansion was 
only just beginning to be implemented. Consequently educational achievement was 
still relatively rare and this may have led to it being highly prized.100  
 In contrast to the African areas demands in Bonteheuwel and other coloured 
communities did not focus on the quality of education or widening access; instead 
responses to the unrest and demands to organise dominated. The main campaign in 
Bonteheuwel in 1985 was for the promotion of students who had boycotted the 
exams. Similarly, whilst there is no archival record of demands issued by BISCO, 
demands issued in Athlone show how the demands of coloured students made only 
limited reference to the material conditions within the schools: 
An end to Police and SADF presence at schools 
The removal of the Department’s security at our schools during school hours. 
The release of all detainees and those arrested. 
We demand the right for the SRC’s and the Teacher Union to meet at school. 
The reinstatement of our teachers 
The right to form democratic SRC’s 
The right to make use of all school facilities and equipment. 
Amendment to excessive authority (e.g. corporal punishment) 
That our principals stop negotiating with Carter. 
End the state of emergency101 
 
However, the absence of demands around the quality of schooling did not represent 
contentment. In an inversion of the situation in Guguletu interviews with activists 
in Bonteheuwel saw the quality of schooling rarely raised as an issue. Instead the 
impetus towards action was a belief that in spite of educational achievement there 
were few opportunities and no real hope for achievement beyond the school yard: 
The fact we having this education doesn’t mean that when we finished with this 
education we gonna land good jobs < Whatever they implemented was to keep you 
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back. And we noticed that and we tried to explain that to the kids... And that is why 
we felt so passionate.’102 
 
Yes, people latched on to it *the struggle+ as a way out. It’s breaking down that 
ceiling. I would give my everything to see< a new South Africa, because there is 
opportunity for me< I fought for an equal opportunity. That each and every one, be 
you from whatever background or from what race, you have the same opportunity 
at whatever is available.103 
 
Similar motivations were also apparent in the publications of progressive 
organisations. In October 1985 a pamphlet was issued in Athlone calling for a 
continuation of the boycott. In this pamphlet they articulate the reasons why the 
boycott should continue and why the education system needed transforming. This 
analysis chimes closely with the structural conditions that were restricting coloured 
advancement in the mid 1980s:  
Students and parents believe that once students have a matric certificate they will be 
ensured a job. The reality is there is no work and that the majority of students will 
be forced into the cheap labour market. The majority of students will not be able to 
attend universities. The majority of students will be forced into the factories as cheap 
labourers or form part of the 6 million unemployed.104 
 
Like in Guguletu the key activists within the school movement were amongst the 
most academically successful in the school.105 However, unlike Guguletu their focus 
was not primarily on improving their education. This reflected the coloured student 
experience. Coloured per capita spending on education was far higher than 
provided to Africans, coloureds did not have to pay for books or exam fees, and 
education had seen increasing investment with the advent of the tricameral 
parliament For coloured students, therefore, it was not the quality of education that 
was felt to be restricting advancement. Instead it was the inability of the apartheid 
political economy beyond the schools to fulfil people’s aspirations. Consequently 
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demands focused on the daily fallout from struggle, yet underneath this ran a 
deeper vein of animosity driving protest.106  
As a result of the shared experiences of apartheid education and repression, 
the existence of effective organisations to structure discontent and the growth of 
shared understandings of discontent unique political cultures emerged in both 
Bonteheuwel and Guguletu. In Bonteheuwel a common theme in interviews was the 
importance of the social aspects of activism. Workshops and political rallies were 
not just about dry political action, but also occupied people’s spare time and 
provided them with friends, whilst the opportunity for violent protest could bring 
with it a sense of excitement. Activists wore parka jackets, jeans and boots and 
addressed each other as comrade. 107 People made friends in the struggle and 
political action was intertwined with deep personal bonds: 
So here you had a bunch of likeminded people< we had a cause for which we were 
struggling and we liked each other’s personalities< we were fun loving people at 
the same time. We weren’t your nerdy, booky type persons. We had vibrant lives 
and politics made it even more vibrant. You know. We had time to work and we 
had time to play. If we worked, we worked, if we played, we played hard< We are 
life-long friends at the end of the day, simply because we worked through a very 
traumatic youth as well.108 
 
Similarly, in Guguletu, student activists shared friendships as the struggle became 
the centre of people’s social lives. They also developed strong traditions and 
practices of democracy and debating, which drew people together and imparted a 
specific student identity on action. 109  
This development of political subcultures sustained participation by making 
activism fashionable and commonplace. As activism became widespread the risks of 
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participation reduced whilst being part of the struggle gave students status and 
increased the rewards of participation. Combined with, and in large part a result of, 
the organisation and shared experiences of this period these subcultures were 
crucial to the continuing of protest. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the success of student politics in Cape Town is 
of particular interest because it undermines a common explanation of the overall 
weakness of progressive politics in the Western Cape. It has often been suggested 
that ideological diversity was central to the limited success of progressive 
organising in the Western Cape because it undermined the ability of activists to 
coalesce around coherent programmes of action. However, this study provides little 
evidence to support this interpretation. As shown above, student politics in the 
Western Cape were widely acknowledged as the most effective and well organised 
in the whole country. However, student organisations in the Western Cape, and 
particularly the African townships, were marked by ideological heterogeneity and 
ongoing ideological debates and division. The existence of strong organisation 
alongside such ideological diversity shows that ideological splits did not necessarily 
lead to organisational weakness.  
As already shown the Joint SRCs were a major force in township politics and 
a key player in both regional and national student politics. However, the Joint SRCs 
were also made up of people with a broad range of political views. Many activists 
were heavily influenced by the Trotskyite traditions of the Western Cape: 
So the joint SRC. If you look at Cape Town. If you look at Athlone. And our, our 
ideological standpoint and that of the coloured middle class in the Athlone area, the 
Thornhill and the Vanguard, the people that were more New Unity Movement, so 
we had a natural click with them.110 
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However other organising and ideological traditions were also accommodated. The 
collective decision making approach and bottom up democracy adopted by the Joint 
SRCs provided a context within which different ideological tendencies could co-
exist and debate decisions, whilst also demanding that whatever outcome was 
agreed upon would be implemented by all students:  
We treated the black consciousness movement as our comrades, although we knew 
we differ in approach. We treated the pan-Africanists as comrades, although we 
differ. So that was a conscious decision that we took because we said look, in the 
battlefield we can< we shine over these guys because we know they don’t have the 
necessary skill and strategy to deal with mobilisation and running campaigns.111 
 
 This ideological heterogeneity was not always welcomed by organisations 
committed to the Congress cause and the ultra-left presence within the Joint SRCs 
made it difficult for activists to access resources controlled by Congress aligned 
service organisations, especially when there was opposition to the campaigns they 
were running. This led Joint SRC activists to build a range of different alliances and 
contacts. As well as Congress aligned organisations such as Grassroots they also 
linked with individuals in organisations such as the South African Council for 
Higher Education which was closely linked to Neville Alexander and the Unity 
Movement influenced South African Council on Sport and LAGUNYACRO. 112 The 
fact that the Joint SRCs were ideologically diverse and at times had resources denied 
to them because of this heterogeneity, yet were still recognised nationally for their 
schoolyard strength, provides clear evidence that ideological heterogeneity did not 
always weaken organisation and cannot easily be used as an explanation for the 
weakness of progressive politics amongst other communities and within other 
arenas of struggle in the City.  
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5.4.3. The Rationality of Radicalism: Youth Politics in 
Guguletu and Bonteheuwel 1985-7 
Like student politics, the youth radicalism of this period owed much to the 
transformation of political opportunities as a result of unrest. However, unlike 
student politics, which was shot through with a desire for education and self-
improvement, radical youth politics was driven by a desire for immediate 
revolutionary transformation. This radicalism reflected the life experiences of a 
group of young people who, lacking education, were unlikely to benefit from the 
simple removal of discrimination or the improvement of schooling. Instead, they 
were drawn by a call to revolution which contained utopian messages about the 
possibility of a brighter future and a method of violent struggle that was 
understandable, easily actionable and contained within its day to day practice the 
possibility for personal and sometimes material gain.113 
In both Guguletu and Bonteheuwel the unrest led not only to the growth of 
organised schoolyard politics but also the emergence of radical youth activism. The 
immediatism that Bundy identified remained present amongst CAYCO and the 
BMW long after the return to school. Indeed there was conflict in both communities 
between militant youth activists and students over whether the focus should be on 
building organisation within the constraints of apartheid, or maintaining a violent 
challenge to the state. In Guguletu there were clashes between the militant youth 
under the banner of CAYCO, and members of the Joint SRCs when the decision was 
made for students to return to school in 1986:  
We are accountable to the students, we report back to them about what is 
happening. But where do we get the students. In schools. So we must go back to 
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school... But the others *CAYCO+ were saying ‘no, lets keep the momentum, let the 
fires roll’... So that’s where we differed.114 
 
Similar conflicts were ever present in Bonteheuwel between members of the schools’ 
SRCs, BISCO and the BMW:  
[W]e were more the guys that debated things and analysed things and workshoped 
things... And then we had Bonteheuwel Military Wing and they decided. No. You 
guys were too moderate or conservative or diplomatic or whatever you want to call 
it. There were lots of talk and lots of meetings and lot of workshops, but they felt 
there should be more action.115 
 
In time this focus on violence led to growing divisions as organisation building in 
the schools was affected by a continuation of violence which undermined 
agreements made within the schools to reduce violence in return for concessions.116 
 Interestingly, this radicalism was not buttressed by any clear demands for 
immediate improvement. CAYCO publications reveal no clear cut ‘youth’ demands. 
For example, in late 1985 a CAYCO pamphlet was which simply reproduced the 
students’ demand for the postponement of exams.117 Similarly, in a pamphlet that 
was released in late 1986 or 1987 CAYCO demanded the following: 
A living wage 
Rents we can afford 
Lower bread prices 
Troops out of the townships 
Stop spending money on weapons of destruction 
An end to detentions 
A stop to the murder of our comrades on death row.118 
 
Not one of these demands represented an issue which could be argued to 
specifically affect a youth constituency. Rather than individual demands, youth 
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politics became characterised by a revolutionary militancy. The centrality to 
CAYCO and the BMW of revolutionary violence demonstrated in their actions 
mirrored in the few surviving publications: 
So many have died, but not in vain... we shall fight until the death of those who have 
been slaughtered by the regime has been avenged, we shall fight until we attain 
people’s power in our country.119 
 
 If youth activists were not driven to activism by clear demands then what 
lay behind their radicalisation and consistent involvement in struggle? Just as 
students became involved in politics because it offered a chance to make immediate 
gains and also to challenge a system which offered little hope of future 
advancement, so too did youth activists. However, the youth activists had less to 
lose and more to gain through violent action than students. In Bonteheuwel, whilst 
members of the student movement tended to be successful at school, members of 
the BMW were both younger and generally less academically successful. 
Consequently improved schooling offered little. However, the transformed state 
with prosperity for all promised in the rhetoric of the banned political movements 
had much to endear itself whilst the future without transformation offered little. 
The struggle therefore became a way of negating immediate hardships through 
commitment to future transformation. In the words of a member of the BMW:  
The struggle is like a religion, the more you learn about it the more crazy you 
become, the more addicted you become. Because it’s playing with your heart and 
your feelings< I want to give my life for the struggle, and die for the struggle. 
Because in the whole they will achieve from my death or from my blood and my 
country’s going to be the winner and they will achieve from the growth of my 
country itself. That’s what we felt, and that’s what we lived for, and that’s what we 
felt at that time for the struggle.120 
 
Similarly, in Guguletu the youths that flocked to the struggle were driven by the 
belief of immediate transformation. As a key CAYCO regional executive committee 
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member recalled of the many new recruits that had flocked to the struggle at this 
time: 
[T]here are young people, they are seeing freedom. They see nothing, they see 
freedom, they see death, they feared nothing.121 
  
 However, as the above quotes also show, youth politics not only represented 
a vision of sacrifice and transformation that appealed to people with little to lose 
and much to gain; it also provided a repertoire of political action that was easily 
accessible and in itself offered a sense of belonging. The organisation building of the 
early 1980s was the preserve of an educated elite who had the skills to run meetings, 
take minutes and print pamphlets. In contrast, collective action in the mid-1980s 
could be engaged in by anyone willing to sing a liberation song, wield a placard, 
throw a petrol bomb or burn a bus. In large part this was a result of the unrest, 
which transformed the relationship between citizens and the state and created the 
political space within which such action could be undertaken. People who had been 
disempowered by apartheid were suddenly able to achieve a sense of belonging, 
power and esteem. 
When former members of the BMW were interviewed about their 
involvement in the anti-apartheid struggle two key themes came through 
consistently. Firstly, the fact that their involvement created a sense of belonging that 
was missing both before they became involved, and also after liberation and, 
secondly, that along with this belonging became a clear sense of purpose and status: 
It was the best times of my life... There was something to live for. Something to die 
for. And there were comrades in the true essence of comrades. Where people were 
prepared to die for you. To, to give their life for you. You enter a house, you don’t 
even know the people. They were eager to accept you, they would give you a place 
to sleep< and a plate of food to eat, even if it’s the last plate of food in the house 
they will give it to you... You’re fighting for what they could not have fought for in 
those years. And they were proud of you. They were our parents, wherever we 
went... the reception you received from these strangers, that’s what built you. Made 
you strong in the struggle. I mean most of us, our own parents, they never gave us 
                                                   





the love we received from the mothers of the struggle or the families of the struggle 
themselves.122 
 
I was always a nobody now I’m somebody. People listen when I speak... all of a 
sudden everybody’s looking at me because I partake.123 
 
 In Guguletu contacting youth activists who were not involved in the more 
politicised leadership was difficult. However, the work of Schärf and Ngcokoto 
looking at the emergence of people’s courts in the Lagunya townships confirms that 
similar dynamics of belonging, status and purpose were generated amongst the out 
of school youth in Guguletu: 
‘*Comrade+ was the term appropriated by most young people... particularly the 
newer recruits who, until quite recently had been shunned by organizations [sic]. 
Finding a legitimate ‚organizational‛ home, and acquiring the powerful status of 
‚comrade‛ at this time of heightened expectations, could only enhance their sense of 
power.124 
 
Furthermore, this sense of purpose was based on the undermining of existing status 
distinctions. They identified in youth activism an ‘anti- intellectualism’ and a belief 
in equality regardless of education which suggests a desire amongst militant youth 
activists to overturn a social order which offered little in favour of a more utopian, 
and egalitarian future. 125 
Youth politics was driven by the limited life chances of African and coloured 
youth who saw little hope in a future defined by education. However, unlike 
student politics, which built on existing organisation, youth organisation and 
repertoires were transformed by the unrest. The role of pre-existing above ground 
organisation was therefore less significant than in student politics, though is role in 
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laying the ideological groundwork which underpinned the unrest was not 
insignificant.  
However, the commitment to revolutionary violence amongst the youth 
draws focus onto the role of the military underground at this time. During this 
period the ANC often claimed responsibility for the myriad forms of unrest that 
were developing. Similarly, activists saw their actions as representing the wishes of 
the banned political movements. There were also clear links between the ANC 
underground and many of the key figures in youth politics at this time. During 1986 
in Guguletu people with links into MK attended CAYCO meetings and people were 
recruited via this route. Similarly, the key figures in the BMW, Anton Fransch and 
Andrew November, left the country to join MK in exile.  
However, whilst many people have argued the underground played a 
central role in events its relation to action was complex. Barrell argues that in exile 
the ANC was unable to exert much control over activists within the country. Instead 
the ANC was an organisation with links into scattered military units, but lacking 
coherent internal structures to link these cells together, and to coordinate political 
and military activities.126 This interpretation closely reflects the picture in the two 
case studies. There was little centralised ANC command, but there were a growing 
number of activists who came within the orbit of ANC aligned networks and 
through the growing exposure to propaganda, military tactics and on occasion 
arms, these activists became integrated within underground networks that played 
an increasing, if often ad hoc, role in escalating violence and unrest. 
The ANC in exile had little role in directing events within the province. 
Underground structures that would have allowed the coordination of unrest did not 
exist in Cape Town in late 1985. Indeed, even in 1987 unified command structures 
that could effectively relay information and command activists city-wide were not 
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fully functioning. For example, in July 1987 MK cadre Ashley Kriel was shot dead 
by police. However, despite training in exile he did not link into an underground 
support network when he returned; instead, he moved into the house of a former 
teacher, who was a known supporter of progressive politics but was not an MK 
operative and herself questioned why her house had been chosen.127 Similarly, the 
development of strategies and tactics during the unrest period was not a result of 
instructions from underground activists, but emerged from the interpretation of 
proclamations made by ANC leaders outside the country by internal activists. 
Activists in both Guguletu and Bonteheuwel recall how a major guide for action 
was the annual January the 8th statement issued by the ANC in exile. This statement 
was analysed in workshops and on the back of these discussions programmes of 
action were developed.128 One activist from Bonteheuwel explained how the 
linkages between statements in exile and conditions on the ground worked in 
practice. After the ANC’s call for ungovernability, activists within Bonteheuwel 
sought ways to provoke violence and encourage people to attack symbols of the 
state. However the actions they undertook were not directly commanded by 
underground ANC cadres:   
[W]e would have a march and we would consciously direct the march past a known 
policeman’s house, or town councillor’s house. And when we reached there the call 
would go out< The situation was so volatile you could say one word within that 
crowd and that’s the last word. And that person’s house would go up in flames... 
We were basically operating from the word that came through. It wasn’t specific 
instruction what to do. But the word came through to make the area 
ungovernable.129 
 
Because the ANC in exile did not have formal route-ways into communities 
and organisations the ANC as a formal organisation had a limited role in 
developing unrest and militant youth politics. However, the ANC’s iconography 
and its very existence had a key role to play in militant youth politics (and politics 
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in general in the two case studies). Indeed, it was the fluidity of the ANC as it 
existed on the ground that helped create a context within which militant politics 
could flourish. 
Far from weakening anti-state action the fluidity of messages and the lack of 
clearly defined underground command structures allowed different people to 
pursue different forms of activism without having a single approach placed upon 
them. It also allowed individuals to build networks, and consequently the ANC, 
without needing to be formally linked into exile. Trial evidence and interviews with 
ANC activists during this period reveal just how complex and shifting the ANC 
structures in the province were. Anwar Dramat, a Bonteheuwel activist convicted of 
ANC activities, provided evidence at his trial that sketched out the nature of 
political violence in the township and its dynamic relationship with the 
underground political movements. In his evidence he described how as a result of 
his involvement in the school unrest he formed a ‘mobile unit’ along with several 
others of the accused. This mobile unit came out of the need to create a more 
structured and disciplined response to the constant police repression and operated 
as a form of underground cell: 
At that time there were various mobile units in the area or groups which – activities 
[were] normally building barricades and so forth but I had a particular problem in 
the way that it was done is that it was done openly. Police could usually pinpoint 
who the people were and for this reason I thought in joining a mobile unit but using 
underground tactics.130 
 
During its early inception this mobile unit, which drew in other activists tried 
alongside Dramat, did not undertake underground military activities, instead being 
involved in things like spray painting slogans. However, as the situation developed 
and arms became available it became involved in undertaking limpet mine attacks. 
Interestingly, at no point was there a clear turning point where Dramat moved from 
above ground activities to underground military actions; instead his activities 
                                                   





escalated along a continuum which saw him move from manning barricades to 
receiving and using arms smuggled into the country.131 
Whilst this mobile unit emerged as a semi-organic response to the ongoing 
unrest in the townships, its members were quickly drawn into linkages with the 
ANC underground. However, these linkages were not into clear command 
structures but the joining up of often long and complex chains of activists, many of 
whom had no experience of exile or formal contacts with the ANC outside the 
country. Further evidence from the trial demonstrated how joining the ANC often 
involved simply being asked by somebody who saw themselves as a member. There 
was no universal process of scrutiny and no membership records. Niclo Pedro, who 
was closely involved with Dramat, described how his recruitment into the ANC 
involved just being asked: 
[W]e spoke quite regularly about the ANC. Now when he approached me, he 
basically said that he is an ANC member and he asked me, I mean do I want to 
become an ANC member and I said yes and I trusted his words. Now I think that is 
– joining the ANC.132 
  
The simplicity of the act of joining the ANC, combined with a lack of clear 
command structures, provided an organisational context which allowed diffuse 
networks to spread. Once recruited an individual could recruit additional members 
without permission from elsewhere. By providing an organisational framework, 
and collective identity, within which individuals could forge their own networks 
and use these networks to undertake actions in the name of the ANC, the 
considerable militancy that was being precipitated by the unrest could be 
harnessed. It was this which underlay the growth of underground political action in 
this period in the city, rather than an influx of MK activists sent or commanded by 
the ANC in exile:   
 One particular guy comes to... one area. And he meets with one or two leadership 
people from that particular area. And he give the message to them and they start 
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spreading the message to other leaders in the areas. And they start forming their 
own thing individually among a group of people, say two, three, four, five< So this 
is how it went on. And that is where most of us came to find out a lot of things. 
What we need, what the areas needs, and what we lack and what needs to be 
done.133 
 
The actions of the CAYCO youth and the BMW both broadly reflect this 
pattern. The BMW were led by activists who were selected by leaders within 
Bonteheuwel to push militant action. Once brought within the ideological and 
organisational space owned, at least rhetorically, by the ANC these activists 
themselves went out and brought other people within their organisation. Their 
organisation then grew and, perhaps as importantly, was able to continue even after 
its initial founders had moved into exile. Similarly, in Guguletu ANC rhetoric and 
the proclamations of ANC activists within the community created a context within 
which the militant youth undertook violent action (sometimes beyond the control of 
these same activists; sometimes supported by them) in the name of the military 
underground and liberation.  
Overall, therefore, youth politics in the mid-1980s was characterised first by 
action and subsequently by organisation. Consequently it cannot be seen as an 
organised response by the banned political movements. However, organisation was 
still crucial. Specifically, the existence of activists and networks in the two 
communities which were willing and able to engage with a more radical and 
revolutionary style and rhetoric of politics was crucial to the development and 
sustenance of youth militancy. In Bonteheuwel key activists were willing to support 
and encourage violent action, and themselves became drawn into underground 
structures. Similarly, in Guguletu CAYCO activists pushed militant and 
revolutionary rhetoric which supported the actions of the radical youth.  
 
                                                   





5.5. Conclusions: Race, Class and the Myth of Youth 
Revolt  
 
Whilst the picture that emerges from a cursory glance at progressive organisation 
and activism in the mid-1980s is of a youth in revolt, this chapter has shown how 
such an interpretation misreads the fundamental dynamics driving activism. Whilst 
adults continued to be disengaged from progressive political action this was not 
simply a revolt of young people. Behind the progressive action of 1985-7 in Cape 
Town sat two distinct protests, patterned by the operation of apartheid’s political 
economy. 
 The shift to revolt took place as organisations organised protest and the state 
repressed. Networks that had strengthened links between activists and communities 
over the preceding five years then provided the mechanisms through which protest 
was spread, organised and understood. Yet this diffusion of protest did not occur 
uniformly. It interacted with the complex patterning of race and class in the city to 
produce two separate, if overlapping revolts. Increasing numbers of students in 
both Guguletu and Bonteheuwel were experiencing curtailed life chances under 
apartheid and this led to the demands of student activists achieving considerable 
salience, particularly as repression opened political space and created conflict.  
Similarly, within the broader youth population, which did not share the same 
aspirations as school activists, the explosion of unrest created opportunities for 
status, belonging and the promise of a better future.  
This led to the development of a student politics focused on education for 
liberation and a youth politics focused on liberation before education. Educated 
activists opposed apartheid because of the ceiling it placed on their current and 
future advancement; they therefore developed a form of activism that allowed for 
continued educational achievement alongside demands for transformation. The 
importance of personal achievement was clearly revealed in the different nuances 





of apartheid discrimination; African students sought improved schooling quality, 
whilst coloured students sought better opportunities beyond the classroom.  In 
contrast, youth activists were driven by rising unemployment and a desire for an 
egalitarian future in which their current disadvantage would be overturned; when 
they supported liberation before education they were not simply articulating a 







From Conflict to Negotiation: Five Transitions 





The second state of emergency, declared on the 12th June 1986, marked a watershed 
in internal opposition to apartheid. Public meetings were banned, grassroots 
organisations restricted and many of their members interned. By 1988 the UDF and 
many of its affiliates were decimated.1 In this climate few people would have 
expected that within two years Nelson Mandela would be free and the African 
political parties unbanned. However, on the 2nd February South Africa’s new 
President, F.W. DeKlerk, announced these actions and by 1994 all South Africans 
were voting in the country’s first non-racial elections. 
Accompanying the move from revolt in 1986 to democracy in 1994 was a 
transformation in local civil society. The state of emergency removed the space 
within which organisations could operate and as space started reopened from 1989 
it did so alongside a growing centrality of political organisation and negotiation. 
This was implicit throughout 1989 when it was becoming increasingly clear that a 
negotiated settlement would take place, and explicit after the unbanning of the 
African political movements in 1990. 
This chapter examines civil society during this transition period, asking how 
and why civil society changed in the two case studies. In doing this it broadly 
accepts the view, put forward in a range of studies, that the opening of political 
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space led to a movement of activists from civil to political society and a 
corresponding decline in grassroots activism. However, it also expands these 
interpretations. In Cape Town not all civil society organisations declined, indeed the 
student movement remained strong and the civic movement underwent a rapid 
expansion. Furthermore, whilst activists moved into political society this process 
was not uniform; many activists abandoned progressive politics completely whilst 
others who had moved out of organising in the mid 1980 became re-engaged. These 
differential reactions to the same national political transformation mean it is 
impossible to argue that shifting opportunities alone were responsible for the fate of 
civil society during the transition.  
Instead, this chapter argues that to understand the differing trajectories of 
activism it is necessary not simply to understand changes in political opportunities 
at a general level; it is also necessary to understand how they interact with, and are 
mediated by, the local political and socio-economic context. As Oberschall argues, 
political opportunities are just one of several different dimensions that need to be 
understood when considering why people act collectively; with the other 
dimensions not only including the material and ideological resources available to 
organisations, but also the ‘basic conditions of life’ most likely to produce 
discontent.2 
It identifies three broad changes that were experienced across the case 
studies, but which led to different reactions amongst different organisations. These 
are: 1) the shifting loci of politics from the local to national level as a result of the 
move to national political negotiations; 2) the increase in legal political space for 
civil and political society; 3) shifting patterns of resource distribution as the state 
sought partners through which to administer its black population. These 
transformations encouraged some forms of activism and discouraged others. They 
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also provided opportunities for some activists, whilst removing opportunities from 
others. Youth activists who had flowed into the progressive during unrest became 
disengaged as activism no longer offered the chance for empowerment and radical 
transformation through militant action, whilst educated activists thrived as they 
were better able to engage with the demands of transitional organisation building. 
Adults who had previously avoided involvement were drawn into organisation as 
the state sought partners to build legitimacy and resources flowed through 
organisations that had previously been driven by political concerns. The only 
organisation not to be radically transformed by the initial transition was the student 
movement in the African areas, which due to the severity of the schooling crisis 
continued to campaign on schooling issues.  
This chapter starts by outlining current understandings of the transition in 
literature. It then discusses the broad changes that took place within progressive 
organisation and activism between 1998 and 1994. Finally, it focuses on five specific 
transitions within civil society to show how the unbanning interacted with the 
broader structural context to create differing responses to the opening of political 
space. These transitions are: the collapse of youth politics; the growth of 
factionalism within Bonteheuwel; the continued strength of the African student 
movement; the growth of civic activism in African communities and the collapse in 
support amongst coloureds for progressive politics. It shows how, in each 
transition, the same broad dynamics were experienced, but that their intersection 
with local traditions of activism, historical experience, and the local political 
economy to create different responses. These responses reflected not just national 
political change, but were firmly rooted in the local experience. 
 
6.1.1. Current Literature and Argument 
Specific focus on the impact of the transition on civil society has been less prominent 





should play/have played within the process of democratisation and afterwards.3 
However, several studies have sought to outline how and why transition impacted 
on anti-apartheid activism and civil society. Broadly these discussions deal with two 
key dynamics. Firstly, they focus on changing political opportunities within the 
country and the way that political transition affected organisation. Secondly, they 
focus on the decline in social compression within the black communities and the 
declining social base of activism.  
With regards to political opportunities, there is a widespread acceptance that 
the movement of activists from civil society into political society served to weaken 
many progressive organisations as people could openly organise for their political 
aims and therefore neglected local organisation building.4 This is most universally 
accepted in terms of the youth and women’s movements which collapsed 
themselves to form the ANC Women’s League (ANCWL) and the ANC Youth 
League (ANCYL) and reflected by the relatively limited focus in academic studies 
on the impact of transition on these organisations.  
However the broader impact on civil society is more contested. Drawing on 
the movement of activists from civil society into political organisations, the focus on 
national political transition rather than people’s immediate concerns, and a growing 
focus on leadership, rather than democratic decision making, some of the more 
simplistic analyses of this period see the transition as representing a large scale 
demobilisation of civil society as politics shifted from being based in mass action to 
elitist deals and civil society ceased to concern itself with political change. As 
Neocosmos argues: 
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[T]he period 1990-1994 was, in South Africa, largely... characterised by a process of 
popular demobilisation as an elitist deal was struck behind closed doors... While 
whatever popular structures that remained were largely destroyed through 
systematic, state-inspired violence.5 
 
Although there is certainly much truth in this narrative of demobilisation the 
decline of civil society was not absolute, nor was it driven solely by a growing 
elitism within politics. Even in the case of the women’s movement, which did move 
directly into the fold of liberation politics, Hassim demonstrates how, by focusing 
on influencing the national constitutional negotiations, activists were able to 
influence the nature of the post-apartheid settlement. In this way continuity in aims 
was achieved, making the break between civil and political society appear 
somewhat more artificial.6 
More significantly for this thesis, at the local level the unbanning and 
negotiations did not always lead to a decline in activism. Rather activism was on 
occasion transformed. Most widely considered within studies of transition has been 
the fate of the civic movement including both individual civics and the fate of the 
South African National Civic Association (SANCO) which was launched in 1992. 
Interpretations vary. In one paper Zuern identifies the high point of civic activism in 
1990 and argues, in a similar vein to Neocosmos, that the growth of political society 
squeezed out civil society, although civics did still continue to operate: 
During the transition period, the existing state structures and the developing 
opposition political party structures increasingly squeezed the space for civic action. 
In this tighter space, civics found their own choices increasingly limited as they 
attempted to continue to champion the goals of popular democracy defined during 
the pre-transition period.7 
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In keeping with this view Zuern sees the ability of civics to engage in local 
negotiations as highest in 1990 and falling rapidly after this as ‘government actors 
assumed greater control of local negotiation processes.’ However she also makes the 
interesting point that just because national changes were closing down political 
space for the civics this did not necessarily mean that locally these changes would 
be recognised and acted upon by the civics.8 
In contrast to Zuern both Cherry et al and Lanegran see the early 1990s as 
representing a moment of expanding opportunity for the civics. Lanegran provides 
a periodisation of civic activism that sees the civics, until 1993, seeking to create an 
autonomous space for themselves aside from the ANC, albeit simultaneously 
supporting many of its aims. She focuses on the numerous local negotiations that 
took place in spite of both SANCO and the ANC’s calls for all local government 
negotiations to be undertaken nationally to argue that the civics were actually 
asserting their autonomy.9 Similarly, Cherry et al see within the collapse of local 
government from 1989 and local government’s desire for partners, opportunities for 
the civics during transition. They therefore locate the decline of civic activism not 
solely within transition, but in the period after democratisation as people gained 
increasing faith in political society (an issue which will be discussed in the next 
chapter).10 
The second explanation of post-apartheid transformation sees change not 
simply as a result of the changing opportunities for organisations vis a vis political 
society but also within changes to the social base of anti-apartheid activism. Van 
Kessel, writing about the civic movement in Katlehong, notes that to be successful 
community organisations depended upon a lack of social differentiation interacting 
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with repression and disenfranchisement to create mobilisation. Consequently, as 
society became more fragmented, state repression eased and political change came 
onto the horizon, people became less likely to organise as communities and more 
likely to organise along the basis of social class.11 
Overall the picture presented in current literature on South Africa in 
transition is of a radical change in political opportunities and a growing socio-
economic differentiation amongst the black population. The analysis presented here 
does not radically depart from the broad focus within current literature on political 
opportunities. It would be remarkable if such a radical change as the unbanning of 
the African political movements did not have a massive impact on a civil society 
that had always been focused in part on political issues.  
However, what it will also show is that the impact of these political changes 
was mediated at the local level by the same complex terrain of racial and class 
divisions that had influenced civil society over the preceding fifteen years. The five 
transitions examined all demonstrate how the same national and regional context, 
was experienced differently by South Africans as a result of their position within the 
apartheid political economy. The collapse of youth politics demonstrates how the 
shift from local to national negotiations simultaneously stripped the youth 
movement of its most effective leaders whilst creating a repertoire of activism 
foreign to the lived experience of the youth that had been active in the mid-1980s. 
The development of factionalism within Bonteheuwel shows how the growing 
allocation of resources through political society combined with shifting repertoires 
of activism to create conflict over which form of activism (democratic organisation 
building or a history of militant sacrifice) was most worthy of post-apartheid 
reward. The growth of civic activism in African communities reveals how the need 
for the state to find partners in administering local government (and distributing 
resources) led to a rapid expansion in organisation to fill this gap. The continued 
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strength of the African student movement reveals how political change could have 
only limited impact on activism when there was considerable, and ongoing, 
hardship as represented by the continued crisis of the schooling system in the 
province. Finally, the collapse in support amongst coloureds for progressive politics 
demonstrates the importance of the legacy of coloured preference policies and the 
continuing relevance of apartheid’s differential discrimination to people’s lives and 
political choices. Specifically, coloured disengagement is located in changing 
patterns of urbanisation  and labour market engagement in the province which led 
to a growing opposition to non-racial politics by coloureds threatened by these 
changes, and in a shift from local to national politics and the creation of a 
progressive political culture that was focused on the concerns of Africans and failed 
(in part because structural cleavages made it highly problematic to do so) to 
articulate a coherent vision for political transformation that could resonate with the 
coloured experience.  
 
6.2. Civil Society in South Africa and Cape Town: 
1988-1994 
 
Between 1988 and 1994 local civil society across South Africa underwent 
considerable transformation. Within this three broad periods can be located: 1) 1988, 
when resistance and organisation saw a marked decline as a result of the state of 
emergency; 2) 1989-1990, the re-emergence of organisation and activism around acts 
of defiance to the restrictions introduced by the regime; 3) 1990-1994, the return to 
the country of the banned political movements and negotiations towards a political 
settlement.  
In 1988 most local organisations which had been so strong during the 
insurrectionary period of the mid-1980s had ceased to function effectively. Public 





activists still free were either restricted through banning orders or were in hiding 
from the police. The UDF had ceased to operate effectively and mass action based 
on public meetings and local grassroots organisation fell away. Defiance became 
more personal and the trade unions and churches began to play an increasing role. 
Protests such as stayaways and rent boycotts replaced mass marches and 
insurrection.12 
Whilst 1988 was a low point in internal opposition, it saw the forging of the 
alliances that allowed the re-emergence of protest. The growing importance of the 
trade union movement saw increased cooperation by the UDF with its activists. In 
May 1988 a special COSATU conference was called at which UDF and trade 
unionists agreed to hold three days of ‘peaceful national protest’. The stayaway 
called to accompany this was supported on its first day by between 2.5 and 3 million 
workers.13 From late 1988 internal organisation began to slowly re-emerge and 
campaigns, such as that against the 1988 municipal elections, started to revitalise 
internal opposition. Then, in mid-1989, the Mass Democratic Movement (the term 
adopted for the alliance between the UDF and COSATU) called for a nationwide 
campaign of defiance against apartheid. Restricted organisations declared 
themselves unbanned and held mass meetings. Activists invaded white only 
beaches and attended white only hospitals to demand treatment. Large scale 
marches also took place across major cities. 
The impact of this upswing on local civil society was complex and uneven. 
The growth in mass organising clearly relied, at least in part, upon the efforts of 
local activists and from mid-1989 Seekings identifies growing actions by the civic 
movement as a result of the defiance campaign.14 However, the opposition of the 
late 1980s was very different to that of the mid-1980’s. Whilst earlier activism had 
been planned and implemented locally, around local issues, by the late 1980s 
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regional and national leaders had assumed the central role and the forms of action 
being undertaken, such as mass marches and beach invasions, did not rely upon 
tight networks of local organisation. As Lodge says: 
In contrast to the mid-1980s, when the insurrectionary movement was being pulled 
onto uncharted courses by cadres of youth in the streets of the townships, the 
popular protest in the late 1980s was choreographed and coordinated and seemed 
much more under the control of its leaders.15 
 
If the late 1980s represented a new, more national, stage in progressive politics the 
unbanning of the African political movements transformed civil society again. Yet, 
this was not a uniform process, with different elements of civil society reacting 
differently. Some civil society movements, most notably the civics, expanded as 
their activities were no longer restricted. Indeed in several areas, most notably 
Soweto, civic organisations began to engage in direct discussions with the all-white 
local authorities and conclude agreements on service provision and rental arrears.  16 
This new found strength was compounded in 1992 when SANCO was launched as a 
national umbrella body representing the vast majority of civics nationwide. In other 
cases, the growing prominence of the political movements led to the collapsing of 
organisations which had previously been central to internal opposition into the 
newly unbanned political movements with the formation of the ANC Women’s 
League (ANCWL) and the ANC Youth League (ANCYL). Finally, the early 1990s 
also saw an escalation of conflict within African communities as so-called ‘black on 
black’ violence reached levels unseen even in the heyday of the insurrectionary 
1980s. This was most notable in the conflict between Inkatha and ANC supporters in 
Kwa Zulu, Natal and the Transvaal which claimed thousands of lives as people 
fought for control of territory in townships and hostels. 
Broadly transformations in Cape Town followed a similar pattern to those 
elsewhere in the country. The state of emergency decimated activism; the opening 
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of political space from 1989 allowed for an expansion of organisation; the 
unbanning of the African political movements decapitated some organisations and 
provided space for others. However, within this broader narrative different 
movements had different experience reflecting the complex patterning of race and 
class in the City.  
Like elsewhere the second state of emergency had a devastating impact on 
civil society in both the Western Cape and the two case studies. Large numbers of 
activists were detained or went on the run and organisations could no longer meet 
publicly. This decline was widespread. As noted in chapter five the civic movement 
was far from active in both communities before the unrest. By 1988 this collapse was 
complete. In Bonteheuwel the civic association was no longer being run by 
progressive activists and instead was being run by people with links to the local 
Labour Party.17 In Guguletu the ban on public meetings led to the effective collapse 
of the civic. As the chair of the Guguletu branch of the WCCA said: 
You see there was a year when all the organisations were banned. Even civic 
organisations. All groupings were banned. So we couldn’t hold meetings. Because 
we couldn’t hold meetings, I couldn’t go on with the civic association.18 
 
The Women and youth movements also suffered as a result of the 
emergency; although the main impact of the repression was to transform the way 
they operated, rather than causing their complete collapse. In Bonteheuwel there 
had never been an effective women’s organisation. Yet in Guguletu the United 
Women’s Congress (UWCO), formed from the merger of UWO with the Women’s 
Front Organisation, had continued to function. However, with the second 
emergency UWCO in Guguletu transformed from an organisation based on mass 
action to become a semi-underground organisation run by activists in hiding. 
Meetings were organised through a checkpoint system with locations announced at 
the last minute to prevent informing. Whilst these precautions allowed UWCO to 
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keep operating, they removed the mass base of the organisation, restricting 
participation to activists linked into existing networks: 
‘Naturally people took cover... So *under the+ state of emergency< the structured 
way of organisations meeting suffered< we were trying by all means not to expose 
those who haven’t been exposed already< So *only+ those who are known will 
meet.’19 
 
CAYCO in Guguletu also suffered as many of its central activists were 
detained. Just like UWCO its activists moved away from holding mass meetings, 
with one member reporting that during the emergency they tended to work in small 
‘units’ of around five people.20 The impact of the emergency on CAYCO as a 
regional structure was revealed in a retrospective assessment by the organisation, 
undertaken in 1990, which remarked: 
We were restricted on 23 February 1988 and since then we had to endure continuous 
harassment, detentions and even the killing of some of our members. The 
restrictions had a telling effect on us and we were almost reduced from a political 
youth organisation to an ‚administrative youth club‛. Many of our leadership 
figures were detained or scared of being detained for the whole of last year< Our 
political programme of action could never really be implemented because of 
constant repressions.21 
 
Similar transformations were taking place within Bonteheuwel. By 1988 the 
BMW had been broken by police arrests. More generally, many activists had been 
detained and for those who remained it was increasingly difficult to meet. One 
member of the Bonteheuwel UDF Area Committee remembered how under the 
state of emergency, ‘We had no organisation left. We had to restructure all our 
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organisations.’22 This led to the Area Committee, which had been established to 
coordinate progressive organisations, becoming the instigator of actions on its own. 
For example, one activist recalled how the Area Committee started to organised 
pamphlet production and distribution without any direct involvement of its 
affiliates, as the same activist said: ‘the area committee became the organisation.’23 
However, whilst most activism was repressed during 1988 organisation 
continued in two areas – the schools and, outside the focus of this thesis, the 
squatter communities. Although not replicating its earlier intensity organisation and 
low level conflict between the students, authorities and police continued despite the 
emergency. WECSCO was able to organise effective city-wide protests during 1988 
including on the 18th April a day of protest at which ‘students protested against the 
hanging of the Sharpeville Six; the locking out of students and the dismissal of 
teachers and the continued detention of students and teachers.’24 Students also 
supported the three-day April stayaway. The African high schools ‘stood empty for 
three days as pupils and teachers displayed their protest’ whilst ‘Hundreds of 
pupils in DEC [coloured+ schools were absent from school’.25 The two case studies 
were amongst the most active in their respective communities. Of the twenty two 
schools which had stayaways in support of WECSCO’s April day of protest all four 
Guguletu schools (Fezeka, I.D. Mkhize, Sizamile and the Guguletu comprehensive) 
were represented. Equally, the three Bonteheuwel were amongst ten schools who 
staged walk outs later in the day.26 Protest was mirrored in continuing organisation. 
The coordinated response to WECSCO’s day of action reveals regional school 
structures able to undertake coordinated action. This picture was reflected in the 
case studies. Schools in Bonteheuwel were able to coordinate protests across the 
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township in the run up to the elections in October. 1988.27 In Guguletu the Joint 
SRCs were linking into city wide support networks such as the Unrest Monitoring 
Action Committee where they were providing regular reports of unrest in the 
schools to the organisation.28 
 In Cape Town the defiance campaign was launched at the funerals of the 
ANC activists Robbie Waterwitch and Coline Williams who were killed in July 1989 
by what many people suspect was a booby trapped limpet mine. At their funeral the 
ANC and SACP flags were flown and high profile figures spoke in contravention of 
their banning orders. The campaign rapidly escalated. The scale of the defiance 
campaign was revealed by the Repression Monitoring Group which in September 
1989 recorded 1120 arrests, 43 detentions, 567 injuries and 20 deaths in the greater 
Cape Town area.29 Similarly, on the 3rd September around 60,000 people marched in 
central Cape Town to protest at deaths that had occurred during protests against 
elections to the Tricameral Parliament.30 The Western Cape UDF was able to reopen 
its office and organise an AGM.31 
However, it would be wrong to automatically associate the success of the 
defiance campaign with a large scale rebirth in grassroots organisations. The 
defiance campaign was based on public, high profile events, which could be called 
by leaders and did not rely upon tight-knit organisation. Indeed ongoing 
organisational weakness was recognised by figures within progressive politics. 
Dullah Omar, writing in late 1989, dismissed criticism of the campaign for not 
focusing upon organisation as ‘unreasonable’ given the prevailing circumstances. 
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However, he saw the main task of the MDM moving forward to ‘consolidate and 
organise’ through building grassroots organisations and trade unions.32  
In Bonteheuwel the defiance campaign appears to have had an impact on 
organising. Towards the end of 1989 the civic association was ‘taken back’ by 
progressive activists, although the extent to which this led to new campaigns is not 
clear.33 However, more generally organisation appears not to have recovered. The 
funeral of Anton Fransch, an ANC guerrilla who had been a key figure in youth 
politics in Bonteheuwel during the unrest of the mid-1980s as both a member of 
CAYCO and a founder of the BMW, reveals the organisational weakness in the 
township. Anton was killed on the 17th November 1989 after a 7 hour fire fight with 
police. In the immediate aftermath of his death a Committee was established to 
organise and coordinate the funeral. This committee was able to produce 125,000 
pamphlets and thousands of posters.34 However, organisational participation was 
limited. The initial meeting establishing the funeral committee was ‘very poorly 
attended’ and had to be postponed to the next morning, ‘at which several 
organisations, mainly youth, were present.’35 Even those organisations that were 
nominally functioning had returned to the relatively low levels of participation seen 
before the unrest, with the Bonteheuwel youth reporting membership of between 25 
and 40.36 
In contrast organisation in Guguletu did grow. By late 1989 there were 11 
CAYCO branches in the township region, and whilst some were reported as weak, 
several were reported to be strong. These branches were meeting monthly in a 
township wide structure for ‘administration and political education’, held July 16th 
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celebrations and were raising money through gumbas and cultural events. A 
campaign against gangsterism that saw youth activists patrolling the streets and 
violently punishing suspected gangsters was also launched, and was particularly 
well supported.37 The UDF area committee started meeting more regularly and 
alongside CAYCO representative from UWCO, the Young Christian Students and 
the Western Cape Student’s Congress were all involved in its meetings by late 
1989.38  
More generally student politics remained well organised and active, despite 
growing tensions in the African townships over whether students should continue 
to be organised solely through the Joints SRCS or whether political student 
organisations were more appropriate. These debates broadly split on ideological 
lines with Congress aligned students arguing in favour of the move to political 
organising and students supporting a one-stage socialist perspective against. 39 The 
congress activists ultimately won out, despite heated debates within the schools, 
and on the 22nd of October 1989 the Township Students’ Congress (TOSCO) was 
launched in Guguletu. 40. However, in spite of these tensions the Western Cape 
student movement continued to stand out for its effective organisation: 
[T]he repression wave of 1986-9 has restricted the activities of our organisation and 
consequently the potential problems within black education – founded upon the 
NECC’s strategy of building democratic structures (SRCs, PTSAs) on the ground 
which we believed would translate into a maturation of parent-teacher-student 
relationships and create conditions upon which People’s education can be founded – 
has by and large grounded to a halt in most parts of the country, with the notable 
exception, the Western Cape.41 
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However, in spite of the more general growth of organisation in the African 
communities civic activism did not re-emerge. There are no records of the Western 
Cape Civic Association functioning before the unbanning and there was no 
involvement by any progressive civic structure in the campaign against 
gangsterism, despite it being a clearly civic issue. Instead CAYCO, and at times 
other organisations, such as the Lakhagunya action committee which was linked to 
a community councillor and involved the SADF in its activities, were left to organise 
against gangsterism.42  
With the unbanning of the African political movements both continuity and 
change in civil society and activism were apparent. The unbanning of the African 
political movements had a major impact on civil society across the City. At the most 
basic level the near hegemony of Congress politics amongst activists meant that 
people who had spent years fighting for the unbanning of the ANC were suddenly 
able to become members of an organisation which had long been their psychological 
home. Furthermore, with the unbanning the ANC assumed a crucial role in defining 
the country’s future, a role which local organisations did not, and could not, play. 
Within this context activists moved into the ANC, leaving local campaigns and civil 
society behind. This was clearest in the youth and women’s movements, which 
disbanded completely. However it occurred across all organisations and weakened 
many of those organisations which sought to continue operating. As one activist 
said:  
[People] threw all their energies into building ANC branches. [People were 
preparing for the upcoming elections and] with that process a number of 
organisations suffered< organisations were weakened< our people then went into 
government< So we didn’t do proper succession planning< in my mind we were 
focused on the short term< we weakened our structures.43 
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This shift into political organisation was intimately linked to the opening of 
political space and was not so much a rejection of civil society, as a reaction by 
politicised activists to new opportunities for political involvement. Liberal 
democratic dichotomies between civil and political society hold little explanatory 
value in apartheid South Africa where the two were always intimately linked in the 
minds of activists. With the unbanning political activism was more likely to produce 
results than local grassroots action and consequently many activists moved into 
political society. One interviewee clearly articulated this when they argued that any 
debate around the political nature of the women’s movement had been settled back 
in 1983, when the UDF had been formed: 
*F+or the majority of women in the Women’s League that debate was started with 
the establishment of the UDF. That in a long term where do we see ourselves... The 
view was we see ourselves alongside our men folks. We see ourselves as women 
participating in something that is going to change this country, and holding key 
positions< we not just a women’s group that is going to play with the nappies and 
the kids and that. We are a formidable group of people that wants to change, or to 
participate, in making sure that the policies of this country do what they are 
supposed to do< Are we going to be a structure that is opposed to the ANC? And 
we say no, because we want to be the structure that eventually will be part of that 
policy making.44  
 
Interestingly, the movement of large numbers of activists from civil into 
political society depended upon the hegemony of political society, particularly the 
ANC, within discourses of transformation: for people to move into political society 
they had to believe it held a greater possibility of creating an improved South Africa 
than organising within civil society. Furthermore, the movement into the ANC 
depended on a belief amongst progressive activists that the ANC was the political 
organisation best placed to achieve this transformation. As noted elsewhere, both 
these beliefs had been commonplace amongst activists throughout the previous 
decade. However they had not been universal. Multiple ideological tendencies 
rubbed shoulders and activists were driven by a broad range of motivations, not all 
of which held political hegemony of the ANC in Pretoria as their ultimate goal. The 
                                                   





large scale acceptance of the ANC, therefore, needs further explanation. Two 
dynamics assisted this change. Firstly the state of emergency strengthened the hand 
of activists linked into covert networks vis a vis more locally based activists. 
Secondly, actions were taken by Congress activists to built hegemony within civil 
society organisations. 
The increased centralisation of progressive activity as a result of the state of 
emergency reduced the diversity of progressive activism. As noted earlier meetings 
became clandestine, mass involvement collapsed and people would only deal with 
people that they knew and trusted. This scared away all but the most politically 
committed activists and eroded the mass nature of organisation. Combined with the 
defiance campaign, which was built through individual linkages rather than in mass 
organisation, this led to a situation in 1990 when most organisations were 
dominated by a politicised activist elite. It was this elite that made the key decisions 
within organisations and it is not surprising that this often led to a neglect of local 
issues in favour of national political issues (which in turn deterred mass 
involvement in organisations) . 
In turn, this centralisation interacted with, and enabled, moves by Congress 
activists to entrench ideological hegemony within civil society. This started in the 
late 1980s with the dissemination of the SACP’s theory of National Democratic 
Revolution (NDR). Diverse ideological positions existed within progressive 
organisations in the Western Cape, including those that considered themselves loyal 
to the ANC. However, the late 1980s saw concerted moves to counter this 
ideological diversity and to draw organisations more firmly under the control of 
explicitly ANC aligned political leadership. Within Congress aligned organisations 
moves were made to spread the correct political line. The growing centralisation 
and enforcement of ideological hegemony is best represented by youth politics in 
the Western Cape. After the formation of SAYCO in late 1987 one of the central 





through the youth movement. As one discussion document circulating within 
congress youth circles during the late 1980’s argued: 
Our task is to build a dedicated and committed leadership and activist organiser. 
But whether leaders and activists are good or bad depends in the first place on the 
political line. Once a line has been worked out; the whole question boils down to 
how to organise its application. Organisation is the basic measure to ensure the 
application of the line.45 
 
This represented a marked shift from the earlier focus on the community as the 
source of legitimacy and paved the way for the move from civil society into political 
society.  
In Cape Town this uniformity was created through three mechanisms. 
Firstly, those organisations which provided educational and organisational support 
began focusing much of their education on spreading the South African Communist 
Party’s theory of National Democratic Revolution, which argued for a national 
democratic revolution (i.e. a liberal democratic state) as the first stage in the 
transition to socialism.46 Secondly, campaigns were organised nationally to draw 
youth across the country behind a unified (and political) programme of action. 
These included a Freedom Charter campaign and a save the patriots campaign 
based around ANC guerrillas who were on death row. Finally, those youth who 
would not accept the political line were expelled from the organisations as 
acceptance of the National Democratic Revolution became the key basis for political 
involvement.47 
Alongside building ideological hegemony within Congress aligned 
organisation, deliberate moves were made to undermine organisations which did 
not demand ideological uniformity. This is best illustrated in the case of the student 
                                                   
45 „Verslag van Die Noordelik Voorstede Werkswinkel‟, n.d. 1988/9, MA, Neville Naidoo Collection, 
2.2.8.5.11, p. 
46 Letter from Voli Maboee CAYCO ET Officer, „Dear Comrades…‟, 17/11/1989, 6p., typed, ss, A4, 
MA, CACE, pp.2-3 
47 A group of one stage theorists were expelled from CAYCO/SAYCO in 1987 and there were 





movement. The organisational framework of the student movement led to 
ideological heterogeneity as it involved decision making through the SRCs led by 
popular will, rather than decision making within ideologically homogenous 
organisations. Within this framework Congress struggled to build hegemony as 
many student leaders rejected the National Democratic Revolution in favour of a 
one stage move to socialism. As Congress activists were unable to dominate SRC 
level politics, and as the organisational structure of student politics did not permit 
the enforcement of ideological positions, Congress activists (encouraged by senior 
figures within the ANC) established TOSCO as a membership only organisation and 
used this to influence and dominate existing student structures. As one Congress 
activist involved in the process noted: 
Joint SRCs were contested terrains from all sorts of ideological backgrounds. You 
know. AZASM, PASO, Marxist workerist tendencies would want to occupy the 
centre stage. All for their own ideological understandings. And the ANC would also 
want to have a stage. Now the disadvantage of the ANC is that it owns no property 
rights over< SRCs and Joint SRCs< But it had to be wise and clever. Using your 
words tactically strategic. To say lets deploy our key cadres into key portfolio. If not 
all positions of leadership of those SRCs and Joint SRCs to try to ensure that we 
safeguard our ideological understanding as the African National Congress<You see 
maybe wiser people saw that things are changing. Hence the establishment of 
TOSCO (Township Student Congress) to start to impart the traditions and the 
cultures of the ANC as and when we get free there’s no difficulty in re-establishing 
the ANC within the country and within the Western Cape and within Cape Town in 
particular. Because nothing else we taught in student structures like TOSCO and the 
others except for the ANC background and so on. Even though you are a student 
leader. But you’ll speak more on the African National Congress.’48 
 
 Whilst neither of these strategies would have worked without considerable 
existing support amongst activists for positions aligned to the National Democratic 
Revolution, within the context of the emergency the decision to use political purity 
as an entry point into progressive organisation did help homogenise civil society. 
Within the Western Cape Congress organisations had a near monopoly on external 
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resources which were distributed through service organisations within the country. 
Underground networks were also predominantly maintained by ANC activists or 
sympathisers. Exclusion from these networks, therefore, essentially meant exclusion 
from progressive organisation and this meant that, by late 1980, the key figures in 
key organisations were clearly politically aligned, smoothing the transition of 
activists from civil to political society. 
By the transition period, considerable change had taken place in the nature 
of civil society across the country and city. ANC hegemony had become 
increasingly entrenched and was accompanied by a move from civil society into 
political society. Interestingly, however, the impacts of these broad changes within 
the case studies were not universal. Indeed, different segments of civil society 
reacted in different ways to these dynamics. Five main trends during the transition 
are of particular interest and are outlined below in greater detail.  
Firstly youth activism declined in both communities. At a simplistic level the 
decision by former CAYCO youth activists (who had recently become members of 
the national South African Youth Congress (SAYCO)) to disband their organisation 
and move en mass into the ANCYL led to a withdrawal of youth activists from civil 
society. However more importantly, particularly as the focus of CAYCO/SAYCO 
had always been predominantly political, was the fact that many youth activists did 
not move with their organisation into the ANC. During mid-1990 Women’s League 
activists were expressing concern about the effectiveness of ANC branches in 
general, and the Youth League in particular. As one UWCO/ANCWL report put it: 
‘work has started to build the ANCWL, but this cannot happen when no ANC 
branches exist.’ 49 ANC weakness extended beyond the African Townships with one 
organiser noting that the ANC in the region was organisationally very weak and 
owed its popularity not to its organisation but its high profile activities. In the 
words of the author: ‘*The+ ANC does not exist on ground. *It only+ exists in 
                                                   





stadium. ‘50 The lack of mass participation by the youth was particularly noted. An 
inter-branch meeting of the ANC summarised the situation in the Western Cape 
thus: 
On the whole the RIC [Regional Interim Committee] is satisfied by work in the 
region. There are at least 54 branches present today. There is, however, a great 
unevenness in work... We... note the poor participation of SAYCO members.’51 
 
Secondly, In comparison to a decline in youth involvement the strength of 
civic activism mushroomed after 1990. This was particularly marked in Guguletu 
where from a complete absence of organisation in 1989 a vibrant, if fractured, civic 
movement emerged. By 1991 the WCCA had begun to hold regular meetings and 
patrol the streets in a campaign to prevent gangsterism.52 With the national launch 
of SANCO the picture became complicated as the civic movement split with both 
SANCO and the WCCA operating in the community amidst accusations that no 
local mandate had been taken on the decision to form SANCO.53 By 1993 this split 
was beginning to be resolved as SANCO began to dominate. By 1993 SANCO was 
operating in all of the LAGUNYA townships and was increasingly active. In 
Nyanga they were submitting development proposals.54 In Guguletu SANCO 
Section 3 branch was trying to acquire an office from the council.55 The power of 
SANCO in the community also increased. By 1993 funds could not be released for 
the upgrading of squatter areas in and around Guguletu without a letter signed by 
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the SANCO regional office.56 Similarly they also became an official component of the 
local authority’s housing allocation committee.57  
A similar picture also emerged in 1991/2 in Bonteheuwel as the Bonteheuwel 
Resident’s Association became very active in the community. In July 1991 a sit-in 
was staged by around 50 people. Demands included the allocation of housing in 
Bonteheuwel to Bonteheuwel residents only, the scrapping of rental arrears, 
cleaning the streets, providing bus shelters and helping with transport. The sit-in 
itself was based around disconnection of electricity and water in the area. In 
response the council reconnected the services providing that the residents agreed to 
pay their accounts and some of their arrears.58 In 1992 a similar sit-in was also 
successful in gaining a two week moratorium on rental payments for residents after 
two people were evicted from their homes for non-payment.59  
Thirdly, the school movement in Guguletu remained strong throughout 
most of the transition period (although it declined in the coloured areas). This was 
despite considerable infighting in 199060 both between African and coloured schools 
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over how African leadership should be realised in practice, and within the African 
schools as debates between TOSCO and the Joint SRCs rumbled on. Immediately 
after the unbanning student activists were able to take advantage of a new found 
willingness amongst government administrators to engage with grassroots 
structures and a series of concessions were negotiated in the African schools, such 
as the recognising PTSAs, allowing schools to affiliate to non-racial sporting bodies 
and agreement to discuss future teacher retrenchments.61 From 1991 onwards, as 
infighting waned and the reformed COSAS was able to consolidate itself, student 
activism began to increase in prominence. The leadership of COSAS started pressing 
a range of educational demands including: deracialising access to all schools 
(including those in the white group areas) to reduce overcrowding; abolishing exam 
fees; upgrading existing school buildings; employment of more teachers; free access 
to school books and stationary; the ending of violence and the disbanding of the 
DET.62 When the government failed to meet these demands a programme of mass 
action was run from August 1991. Interestingly, in a sign of how the loci of change 
was shifting from the streets to the negotiations of political leaders COSAS was 
criticised by ‘progressive organisations’ for continuing its campaigns and keeping 
its students involved in disruptive actions.63 
This more active style was continued in 1993 when COSAS launched a 
concerted campaign in opposition to the charging of exam fees for matriculation 
exams. On the 24th March 1993 stayaway was organised in opposition to these fees. 
The campaign was supported by COSAS, the Pan African Student Organisation and 
the Azanian Student Movement. Protests escalated into ‘Operation Barcelona’, a 
campaign so named because one of the central activities of the campaign – the 
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burning of delivery trucks and municipal property – was linked to the Olympic 
torch from the Barcelona games. This campaign garnered widespread support 
within Guguletu and rapidly escalated into violent confrontations between the 
students and police. However the level of control over the actions of the students 
was limited. One key figure in the provincial COSAS leadership described 
Operation Barcelona as ‘very hectic’64 and it was during this campaign that the 
infamous murder of the American student Amy Biehl took place. The violence and 
extent of the campaign revealed both the continued militancy of the student 
movement and how far the broader progressive movement had moved. Alan 
Boesak appeared on national TV on behalf of the ANC leadership to ask the 
students to call off their actions.  
The fourth feature of the transition was the withdrawal of coloured 
communities, particularly working class communities, from progressive politics. 
Whilst much of the academic focus on coloured disillusionment has focused on the 
high proportion of coloured voters that supported the National Party in the first 
post-apartheid election in 1994 there were clear signs that coloured support for 
progressive politics was not as strong during the late 1980s as had been presumed. 
For example during the 1988 elections for the tricameral parliament coloured 
participation increased markedly on that achieved in 1984, standing at 45% of 
registered voters.65 However there was also more general demobilisation even in 
areas where progressive politics had previously been strong. As early as 1990 the 
Unrest Monitoring Action Committee (UMAC) was reporting ‘relative calm’ in the 
coloured townships and its monitoring work was predominantly focused on the 
African areas.66 By 1993 there was not even a COSAS branch in Bonteheuwel.67 
Finally, like the student movement, significant splits also emerged within the 
activist community within Bonteheuwel. Interestingly, these splits developed 
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despite almost unanimous support for the ANC in the community, instead 
coalescing around allegiances to different figures from within the congress 
movement – the broadly defined Isselite/Manualite divisions.68 These splits spread 
throughout both the newly forming political organisations and the community 
organisations. Within the ANC these divisions became so bad that a series of special 
meetings were convened to ‘settle the differences that have arose (sic) in our 
ranks.’69 Indeed, the situation reached the point at which a group of ANC members 
walked out of the meeting which formed the Bonteheuwel ANC branch.70 The same 
divisions also coalesced within and between community movements. Factions in 
Bonteheuwel developed to the point where physical fighting took place between 
activists. Activists associated with the Bonteheuwel Civic Association marched to 
the advice office in the community, which was also considered part of the 
progressive movement and was funded as such, and physically evicted them from 
their premises.71  
 
6.3. Explaining Transition: Local Experiences of 
National Change 
 
The decline of civil society under the state of emergency is not surprising. The harsh 
repression of the state closed down space for action in a way that had not previously 
been achieved. However, the evolution of organisation and activism over the 
following five years, as political space reopened, is less obviously explicable. Whilst 
the ANC built a strong base for hegemony within civil society during the late 1980s 
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this did not lead to uniform responses within civil society to the unbanning as 
different groups of activists reacted differently to the changes that accompanied 
transition. The following discussion examines five separate transitions that took 
place between 1990 and 1994 and shows how broader changes in the political 
context interacted differently with different parts of the progressive movement. 
Three dynamics are identified as influencing civil society during this time: 1) there 
was an opening of legal space within which progressive organisations could operate 
without repression; 2) opportunities developed for organisations to gain increasing 
access to resources, either directly or through cooperation with the state; 3) the 
unbanning of the African political movements saw progressive politics become 
focused primarily on national political transformation. These three dynamics 
intertwined with existing forms of activism to produce very different results.  
 
6.3.1. Youth Decline: The Nationalisation of Politics 
Chapter five demonstrated how youth involvement in progressive organisation was 
more than simply political. The very nature of activism provided a framework and 
repertoire of action which resonated with the life experiences of the City’s youth. 
The transition, whilst providing more space within which people could organise 
legally, simultaneously removed many of the key motivations for youth activism. 
Legality saw an abandonment of the militant repertoires of action that had attracted 
many youth activists as street battles, boycotts and protests gave way to branch 
meetings, door-to-door recruitment and national debates. Simultaneously the shift 
from local to national politics and decision making saw the goals of progressive 
organisations lose their utopian flavour and become increasingly technical, whilst 
local level activists lost their ability to influence events. Combined these dynamics 
led to a decline in youth participation in progressive politics. 
During 1989 civil society organisations increasingly shifted from 
campaigning around local concerns to explicitly supporting the ANC. With the 





the ANC in its negotiations with the government. This led to a focus on national 
political issues and a corresponding decline in focus on local concerns.72 This shift 
saw a disjuncture develop between the campaigns of progressive organisations and 
the lived experiences of many activists. For example, during 1989 SAYCO 
announced a nationwide ‘save the patriots campaign.’ This campaign protested 
against the execution of MK members and sought to draw all youth congresses 
nationwide behind a single course of action. However, it was heavily criticised by 
youth activists as it was of little relevance to most people’s lives, a fact that led to 
little support and organisational growth: 
It is all very well having a campaign like save the patriots or let Govan Mbeki speak 
in which we expend enormous energy and money but at the end of which no 
concrete gains have been made in building organisation. That is a central weakness 
of the MDM.73 
 
Similar changes were reported in Bonteheuwel, where the shift in focus saw 
activism after the unbanning retreat to an activist core concerned with national 
political issues, rather than local community concerns: 
[W]hen the ANC was unbanned< a lot of the focus again went into the ANC and 
those kind of things and again, the focus was removed from the issues of the people to 
politics.74 
 
As organisation ceased to take up and campaign on issues that were of 
relevance to people locally the desire to participate waned.75 This is well 
demonstrated by the strong levels of support that SAYCO was able to generate 
when it campaigned on issues that did have strong resonance within communities. 
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A report from the township region of SAYCO noted that whilst the Save the Patriots 
campaign had been unsuccessful a campaign being run that targeted gangsterism 
within the African townships, which had been an issue of major concern amongst 
residents, had gained considerable backing.76 
 This shift from local to national issues had two other effects which also 
caused a demobilisation of youth activism. Chapter five showed how many youth 
activists became involved in political action because of the sense of empowerment it 
could offer. With the unbanning the field of political struggle shifted from local 
issues and organisations where individuals could make significant personal 
impacts, to national negotiating forums. This saw local activism increasingly 
alienated from decision making. It also led to a new terrain of struggle which it was 
not easy for many more militant activists to engage with. 
Disillusionment at the nature of the negotiations was clear in interviews with 
activists from both communities. As one activist recounted: 
Even branches of the ANC cannot lie and say they have ever influenced any decision 
taken in the negotiations. The leadership took those decision all their on their own 
[from] the structures of the ANC. Including the leagues... They [only] come back to 
the masses when they have deadlock which is very much serious, [they come back] 
and say we need to mobilise, pickets and march and so on.77 
 
Similar sentiments were also apparent within internal ANC reports, which noted 
the difficulties branches had in maintaining involvement when their role in decision 
making was minimal: 
Our leadership [ANC nationally] has conducted meetings with Inkatha, the PAC 
and the South African government. Some of the decisions taken affect directly this 
volatile constituency: the youth. Our leadership did not consult with the Youth 
League before these meetings, nor were we briefed on the outcome of these 
meetings. We then have to rely on our political understanding and maturity to 
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explain some of the undertakings made to our constituency, whether we agree 
entirely with all of the undertakings or not.78 
 
This removal of local power both contributed to, and was compounded by, a 
shift in the nature of activism. As the ANCs reaction to student campaigns during 
this period makes clear, mass action was no longer widely supported as focus fell on 
negotiations. Mass action had been both one of the easiest ways in which people 
could involve themselves in political struggle. It had also been one of the most 
empowering. As the nature of activism shifted, therefore, the social base of activism 
also transformed. 
 The UDF produced a damning summary of the decline that had hit their 
organisation that captures the key themes of this shift. Organisations no longer did 
anything as political change was being negotiated elsewhere. It was therefore 
impossible to maintain involvement amongst people who were drawn to activism 
because of a desire for action: 
The absence of mass action left many structures inactive and activists redundant. It 
became meaningless for them to attend meetings which did not produce definite 
programmes of mass action. Consequently many activists stopped to attend 
meetings.79 
 
This shift hit less educated activists particularly badly. The growing focus on 
building branches and expanding organisation provided opportunities for people 
with education and skills, but was less accessible to youth activists who had been 
drawn to activism by the appeal of mass action. A dynamic which continued after 
the democratic elections: 
[M]any people, some who were involved in the Youth League, sacrificed their lives, 
even education.. When we start, government of the ANC.... [those] people were not 
necessarily absorbed in the power houses now and then the whole issues of 
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education became an issue of point here. So it was quite challenging. And many 
people I must say felt betrayed in the process.80 
 
The overall impact of this shift in political involvement from local to national 
issues and the declining opportunities for personal involvement was well captured 
in an interview with a former activist from Bonteheuwel who had been involved in 
BISCO and CAYCO. He recalled how he had personally experienced a great sense 
of loss with the unbanning of the ANC in 1990. He recounted how through the 
struggle he had been able to define an identity for himself as an independent person 
and had achieved power and status within his community. However, with the 
unbanning, decisions were no longer taken locally and this power disappeared. At 
the same time the regional and local support networks which had existed for 
activists began to disintegrate as political structures were formalised.81 
 
6.3.2. Coloured Disengagement 
It was not only the out of school youth who saw limited involvement in progressive 
activism after 1990. More generally this period saw an alienation of many coloureds 
from progressive politics. This occurred on two levels. Firstly tensions between 
African and coloured activists increased, leading to a weakening of progressive 
political leadership within the coloured communities. More broadly many ordinary 
coloureds chose not to support progressive political movements or their positions. 
Some of the dynamics behind this disengagement reflect the youth experience. 
Specifically the growing nationalisation of politics led to an ‘Africanisation’ of 
political struggle within the province and reduced the space for activists to 
construct locally a form of progressive politics with meaning for coloureds. 
However, it also reflected the broader disengagement of coloureds as a result of 
shifting economic trends within the province and the collapse of the CLPP. Within 
the context of rising unemployment and growing competition from Africans the 
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opening of legal space to organise did little to invigorate progressive organisation as 
coloured people looked increasingly to protect what they had, rather than transform 
society. 
From the early 1980s onwards the African population of the Western Cape 
increased rapidly and by 1990 Africans made up a significant minority of the city’s 
population. Simultaneously, as opposition escalated the focus of progressive 
organisations ceased to be local and became national. The result of these changes 
was a growing focus upon the relationship between coloured communities and 
activists and the broader (African dominated) Congress movement. This focus 
closed the space for a unique coloured politics and thereby saw many coloureds 
drift away from progressive organisation. 
The growing importance of African communities within the province led to 
debates and conflict over the role of the ANC and its relationship to coloured 
people. This conflict emerged as African activists increasingly asserted the 
SACP/ANC position on African leadership of the struggle. This doctrine argued that 
as the African working class was the most oppressed, political transformation could 
only occur if the African working class assumed leadership of the struggle. In the 
Western Cape this was interpreted by many as meaning that Africans should 
assume key leadership roles within progressive organisations. This led to 
considerable debate and disagreement, not to mention the fracturing of 
organisations such as WECSCO along racial lines. It also led to a broader sidelining 
of coloured activists which overall led to many coloured activists abandoning active 
involvement in progressive politics.82 
This decline of activist involvement was compounded by the fact that socio-
economic and political changes over the preceding decade had shifted relationships 
between many coloured people, Africans and the state. As discussed in chapter 
four, tricameral MPs increasingly used resources such as grants and food parcels to 
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build support within their communities.83 At the same time as local patronage 
networks were being consolidated the impact of the deracialisation of the province 
as a result of the erosion of influx control was being increasingly felt. 
Whilst in 1983 the Colour Labour Preference Policy was still operating and 
African immigration was relatively low, by the late 1980s coloured workers were 
both suffering the consequences of economic stagnation, and experiencing increased 
competition from African workers as colour bar legislation was removed. As shown 
in chapter two the growing deracialisation of Cape Town’s economy led to growing 
impoverishment for those coloureds with limited skills, whilst at the same time 
opportunities for educated and middle class coloureds expanded.  
That the removal of coloured preference policies was having a notable 
impact on the lives of coloured voters was noted by key figures in the progressive 
movement. In 1993 Max Ozinsky and Ebrahim Rasool produced an article focusing 
upon engaging the coloured community. This noted that coloured unemployment 
had risen since the repeal of coloured preference policies and that many working 
class coloured depended on state welfare.84  
Whilst it is difficult to prove beyond doubt that these changes led to a 
decline in coloured support for progressive organisation, evidence from the 1994 
general election provides considerable support for this argument. It shows how 
those coloureds which chapter two showed were particularly vulnerable to the 
economic deracialisation formed the bedrock of support for the National Party after 
1994. As Eldridge and Seekings' study of the 1994 elections argues: 
The NP’s support base comprised predominantly lower class coloured voters on the 
one hand, and predominantly higher class white voters on the other. The ANC’s 
support base comprised predominantly lower-class African voters and higher class 
coloured and white voters< Many working-class coloured citizens assessed that 
change would affect them adversely, and so voted conservatively.85 
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It is worth noting here that whilst Eldridge and Seekings argue that coloured 
voters felt change would affect them negatively in the future, the evidence from 
chapter two suggests that many coloureds had already begun to feel the impact of 
change. Indeed if we consider the relationship between class and voting in more 
detail it would appear that those groups most restricted by apartheid (specifically 
middle class and more educated coloureds) were most likely to vote for the ANC 
and a non-racial future, whilst those coloureds most protected by apartheid (the 
unskilled and semi-skilled working class) were most likely to support the national 
party. 
Overall, the coloured experience of transition draws analysis back to the 
tension between local and national organisation. During the early 1980s it was 
possible for coloured activists to build a form of activism that was exclusive to the 
coloured communities. Whilst not overly successful the organising tradition 
allowed coloured activists to construct progressive organisation that sought to link 
into the coloured life experience. However, as political struggle became increasingly 
national focus shifted from local, ‘coloured’, issues to broader questions of political 
transformation and the role that coloureds would play within this transformation. 
Asking these questions was often problematic as it brought into sharp focus the 
limited interaction that had taken place between different communities over the 
preceding decade. Writing about these tensions in 1989 Dullah Omar noted: 
There is a problem at local levels because of the Group Areas Act and the location 
system. Because people are forced to live in group areas and locations, grassroots 
structures will in most instances have a membership drawn from one so-called racial 
group. It is at local levels that one takes into account the prejudices inherited by 
people. The point of entry into the Mass Democratic Movement is more often than 
not (except in the case of trade unions) through Group Area based organisations.’86 
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However, whilst politically problematic these ‘Group Area based organisations’ 
allowed for the construction of locally specific political positions. With the move to 
national organisation came the need for national campaigns. Yet the nature of 
apartheid discrimination prevented national issues from uniting coloured and 
African communities. Coloureds had privileges they did not want to lose, whilst 
Africans had their own concerns for transformation and common ground was not 
easy to find. The tensions that had lain beneath politics in the province for the past 
decade could no longer be easily buried. Very few coloured civics joined SANCO 
and the WCCA and CAHAC continued to exist separately and campaign on 
different issues. 
 
6.3.3. Political Opportunities: The Civic Movement, from 
Weakness to Strength 
Whilst coloureds in general became disengaged from progressive politics there was 
a growth in civic activism during the transition in both Bonteheuwel and Guguletu, 
despite the fact that during apartheid adults had been generally quiescent. This did 
not, however, represent a mass transformation in the attitudes and concerns of 
adults. Rather, the opening of political space reduced the costs of involvement in 
civil society, whilst national political change led local government to search for 
partners in the delivery of services (in Guguletu) and to be more receptive to civic 
protest (in Bonteheuwel).  
In Guguletu quiescence before 1990 was rooted in the fact that there was 
little pressure within the township and it administration pushing people into 
conflict. The state distributed little and expected little in return. Consequently 
residential civil society had purpose and the local political economy was 
depoliticised. However, with the unbanning of the African political movements this 
changed as resources began to be channelled through civil society. This led to 





The unbanning of the African political movements at the national level led to 
a change in political practice at the local government level as the local state in Cape 
Town sought mechanisms with which to engage with its African citizens and 
national developments, such as the launching of SANCO, encouraged local 
authorities to engage with civics. The need for engagement was further heightened 
by the fact that local township administration was collapsing and the black 
community councillors had lost legitimacy and were unable to represent the 
residents of the township. Opportunities therefore opened for civics to represent the 
township population. 
Interviews with administrators from the Guguletu housing office reveal how 
these opportunities developed in practice. As will be seen, the channels and 
procedures strongly resemble the processes that had developed in the 1960s and 
1970s. From around 1990 the street committees began to assume the central role in 
making decisions around housing allocation. This occurred as effective 
administration and record keeping collapsed and state administrators had to find 
ways of legitimating people’s claims to housing.87 This process became so 
entrenched that moving into the democratic period it was impossible for the council 
to allocate a house without consulting with members of the relevant street 
committee or civic association.88 Simultaneously, civic associations began to 
represent residents in negotiations with the local authorities around housing 
upgrades and by 1993 local authority records reveal that funds could not be released 
for upgrading of squatter areas in and around Guguletu without a letter signed by 
SANCO’s regional office.89 
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At the same time as local pressures were creating links between the state and 
civil society, national political change was encouraging cooperation. Unlike many 
other areas in South Africa where civics came into conflict with local ANC branches, 
in the LAGUNYA Townships the previous weakness of the civic movement allowed 
ANC activists to influence its development. Rose Sonto, who was to become the 
leader of SANCO in the Western Cape, recounted how when he had been in prison 
in 1988 at Victor Verster he had discussions with Walter Sisulu, who instructed him 
to build the civic movement in the Western Cape.90 The fact that the ANC instructed 
activists to involve themselves in civic issues and unite civic structures in a single 
body was reported by several activists in Cape Town.91 Furthermore, the building of 
SANCO in Guguletu was greatly facilitated by the links between its activists and the 
ANC. For example, agreement was reached between the ANC and the city council 
demanding that all development plans in the formal townships had to be agreed 
with SANCO. 
The growing flow of local government resources through the civic 
organisations combined with the fact that involvement with state development 
plans also provided direct access to funding which civil society organisations could 
use to build their organisation and employ people. In Nyanga, for example, one of 
the stated goals of a proposed development programme was ‘empowerment of the 
SANCO Nyanga branch.’ Consequently the proposal asked for training and funds 
to be allocated to SANCO so that it could perform its role. This included providing 
furniture, offices and meeting rooms, training, employing people to administer the 
project. It also suggested a 10% administration charge for the project accrue to 
SANCO.92  
 Unsurprisingly, the growth of opportunities for civil society to influence the 
allocation of resources and the existence of funding to sustain these organisations 
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led to increased support and involvement. Seekings in his research into civics under 
apartheid noted how their key weakness was a lack of consistent benefits to offer to 
those who participated.93 In Guguletu at this time this weakness was removed and 
participation increased.  
 The key role that local resource allocation played in the growth of civic 
organisations was clearly revealed by the mushrooming of organisations and 
individuals during the transition who sought to present themselves to the local 
authorities as representatives of the community (and as SANCO officials). This 
included SANCO, the WCCA and various other organisations. The proliferation of 
organisations became so complex that in May 1993 the regional director of the 
Community Services Department of the Cape Provincial Administration wrote to 
SANCO to request that meeting requests be channelled through SANCO’s 
provincial office so that they office would be able to tell if they were genuine. This 
was in part a response to growing concerns amongst the administration about: 
a) A proliferation of committees who style themselves as ‚civics‛ and profess to 
speak on behalf of, or being part of SANCO; 
b) persons professing to be members of local SANCO branches, while not having 
been identified as such.94 
 
 In Guguletu the growth in civic activism, therefore, relied less on grassroots 
pressure for change than the changing opportunities that the transition provided for 
involvement in resource allocation and distribution. The state and the ANC both 
sought local partners that could articulate the views of the community to the 
administration and were willing to allow such partners a degree of say in local 
decision making. Civic organisations expanded to fill this role.  
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 In Bonteheuwel the reason for the growth of the civic is more difficult to 
fully explain, in part because archival records of the functioning of the local 
authority are not available. However, it appears that like in Guguletu there was 
increased legal space for activists to operate within and the state was willing to 
make concessions to some civic demands. The fact that activists were able to stage a 
week long sit-in clearly shows that repression was no longer employed against 
progressive activists within the community. Similarly, the fact the council made 
concessions to the civic’s demands shows that benefits could be delivered through 
civic activism in a way that had not been possible in the mid-1980s. However, it also 
has to be recognised that part of the reason activists involved themselves in the civic 
may have been linked to the broader splits within the activist community and the 
need for an organisational base from which to challenge the existing leadership of 
the progressive movement in the township which are discussed in more detail 
below.  
 
6.3.4. Bonteheuwel: Transition and the Growth of 
Factionalism 
The fourth transition discussed here is interesting because it stands in contrast to the 
general disengagement of coloureds from progressive politics discussed above. This 
transition took place amongst activists within Bonteheuwel and saw increasing 
factionalism as people fought for positions within progressive structures, 
particularly the ANC branch, in the community. The dynamics driving this 
transition were a mixture of those affecting the civic movement – most notably the 
increased relationship between organisational involvement and resources – and 
those represented within the decline of youth structures, specifically the impact that 
the shift in repertoires of action as a result of the nationalisation of politics had on 





The actual cause of the factionalism is hard to identify. Interviews revealed 
diverse beliefs over why such deep fissures emerged within a community that had 
earlier been hailed as a prime example of coloured resistance. These explanations 
fall roughly into the following 3 areas: 1) a belief that those (often militant) activists 
who had been most active in the 1980s had abused their positions to enrich 
themselves financially; 2) a belief animosity represented conflict over positions as 
the progressive movement restructured itself post-apartheid95; 3) a belief that 
broader factionalism within the Western Cape was playing itself out within 
Bonteheuwel.96 
Assessing the validity of these accusations is not only beyond the scope of 
this thesis but would be ultimately futile. Indeed, their accuracy is less significant 
than the fact that they assumed salience at the time they did. Similarly, although the 
factions in Bonteheuwel were closely identified with those within the broader 
Congress movement, such factions had long existed without leading to a 
breakdown in relations on the scale experienced during this time. The growth of 
factionalism, therefore, needs to be located beyond the simplistic accusations and 
counter accusations of this period in the reasons why divisions became 
insurmountable and conflict, rather than co-operation, emerged at the time it did.  
Conflict in Bonteheuwel was based around disagreements over who should 
assume key positions within the recently unbanned ANC and other progressive 
structures. In this way it was clearly linked into a changed political context which 
increased the rewards for activism, whilst simultaneously reducing the risks of 
participation. One activist, in a statement which also reveals the continuing depth of 
animosity in the community, clearly outlined the centrality that political positions 
assumed at that time: 
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*T+he rats came out of the woodwork. Suddenly there was power to be had. I’m 
talking about real power< other people came out of the woodwork and wanted to 
assume power< and that created a lot of problems.97 
 
However it was not only the possibility of power that encouraged participation, it 
was also that the risks of participation had reduced, which led to an increased 
willingness amongst people to involve themselves in progressive organisation. As 
one activist, who had been a central figure during the mid 1980s, argued: 
Now it was something else. We weren’t opposing apartheid< *T+here were no 
imminent risks and dangers to being ANC leadership.98 
 
However, whilst these changing opportunities made the cost benefit 
calculation for activism more attractive, they did not necessarily have to lead to 
factionalism and conflict as people could have co-operated in distributing positions 
or could have followed non-confrontational mechanisms for allocating such 
positions, like elections. What is significant, therefore, are the reasons why such 
immiscible views on activism emerged. 
Underlying the development of a zero sum conflict over positions in the city 
was the fact that under apartheid very different organising traditions and interests 
had been brought under a broad opposition to the state. However, with the 
unbanning progressive politics needed to be homogenised. This led to people from 
these different traditions, with very different organisational styles, and from very 
different socio-economic backgrounds being brought within the same organisations 
for the first time since before the unrest. These activists brought with them very 
different discourses of entitlement and very different organisational cultures, rooted 
within their experiences of struggle, which could not be reconciled. The two key 
discourses that assumed salience during this period were: 1) a belief that 
participation in the struggle and struggle organisations during the unrest period in 
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the mid-1980s was a necessary and valid criteria for the assumption of positions 
post apartheid; 2) a belief that the actions of many of the people who had assumed 
critical positions during the mid-1980s were unacceptable and that there was a need 
to democratise struggle organisations.  
One activist, who assumed leadership of the youth movement in 1990, 
argued that when he returned to Bonteheuwel in 1989 the youth in Bonteheuwel 
was ‘falling apart’. He saw this as a result of the refusal by leadership to share 
power and a lack of political awareness and organisational skills amongst activists 
from the mid-1980s who were ‘simply militant’. Therefore, after being tasked by the 
ANC to rebuild the youth, he started to devolve responsibilities and develop more 
democratic ways of working. However, he felt this led to people who had 
previously held positions coming into conflict because they were in danger of losing 
their positions.99 Similar dynamics were reflected in the action of the civic 
organisation when it marched to ‘take back’ the advice office. The rhetoric behind 
this move was that the advice office was a community project and should be owned 
and run by the community, rather than by a distant group of activists who were 
using its resources for their own personal gain, rather than that of the community. 
Another activist, from the other political faction, gave an alternate take on 
this situation which reveals how those people who had become more involved in 
underground working during the mid -1980s placed more premium on political 
involvement (including underground involvement) than on democratic decision 
making, which was being discounted by the faction associated with the organising 
tradition of the early 1980s. It was these conflicts that he saw as lying at the root 
cause of the conflict: 
[T]he state also responded [through the state of emergency] so those in leadership 
had to change their way of decision making, but you would find that the aspirant 
leadership that was at that stage in Bonteheuwel, they didn’t understand that, you 
see. For them is it that we still need to work according to the basics [i.e. democratic 
                                                   





decision making+ you see. The basic rules, that’s what brought us, brought us into 
conflict.’100 
 
 Whilst these divisions in part represented different cohorts of activists, this 
was not simply a consequence of involvement in different periods of political 
activity. The different cohorts also had differing personal characteristics which 
influenced their preferred forms of protest. Those activists who had been prominent 
in the mid-1980s had tended to assume their positions because of their willingness 
to engage with the dynamics thrown up by the township unrest. As seen in the 
previous chapter, many of these activists played a key role in encouraging and 
supporting the more militant youth in the community. Furthermore, they became 
subsumed within the broader UDF/ANC structures within the province during this 
period as the state of emergency closed down the possibility for above ground 
activity. In contrast, many other activists became sidelined during the mid-1980s, 
particularly those who either lacked the status or links into the broader progressive 
movement, or those for whom the nature of activism during the unrest was seen as 
unsavoury or inappropriate.  
 However, with the unbanning, all activists could re-engage with progressive 
politics. Yet certain activists were better placed to take advantage of these 
opportunities than others. People with provincial links and education were able to 
assume significant roles both within the ANC and other progressive structures. This 
led to divisions between activists who had built profiles in the mid-1980s in regional 
structures and those activists who were trying to build profiles after the unbanning. 
These divisions were compounded by the fact that those activists who had been able 
to build these links shared a history of militancy which, because of its focus on 
violence rather than organisation and democracy, was frowned upon by some 
activists who had not taken a central role in these events. Consequently, divisions 
solidified around discourses that highlighted the respective virtues of these 
different activist groups. Those activists from the mid-1980s highlighted the sacrifice 
                                                   





that they had made and the courage that they had show, seeing those challenging 
for their positions as usurpers and ‘scaredy cats’ who only chose to be involved 
when life was easy. 101 Conversely, those activists who were on the outside of 
politics focused on the lack of transparency and moral propriety that characterised 
the lives of those mid 1980s activists and in many ways were the personal 
characteristics that accounted for their success during the mayhem of 1985-7. As one 
activist argued: 
The basis of that division is that we’ve got comrades. We’ve got the sixties. The 
people from the sixties, the people from the seventies and the eighties... So you’ve 
got the people here on the ground who were very loyal to the ANC during those 
years, through the seventies and eighties and even through the nineties. And the 
people that were, at the forefront. The intellectuals that you might call them, and the 
people that hold high positions within the ANC in Bonteheuwel, you know they get 
promoted when it came to after ’94. They get positions within government< And 
there are certain people that didn’t get anything. So that division stems from there.102 
 
6.3.5. Student Strength 
The final transition considered here is the student struggle in Guguletu. This 
remained relatively unaffected by the unbanning and centralisation of politics 
during this period in both its aims and its repertoire of action. As such it shows 
how, despite a political context that was pushing most activism into conciliation and 
negotiation, when strong collectively held grievances continued to exist these could 
sustain protest in the face of a changed political context.   
In understanding the different history of the student movement in the 
province two key factors are significant. Firstly, whilst national political dynamics 
were pulling the focus of activism away from local communities, in the schools local 
issues remained salient in spite of national political changes. Secondly, unlike other 
areas of struggle where the unbanning removed the glue that kept activism 
together, student activism was underpinned by the existence of a shared physical 
space and common experiences defined by the apartheid political economy. 
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Combined, these two factors perpetuated a collective student identity which 
interacted with the political space opened up by the unbanning to create a 
movement that continued even though it was often opposed by both the authorities, 
and on occasion the progressive movement. 
The strength of the student movement in Cape Town was in large part a 
result of the ongoing crisis within the African schools and the resentment and 
conflict this created. Throughout 1988 and 1989 the relationship between the State, 
the school authorities and students continued to precipitate conflicts that united 
students in opposition to the schooling authorities. The centrality of immediate 
material issues to student organising is well demonstrated by the fact that every 
single campaign organised by the students during this period had a focus on 
conditions within the schools. The 1989 registration crisis provides an example of 
the pressures that were driving student activism. In 1989 the school authorities 
demanded that all African students registering for the new school year would have 
sign a form declaring they would refrain from involvement in political activities and 
organisations. However, many refused, leading to a large number of students being 
denied registration. There were also insufficient spaces in African secondary schools 
for all students. This created a situation in which a large number of students 
collectively experienced exclusion from school. In turn this generated hostility 
towards the state and campaigns were arranged around this issue which claimed 
considerable support.103  
 The centrality of student issues continued into the 1990s. COSAS’s early 
campaigns in 1990/1 were again almost wholly educational. These focused upon the 
opening of all schools to reduce overcrowding, exam fees, upgrading of buildings, 
employment of more teachers, access to school books and stationary, ending 
violence and disbanding the DET.104 Similarly Operation Barcelona was organised in 
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order to demand the abolition of exam fees for matriculants which affected all black 
students and had been a focus of campaigns throughout the 1980s.105 
 The transformation of immediate grievances that could be clearly linked to 
the actions of the state and schools authority into coherent and organised responses 
by students was greatly facilitated by the physical context within which the students 
operated. Many other grassroots organisations organised themselves within the 
physical space of the township. Consequently people had to make explicit decisions 
to participate. However, because the students were brought together within the 
school they were able to organise within a space that repressive state action could 
not close down. Furthermore, students were all exposed to action simply through 
attending school. The very real importance of the school yard for the continuing 
success of the student movement was made clear in the actions of the student 
leadership during the state of emergency. The banning of all meetings in the 
Western Cape that were discussing the school crisis in 1988 led to considerable 
disorganisation as the students and parents were unable to meet to discuss issues. A 
spokesman for the African SRCs reported to the community newspaper Learning 
Roots that the banning had led to ‘confusion and misunderstanding’ amongst the 
students, who were boycotting school at the time. As a result of this breakdown the 
school leadership decided to return to school, citing the need ‘to meet, organise and 
take decisions democratically.’106 After the schools had returned student activism 
once again turned upwards. 
Overall, the student movement provides particularly strong evidence of the 
close relationship between the political economy, civil society organisation and 
activism. As outlined earlier, there were considerable ideological divisions within 
the student movement in 1989/90. However, despite these, student organisation 
during the transition was able to undertake increasing militant and widely 
supported campaigns even in the face of almost universal condemnation from the 
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state and other progressive organisations. The continued existence of local, strongly 
felt, grievances alongside an arena of action in which students could continue to 




All five transitions discussed in this chapter were affected by the same changes in 
the political context. However these changes interacted with local organisational 
traditions and socio-economic dynamics to create very different results. The decline 
of apartheid as a focus of protest removed much of the glue that had held the 
progressive movement together and the new political opportunities that unfolded in 
its wake were not universally experienced. Race and class mediated people’s 
experiences of the transition, leading to very different transitions across the 
progressive movement.  
The shift in political struggle from the local to national level contributed to 
the demobilisation of youth politics as local opportunities for action closed down. 
Involvement in the struggle came to be dependent upon education and linked into 
national political networks, whilst local militant activism lost favour. This shift saw 
many of the driving forces behind the youth activism of the mid 1980s evaporate, 
along with many of the activists. 
Like youth politics, coloured activism in general saw a marked decline by 
1994. Whilst this represented a disengagement from progressive politics amongst 
coloured people that had characterised the whole of the 1980s, it was also a 
consequence of the move from local to national politics that had caused youth 
disengagement. As politics became focused on national transformation and 
organisation it became increasingly difficult to sustain forms of activism and 





Africans for positions within the ANC and could no longer construct campaigns 
within the Congress tradition that focused exclusively on the material concerns of 
the coloured population. The broad church of anti-apartheid activism that had been 
possible when the focus had been on challenging state power could not be sustained 
now the goal was defining the new state.  
Both the African civic movement and political involvement within 
Bonteheuwel were affected by the opening of legal space for activism and the 
opportunities that this provided. In the civic movement the fact that the civics were 
increasingly integrated into the distribution of resources and were able to access 
funds to construct their organisations led to an expansion of organisation where 
there had been non-previously; quiescence gave way to participation as risks of 
activism reduced, whilst rewards expanded. In contrast the expansion of political 
opportunities in Bonteheuwel interacted with underlying fissures amongst activists 
to create conflict as people from differing organisational traditions used different 
justifications to lay claim to these positions. Without apartheid to challenge the very 
real cleavages between different forms of activism and different activists solidified. 
In stark contrast to the other forms of activism considered here the African 
student movement continued in strength, despite national opposition to its 
campaigns. The explanation for this lay in the fact that student activism in the 
African townships was always underpinned by very clear material demands and 
the ongoing crisis within apartheid education. Student numbers continued to 
increase whilst educational standards continued to fall. This bottom up pressure 
sustained organisation, which maintained a strong grassroots presence and clear 












An Apartheid Inheritance: Continuity, Change 
and Moral Economy in Civil Society since 1994 
 
7.1. Introduction: Democratisation and Civil Society 
Transformation 
 
The victory of the ANC in South Africa’s first democratic elections marked a major 
step in the transformation and deracialisation of the country’s political system. 
Consolidated by local government elections and the institution of a written 
constitution in 1996 these changes represented the end of struggle against white 
political supremacy. Unsurprisingly, they were also accompanied by considerable 
transformations in both political and civil society. In the space of just over four years 
the ANC moved from preaching violent revolution to heading government 
departments and holding the presidency; civil society organisations moved from 
opposing local government to involving themselves in negotiations and 
partnerships in the delivery of services; and many organisations, such as the 
women’s movements and youth congresses, simply collapsed themselves into wings 
of the newly legal political parties. However, democratic elections were not the end 
point of transformations in the South African state and civil society; indeed, in many 
ways they were just the beginning. As activists moved from civil society and 
opposition into government the nature of the state, its policies, and civil society 
were all transformed. 
This thesis focuses on the changing nature of local progressive organisation 
and activism and this chapter will therefore concern itself with examining the ways 
in which, and reasons why, civil society at the local level has transformed post-





emerged under apartheid transformed with democratisation, and what new forms 
of organisation and protest emerged. Because of the decline of most progressive 
organisation during and immediately after the transition, this chapter restricts itself 
to considering the fortunes of residential civil society, specifically the civic 
organisations and new social movements that have emerged post-apartheid to 
protest around service delivery. 
In doing this it will demonstrate a considerable decline in civic activism in 
both Guguletu and Bonteheuwel. However, rather than arguing that this represents 
a discontinuity with apartheid, it will show how activism in the two townships 
continues to be heavily patterned by the apartheid past. In Guguletu it will show 
how present day quiescence within civil society continues to reflect residents’ 
struggles to access scare resources within the urban environment in much the same 
way as it did under apartheid. Just as people involved themselves in co-dependent 
relationships with apartheid administrators, so after apartheid similar relationships 
emerged between local councillors, civic activists and residents. People acquiesce 
because to not do so runs the risk of exclusion from the township’s distributive 
networks, networks which have been swelled post-apartheid as resources have 
flowed into previously disadvantaged communities. 
Similarly, in Bonteheuwel, the decline of activism owes much to the 
apartheid past. The dominance of activism by a relatively small group created a 
situation where the continuity of such activism relied heavily upon this elite’s 
continued engagement. In 1994, as coloured people rejected progressive political 
positions, this elite became alienated from the communities it had previously tried 
to mobilise. This combined with the deracialisation of the labour market and urban 
space which provided opportunities for personal advancement and residential 
mobility. Activists could move out of Bonteheuwel and they could get on in life. 
With this many of the reasons for mobilising their community dissipated, just as the 





Combined this saw activists disengage and, in the absence of deeper roots within 
the community, progressive organisation and activism decline. 
Finally, alongside this decline, this chapter will also examine the situations 
in which collective action has occurred (this will only be done for Guguletu because 
such activism was marked by its absence in Bonteheuwel). Again, rather than 
representing discontinuity, and/or a radical departure in the relationships between 
residents and the state, it will show that instances of post-apartheid protest actually 
reaffirm the importance of the apartheid experience for post-apartheid activism. 
Specifically, it will show that as increasing amounts of resources have flowed into 
Guguletu contestation has arisen over how those resources are distributed. 
Generally this has been managed through the relationships between local 
councillors, civil society and residents. However, inscribed within these distributive 
networks is a clear moral economy of distribution, governing the criteria by which 
resources should be allocated. When councillors step outside the boundaries set by 
this moral economy they precipitate protest. Yet this moral economy is not simply a 
post-apartheid construction. It draws not only on opposition to corruption, but at 
times on insider/outsider identities inscribed within the city through processes of 
class formation under apartheid. Capetonians have protested when incomers from 
the Eastern Cape are given access to resources despite the fact that such identities 
have had no basis in law for over 20 years.  
This chapter then concludes by considering the relevance of apartheid 
governance structures and identities in the post-apartheid period, the implications 
of this analysis for the role of civil society within the state, and the rationality of 







7.2. From Protest to Passivity: The Decline of Anti-
apartheid Organisation 
 
There is relatively little contestation of the broad contours of post-apartheid 
transformation in South African civil society. Dealing first with the fate of apartheid 
era civil society organisations the general discourse has been one of decline. As 
shown in chapter six civil society organisations simply disbanded themselves or 
transformed into wings of the political movements after the liberation movements 
were unbanned. Furthermore the UDF, which had acted as a meeting place and 
coordinating structure for civil society activists, was itself wound up in 1991. Even 
those organisations which sought to maintain a strong and independent presence in 
civil society are seen to have failed in their task. Most significant here is the fate of 
the civic movement which, after gaining considerable prominence and publicly 
adopting a role for itself as a watchdog ensuring that the government delivered on 
its promises, suffered a collapse in both strength and influence.1 
Three broad dynamics are usually seen to account for this decline. Firstly, 
changes in the broader political opportunity structure, particularly the unbanning of 
the African liberation movements and the subsequent creation of non-racial, 
democratic, governance. It has been argued that whilst many organisations, 
particularly the civics, benefited from the transition period, after democratisation 
the political context decreasingly favoured apartheid era forms of activism as 
political society was imbued with a newfound legitimacy and citizens acquired an 
expanded range of channels through which to pursue their demands. A 
consequence of legitimate government and legitimate political channels for making 
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claims is that people are now willing to wait for results and, where they are not 
forthcoming, to work within political structures: 
The appearance of quiescence [within the civic movement] reflects primarily the 
confidence in which residents hold political society, i.e. confidence that it will 
deliver the goods over which some people had taken direct action over prior to the 
political transition.2 
 
In South Africa, as elsewhere, the decline in mass direct action within civil society 
appears to be linked to public confidence in political society, i.e. in the political 
parties and elected councillors who provide mechanisms for local representation in a 
representative democracy.3 
 
The second cause of decline is the impact of democratisation upon the 
resources of civil society organisations. Specifically, a decline in resources within 
civil society is seen to have reduced their capacity to act. The ending of apartheid 
removed much of the financial support which had allowed civics to operate. As 
apartheid ended, funding shifted to support the state and reconstruction, rather 
than opposition within civil society.4 As seen in chapter six transition also reduced 
the human resources available to civil society as many of its most talented 
organisers and activists moved to assume jobs in the unbanned liberation 
movements, the state or both.5  
Finally, activists and their strategies have also been placed at the centre of 
analysis. Zuern has argued that the success of the civics, their nature and their 
prominence, depends in large part upon the ability of individual activists: 
How well it [SANCO] plays this role [as intermediary between government, the 
ANC and local communities] and whether or not in doing so it represents the 
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interests of the majority of local residents, completely depends upon the actions of local 
Sanco leaders.6 
 
Similarly, Seekings has attributed part of the responsibility for decline to a failure by 
civic activists to develop strategies to tackle transformations in the political context: 
[Civic] activists give the impression of being demoralised, bewildered by the 
complexity and inherent pluralism of the new political context, and paralysed by 
uncertainty over how to respond to elected councillors who ignore them. Much of 
this is due to a lack of vision.7 
 
Whilst apartheid era organisations are seen to have declined there has been a 
simultaneous recognition of the emergence of new forms of organisation and 
struggle, many of which have opposed elements of ANC policy. This has included 
the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee which reconnects peoples’ electricity 
supplies after disconnection for non-payment; the Anti-Eviction Campaign which 
was formed to coordinate opposition to evictions from council housing for non-
payment of rent in Cape Town, but which has grown to embrace housing issues 
from a range of communities; and at a national level the Treatment Action 
Campaign which fights for the rights of HIV+ South Africans.8 Furthermore, a 
growth in public protests against policy decisions has also been noted. 
In accounting for the emergence and form of these ‘new social movements’ 
(NSMs), explanation usually focuses upon growing inequality and a belief that the 
ANC has failed to improve the quality of life for many of the poorest South 
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Africans. Patrick Bond, one of the most vocal scholars writing on NSMs, articulated 
this relationship in stark terms when he argued in a 2006 newspaper article that: 
‘lack of delivery is turning poor settlements into hotbeds of activism.’9 
Furthermore, this ‘lack of delivery’ is almost always linked by radical 
scholars to the adoption by the ANC government in 1996 of the Growth 
Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR). By leading to the removal of 
services from those unable to pay, such as electricity disconnections and evictions, it 
is argued that GEAR’s neo-liberal policies have led to growing opposition within 
civil society to both government policy and the ANC and this discontent lies behind 
the growth of the NSMs.10 Indeed, in its most brutal form this argument posits an 
almost mechanistic correlation between the adoption of GEAR and the emergence of 
NSMs: 
Ultimately, the major cause of tension between the government, labour, and people 
in organisations like the CCF [an NSM in Durban], is linked to GEAR and the 
consequences of GEAR policies on the life of CCF participants.11 
 
 A consequence of this interlinking of protest with post-apartheid policy is 
that the NSMs tend to be seen as distinct from earlier forms of activism and are 
consequently considered ‘new’: 
[B]ecause of their simultaneous political break from the ANC, the most substantial 
community groups that formed the APF [an umbrella body of NSMs in 
Johannesburg] were mainly unconnected to the organisational forms of the prior 
decade, even if many of their leaders had been forged in the earlier round of urban 
struggles.12 
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Furthermore, their development in opposition to ‘neo-liberalism’ is also believed to 
represent a political challenge to the ANC and its capital friendly policies, as well as 
the possible basis for an alternative politics in South Africa. Such transformationary 
interpretations vary between authors who believe the NSMs represent a clear, 
coherent and openly political challenge to the ANC and capital13 and those which 
recognise that whilst such movements tend to be small, localised and mainly 
defensive, still argue that simply by existing they represent a challenge to 
globalisation and capitalism. Gibson, for example, argues that because these 
movements concern themselves with basic human needs such as land, food and 
housing their very existence challenges the belief there is no alternative to capitalist 
globalisation.14  
There is no doubt that many of the explanations of civil society evolution 
since 1994 have relevance to the cases studies considered here. A decline in funding, 
a loss of skilled personnel, changes in political society and the development of new 
channels for addressing grievances have all affected apartheid era civil society 
organisations. Furthermore, NSMs and post-apartheid protest have generally 
coalesced around the (non) delivery or removal of access to public services. 
However, evidence from Guguletu and Bonteheuwel suggests that these 
interpretations are incomplete.  
Firstly, current studies are found to overemphasise the impact of 
democratisation and transformations in state policy. The vast majority of academics 
treat democratisation as a decisive break in the history of civil society within South 
Africa.15 The centrality of GEAR in explaining the rise of NSMs is perhaps the 
                                                                                                                                                
who argue that whilst the new social movements may draw on earlier struggles that they are 
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clearest example of this tendency to overstate discontinuity; yet, it is implicit in the 
central role that political transformation assumes in explaining the decline of 
apartheid era civil society. However, the cases examined here suggest that whilst 
there has undoubtedly been change since 1994, the nature of this change has been 
heavily conditioned by inheritances from apartheid. Apartheid created governance 
structures, political practices and collective identities which have interacted with, 
shaped, and sometimes pulled against post-apartheid transformation.  
Secondly, existing studies have incompletely investigated the rationality of 
actors within civil society. Several studies have made either direct or indirect 
reference to the importance of changes in the political opportunity structure in 
shaping activism.16 However, these have usually focused upon national 
transformations, neglecting the political practices which construct the political 
opportunities and risks for civil society at the local level. Consequently variation in 
local activism is often explained in terms of activist choices and abilities, rather than 
differing local contexts that influence choices and encourage ordinary South 
Africans into, or away from, civil society organisations. However, this study reveals 
how in the two case studies rational decisions are made by individuals influenced 
by local social, political, economic and historical dynamics. 
Thirdly, in accounting for local developments the continuing significance of 
the interaction of race and class are highlighted. There is a general trend to see the 
post-apartheid period as one of widening inequality, poverty and a lack of service 
provision in which ‘the end of apartheid has seen the rich get richer and the poor 
get poorer.’17 Whilst containing some truth this misses the complex nature of the 
restructuring of the apartheid economy and state distribution. As shown in chapter 
two, democratisation has impacted differentially upon different groups. 
Furthermore, whilst GEAR has seen an increased adoption of free market policies it 
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is far from representing the end of spending on social and welfare projects by the 
government: 
GEAR’s macroeconomic policies have not reduced the state’s transformation project 
to economic matters alone directly at the expense of poverty alleviation programmes 
as many analysts argue. Nor, for that matter, has the state withdrawn from the 
development arena. The budget for social services... accounts for just under half of 
the national budget.18 
 
Consequently, in post-apartheid South Africa, the ‘poor’ do not have 
uniform experiences of poverty, nor uniform expectations. In both the communities 
studied here deracialisation has had positive and negative economic results, results 
which are not necessarily evenly distributed. Within this context the significance of 
apartheid categories and identities and continuity in their articulation is one of the 
most notable features of political and civil society action in the two communities 
and much post-apartheid protest has emerged from changing patterns of resource 
redistribution amongst the poor, rather than in conflict between ‘the poors’ and the 
neo-liberal state.19  
 
7.3. Political and Civil Society in Post-Apartheid Cape 
Town 
 
7.3.1. Political and Institutional Transformation 
Changes since 1994 have sought to redefine both the nature and purpose of political 
practice in South Africa. At the most basic level local, national and provincial 
governments are now democratically elected on the basis of one-person one-vote. 
Governance structures have also been transformed. Provincial governments with 
their own legislatures have been created. In local government racially segregated 
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administrations have been abolished and replaced with unified governance 
structures. In Cape Town this has included the abolition of the racially defined 
Black (African) Local Authorities, the coloured Management Committees, the white 
City and Divisional Councils and the creation of a unified council administration or 
‘unicity’ for the whole Cape Town metropolitan area, the unicity administration 
being elected by a mixture of first past the post elections across 99 wards 
supplemented by councillors from a proportional representation list. 
These administrative transformations have been accompanied by 
considerable shifts in the purpose of politics. Whereas under apartheid financial 
resources remained overwhelmingly targeted at providing for the needs of whites, 
and to some extent coloureds and Indians, post-apartheid government in general, 
and local government in particular, has been assigned a central role in development. 
Resources have been targeted at providing for the needs of the most disadvantaged 
and the provision of services such as electricity and water to previously neglected 
townships have been central to government policy. 
Transformation of political practice has also been central to government 
rhetoric with South Africa making the participation of communities and civil society 
in governance part of its project for development. Tying with shifts in academic and 
development discourse which see public participation as a method for enhancing 
the accountability and effectiveness of government, and for empowering citizens 
and thereby deepening democracy,20 post-apartheid policy making has established a 
range of mechanisms to seek public input into local and national policy and 
development decisions.21 Consequently, a range of institutional mechanisms and 
procedures have been established by the City of Cape Town with which civil society 
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organisations and individuals can interact. At the city level public input is sought 
into the overall strategic direction of policy and spending priorities. Input was 
requested through public meetings and submissions on the city’s Integrated 
Development Plan, a statutorily required plan which outlines development 
priorities and how they will be achieved. Similarly, the city’s budget is published 
before adoption and the public is invited to submit comment and recommendations.  
At the local level input is sought on issues affecting individual communities 
and their own development. Every ward councillor is expected to hold at least four 
public meetings in their constituency every year, at which they present ongoing 
developments and seek feedback. In 2005 the city also adopted the ward committee 
system, although it was subsequently discontinued after the change of 
administration in 2006. Here residents of each ward elected ten community 
representatives at an open community meeting. The representatives were forbidden 
to stand as members of political parties and were usually involved in civil society 
organisations within the ward. In Cape Town each committee member was chosen 
to represent a sectoral interest such as women, youth or business. These committees 
met monthly to discuss local government proposals affecting the ward and provide 
advice and feedback to the councillor.22 Alongside these channels of participation 
there are also Community Development Workers (employed by the provincial 
government) and Community Liaison Officers (employed by the municipality) part 
of whose job it is to work with the local communities in identifying their needs and 
ensuring that they are brought to the attention of the elected politicians. 
Simultaneously, when development projects are established in an area local 
community development forums are created and alongside representatives of the 
businesses involved in the projects and the local councillors civil society 
representatives are also involved. These run alongside permanent structures such as 
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the community policing forums, where the police, councillors and civil society 
representatives sit to discuss policing priorities and strategies. A range of channels 
therefore exist through which local residents and civil society organisations can 
bring issues and concerns to the attention of both their elected representatives and 
local government administration. 
 At first glance the period since 1994 has seen a widening of political 
opportunities for many civil society organisations. Civil society organisations are no 
longer illegal; the state now deliberately seeks input on policy issues and provides 
forums through which to gain this; support is even directly extend to empower 
organisations.23 These opportunities have been further enhanced by the possibility 
of civil society using institutions such as the constitutional courts to pursue goals. 
At the same time, as outlined in chapter two, poverty and inequality have not been 
eradicated. There appears, therefore, to be both opportunity for civil society 
organisations to mobilise as well as the persistence of the issues with which they 
claim to be concerned. Interestingly, however, since 1994 civil society activism in 
both Guguletu and Bonteheuwel has declined.  
 
7.3.2. Guguletu: Quiescence and Occasional Complaint 
Overall, civil society in Guguletu resembles the picture of decline of traditional 
organisations and the emergence of new forms of protest sketched earlier. As 
discussed in chapter six the women and youth congresses disbanded in the early 
1990s; furthermore the political youth and women leagues that replaced them have 
operated as adjuncts to the political parties, rather than as groups within civil 
society. COSAS has also declined in membership and vociferousness and the only 
apartheid era organisations maintaining a notable presence are the street 
committees and civic organisations.  
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The one area where little appears to have changed within the community is 
in the role of the street committees. In Guguletu these continue to act as arbiters of 
local disputes, seeking to maintain peace within the street, calling criminals to 
meetings to explain their actions and, where more serious crimes are committed, 
reporting culprits to the police. They also continue to mediate between individual 
residents and local government. Street committees conduct negotiations with the 
local housing officials on behalf of residents threatened by eviction. Similarly, in a 
direct replication of apartheid practice local officials and councillors still approach 
the street committees when seeking beneficiaries for local government resources, 
whether this is in the form of helping identify recipients of public works jobs, or 
deciding who has rights to rented housing when it become vacant.24 
Although the street committees have seen little change, civic organisation in 
Guguletu has collapsed since the transition. The movement of many WCCA 
activists into SANCO by the mid-1990s led to its consolidation as the main civic 
organisation in the community. Defining SANCO’s current role is difficult as 
officials often exaggerate its strength. However, it appears that SANCO continues to 
be based in both mass meetings open to all at which issues affecting individuals as 
residents of the township are discussed, and around interactions between street 
committee members and civic officials. Within post-apartheid Guguletu SANCO 
has become geographically organised around defined territories, which link 
together in a hierarchical fashion. At the lowest level are the area committees, which 
are comprised of the street committees and residents of approximately 5 streets. 
These area committees send representatives to their SANCO branch, of which there 
are four in Guguletu. These branches also on occasion call public meetings. These 
then link into and report to regional and then national SANCO structures. Each of 
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these structures has an executive committee which is theoretically elected at regular 
intervals.25  
SANCO operates as an umbrella body for the street committees, to which 
disputes and complaints are referred if they cannot be resolved at the local level. 
Here the hierarchical structure comes into play, as issues that cannot be dealt with at 
the level of the street are referred to the area, and if still unsolved to the branch and 
beyond. SANCO also calls meetings at which local issues such as crime and 
development are discussed and these meetings sometimes operate as forums where 
local councillors come to discuss proposals and seek feedback. This feeds into the 
oft-claimed role of SANCO as a watchdog for the community, ensuring that local 
government provides appropriate services and attends to the community’s needs 
(although SANCO’s willingness to challenge unpopular decisions and policies is 
questionable, as will be seen later). SANCO also provides representatives for local 
participatory structures such as the community development forums and ward 
committees set up by local government, as well as directly taking residents’ issues to 
local officials and councillors. Here SANCO ties into the distributive functions 
performed by the street committees, as in some areas SANCO is responsible for 
working with and overseeing the street committees’ distribution of resources, or on 
occasions identifying beneficiaries itself. 
However, despite its continued presence within the community the level of 
support enjoyed by SANCO has decline recently and key figures within both the 
branch and provincial structures talk of falling attendances at meetings and 
involvement in the organisation. Equally, SANCO’s influence with both local 
government officials and councillors has waned and many members express the 
feeling that local councillors are listening less and less to SANCO’s concerns.26 This 
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decline has coincided with an adoption by SANCO of a generally quiescent stance 
with regards to local government policies and defending its members’ interests, in 
spite its claim to be acting as a watchdog. One senior official noted that in recent 
years ‘SANCO has been so silent it seems as if it is non-existent.’27 Furthermore, on 
occasions when public discontent has developed SANCO officials have tended to 
avoid the issue or side with political figures. With regard to housing, a highly 
contentious issue in both the township and the city at large, one resident who 
regularly attended SANCO meetings revealed that in her area SANCO did not even 
discuss the issue: ‘*W+hen I was in... meeting*s+ with SANCO we didn’t talk about 
the houses, just talking about the violence and crime and whatever.’28 In the public 
domain members of SANCO in the township have even condemned participants in 
protests, and rather than taking up their grievances have characterised the 
discontent as the work of shady agent provocateurs. Talking in a local newspaper one 
senior branch official in Guguletu said with regard to housing riots in the 
community, ‘what started this whole mess is that people are playing on emotions to 
discredit the current councillors.’29 
In fact not only is SANCO failing to represent peoples’ interests to local 
government, it is in many ways doing the inverse – defending the councillors and 
government to a discontented populace. The above condemnation is perhaps 
understandable, given the violent nature of the protest, but this even appears to be 
happening in community meetings. As another resident who regularly attended 
SANCO meetings in his area says: 
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When we calling the ward council[lor], ward council[lor] come address the people 
about what going on with that development [a housing upgrade project in 
Guguletu’s hostels+. He didn’t know nothing. Then those people, structure of 
SANCO in this area, they protected the ward councillor.30 
 
This quiescence even affects participatory forums such as the ward 
committees where civil society is invited to give feedback. Here community 
representatives rarely highlight contentious issues, such as housing, and instead 
discussion is driven almost completely by the councillor. Equally, whilst committee 
members should regularly liaise publicly with their communities this appears to be 
the exception rather than the rule.31 
Quiescence in itself is not necessarily unusual or negative. Indeed, it could 
represent general contentment amongst Guguletu’s population with delivery and/or 
a willingness to wait for services. Such a view is certainly supported by the support 
that the ANC continues to receive at the ballot box, which suggests that people are 
content with its performance in power (see table 7.1). 
 
Table 7.1 ANC Share of the Vote in 2000 and 2004 Local Elections (%): Guguletu 
Wards32 
 2000 2004 
Ward 40 96.11 95.84 
Ward 41 94.77 94.47 
 
Crucially, however, there is much evidence to suggest that this quiescence is 
not a result of satisfaction. Chapter two revealed that not all Africans have benefited 
since 1994 and this appears to be reflected at the local level. Housing riots in 
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Guguletu in May 2005 led to 30 arrests and revealed considerable anger about the 
pace and nature of service delivery. This anger was also almost universally 
expressed in discussions with street committee members within the community.  33 
As one ANC and SANCO member put it, ‘we are always crying to our councillors 
*about the lack of delivery+ and our councillors they don’t work hand in hand with 
us.’34 Furthermore faith in political society is markedly absent. Rioting in protest at 
policy decisions suggests a far from patient populace. Survey data contradicts the 
idea that communities hold faith in their local politicians to deliver. In a 2003 survey 
of political attitudes in Cape Town only about 15% of respondents trusted their 
ward councillors to ‘do the right thing’ ‘always’ or ‘most of the time’ whilst over 
30% felt they would do so either ‘never’ or ‘only some of the time’. These results did 
not vary noticeably on racial grounds.35  
With SANCO quiescent and the ANC politically omnipotent opposition to 
unpopular policies in Guguletu has instead been articulated through contentious 
political action and outside of the civic movement. Whilst it would be incorrect to 
argue that Guguletu has seen NSM activism on a large scale – indeed a notable 
feature of Guguletu is a lack of sustained contentious mobilisation – some NSMs 
have emerged and some contentious political action has occurred. Three specific 
examples emerged during this research. The first involved the upgrading of hostels 
into family homes in an area of Guguletu called Kiki. During 2005/6 there had been 
considerable conflict between two separate groupings over executive positions 
within the local SANCO area committee, and the composition of the development 
forum established to oversee the allocation of the upgraded hostel units. The conflict 
started after members of the SANCO area committee, who also comprise the bulk of 
community representatives on the allocations committee, were accused of allocating 
finished units to their friends and relatives, as well as to people from outside the 
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hostels in return for bribes. This led to demands for the election of new area and 
allocations committees; a request backed up by the fact that both these committees 
had overrun their mandated terms. However, the existing committees refused to 
disband and a range of strategies, such as closing meetings early, were employed in 
order to ensure that they continued in power.36 This conflict eventually led to a 
breakaway civic group being formed, which approached council officials with their 
concerns and demanded a new allocations committee be elected. Violence has 
occurred intermittently and whilst attempts are being made to create a compromise, 
in late 2006 no new committees had been elected and the conflict was still ongoing. 
 The second example is housing protests in May 2005. During March 2005 
backyard dwellers (residents who live in shacks in the back yards of formal houses) 
from Guguletu came together to form a committee dealing with housing issues and 
in May 2005 allocations for a new housing project being constructed alongside the 
N2 highway were announced. Under the allocation system 70% of the units are to 
go to residents of the Joe Slovo informal settlement, whilst 30% are to go to 
backyard dwellers. Of this 30% only a third was allocated to Guguletu, with other 
formal townships taking the rest. This led to a series of meetings where backyard 
dwellers expressed their discontent with the allocations and a series of activities 
were planned including a march to the city centre and the handing in of a 
memorandum of demands to the provincial minister for housing. Following this 
more meetings were held and after one of these a riot broke out which lasted several 
days. Subsequent to these riots meetings continued to be held by some of the 
participants and a backyard dweller’s association was formed and some follow up 
action, such as the handing in of memorandums and marches to the local housing 
office, have continued. Attendance at the organisation’s meetings has varied from 
around 20 to 100 people.37 
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The final example is a conflict surrounding employment allocation. In 2004 
an extended public works programme was announced in Guguletu and the tender 
was granted to a company called BTH. A series of project committees were elected 
in community meetings to oversee the development process and it was decided that 
60 people would be employed from each ward and would be chosen by the street 
committees. However in two wards controversy erupted. In ward 42 this started 
when the councillor was accused of selecting 20 employees from her friends and 
family and in ward 44 the councillor was accused of hiring people from other 
wards. This conflict spilled over into the streets and a series of meetings, toyi-toyis 
and protests were held. Residents even dumped their rubbish on the street, blocking 
Guguletu’s main road. Concerns were also raised surrounding the tendering and 
employment practices of BTH. This led to negotiations between representatives of 
the residents, the local councillors and officials, which whilst not satisfying all their 
demands did lead to some changes. Following this a group have continued to meet 
and have formed themselves into the Young Jobless People’s Coalition (YJPC), 
although participation has generally ranged between five and twenty people.38 
  
7.3.3. Bonteheuwel: Public Discontent and the Collapse of 
Residential Civil Society 
In comparison to Guguletu the picture in Bonteheuwel is simpler and appears to 
represent a general collapse in grassroots civil society structures. Whilst a range of 
residents’ organisations claim to be operating within the community, including a 
branch of SANCO, in real terms activity is non-existent. In 2005 activists did 
organise a meeting under the name of SANCO with the then mayor to protest 
against plans to introduce meters to regulate water bills. SANCO was also 
                                                   





represented on the community’s ward committee. However regular meetings are 
not held and the civic structure itself is seen as weak by activists involved.39  
 This is not to argue that there is no civil society organising in Bonteheuwel. 
There is considerable involvement in religious and sports organisations throughout 
the community. However, civil society organisations which specifically organise on 
issues of socio-economic transformation are less in evidence, and such activism is 
dominated by the emergence of ad hoc groups dealing with specific issues and 
temporary problems, or organisations tied to local governance initiatives, rather 
than formal, longstanding structures. In late 2006 an organisation of residents 
liaised with the local council about problems relating to a block of stables in their 
street and the organisation they used to do this was established specifically to 
perform this role.40 A Friends of the Library committee was also established to 
oversee the upgrading of the local library by the City Council after the project was 
announced. Regarding governance initiatives, the main vehicle used by youth 
activists – from both political parties and NGOs – is the Local Youth Development 
Forum which was established by the council. Similarly, the main forum for dealing 
with crime and policing issues is not mass participation in neighbourhood watches 
or civic organisations but the local community policing forum in which activists sit 
alongside councillors and local police officials.41 
 The lack of civil society organising in Bonteheuwel does not, however, 
represent a lack of discontent within the community. During interviews with 
activists, residents, councillors and ex-activists constant discontent was expressed 
with the nature of the post-apartheid order and delivery. A common view was that 
coloureds had missed out as a result of state policies which overwhelmingly 
favoured Africans in the provision of services and in the distribution of 
opportunities. One of the Bonteheuwel councillors specifically linked the racism 
expressed by many coloureds to the unequal provision of services: 
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[I]f a house opposite in the [African] squatter camp burns down, ok. In no time at all 
people are there to give food, to give blankets, to give this, to give that. Whatever. 
People are given five hundred Rands, people are given starter packs and whatever. 
Yet if a wendy house *shack+ in the Bonteheuwel area burns down< we aren’t given 
the liberty. Our people aren’t given 500 Rands, they aren’t given starter packs, you 
know what I’m saying... That  is where the us and the them comes from.42 
 
This discontent is even expressed by many local activists who supported the ANC. 
One former activist who had applied for a bursary to attend a training course 
argued that, ‘You have to make an application for a bursary and< if your surname 
doesn’t begin with X or a Q or a Z or *is+ Xhosa related, you can see your chance is 
nil.’43 
Coloured discontent with ANC politics is also reflected at the ballot box. 
Unlike most of South Africa, where the ANC is the dominant political party, in the 
Western Cape it has experienced a sustained challenge from first the National Party 
and lately the Democratic Alliance.44 Consequently, the Western Cape Province was 
governed between 1994 and 1999 by the National Party  and the City of Cape Town, 
discounting the period between 2003-5 when defections to the ANC gave them a 
majority, was again governed by a Democratic Alliance – National Party coalition 
and since 2006 by a Democratic Alliance led coalition. Moreover, whilst the extent to 
which voting patterns in South Africa are defined by race is a contested issue, in 
Cape Town the Democratic Alliance gains the majority of its support from white 
and coloured voters whilst the ANC gains its support from Africans. 
Even in Bonteheuwel, with its history of Congress dominance within civil 
society during the 1980s, ANC political success has been paltry. Unfortunately 
election results are not easily available for the 1994 and 1996 elections, although it is 
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clear that the majority of coloured people voted for the National Party.45 However 
election results from local and national elections (table 7.2 & 7.3) between 1999 and 
2004 clearly show that the ANC has consistently attracted only around 20% of the 
vote in Bonteheuwel. 
 
Table 7.2 Share of the Vote in 2000 and 2004 Local Elections (%): Ward 5046 
 2000 2004 
Democratic Alliance 68.17 50.35 










                                                   
45 Eldridge, M & Seekings, J, „Mandela‟s Lost Province: The African National Congress and the 
Western Cape Electorate in the 1994 South African Elections‟, Journal of Southern African Studies, 
22/4, 1996, pp.517-40, p.532 & p.536;  
Lodge, T, „The South African General Election, April 1994: Results, Analysis and Implications‟, 
African Affairs, 94/377, 1995, pp.471-500 
46 PR votes from ward 50 which lies wholly within the boundaries of Bonteheuwel. Data from 
http://www.elections.org.za/ 
47 Votes cast in national elections. Data from http://www.elections.org.za/ 
Table 7.3 ANC Share of the vote in 2000 and 2004 National 
Elections (%): Bonteheuwel Polling Stations
47
 
 1999 2004 
Modderdam High 24.8 24.3 
Arcadia Primary 21.7 19.5 
Cedar Primary 23 19.6 
Mimosa Primary 18.6 20 
Boundary Primary 22.2 22 
Nerina Primary School 22.7 20 





7.4. From Mass Action to Mass Inaction: Explaining 
the Decline of Apartheid Civil Society 
 
Post-apartheid civil society appears riddled with contradictions. Many of the 
hardships which formed the fulcrums around which anti-apartheid activists 
mobilised continue to persist; in many cases they have even got worse. 
Furthermore, the post-apartheid state has (at least rhetorically) committed itself to 
empowering civil society and involving communities in decision making. In such a 
context it could be expected that individuals and civil society organisations would 
seek to organise and use the political space available to them to represent their 
interests and seek alleviation of their hardships. This, however, has not occurred. 
Civil society has demobilised and where people have sought to protest this has 
occurred through the emergence of new forms of activism. Furthermore, even these 
new forms of activism have been sporadic and not well supported. In Bonteheuwel 
activism has dissipated whilst in Guguletu contentious political action has been 
characterised by either sudden outbursts of discontent which rapidly subside 
leaving small organisations with limited participation (employment and housing 
protests) or in attempts to replace existing civil society structures rather than form 
alternative mechanisms of representation (hostel protests).48 A range of questions 
exist, therefore, surrounding why established civil society has became demobilised 
and quiescent, despite discontent and, in the case of SANCO, a rhetorical 
commitment to represent community interests and to act as a watchdog over 
government policy and delivery? Furthermore, there also exist questions 
surrounding the circumstances in which, however momentarily, this quiescence 
collapses. 
Before moving to a more detailed consideration of the specifics of the case 
studies, it is first worth noting that many of the explanations for the decline of 
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apartheid organisations highlighted in existing studies of decline have salience in 
Guguletu and Bonteheuwel. As already covered in chapter six, with political 
transformation activists from both communities were rapidly assimilated into the 
unbanned political parties and the state administration. In Guguletu most key 
figures from the progressive organisations of the 1980s have assumed some role 
within the state. To give just a few examples key CAYCO/SAYCO activists Mcebisi 
Skwatsha and Whitey Jacobs are now leaders of the Western Cape ANC and the 
provincial Minister for Sports and Recreation respectively. Wilson Sidina and 
Mildred Lesiea who were instrumental in the formation of the WCCA are now a 
ward councillor and an MP. Zoliswa Kota and Nomaindia Mfeketo who came to 
prominence in the women’s movement are now an MP and a councillor/ex-mayor of 
the city. Similar trends are also apparent in Bonteheuwel. Quentin Michels, original 
founder of the BCA has joined the army, as has Andrew November, a founding 
member of the BMW. Bennet ‘boycott’ Bailey who was a representative on the 
Committee of 81 now works in the provincial government, as does Civic Activist 
Colin Lawrence.  
The loss of key leadership figures from civil society has been further 
compounded by political loyalty amongst remaining activists to the ruling ANC, as 
people with strong political allegiances formed during the anti-apartheid struggle 
have moved into political structures and baulked at openly challenging their own 
political party. In Bonteheuwel, for example, SANCO was relatively quiet during 
the period that the ANC was controlling the city. However, after the Democratic 
Alliance won the 2006 election there was talk amongst activists, one of whom was 
an ANC Councillor, of it taking a more proactive role.49 Similar sentiments were also 
clear in Guguletu. Whilst SANCO claims to be a non-partisan organisation the 
overlap between ANC and SANCO membership is considerable and SANCO 
helped the ANC campaign in recent local government elections. These close 
relations were confirmed by an executive member of SANCO Guguletu’s section 2 
                                                   





branch, who despite arguing that SANCO was a home for people from all political 
organisations also admitted: ‘Yeah, we are a political organisation< we will sell the 
ideas of the ANC at our meetings, but you don’t necessarily have to buy them.’50 
A decline in organisational capacity due to changing leadership dynamics 
has been compounded by the loss of funding since the early 1990s. The removal of 
funding from civil society after 1994 and its targeting on development and 
governance programmes has been well documented elsewhere 51 and in both cases 
here its impact was far from insignificant. In Guguletu, for example, SANCO had to 
close its office in the local shopping centre due to a lack of funds and whilst paid 
organisers were commonplace before the first democratic elections there is no 
longer the money to pay them. Indeed, it is usually down to the local leadership to 
provide funds themselves for even basic resources such as stationary. 
 However, these explanations are incomplete. Not all activists have assumed 
roles in government or the post-apartheid state. This is particularly the case in 
Bonteheuwel, where many old activists are employed outside the state or are 
unemployed, yet few are actively involved in grassroots community structures. 
Furthermore, those people with key positions within civil society are not incapable 
and SANCO leaders in both communities do have organising skills. In Bonteheuwel 
the core of SANCO consists of people who were active in the youth, civic and trade 
union movements in the 1980s and one activist even works providing outside 
leadership training to social movements in other communities. In Guguletu 
organisational skills are also far from absent. The executive of SANCO’s section 2 
branch includes a veteran of the Hostel Dwellers’ Association and the Section 3 
branch includes a veteran trade unionist from Port Elizabeth. Furthermore, these 
explanations also provide little to account for the timidity of civil society 
organisations in forums specifically created to allow them to express their concerns. 
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A lack of resources may hinder effective organisation building but it does not 
explain why in communities in which the sense of disappointment with delivery is 
palpable community representatives do not articulate this to government. Nor does 
it explain why SANCO officials in Guguletu have actively moved to diffuse protest 
and discontent. 
 Secondly, these explanations cannot account for why, in the face of the 
inactivity of older civil society organisations, residents rarely seek or engage with 
alternative forms of organisation and action through which to articulate their 
demands. It is undoubtedly true that organisations play a major role in shaping, 
articulating and providing a vehicle for collective interests. However, as events in 
1976 showed, collective action is not simply a question of organisation; collective 
grievances can precipitate collective action without strong organisation. 
Furthermore, whilst organisation has all but collapsed within Bonteheuwel the same 
is not true in Guguletu. There are activists, such as those from the YJPC and 
Backyard Dweller’s Association, who gained organising experience in the 1980s and 
who are proactively seeking to mobilise people around their day-to-day 
experiences. Yet in spite of this success has been generally muted. 
 
7.4.1. Civic Silence: Guguletu and the Benefits of Quiescence 
In Guguletu civil society quiescence can be explained primarily as a result of the 
predominance of political society within decision making and distributional 
processes and the use of this to court political loyalty through a form of patronage 
politics. This thesis has already shown how civic activism was weak when its 
control of resources was limited, and grew as the civics became vehicles through 
which local government resources were distributed during transition. From 1994 the 
strengthening of local administration has transferred much of this power from civic 
activists to the state,  and the decline of the civic movement has closely echoed the 
strengthening of local government structures and the growing powers of councillors 





and consequently civil society structures were able to exercise a degree of control 
over local development, especially through the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) forums which were established to decide on development 
projects and included civil society representatives. However, as the power of elected 
councillors has been consolidated, civil society influence has waned and with this 
strength within the community. As one senior SANCO member said: 
You see there was a time when there were the RDPs. And most of the members of 
the RDP’s were from SANCO. And the RDPs were responsible for the development. 
Any development in the township. But they seem to have died a natural death, the 
RDPs. And because of that now things have gone back to the ANC and the ANC is 
calling the tune in almost everything that is taking place in the townships.52 
 
Yet, as has been seen, this decline in civil society activism does not reflect 
contentment with, or faith in political society. Instead, it represents the use by local 
councillors of their growing power – a power derived from both formal policies and 
informal traditions of governance – to draw civil society organisations and residents 
into dependent relationships which ensure their loyalty. 
Four factors are central in explaining the development of these dependent 
relationships. Firstly, whilst the government has introduced policies in an attempt 
to increase the role of civil society in governance, ward councillors have assumed a 
pivotal and predominant position within local government decision-making. 
Secondly, the relationships between local government, civil society and 
communities are only loosely regulated. Thirdly, within this loose framework 
certain powers have been devolved to civil society, yet because these powers are not 
legally guaranteed civil society has to court favour with the ward councillors to 
guarantee their continuance and effective operation. Fourthly, the power of ward 
councillors over scarce resources allows them to exclude people on the basis of 
political loyalty. 
                                                   





Whilst the City of Cape Town has introduced several citywide policies on 
participation, overall there is a lack of formal procedures for regularising and 
monitoring the interaction between civil society and the state. Some initiatives, such 
as the ward committee system, are prescribed centrally. However, beyond this there 
is no set procedure for the conducting of participation, merely a shopping list of 
possible options from which councillors can choose. Participatory practices are 
therefore highly localised and vary considerably between different suburbs and 
wards.53 Local councillors can, in many cases, select the forms of participation and 
the level of civil society involvement in these forums. In one ward in Guguletu, for 
example, the previous councillor held regular meetings with the chairs of all the 
street committees, as well as SANCO officials, where local development issues were 
discussed. However, the councillor elected in 2000 stopped these meetings, as he 
did not see them as necessary.54 Local councillors also exercise discretion in 
pursuing concerns raised by the civics, street committees and civil society in 
general. There is no legislative demand that councillors must act on feedback 
gathered during ward committee meetings, despite their centrality in Cape Town’s 
participatory project before 2006. Equally, each councillor can decide whether to 
take up issues brought to them by the civics and street committees, as revealed by 
the fact that in the same wards different street chairs report varying satisfaction 
with their councillors. In one street, for example, the chair was very pleased because 
he had approached the councillor about housing and the councillor had managed to 
find houses for two residents of the street, whilst in another street in the same ward 
the chair felt that the councillor ignored any requests he made.55  
Alongside this lack of formalised procedures local government also has very 
limited capacity through which it can monitor and administer services to the local 
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population and this has led to a continuity of the apartheid period reliance by both 
local councillors and local government upon civil society to perform quasi-
administrative functions, although the amount of resources local government has to 
distribute has expanded rapidly. Here three examples will suffice. Firstly, a large 
scale upgrading programme has been introduced in Guguletu’s hostels, in an area 
of the township known as Kiki. This project aims to transform the hostels from 
dilapidated buildings, often containing upwards of three families in a single room, 
to two and three bedroom flats, which current hostel dwellers are reallocated into 
upon completion. However, due to the lack of records regarding current residents of 
the hostels the council owns no clear list of beneficiaries. Therefore residents were 
asked to register before the development commenced, and the local street 
committees played a role in verifying their claims. Similarly, as the units have been 
completed local street chairs, liaising with members of the hostel development 
forum, which includes both SANCO representatives and the local councillor, play a 
role in identifying those most in need of accommodation as it becomes available.56 
A similar process is at work in the distribution of food parcels for the most 
impoverished township residents, provided by the council’s social development 
unit, and temporary employment, involving the department of public works. Again 
there is no clear list of residents or their incomes available through which to decide 
who is most deserving of these opportunities. Therefore it is often the case that the 
local councillors, who at times compile the lists of names which are used to allocate 
these opportunities, will seek either the help of SANCO, and through it the street 
committees, or simply approach the street committees directly and request a list of 
worthy residents.57 These practices are not illegal, but nor are they effectively 
regulated. Often they flow directly from formal legislation. In the case of the 
allocation of hostel units, for example, City of Cape Town policy states that 
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beneficiaries of state provided housing must not have ‘evidence of anti-social 
behaviour’ and people can be refused a new house or moved down the waiting list 
if this is reported.58 However, it is the local street committee, and sometimes 
SANCO, which attests to whether neighbours have been anti-social and officials 
rarely investigate the veracity of such claims. Therefore whilst they have no formal 
rights to allocate housing, the street committees and SANCO become de facto 
gatekeepers of some housing opportunities.59 
 Alongside the powers which come from involvement with local government, 
civic officials as individuals also accrue personal benefits through their 
involvement. Local councillors control access to many jobs and training 
opportunities which individuals in civil society hope to access. Involvement in the 
development forums and local community initiatives often brings with it small 
material benefits, such as the free meals handed out to participants in 
neighbourhood watch schemes, or the food gathered from gardening projects. 
Similarly, training is made available to civil society members and job opportunities, 
such as the community liaison officer positions, are at times given to SANCO 
members. A member of the Guguletu Section 3 SANCO executive committee, who 
was sitting on the ward committee in her area and had been previously employed 
by the Integrated Serviced Land Project made this close linkage between 
involvement in SANCO and access to opportunities clear: 
I say to you if you are a member of SANCO... [you should] get jobs, seminars 
whatever, courses to be clear.60  
 
However, many of these opportunities rely upon maintaining good relations and 
working closely with the local councillor, as it is the councillor that plays a key role 
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in selecting people for employment, and often passes on names of people to be 
given training.61 
Overall, therefore, local members of civil society are given certain powers, 
which they can exercise to a large degree at their own discretion, and gain benefits 
by working with their councillor. The local street committee is able to choose who in 
its street is worthy of a job, a food parcel, and who can move into some vacated 
properties, whilst civic officials often oversee this process and can veto decisions 
made by the street committees, and through their role in certain development 
committees exercise similar powers. However, because these powers are delegated, 
usually by the local councillor, they can be removed or circumvented at any time. 
Equally, selection for involvement in participatory forums brings with it some 
personal rewards, yet access to many of these rewards is again dependent upon 
local ward councillors. The danger for street chairs, SANCO officials and members 
of participatory structures is, therefore, that if they fail to maintain good terms with 
their councillors these powers and the resources which accompany them will be 
removed from them and distributed elsewhere. One ward committee member in 
Guguletu made this abundantly clear. When asked what would happen if she did 
not have a good relationship with the councillor she said that the consequences 
would be that ‘The work *of the committee+ will stuck’. As a result of this she 
argued that as a member of the ward committee, ‘you must protect he or she. If they 
*the community+ criticise her or she or him, you must stop it.’62 Thus, the 
participation of civil society in the distributive regime in Guguletu has drawn civil 
society into a dependent relationship with the local council and its councillors. The 
fact that SANCO derives most of its benefits, both as an organisation and as a 
collection of individuals, through its relationship with local government and ward 
councillors has created a situation in which it is more important for civil society 
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organisations to please their councillors, than it is to represent broader community 
concerns.63  
Similar factors also underlie the reason why despite their discontent little 
effort has been made by residents to either turn to alternative channels for 
representation, or to force the existing civil society organisations to be more 
proactive. Just as the civil society organisations are tied into dependent relationships 
with local councillors, residents are in turn drawn into a dependent relationship 
with both civil society and their councillors. Often it is through their interactions 
with the street committees and SANCO that residents’ entitlements to government 
resources are negotiated. It is therefore crucial for residents to remain on good terms 
with their street committees and SANCO if they are to be given access to these 
resources. In one street, for example, attendees at street committee meetings are 
noted every week and if people fail to attend these meetings they are considered 
‘not known’ and therefore do not get considered when resources become available.64 
This leads to people avoiding contentious issues or challenging the status quo 
because if they are identified as troublesome they are likely to be excluded from the 
existing distributional networks. One activist involved in a housing social 
movement in Guguletu says how his involvement in an organisation with a 
fractious relationship with SANCO in the area impacts upon him and other 
movement activists: 
So SANCO is playing one of dirty tricks. It is a sister organisation of the ANC, and it 
is also working hand-in-hand with the councillor. So there is some sort of nepotism 
run by SANCO. I’m sure you know the word that they employ their families etc... 
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Okay, they know me [because of my involvement in the social movement]. I will not 
get any job. 65 
 
The rewarding of loyalty is even reported to occur within SANCO structures, where 
members seen as troublesome by the leadership are excluded from job 
opportunities.66 
This filters down to ordinary residents, who are aware of the dangers of 
becoming involved in oppositional or contentious political activity. One resident of 
Guguletu reveals in stark terms the risks inherent in opposition. Asked whether she 
would consider voting against the ANC or abstaining from local government 
elections due to the council’s failure to provide her with a house, despite having 
been on the waiting list since 1994, she said that she would not as she doesn’t want 
to fight with the councillor because, ‘our councillor say if you don’t vote, you don’t 
get a house. If you vote you get a house.’67 Such findings correspond to, and perhaps 
in part help explain, survey data which has found that in Cape Town, ‘many people, 
especially African people, say that you need to watch what you say with regards to 
politics.’68 
The quiescence of both civil society and township residents cannot, 
therefore, simply be explained through the weaknesses of the organisations 
themselves, through a growing faith in politicians to get things done, or a failure to 
adjust to the changed political context. Instead, the opportunities which the local 
political and administrative context has presented for civil society organisations 
have played a major role in shaping their behaviour. A range of opportunities are 
available for civic activists and street committee members within Guguletu. 
However, in taking advantage of these opportunities they have had to moderate 
their role as advocates of community demands and instead have become closely 
integrated into post-apartheid governance and distributional networks. In many 
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ways this shows a highly astute reading of the post-apartheid political dispensation, 
and not a failure to adjust as has been suggested. One criticism of the civics is that 
they have been unwilling to accept the superiority of political society over civil 
society and have sought to maintain a role for themselves as organisations to which 
political society must come to access the will of the people.69 The fact that in 
Guguletu SANCO has come to accept that benefits flow from political society and 
have therefore assumed a subordinate role in order to access these benefits, whilst 
not necessarily palatable, does not in itself suggest a misreading of the opportunities 
of the new political context.  
 
7.4.2. Bonteheuwel and the End of Aspirational Activism  
Unlike Guguletu, in Bonteheuwel grassroots civil society has not simply become 
quiescent, but has almost disappeared. In accounting for this several factors have to 
be considered. Firstly, historical traditions of governance and activism were 
significant. Unlike in Guguletu where apartheid governance encouraged the organic 
formation of residential civil society structures and gave them day-to-day 
significance in the lives of African  residents, in Bonteheuwel civil society was not 
well embedded in people’s life experiences and was generally unsuccessful in 
delivering material benefits. Under apartheid coloureds received state services such 
as policing, and the administration of coloured communities was far more 
developed than in African areas, even if democratic accountability was denied. 
Consequently, there were not the impulses towards self-organisation which led to 
the creation of strong structures within communities separate from the state. 
Secondly, and tying closely into this, was the fact that whilst anti-apartheid activists 
claimed to be acting and mobilising the community their social base was narrow 
and they tended to be dominated by younger, more educated and better off 
members of the community. Consequently, much anti-apartheid activism was done 
on behalf of, rather than with the full participation of, the community. Consequently 
                                                   





grassroots civil society in Bonteheuwel was particularly vulnerable to the 
withdrawal of an activist elite. Finally, both socio-economic and political 
transformations post-apartheid led to growing fissures between this activist elite 
and the wider community and consequently many activists withdrew from 
grassroots organising, precipitating its collapse. 
The centrality of an activist elite in sustaining grassroots organising and the 
considerable impact of their withdrawal was made clear by a former civic activist, 
reflecting on his involvement in community organising and the impact of 
democratisation upon civil society in the community. Describing the impact of 
democratisation on grassroots structures as ‘disastrous’ he went on to explain this as 
a result of the limited penetration of grassroots mobilisation beyond the schools and 
more educated residents: 
[S]o called coloureds have not been involved [in community organising] with the 
intensity and the sophistication for a long time in their life. There might have been 
individual so called coloureds in the past< but not in terms of mass community 
organisation. And we were just kind of tasting the power of that and then came the 
unbanning< I always make a joke and say freedom came too early for the coloured, 
man< So we didn’t have all the elders with that kind of continuation of experience 
and learning< Whilst in African townships, at this level of community 
organisations. They had kind of a history. < *in Bonteheuwel+ we just talking the 
‘80s period. It was too quick in a generation of a community. To kind of embed a 
particular consciousness. About oneself and who you are and what you are< It 
came a bit too quick.70 
 
The importance of this elite and the limited commitment to grassroots 
structures  more broadly within the community was backed up by work done in the 
Tygerberg region of the City of Cape Town’s Department of Community 
Development and Liaison in 2003 as part of a provincial government programme 
known as the Cape Flats Renewal Strategy. One of this programme’s explicit goals 
was the strengthening of relationships between civil society, the local state and the 
local community.71 In order to achieve this the programme sought to support 
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community structures and leadership.72 Small scale projects such as soup kitchens 
and community gardens were decided upon. Leaders were identified and sent on 
leadership courses sponsored by the City Council. A further condition of leadership 
was that the leaders had to report back every month to a community gathering in a 
move designed to encourage accountability and prevent gate keeping.73 What is 
interesting is that the strategy employed was based upon the need for the council to 
develop effective civil society structures, rather than engaging with strong existing 
structures. Leadership was not to be consulted, but built. The very fact that 
leadership had to be ‘built’ in a community with strong traditions of civil society 
organising reveals the extent to which apartheid organisations had failed to 
reproduce themselves in the post-apartheid context. The key factor in accounting for 
the collapse of grassroots organising in Bonteheuwel, therefore, is accounting for 
why so many activists withdrew from civil society after 1994. 
This withdrawal was primarily a result of contradictions, which had existed 
in coloured activism throughout the 1970s and 1980s, tearing apart the alliance 
which an educated activist elite had sought to build between themselves and their 
broader communities. This withdrawal had both structural and cognitive 
dimensions, though both reflected a divergence of the views of activists from the 
communities they had previously mobilised; a divergence which was intimately tied 
to the impact of apartheid discrimination, and its demise, on different sections of the 
coloured community. 
The rejection of the ANC by the coloured electorate during the first non-
racial elections in April 1994 had a major impact upon the relationship between anti-
apartheid activists and broader coloured communities. During the 1980s, grassroots 
organising had often revolved around a romanticised vision of the role of the 
working class in transformation. However, as discussed earlier, the strategy of 
community organising was actually based upon recognition of the limited support 
                                                   
72 City of Cape Town, Bonteheuwel: Beyond 2010, (Cape Town, 2005), p.2 





for political goals amongst coloureds. Furthermore, as activists tended to circulate in 
social networks which were defined by political commitment, exposure to broader 
sentiments within the coloured communities was limited. Consequently, the 
widespread support that the National Party gained in the 1994 elections was both 
unexpected and, for many activists, devastating. The coloured working class rapidly 
transformed in the minds of many activists from being the bearer of revolution to a 
racist and parochial obstacle to political and social revolution. The impact was 
drastic as people who had made considerable sacrifices during the apartheid 
struggle, and had even had friends killed, were rejected by the communities in 
whose names they had claimed to be acting. As one activist from Bonteheuwel 
noted, after 1994 many people withdrew from grassroots civil society, ‘because after 
1994 we didn’t want to have anything to do with them.’74 Another talked of the 
feeling of betrayal she felt after all the sacrifices that she and her friends had made 
in both lives and in helping people with rent, housing and community issues.75 
 However, disjuncture at the political level represented more than just 
conflicting political choices; it was in many ways a manifestation of deep structural 
divisions amongst coloureds created by the ongoing reconfiguration of the 
apartheid political economy. As discussed in chapter two the coloured community 
has experienced growing internal differentiation, with the working classes suffering 
most and the better educated gaining most. The more educated activist elite have 
been amongst those that have benefited most. Many have moved into politics and 
government administration. Furthermore, the fact that they were amongst the most 
educated people within the community meant that as apartheid deracialised and 
opportunities opened up for people with skills, many activists were able to take 
advantage. This has led to considerable social and economic advancement in the 
post-apartheid period and many activists have moved out of the community. A 
brief life history, which is broadly representative of many of the activists I 
interviewed, reveals the benefits that many coloureds have experienced after 1994. 
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This activist lived in Bonteheuwel during the 1980s, became involved in the civic 
and was recruited by the SACP where he helped to organise trade unions. After 
1994 he started working for an NGO and has subsequently moved into the state. He 
is no longer involved in community organising and sees himself as ‘middle class 
now.’ Although he does claim to get gratification from delivering for the 
community through his job:  
[M]aybe I’m trying to fool myself, but I get gratification that what I do I do 
aggressively< as a progressive civic servant< So Bonteheuwel never had a police 
station, so they have [one now]< There’s [CCTV] cameras< They will have 
whatever I can get for them from the state as my local area, would be the way I’m 
working. Or there’s something wrong with the gangsters I would kind of< kind of 
go and make peace. But very superficial type of, not an imbedded grain. Day-to-day 
community issues< No I’m a sell out in that way.76 
 
Other occupations undertaken by activists include editing a major newspaper, 
managing in an engineering firm and working for the South African Revenue 
Service. 
 Coloured activists, therefore, have become increasingly distanced from the 
communities within which they used to mobilise. Under apartheid young, educated, 
coloureds sought transformation, in part because of the limits apartheid placed 
upon their life chances. To achieve this they attempted to mobilise the communities 
within which they lived. However, post-apartheid, opportunities have expanded, 
many activists no longer live within their old communities, and furthermore those 
communities have lost their ideological virtue. Consequently community activism 
has lost its appeal and urgency for those who in the past drove it. 
The withdrawal of activists from community based structures has been 
compounded by post-apartheid transformation in local governance and broader 
deracialisation which has made possible civil society activism without demanding 
consistent grassroots involvement. As discussed with reference to Guguletu, a range 
of mechanisms for public participation have been established and activists are able 
                                                   





to involve themselves in structures such as the community policing forums, youth 
development forums and development committees. However, the way in which 
these committees are elected in Bonteheuwel – through a vote at a mass meeting – 
means that activists can become involved in development in the community 
without having to consistently work with community members. In Bonteheuwel 
there is very little public involvement in participatory forums – again a legacy of 
apartheid governance – and consequently they are dominated by people with links 
to political parties. Being able to gain support at a mass meeting is possible by 
mobilising people through ANC branch structures and thus there is little need for 
activists to gain support through involvement in the broader community; indeed, 
unlike Guguletu, very few residents who are not party political members attend 
community meetings at all. This means that activists are able to make a contribution 
to development within their communities, but in doing so they can limit 
involvement to structures dominated by like minded people.77 
Involvement in government supported structures also provides 
opportunities for personal advancement, just as it does in Guguletu. One member of 
the local branch of the ANCYL who was active in student politics in the 1980s talked 
of how he was involved in local development primarily as a way of expanding his 
opportunities:  
Our focus has shifted mainly to youth development. Basically employment is our 
main concern, as well as HIV – Aids. So we do run< awareness workshops on HIV 
– Aids and we try to engage government< on how< to employ unemployed young 
people. In our community and especially from the ANC youth league. Our main 
motivation basically is to get education and employment< *B+asically we look at 
ourselves – straight talking to you now. We need to empower ourselves before we 
can empower other people.78 
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However, just like in Guguletu, participation in these structures is dependent on 
party political support and relationships with government officials, rather than 
support within the broader community; as already noted support mobilised 
through local ANC branches is more significant than support within the broader 
community. Consequently, whilst activists do engage with local communities they 
do so in a very different way than was promoted during the 1980s. Activists no 
longer derive their legitimacy from public support, but from their location within 
state and NGO sponsored structures. 
 
7.5. The Moral Economy of Collective Action and 
Political Practice in Guguletu and Bonteheuwel: The 
Continuing Salience of Differential Discrimination and 
Post-Apartheid Reconfiguration 
 
Whilst civic society has become quiescent in both Guguletu and Bonteheuwel, it 
would be incorrect to claim that contentious or oppositional action has been wholly 
absent. In Bonteheuwel opposition has been primarily expressed through the ballot 
box. In Guguletu, whilst limited in scope, opposition has tended to emerge within 
civil society, either in street protests, or through civil society organising. As outlined 
earlier, in accounting for this opposition much focus is placed upon the policy 
choices of the ANC in government and their perceived failure in tackling hardship. 
However, the evidence here suggests that such interpretations are highly 
problematic.  
E.P. Thompson, in his work on unrest in the eighteenth century argued that 
amongst historians there was a tendency simply to argue that distress and hardship, 
as reflected by factors such as high food prices, leads people to riot. However, he 





complexity of people’s social and cultural norms and organisation. In opposition to 
this he argued that: 
It is possible to detect in almost every eighteenth-century crowd action some 
legitimizing notion. By the notion of legitimation I mean that the men and women in 
the crowd were informed by the belief that they were defending traditional rights or 
customs; and, in general, that they were supported by the wider consensus of the 
community. On occasion this popular consensus was endorsed by some measure of 
licence afforded by the authorities. More commonly, the consensus was so strong it 
overrode motives of fear or deference.79 
 
 In his work on peasant protest in South-East Asia Scott makes a similar 
point, outlining the fact that protest had a moral dimension which meant that 
communities in different localities bore different levels of hardship before reacting 
violently. Moving on from this he traces the linkages between the material 
conditions in which different communities lived and developed to the different 
moral codes that governed social relations: 
I have argued that by starting with the peasants’ existential dilemma – his need for 
crisis subsistence insurance – we can deduce much of his conception of the decent 
landlord and the decent state, on the one hand, and his vision of the exploitative 
landlord or state on the other.80 
 
Scott progresses to argue that such moral codes set reciprocal responsibilities 
between patrons (landlords/state) and their clients (peasants). Protest occurs, 
therefore, when the historical balance of these relationships is transformed: i.e. 
when the balance between the demands of the patron and the rewards of the client 
are altered to the client’s detriment.81 
 Such ‘moral economies’ are apparent in both Guguletu and Bonteheuwel. In 
both communities a series of moral codes have developed surrounding legitimate 
forms and conditions for distribution: what it is ‘fair’ for the state and local 
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gatekeepers to take and what they should give in return. In large part these codes 
are embedded in the processes of class formation under early apartheid; though 
they have been modified by post-apartheid transformation. It is these complex 
notions of what is and is not legitimate that lay behind post-apartheid oppositional 
and contentious political action in the two communities, not hardship itself.  
 
7.5.1. Guguletu: Insiders, Outsiders and the Distribution of 
Resources 
Returning to the incidents of contentious political action in Guguletu sketched 
earlier, it can be seen that such action has emerged not in response to hardship, but 
principally in response to the nature of delivery. That protest was always not driven 
by a lack of delivery is clearly illustrated by the fact that in the case of the hostel 
development protests in Kiki the consequences of protest was to completely halt 
development in the area. Similarly, it is by addressing discrepancies in the 
distribution of resources that protest has more often than not been dampened, not 
by the allocation of more resources. For example in the case of the employment 
protests once the councillor in ward 42 had met with the community and agreed a 
compromise attendance at meetings declined to a few core activists, despite the 
continued existence of large scale unemployment and the activists’ attempt to re-
brand themselves as a social movement fighting for the right to work.82 
If protest is not simply about delivery then what defines the limits of consent 
within Guguletu? This can be explained in two dimensions. Firstly, fairness is 
defined horizontally, through expectations that all people within a given 
geographical or administrative unit will be treated similarly, providing they fulfil 
basic standards for entitlement. In both Kiki and the employment protests 
                                                   





discontent emerged when fair practice appeared to be being unfairly tampered with 
and people were using personal ties to promote their own interest. 83 
The form of fairness that is expressed within Guguletu reflects a belief that in 
return for abiding by the expectations of local gatekeepers everyone should have 
similar access to the resources they control. People accept that their loyalty is 
expected and that opposition may well be punished: hence the quiescence of civil 
society and the enduring support for councillors that are often held in low esteem 
within the community. Equally they accept that they may not be the first to get a 
house or a job. What they do not accept is that they have no chance of accessing or 
are unfairly disadvantaged in claiming these resources.  
Secondly, alongside expectations of equal distribution within communities 
protest has also been linked to vertical contestation in which individual 
communities claim a moral right to resources over other communities.  
Whilst the employment protests emerged in part as a response to corrupt 
practices of allocation within wards, they also coalesced around contestation over 
the allocation of resources between wards: specifically the view that jobs meant for 
one ward had been given to the other. Similar inter-community rivalry is apparent 
in the backyard housing protests. Here it was the fact that people from the Eastern 
Cape, who were felt to be less deserving than people from Cape Town’s 
longstanding townships, were being allocated housing that caused much of the 
outrage behind the protest and people from shack communities were physically 
attacked during the protest. As one woman involved in the protests said: 
A lot of people get houses without the red card [a card given to people on the 
housing waiting lists in the late 1980s and early 1990s]. Our Cape Borner, our Cape 
Borner, owns a red card. Our Cape Borner [should get a house].84 
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This was backed up by a leader of one of the backyard dwellers associations in 
Guguletu who argued that there was bias in favour of newcomers from the Eastern 
Cape in resource allocation, due to attempts by the ANC to shore up its electoral 
base in the province. Specifically he argued that newcomers were getting access to 
land whilst people who were born in Cape Town were given nothing.85 
Interestingly, this animosity also extended beyond housing to the belief that 
‘outsiders’ were being given unfair access to jobs in the region: 
*I+t’s now *my+ thirteenth year staying without a job< but what I don’t believe, 
people who are coming from the Transkei and the Ciskei, they do get jobs here, I 
don’t know whether maybe they are families here are trying the jobs to be found by 
them. Because I’ve been struggling all these years and now, I’m getting old now, 
sitting without getting a job, and yet I wanted to work that time, very very bad.86 
 
The fact that such attitudes are widespread was revealed in a survey conducted 
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Overall, less than 30% of people at the meeting attributed no blame to people from 
the Eastern Cape for their failure to secure housing, whilst over 50% held them 
responsible either a lot or quite a lot. 87 
The vertical dimension of Guguletu’s moral economy is complex. It draws 
heavily upon distinctions inscribed during apartheid. Capetonian and ‘Cape Borner’ 
identities are a direct inheritance from apartheid and their articulation recalls a 
period in which possessing section 10 rights was one of the few ways in which 
Africans could seek to secure their urban residence. The fact that such identities 
have survived, almost unchanged, despite democratisation and in the face of 
deracialisation and the universalising discourses of the liberation struggle shows the 
powerful impact apartheid played in structuring urban African’s life experiences.  
However, it is not simply apartheid’s moral economy which has driven 
vertical discrimination between communities. There has also been conflict within 
broader communities, but based around ward boundaries. This suggests that post-
apartheid transformations are beginning to change peoples’ claim making 
repertoires and identities; although it does not appear that they are becoming more 
universal, simply that insider-outsider boundaries are shifting. 
Overall, the vertical dimensions of the moral economy in Guguletu reflect 
the nature of the participatory and distributional regime in both Guguletu and Cape 
Town over the last fifty years. In the context of limited resources controlled by state 
agents – whether they are apartheid administrators, local civic officials or ANC 
councillors – individuals have sought the most fruitful means of accessing these 
resources. Under apartheid, proving a claim as a Capetonian provided clear 
advantages. Post-apartheid ensuring your local ward or community secures 
maximum resources also increases the likelihood of accessing such resources. 
However, in the context of limited resources benefits for one group necessarily 
                                                   






reduces the resources available for others and the identities so formed have been 
highly exclusionary.  
The importance of state largesse is further heightened by the fact that since 
1948 ways most Africans have relied upon the state for ensuring their wellbeing in 
one way or another. Under apartheid repressive state policies meant that securing 
the right to live and work in the cities conferred considerable benefits. Post-
apartheid high levels of unemployment and low wages have created a situation in 
which many Africans rely upon the state to provide basic necessities such as welfare 
grants and subsidised housing. Consequently, for many, it is only through accessing 
state resources that many basic needs can be met. With no other way to realise their 
socio-economic needs, many Africans in Cape Town have developed collective 
identities and a moral economy in which gains for outsiders are seen as loses for 
insiders. It has been this, alongside corrupt practices, not a lack of delivery, which 
has driven protest in the community. 
7.5.2. Bonteheuwel: Holding on to Coloured Preference   
In Bonteheuwel, and amongst coloured communities more generally, oppositional 
political action has tended to focus around the ballot box and support for the party 
of apartheid, the National Party. Interestingly, the rationality of coloured voters has 
rarely been tackled in great detail. Evidence from chapter two clearly reveals that 
the deracialisation of the South African economy and welfare state has had a 
considerable impact upon many coloureds, whilst chapter six argued that coloured 
rejection of progressive politics mirrored the reconfiguration of the apartheid 
political economy and political system during the late 1980s. Moving into the post-
apartheid period this has continued. Coloureds in unskilled occupations, alongside 
those in skilled trades who benefited from the artificial skills shortages which 
apartheid created, have both seen falling wages and rising unemployment. Large 
numbers of jobs have been lost in manufacturing industries and housing provision 
has seen little improvement. Simultaneously welfare grants have been slashed, 





and deracialisation of society has benefited many more educated coloureds, such 
impacts have been limited in working class communities such as Bonteheuwel. As 
Adhikari writes:  
Having the right to live where you want, marry whom you want and send your 
children to the school of your choice is of little consequence to the labouring poor of 
the Coloured townships.88 
 
Consequently, there is considerable validity to the view, expressed by many 
coloureds, that deracialisation has seen their quality of life deteriorate; or in the 
words of a Democratic Alliance activist: ‘this place was better when the European 
rulers were here.’89 
Within this context the continuing identification amongst the coloured 
working class with the party of apartheid is far from surprising. Interestingly it 
reflects many of the same dynamics that are in play in Guguletu; albeit with 
different outcomes. Coloureds, like urban Africans, internalised and mobilised 
around apartheid classifications in order to access resources. Post-apartheid these 
opportunities have diminished in interaction with processes tied into the 
deracialisation of the apartheid political economy and coloureds have therefore 
looked to a time when they were privileged within state policy. 
That most coloureds, faced with these challenges, have continued to 
articulate an identity which ties them to the past provides further evidence for the 
significance of apartheid class structures in conditioning people’s responses to post-
apartheid transformations. However, it may also be the case that because far less 
resources have been distributed to existing urban coloured communities there has 
been little to change the nature of claim making identities. In Guguletu resources 
have flowed through local councillors and consequently new identities based 
around ward boundaries have emerged. In Bonteheuwel such mechanisms of 
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distribution are absent as development within the formal coloured townships, with 
their superior infrastructure and housing compared to Africans, has been more 




Three broad sets of conclusions can be drawn from the above discussion of post-
apartheid transformations in civil society in the communities of Bonteheuwel and 
Guguletu.  
The first set of conclusions relates to the fact that whilst a range of scholars 
have seen democratisation and ‘neo-liberalism’ as representing decisive breaks in 
the history of South African civil society, at the local level such interpretations 
demand reconsideration. Instead, dynamics inherited from apartheid – specifically 
structures of governance and racial and class cleavages – have continued to 
influence post-apartheid civil society. 
Apartheid governance structures continue to cast a long shadow within the 
post-apartheid state. It is difficult not to see a close resemblance between the 
relationships between the street committees and administration boards in Guguletu 
during apartheid and the post-apartheid relations between local councillors, street 
committees and civics. For apartheid governance to function limited administrative 
capacity demanded intermediaries within civil as well as political society, creating a 
situation in which cooperation with local authorities could bring rewards, whilst 
opposition held considerable risks. Indeed, it has been argued earlier that this helps 
explain the quiescence of Guguletu’s adult population under apartheid. Similar 
dynamics are at work now. Rewards are available for those that cooperate with the 
authorities whilst the fear of sanctions helps to stifle dissent. In Guguletu the 





unwillingness, of the state to develop effective administrative oversight has led to 
similar forms of political practice post-apartheid; the main difference being not the 
way in which people are governed at the local level – through patronage and 
resource distribution and manipulation – but the fact that increased levels of 
resources are available and the people distributing them have a degree of 
legitimacy. 
In Bonteheuwel continuity within civil society is less marked. Yet in 
explaining this disjuncture apartheid governance practices still play a role. In 
Bonteheuwel the fact that civil society remained relatively underdeveloped during 
apartheid – a result of patterns of governance which placed the state as the central 
figure in providing welfare and the limited ability of progressive organisations to 
deliver benefits for residents – meant that collective organising was not embedded 
within coloured political culture, instead remaining the preserve of anti-apartheid 
activists. Consequently, the nature of civil society was defined by the actions of a 
relatively thin layer of politically motivated activists.  
Like governance structures, the socio-economic cleavages created by 
apartheid also continue to play a major role driving the nature of activism post-
apartheid. Whilst democratisation and neo-liberalism have been held aloft as key to 
explaining post-apartheid civil society, it is in fact continuities and changes within 
South Africa’s political economy which are crucial. In Bonteheuwel democratisation 
and deracialisation has created a considerable disjuncture between the coloured 
activists which were the driving force of activism during the 1980s and the coloured 
working class they claimed to be representing. However, this disjuncture is less a 
consequence of political transformation than the differential reactions of coloureds, 
heavily conditioned by their educational and class positions, to the post-apartheid 
political economy. Working class coloureds that have seen deracialisation 
accompanied by a collapse in state provision and employment have retreated into 
political allegiances in opposition to the party which championed these changes: the 





progressive political positions: unsurprisingly as many of them have benefited 
considerably from deracialisation.90 
Apartheid differentiation also continues to be significant in Guguletu. 
Cleavages still exist between ‘Capetonians’ and more recent immigrants, in spite of 
the abandonment the legal basis of such categories over twenty years ago. In 
Guguletu post-apartheid protests around service delivery have been not so much a 
progressive rejection of the scourge of neo-liberalism as a reaction to state policies 
which have equalised provision between urban Africans and recent immigrants 
from the homelands. Capetonian Africans continue to define their interests in 
contrast to those of other Africans; something which does in part mirror the fact that 
growing immigration has led to rising unemployment, especially amongst the least 
skilled Africans in the city.  
The above ties into the significance of apartheid’s system of differential 
discrimination in inscribing a distributional network that continues to play a major 
role in defining political and claim making identities in post-apartheid South Africa. 
It also shows how the removal of elements of this distributional framework has 
been resisted. The ‘moral economy’ which underlies this resistance in both 
communities stands in marked contrast to the vision of the rainbow nation so 
common in discussions of South Africa. It is, however, worth noting that 
transformations have started to have an impact; for example, ward boundaries have 
begun to gain significance in Guguletu.  
The second set of conclusions emerge around the relationship between civil 
society, the state and the role of civil society within the state. Public participation by 
civil society within the state and within state decision making processes has often 
been valorised as presenting a way in which communities can be empowered, the 
use of power by government can be regulated and effective governance can be 
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promoted through better linkages between citizens and the state. However, in Cape 
Town, such valorisation of civil society needs revision. 
Talking about the use of civic organisations as a mechanism through which 
to represent a unified, singular, community voice Steinberg argued that:  
The ‚will of the community‛ which emerges< surely masks the relations of power 
entailed in producing a single voice across a complex array of social relations< The 
civic’s institutional complex will surely surreptitiously silence as much as it voices.91 
 
In Cape Town such an interpretation appears to bear considerable weight.  
The fact that government policy seeks to promote linkages between civil 
society and local government but at the same time has provided considerable scope 
for local interpretation, has not established an effective system of oversight, and 
allows the devolution of power to civil society to exist at the discretion of local 
politicians has in many ways enhanced the opportunities for political society to 
dominate civil society, and for people to use civil society as a vehicle for individual 
rather than community ends. This is most apparent in Guguletu where the centrality 
of the ward councillors within the township’s distributional networks and the 
integration of civil society into these networks have created scope for the use of civil 
society as a means of disciplining and regulating local communities, rather than 
empowering them. People are unwilling to bring demands to their councillor, even 
within formal participatory structures, unless they are likely to receive a good 
reception. They are also wary about building new civil society organisations, for 
involvement in, and identification with, contentious politics makes one less likely to 
get access to resources than simply keeping quiet. Overall, therefore, the idea of 
public and civil society participation in governance as a universal good appears 
questionable, as does its ability to create increased sensitivity to popular demands. 
It is a truism that to represent the interests of its constituents to the state, civil 
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society must be able to maintain a degree of independence from the state. However, 
incorporation within participatory networks has constrained civil society 
organisations and linked their fortunes not to the public which they claim to 
represent, but to the councillors to whom they should be taking public demands. 
Similarly, the networks of distribution, and their implementation at the local level, 
discourage dissent and expression amongst residents and severely limit their 
willingness to seek alternative modes of representation. 
If existing civil society and government’s participatory programmes provide 
little scope for the empowering of local communities do the much vaunted ‘New 
Social Movements’ provide a more realistic alternative? Unfortunately not: the view, 
so often articulated amongst radical scholars, that New Social Movements and post-
apartheid protest represent a ‘new’ challenge to neo-liberalism and the makings of 
an alternative political project seem highly flawed. In the examples investigated 
here protest and political behaviour has been overwhelmingly driven by 
exclusionary identities. It has been in equalising provision, as well as deconstructing 
apartheid principles of distribution, that much of the protest in Cape Town has 
occurred. Furthermore, the localised nature of collective identities and the uneven 
nature of administrative practice across the city have meant that similar hardships 
have created fragmented responses. The fact that where protest has emerged it 
tends to be highly fragmented, driven by scrambles over limited resources and 
against other South Africans makes it difficult to see how civil society can combine 
to push wide ranging and visionary plans for social transformation, either within 
state sponsored participatory forums, or autonomously within civil society. This 
conclusion is backed up by the reality of NSM mobilising within Cape Town; after 
the housing riots in 2005 members of Cape Town’s Anti-Privatisation Forum sought 
to bring different community leaders and residents together in a city wide 
programme of action for housing, yet this ultimately failed due to the diverse 
demands and circumstances that the different townships were facing.92 
                                                   





Furthermore, the cases examined here have a particular significance because, 
unlike most post-apartheid protest which has been defensive, these protests have 
been pro-active. In communities where NSMs such as the Anti-Eviction Campaign 
have been successful this has generally occurred through defensive responses to 
moves by the state or other actors to remove existing services. For example, the first 
branch of the Anti-Eviction Campaign was formed after the city attempted to evict 
people from their houses in Tafelsig on the Cape Flats for non payment of rent. In 
these circumstances differences within communities have been collapsed by the 
imposition of common grievances from outside as people have unified to defend 
what they already have. In contrast, in Guguletu, protests have demanded services 
not currently available. As such their parochial nature suggests that whilst NSMs 
may be effective in resisting the removal of services; their ability to create a coherent 
vision for the expansion of services and a more egalitarian future appears limited.  
Finally, the two cases suggest that South Africans within civil society act 
with considerable rationality. Political and collective behaviour amongst Africans is 
not simply a result of loyalty to the party of liberation, just as amongst coloureds 
electoral support for the National Party and Democratic Alliance do not reflect an 
unqualified racism or ‘slave mentality.’93 In both communities political and 
collective behaviour has been heavily influenced by material conditions and their 
ongoing transformation. For Africans in Guguletu contentious political action 
contains considerable risks, whilst quiescence can bring rewards; consequently 
people generally avoid such action. In Bonteheuwel many coloureds define their 
interests in stark opposition to those of Africans; yet rather than reflecting a simple 
racism this reflects the fact that deracialisation has, for many coloured families, had 
considerable negative effects. Similar dynamics are at work in the ongoing conflicts, 
reminiscent of those under apartheid, between urban outsiders and migrants from 
the rural areas.  
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Chapter Eight  
Conclusion: A Tale of Two Townships 
 
8.1. Introduction: How, Why and What Changed? 
 
This thesis started with the question ‘how and why did people involve themselves 
in progressive organisation and action at the local level in Cape Town and how did 
this change between 1976 and 2006?’ It did so with the intention of not only charting 
and explaining the evolution of activism in the two case studies it focused upon, but 
also to draw broader conclusions about the nature of collective organisation and 
action. The adoption of a chronological approach has allowed the documentation of 
the how, why and what at particular points in time. This chapter aims to conclude 
the thesis by drawing together the broad themes that run throughout these separate 
periods.  
 In the introduction four general dynamics were identified that have 
dominated explanations of social movements and collective action. These were the 
impact of the broader political system (or political opportunities); the resources 
available to assist people to mobilise; the ideas and ideologies that provide the 
explanations that drive action; and the structural cleavages that provide the impetus 
which drives people to want to act. The importance of these dynamics over the 
thirty years of this thesis will be considered here.  
All four of these factors will be seen to have played a role in the shifting 
nature of progressive organisation and activism. The presence (or absence) of 
political space, organisational and material resources, and ideas that framed 
hardship all contributed to the emergence and development of activism in the case 
studies. However, whilst playing a role, the impact of these dynamics was mediated 
by the underlying social field upon which they acted. Resources and ideas could 





linked to their relevance for the lives of black South Africans and this relevance was 
intimately intertwined with the differential functioning of apartheid’s political 
economy. Similarly, people’s reactions to the political opportunities within and 
between the two cases were mediated by their personal characteristics. 
This conclusion therefore places the apartheid political economy (defined in 
terms not only of the labour market but also the functioning of state distribution) at 
the heart of its explanations. It does this in three ways. Firstly, it demonstrates how 
those people who formed the bedrock of activism under apartheid were not the 
poorest South Africans, but those who had the most to gain by apartheid’s abolition. 
For most of the apartheid period this saw activism dominated by an educated elite 
who felt particularly intensely the limits apartheid placed on personal advancement. 
However, as recession intensified, unemployment grew and state distributive 
networks were reconfigured, the ties that had bound poorer blacks into quiescence 
began to unravel and the social base of protest expanded to include militant youth 
activists.  
Secondly, it argues that people’s class positions within the broader social 
field played a key role in defining their responses to the shifting organisations, 
political opportunities and ideas. What for one person was an opportunity 
encouraging activism could be for another a restriction shutting off involvement. 
Similarly, the effectiveness of ideologies of liberation and protest varied within and 
between communities depending on their salience to people’s lived experiences.  
Thirdly, it argues that whilst people’s class positions played a significant role 
in the present, alone this cannot fully explain activism. The processes of 
discrimination, class formation and resource distribution that took place under 
apartheid came to pattern expectations as people made claims through the 
articulation and internalisation of apartheid identities. ‘Cape Borner’ and ‘coloured’ 
developed into group identities which, whilst originating in the apartheid political 





abolition. Indeed, as chapter seven showed, these identities are one of the key 
drivers of post-apartheid activism. 
 
8.2. Political Opportunities, Resources and 
Rationality Revisited 
 
In the introduction to this thesis four broad dynamics were sketched out which are 
seen to play a role in shaping the collective action and activism. Three of these were 
broadly grouped together as dynamics which ‘pull’ people into action by increasing 
the appeal of activism. Below the relevance of these dynamics to the two case 
studies will be considered, before the following section considers the underlying 
structural factors that ‘push’ people to act.  
 
8.2.1. Resources 
The weakest explanation for action in the two case studies was the importance of 
resources in creating activism and allowing people to act. It is certainly true that the 
existence of activist networks, access to equipment to print pamphlets, and the 
development of leaders with the ability to organise and articulate visions for 
transformation played a role in the unfolding and emergence of activism. 
Organisation and networks played a central role in drawing people into activism, 
and shaping the nature of that activism. The 1979/80 boycotts in both communities 
drew on a burgeoning of activist networks in the independent trade union 
movement, the non-racial sports movement and the churches to both organise many 
of the boycotts and to sustain themselves. Similarly, the unrest of the mid-1980s and 
its consolidation within the schools relied upon the pre-existence of activist 





and spread explanations for inequality, whilst militant youth politics was sustained 
by it integration into underground MK networks.  
Equally, a declining access to resources in the post-apartheid period has 
accompanied a decline in activism. In Guguletu the civic movement can no longer 
pay activists and relies on volunteers, whilst the movement of leadership from 
political into civil society has reduced the ability to organise within the civic 
movement; in Bonteheuwel a decline in involvement by the activist elite of the 1980s 
in civil society has seen local activism wither in the community. 
However, there is no clear correlation between the presence of resources and 
the strength and breadth of activism over the 30 years studied. Unrest exploded in 
1976 in both Bonteheuwel and Guguletu, despite an almost complete absence of 
resources to mobilise and sustain action. This was particularly the case in Guguletu, 
where students developed their own form of organisation through mass meeting 
without any outside assistance (indeed they explicitly rejected help from people 
who may have helped better structure their response). Similarly chapter four, with 
its study of the organising tradition within the coloured communities, shows how a 
large amount of organisational resource and effort does not necessarily deliver 
results. In 1980 there was relatively wide support for a range of protests across the 
city. Over the next three years coloured activists expended a huge amount of time 
and effort trying to build activism. They provided leadership to poor communities, 
used the media to spread their messages, provided buses and church halls for 
meetings and created regional and city wide linkages, all of which are seen as 
central drivers of movement success in social movement theory.1 However, they 
failed to replicate the level of popular protest in 1980, even when they protested 
around the same issues. This limited success of resources alone is well 
demonstrated by a comparison between the 1980 bus boycott, which was widely 
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supported despite being supported by little formal organisation, and the two day 
bus boycott in 1984, which saw limited support despite the distribution of over 
185,000 pamphlets and papers by around 2000 activists citywide.2  
 
8.2.2. Ideas and Ideologies 
Like resources, ideas and ideologies were significant and played a role in allowing 
people to understand and explain their situation and to sustain and structure 
protest. As shown in chapter five, the militant rhetoric of the ANC provided a vision 
of transformation and made acceptable actions that helped draw the militant youth 
within the umbrella of the broader anti-apartheid struggle. Similarly, the linking of 
gutter education to the apartheid system that took place during the schooling 
struggles of 1980 helped convince people, particularly young coloureds, that the key 
to the transformation in personal circumstances was national political change. 
Furthermore, it was the spreading of this idea across black society that lay behind 
the constant and sustained challenge to apartheid as people began to link their 
grievances into the overall functioning of the apartheid system.  
However, like resource mobilisation theories, ideological framing alone cannot 
be seen as a consistent driver of collective action for action could occur in the 
absence of strong narratives of change. In 1976 the students in Guguletu acted and 
then organised without any coherent frame for their activism except for a rejection 
of Afrikaans, revulsion at the actions of the police, and a desire for a better society. 
To recall the words of a student already quoted in chapter three:  
You know when you are student who didn’t have any ideology, you know for us it 
was just we don’t want Afrikaans, ‘we want to be free’< I remember my own 
perception, it really meant, you know, we threw stones, we burn everything, and the 
whites are going to get scared and I’m going to have a house in Constantia.3 
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Yet in spite of this students not only sustained their boycott well into 1977, but did 
so through the development of post-hoc ideologies that drew on their daily lives, 
but which lacked a coherent underlying narrative of change. 
 A slightly different picture emerges in the mid-1980s African student 
movement, which reveals how ideological coherence was not necessary for 
successful action providing that there was agreement on the need for change (i.e. 
there did not need to be a coherent vision of the future, providing everybody agreed 
that what was happening in the present needed to change). As discussed in chapter 
five, the African student movement was one of the strongest in the country, yet it 
was also one of the most ideologically diverse. There was consistent disagreement 
between activists over whether the target of the struggle was apartheid, or the 
whole capitalist system (the two or one stage approaches to revolution). However, 
broader agreement on the fact that apartheid needed to be overthrown and an 
organisational form that allowed debate and disagreement before decision making 
allowed the Joint SRCs to maintain support and strength whilst other organisations 
failed.  
 Finally, as recognised by people working within this field, the salience of 
frames ultimately depends upon their relevance to people’s lives.4 As shown in 
chapter four, coloured people were not consistently drawn into the civic movement 
in the early 1980s in part because it did not (and could not) articulate a coherent 
narrative of change. The limits of ideas were therefore set outside of the intellectuals 
who generated and spread those ideas by the underlying interests of the people 
activists were trying to mobilise.  
Overall, therefore, whilst the development of new ideas and ideologies helped 
activism in the two cases spread, ideas only achieved power when they intersected 
with people’s lived experiences. Furthermore, even in the absence of ideas activism 
could emerge, indeed the lived experience of activism could generate its own 
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explanations. To fully understand the impact and significance of ideas and 
ideologies, therefore, it is also necessary to understand the interests and coalitions 
that lay behind them. 
 
8.2.3. Political Opportunities 
The importance of changing political opportunities is easy to locate within the two 
case studies across the whole time period. As noted in the introduction, a range of 
different political opportunities have been identified by authors as playing a 
significant role in the emergence and sustaining of collective action. Of these three 
in particular can be seen to have played a consistent and significant role in the 
history of activism in the case studies: repression; the openness of the political 
system; cycles of contention. 
 Repression has often been seen as playing a key role in collective action, 
either by increasing the costs of action and thereby discouraging it, or, if ineffective, 
encouraging it by making the state appear vulnerable and enhancing feelings of 
injustice.5 Both of these dynamics were important in the history of activism in the 
two case studies. State repression was the starting point of the two major incidents 
of unrest studied within this thesis: 1976 and 1985-7. As seen in chapters 3 and 5, 
unrest began as a response to the state’s attempt to close off protest by force. This 
repression then created a sense of injustice and anger which delegitimised state 
power and forced people to react. However, perhaps most significantly, it also 
transformed collective identities by creating a shared (and negative) experience of 
the state which expanded the potential social basis for activism as whole 
communities were exposed to state violence, not only activists. This was particularly 
significant in 1976 when, as chapter three shows, repression pushed people with 
very limited initial demands and little ideological or organisational resource into 
sustained opposition to the state. 
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However, the functioning of repression was not uniform across time and 
place. Repression played a role in closing off protest in 1987/8, when the second 
state of emergency was accompanied by a more severe crackdown that had 
occurred previously. Similarly, the events of 1980 relied on a lack of repression as 
the spread of the boycotts relied on mass meetings, publicity and organising in the 
schools which depended on tolerance from the authorities. It is therefore difficult to 
locate a consistent impact of repression, beyond saying it mattered, within the two 
cases. 
The second significant political opportunity is the openness/closedness of 
the political system. This has been a consistent theme in studies of political 
opportunities and is based on the argument that, if the political system is either very 
open, or very closed, to direct influence by its citizens then social movement 
activism is unlikely to occur. This is because in a closed political system there is little 
return on activism as the state fails to respond, whilst in a very open political system 
there is little need for activism because people’s views can be represented through 
formal political structures. Activism, therefore, is seen to emerge when the political 
system does not necessarily act, but can be made to do so through action.6  
The openness of the state to the demands of the residents of the two 
communities has played a key role in defining the nature of activism throughout 
this period. In the African areas the quiescence of the civil society organisation that 
developed in the 1960s and 1970s was linked to a lack of representative mechanisms 
for Africans to be directly represented in the political process, alongside a 
willingness by local officials to engage with local civil society groups. The nature of 
civil society was therefore shaped by the opportunities that the political structure 
provided for activism. A similar pattern emerges both in the early 1980s in the 
coloured communities (chapter four) and amongst the African civic associations 
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during the transition (chapter six). At both these moments there was a willingness 
by the state to engage with the civics which saw an opening of political space that 
allowed them to deliver benefits to their participants and consequently their 
strength grew. However, as their ability to deliver declined (in the coloured 
communities from 1982 as the state moved towards tricameralism and in the 
African communities after democratisation as direct political representation meant 
that the collective will no longer needed to be solely represented within civil society 
(chapter seven)) so has participation. Similarly, as shown in chapter seven, post-
apartheid new social movement activism is related to the shifting contours of local 
political opportunities. Specifically, the emergence of contentious protest, such as 
the conflicts over jobs and housing allocation, can be seen to have emerged when a 
group felt that they were being shut out of decision making processes (i.e. the 
political system was closing) and organised themselves in order to reopen that 
access. 
Finally, the concept of cycles of contention is of significance, both in each 
individual escalation of protest studied, and over the whole period of this thesis. 
Cycles of contention are seen to emerge when groups emerge which challenge the 
state and press claims that resonate beyond their immediate group. They therefore 
force open political space and temporarily reduce the costs of action, drawing more 
and more people into contention.7 There can be little doubt that the growth of 
protest regularly followed a pattern similar to this in both case studies. The events 
of 1979/80 built through a series of protests each of which convinced people that 
action was possible and had the potential to succeed. The Fattis and Monis boycott 
convinced activists who were looking for ways to challenge apartheid that the state 
could be challenged. The schools boycott further widened people’s horizons and 
expanded the social base of protest, as did the bus boycott. By the time that the 
boycotts tailed off people, particularly in the coloured communities, had been 
convinced that they could challenge apartheid. 
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After 1980 people flowed into the political space created by the boycotts and 
began organising and theorising. Ideas were developed and activists increasingly 
became embedded within the two communities. In the coloured communities civic 
and youth activism emerged, followed later by the formation of the UDF and a 
growth in school yard politics. Similarly, in Guguletu, most notably from 1983 
onwards, youth and student politics began to develop. The activists working in 
these organisations blazed a trail for the unrest that was to be unleashed in 1985. 
The city wide profile of the UDF and the actions of activists within the two 
communities meant that when unrest started elsewhere in South Africa in 1984, and 
then spread to the Western Cape in 1985, people had examples to follow and ideas 
to explain their experiences. The intensity and sustained nature of 1985-7 must in 
part be seen as a consequence of the work done by the activists of the early 1980s in 
setting the scene. The repression after 1986, by closing down the political space for 
protest, brought the cycle to an end. However, the groundwork that had been done 
throughout the majority of the 1980s provided the framework and activists which 
made the re-emergence of activism in 1989, and the consolidation of democracy 
after 1990, possible. 
However, whilst accepting that political opportunities played a clear role in 
the changing nature of organisation and activism, they have their explanatory 
limits. Firstly, they provide little explanation for the reasons why different groups 
respond in different ways to the same opportunities. Chapter six provided clear 
evidence of the fact that the same broad citywide changes caused very different 
responses both across and within the two communities. African adults were drawn 
into civic organisations, coloured adults in general were alienated from such 
organisations, as were the radical youth, whilst African students remained relatively 
unaffected by national and regional changes. Whilst clearest in chapter six the same 
dynamics are also present throughout this thesis. Africans were far more consistent 
supporters of anti-apartheid activism than coloureds. In 1980 the African schools 
and bus boycotts both lasted longer than their counterparts in the coloured areas. 





than Africans. Finally, activism in both communities was almost exclusively 
dominated by young people.  
Two things lay behind these differential reactions, both of which are 
problematic for political opportunity theory’s ability to provide universal 
explanations. Firstly, political opportunities were not consistent across geographical 
space. Bonteheuwel was integrated into relationships with local government and 
political officials in a very different way to Guguletu. However, this was not simply 
a result of the different functioning of apartheid between coloured and African 
communities; it was also the result of local compromise and contestation. As shown 
in chapter three, civics and street committees in Guguletu emerged within a local 
and particular historical juncture in which township administrators needed to 
communicate with their residents as a result of a lack of local administrative 
capacity. This increased the rewards for cooperation with the authorities and 
generated quiescent activism. Similarly, the decline of post-apartheid civil society 
organisation has been intimately linked to the distributional networks and local 
political opportunities in the township; however these networks are locally 
constructed and can easily shift, such as when a local councillor is replaced. In both 
cases, therefore, the political opportunities that define collective action can be 
neither deduced from state policy, nor can they be presumed to exist in other 
townships. They are also open to constant change. This does not remove the validity 
of political opportunity theory in providing explanations, indeed it confirms the 
important role it plays. However, it does suggest that broad reaching conclusions 
about the impact of state systems cannot always provide effective explanations 
when considering local level case studies. 
The second, more significant, problem for political opportunity theories, is 
that their lack of concern with the factors that push people into protest means they 
cannot effectively account for differential reactions to the same opportunities. 
Throughout this thesis adults were less involved in activism than their children and 





chapter five, the same political context (in this case repression) could draw some 
people into protest (a militant youth) and therefore be seen as an expansion of 
opportunity, whilst pushing other people away from protest (older residents). 
Political opportunities, therefore, were mediated by the local and personal context 
within which they were operating.  
Therefore, like with theories of ideas and resources, political opportunities 
provide only part of the explanation for the nature of activism. To fully understand 
what drove people to act in the two case studies since 1976 it is necessary to 
understand not only how they were pulled into action by resources, ideas and 
opportunities, but also what pushed people to want to act in the first place.  
 
8.3. Race, Class and Collective Action 
 
The above discussion has not sought to argue that resources, ideas and 
opportunities were irrelevant for activism in the two case studies. Indeed, they 
played a crucial role in progressive organisation and activism throughout this 
period. However, what it has shown is that in the two cases clear limits were set on 
the impact of these dynamics by the nature of the communities within which they 
were operating. Sydney Tarrow has argued that contention is more linked to 
perceived opportunities and threats than it is to persistent social and economic 
factors.8 As will be shown below, the evidence in this thesis suggests the inverse. 
 Class, as defined by education, consumption and labour market position, 
played a central role in defining people’s responses to collective action. It helps 
explain the how, as people involved themselves in action in ways that were 
accessible to them and forged repertoires of action bound to social position and class 
cleavages. It helps explain the why, as people’s underlying material interests and 
                                                   





conceptions of the right society were intimately bound with their position in the 
social field. It also helps explain the ‘what changed’, as the reconfiguration of South 
Africa’s political economy between 1976 and 2006 played a significant part in 
driving people in and out of activism and in doing so also transforming the form of 
organisation and activism 
 
8.3.1. The Apartheid Class Ceiling 
The first impact of class on collective action was its role in defining who was and 
was not drawn towards progressive organisation and action. Throughout the 
apartheid period it was those South Africans with the most to gain, least to lose, and 
who were experiencing the restrictions of apartheid discrimination most severely 
that were drawn into activism. In contrast, those people who relied most upon state 
resources and protection within the labour market were least likely to become 
involved. This had little to do with wealth and poverty, but was linked instead to 
the functioning of apartheid discrimination. Similarly, moving into the post-
apartheid period, the differential impact of deracialisation led to those most able to 
benefit from the expansion of opportunities moving out of civil society. As it was 
this educated elite that had driven progressive organisation and activism before 
1990, this accounts for much of the decline in activism after 1994.  
In Bonteheuwel, and the coloured communities more generally, the loci of 
progressive activism was primarily within the schools and universities. Expanding 
levels of schooling and university enrolment gave growing numbers of young 
coloureds access to education, whilst, as chapter two showed, apartheid continued 
to deny them the opportunities to make full use of this education. Similarly, the 
protection that apartheid offered from competition in the labour market and the 
expanding opportunities in the skilled and unskilled trades had little meaning for 
this group. Within this context a desire to challenge the race ceiling of apartheid 
grew. This was clear in the demands issued by students in 1980 for an end to gutter 





clear in the interviews with school activists in chapter five and their vision of a 
society without racial boundaries. 
Before 1985 consistent anti-apartheid activism in the coloured communities 
remained limited to a relatively small activist elite, composed mainly of former 
university students and a small number of school pupils. However this elite was on 
occasion supplemented by the broader schooling population when opportunities for 
protest expanded, as they did in 1976, 1980 and most notably in 1985. Interestingly, 
the demands in Bonteheuwel that underlay these broader protests evolved 
throughout the period as experiences of discrimination shifted. In 1980 demands for 
better education were intertwined with anti-apartheid protest. By 1985 the focus 
was primarily political, not educational, change. Whilst difficult to conclusively link 
this shift to the broader apartheid economy, it did mirror the changing nature of 
educational provision and opportunity. In 1980 the economy was expanding and 
there were still opportunities beyond the schoolyard for people who achieved 
educational success (albeit these were limited for those achieving the highest level 
of education), part of protest therefore focused on widening access to quality 
education. By 1985 recession and unemployment had become widespread and 
opportunity was declining, whilst the quality of education had improved. People 
therefore focused on political change as it was beyond the schoolyard that their 
opportunities were being limited.  
In Guguletu a similar picture emerges. School pupils and university students 
were the backbone of the anti-apartheid movement in the township. As in 
Bonteheuwel this was related to the rising levels of education and limited chances 
for advancement. However, unlike Bonteheuwel, there was little improvement in 
the quality of education in Guguletu during the 1980s. Therefore although protest in 
Bonteheuwel shifted to primarily political issues after 1980, in Guguletu there 
remained a strong focus on schooling provision.  
The importance of the apartheid race ceiling is also clear in the trajectory of 





had been driving activism then it would be difficult to explain the decline of protest 
post-apartheid. However, accepting that progressive activism in the two cases was 
predominantly an aspirational revolt helps to account for the broad decline in 
activism after 1994. As chapter two showed, the removal of apartheid has 
increasingly seen South African society structured along the lines of class rather 
than race. In post-apartheid Cape Town the race ceiling that drove progressive 
activism under apartheid has now been removed and therefore engagement with 
activism has declined. 
In contrast, the groups least likely to be involved in anti-apartheid activism 
in both Guguletu and Bonteheuwel were older residents. Civic activism before the 
transition was limited in its strength in both communities and when it did succeed 
(in Bonteheuwel during the early 1980s) it did so as a result of its pragmatic focus on 
day-to-day issues, not political transformation. Similarly, the revolutionary fervour 
of the youth never transferred to their parents. Within this, however, it is important 
to acknowledge that there were clear differences within progressive politics 
between the two communities. Whilst there was little adult involvement in activism 
and organisation in Guguletu, there was considerable sympathy for the broader 
aims of political liberation in the community; in 1976 and the mid-1980s there was 
strong African support for political stayaways and in 1986 for the student rent 
boycott. In Bonteheuwel, despite its status as the most radical coloured township, 
there was not.  
As discussed in chapter four, the dynamics underlying adult quiescence 
varied between the two communities, although both were linked to people’s 
positions within the apartheid labour market and its distributional networks. In the 
coloured communities state welfare transfers and protection from labour market 
competition were valued by those residents who relied upon them most. Coloureds, 
particularly working class coloureds, came to have an ambiguous relationship with 
the apartheid state; whilst there were many elements of apartheid that they 





period between 1980 and 1994 appears to represent an overall decline in coloured 
support for the progressive political movements. As discussed in chapter five, there 
was less support for sympathy actions such as stayaways and boycotts in 1986 than 
there had been in 1976 and 1980. Whilst this cannot be attributed solely the shifting 
pattern of apartheid discrimination, it is certainly the case that as competition from 
Africans grew, unemployment rose, and the nationalisation of political positions 
made the articulation of a specifically coloured politics more problematic, general 
coloured support for political organisations which anchored themselves in 
discourses of deracialisation declined. As chapter two showed, this growing 
rejection of equality did was necessarily a misreading of the likely impact of 
deracialisation.  
Quiescence amongst African adults in Guguletu was less a result of support 
for apartheid, than a lack of immediate grievances pushing people to protest; 
Africans in Guguletu were poor, but they had access to work, housing and low 
rentals. However, apartheid did cause considerable hardship and therefore there 
was a willingness to express sympathy with more general anti-apartheid protest; 
although in the absence of persistent material grievances there were limits to the 
level of consistent protest. 
Finally, a focus on the relationship between the political economy and 
activism also helps explain the transformation in activism during the unrest of 1985, 
as the educated elite became joined by a more revolutionary youth. Similarly, it 
helps explain the disengagement of this group with transition. As argued in chapter 
five, during the mid-1980s recession the distributional and labour market ties that 
contributed to the maintenance of quiescence began to break down. In the coloured 
communities unemployment rose rapidly as deracialisation led to increasing 
coloured unemployment and the closing off of opportunities for people without 
skills who had previously been absorbed into the labour market. In the African 
areas there was also rising unemployment, whilst the costs of action for this group 





housing provision, were no longer available. In this context a group of young black 
South Africans with little to lose and much to gain were drawn under the broad 
banner of an anti-apartheid movement which was being transformed by the shift 
from legal protest to unrest.  
Conversely, as the focus of politics in the late 1980s and early 1990s shifted 
away from revolutionary transformation, this group became increasingly 
demobilised in both communities. The sense of status, hope and belonging they 
achieved by being at the heart of a movement for radical transformation fell away as 
the focus of progressive activism shifted and the deracialisation of the political 
economy undermined the basis on which the cross class alliance of the mid-1980s 
had been built. This decline in radicalism was then compounded, particularly in 
Guguletu, as the post-apartheid reconfiguration of distributional networks served to 
draw people back into cooperation with the state. As noted in chapter seven, the fact 
that people can now access resources, but that such access depends of political 
loyalty, has led to a decline in contentious political action, even when people are 
clearly unhappy with the level of delivery.  
 
8.3.2. (Im)moral Economies? 
The second significant role of the South African social field is that not only did it 
create the immediate interests that drove people to protest, it also created deeper 
underlying identities that helped set the limits of activism by mediating the impact 
of the progressive discourses. Indeed, whilst people’s positions within the apartheid 
social field played an important role in their responses to progressive activism, they 
did not determine them absolutely. Claim making identities, themselves rooted in 
processes of distribution and class formation, also played a significant role in 
responses to activism.  
As chapter four showed, the importance of classification as a Section 10 





identities, but also their internalisation. Section 10 Africans came to believe that they 
were more deserving than recent immigrants from the Eastern Cape. Coloureds 
came to believe they were more deserving than Africans. Furthermore, these 
identities were conceptualised in zero sum terms. Coloureds saw gains for Africans 
as losses for them, whilst section 10 Africans saw gains for migrants in similar 
terms. In many ways this was a correct reading of the apartheid labour market and 
distributive system as it functioned. Many coloureds were protected by the denial of 
rights to Africans, whilst section 10 Africans were protected from competition from 
immigrant labour. In this way the apartheid political economy set not only the 
material, but also the cognitive bounds of activism.  
The importance of these moral economies is ever-present throughout this 
thesis. In Guguletu in 1976 conflict between migrant workers, students and 
township dwellers coalesced not only around the immediate demands of the unrest, 
but also longstanding divisions between the two communities. Chapter four 
showed how conflict over resources was often conceptualised in terms of 
Capetonians and squatters and how this undermined the formation of a unified 
progressive movement in the city. Chapter seven also showed how post-apartheid 
these identities have continued to have salience, even though their legal basis has 
eroded. Furthermore, although only mentioned in passing in chapter five due to 
space, the squatter conflicts of 1986-8 saw similar insider/outsider discourses being 
articulated as conflicts over resources intersected with claim making identities 
rooted in the apartheid political economy: 
They (the committee formed by the squatters) entered on their own strength here. 
We don’t recognize (sic) them. They’ve all got homes in the Transkei – We are Cape 
born. They are making a business here.9 
 
Similar moral economies were apparent in Bonteheuwel. Coloureds saw and 
conceptualised their interests in opposition to those of Africans. Discourses of 
liberation that sought to break down these barriers struggled for salience and in 
                                                   





1994 were conclusively rejected by the townships’ citizens. Post-apartheid, the 
citizens of Bonteheuwel continue to articulate collective identities rooted in 
apartheid’s racial classifications.  
The apartheid social field therefore not only defined the limits of action in 
material terms, but also produced identities which pattered action and mediated 
reactions to the broader discourses being spread by progressive activists. These 
(im)moral economies have also continued to inform collective action post-apartheid.  
 
8.3.3. The Mediating role of Race and Class  
The final role of the South African political economy in influencing progressive 
activism in the two cases has already been touched upon, but will be briefly 
recapped here. This was its role in mediating the impact of the broader 
opportunities and resources operating within the country. 
As noted above, the political opportunities, ideas and resources available to 
activists did not simply define the forms that activism took, but were also defined 
by the social base of the activism that emerged. As shown throughout this thesis, 
particularly in chapter six, the impact of political opportunities was mediated by 
their intersection with the broader social field. For example, the repression of the 
mid-1980s was experienced differentially by a disenfranchised and economically 
marginalised youth which saw within violence the possibility of self fulfilment and 
older residents who disengaged as a result of the rising costs of engagement. 
Furthermore, the shifting base of activism itself shaped the very form of activism 
undertaken. For example within the coloured communities the forms of action 
adopted during the early 1980s were tied to the responses of the broader coloured 
population. Activists wanted to create revolution, but social conservatism required a 
focus on bread-and-butter issues. In contrast, the expansion of radical youth 
involvement in the mid-1980s made possible new, more militant, political 





activism in the two case studies by focusing on the ideas, resources and 
opportunities alone. Similarly, the underlying social structure cannot be understood 




The above discussion has provided a basis on which to begin to answer the question 
at the heart of this thesis. As seen ideas, resources and political opportunities all 
created and shaped the space within which activism emerged. However, their 
impact was mediated by the social field upon which they acted. Socio-economic 
factors influenced who did and did not get drawn into activism in the two case 
studies. In turn there was feedback between the social base of activism and the 
forms progressive activism adopted.  
In chapter one three broad approaches to the study of activism South Africa 
in the apartheid and post-apartheid periods were outlined. Firstly that activism was 
a reaction to the clear injustice and inequality in apartheid and post-apartheid 
society. Secondly, that activism emerged when the political opportunities arose that 
allowed people to articulate their interests. Finally, that activism was and is at heart 
a broad coalition of local struggles, grounded in local conditions, but brought 
together on occasion by their common grounding in underlying structural 
contradictions. This thesis has argued that in both the case studies progressive 
activism emerged out of a combination of the second and third explanations. 
Specifically, that people involved themselves in forms of activism that they could 
understand and that allowed them to articulate their interests within the limits and 
opportunities set by the broader political system. They chose to involve themselves 
in progressive activism because of a belief that it offered a better future and that the 
costs of doing so did not outweigh the benefits. Both the forms of activism and its 





broader opportunity context in South Africa, was configured and reconfigured in 
ways that changed the opportunities for action, the costs and benefits of acting and 
people’s beliefs about what they rightly deserved.  
 
8.5. Last Thoughts 
 
This thesis has covered a large period of time and its coverage of each individual 
time period has been necessarily brief. As such it only begins to scratch at the 
surface of the complex dynamics that lay behind each of the individual events and 
organisations that have been investigated and whilst undertaking this research 
many areas of further research suggested themselves.  
Many of the individual organisations covered here would be worthy of 
further investigation. The Joint SRCs and student politics more generally in the 
province stand out as a unique case in South Africa during the 1980s. A deeper 
understanding of how the Joint SRCs functioned, how the complex ideological 
traditions were transmitted into the African communities, and the collective 
identities that drove the students would be particularly interesting. 
 The functioning of the ANC underground in the province is also ripe for 
study. During the research for this thesis I located a large amount of information 
which could be used as the starting point for a deep study of how MK functioned as 
an underground movement. I hope to have made a small start in this respect in my 
discussion, in chapter five, of the role the underground played in militant youth 
politics. However there is much more to be uncovered as it was clear that beneath 
the grassroots organisations sat underground networks and caucuses, particularly 
moving into the late 1980s. 
 Finally, a more systematic approach to test some of the central hypotheses 





data to sketch the relationship between race, class, insider/outsider status, life 
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The focus of this thesis is to trace and explain changes in grassroots progressive 
organisation and activism in the African community of Guguletu and the coloured 
community of Bonteheuwel in Greater Cape Town between 1976 and 2006. To do so 
it uses a comparative, multi-method, case study approach. Specifically it combines 
qualitative analysis of two case studies through the use of interviews, archival 
sources and participant observation with a quantitative examination of the shifting 
impact of apartheid discrimination, and its removal after 1994, on coloureds and 
Africans in both South African and the Western Cape. The rationale for a 
comparative case study approach has already been discussed in the introduction, as 
has the relationship between this thesis and current academic literature.1 This 
appendix discusses in more detail the methodological approach that I have chosen 
to use, the reasons why, and the strengths and weaknesses of this approach. 
To address the strengths and weaknesses of my design I will first outline the 
research questions I adopted to focus my research. My design’s methodology and 
methods will then be explained and analysed. Then the strengths and weaknesses 
will be discussed. 
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In order to provide focus to my study I followed Blaikie’s advice and defined my 
research using research questions.2 The key question driving this thesis is: 
 
How and why did people involve themselves in progressive organisation and action 
at the local level in Cape Town and how did this change between 1976 and 2006? 
 
Sitting beneath this overarching question are a series of sub-questions. By 
answering these sub-questions it becomes possible to build up an overall picture of 
collective action and grassroots organisation in the two communities through which 
to answer the overarching research question posed. These questions are: 
 
What form did progressive organisation and activism take? 
Who was involved in progressive organisation and activism (what was the social 
base of organisation and activism)? 
Why were people involved in progressive organisation and activism? 
Why did progressive organisation and activism take the form it did? 
How and why did organisation change (or not) over time? 
 
This decision to adopt a set of research questions from the outset of my design can 
be seen to be a considerable strength, as: 
                                                   





Research questions constitute the most important elements of any research design 
*as+ < Decisions about all other aspects of the research design are contingent on 
their contribution to answering the research questions.3  
 
By stating my aims clearly my research design allowed me to judge the 
appropriateness of methods and provided a way to judge the usefulness of data, 
both whilst it was being collected and at the point of analysis. 
   
Methodology 
 
Selecting a Case Study Approach 
The first major decision that I had to make was the methods that I would use to 
answer these questions. Before I entered the field I decided in advance upon an 
embedded case study approach.4 
I selected a qualitative approach to data collection and analysis because the 
retrospective nature of my study made new quantitative data collection highly 
problematic.5 Within this broad framework I decided to use a case study approach 
because case studies provide a recognised framework through which to present and 
analyse qualitative data. Crucial in the production of qualitative research is the 
production of ‚thick descriptions‛ of the links between variables at the micro-level 
as the best way of illustrating the validity of one’s inferences.6 By allowing the 
flexible use of a range of methods the case study approach maximises the 
                                                   
3 Ibid., p.23 
4 Yin divides case studies into holistic and embedded types, with an embedded case study involving 
the analysis of sub units within each case. As I will be studying Cape Town through the investigation 
of two separate townships and various groups within those township my design can be seen to follow 
this pattern. Yin, R, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, (London & Thousand Oaks, 1994) 
5 Any new quantitative study would have been impossible as my desire to trace activism 
retrospectively meant that I could not conduct a survey. However, as discussed later, I did use already 
existing quantitative data where appropriate.  
6 Schofield, J W, „Increasing the Generalizability of Qualitative Research‟, in (ed.) Hammersley, M, 





possibilities for data collection to underlie the thick descriptions that are essential in 
qualitative studies7. The case study also provides a framework through which to 
analyse this data, as it is a holistic approach to phenomenon, which treats them as a 
complex combination of variables and therefore provides a framework for 
compiling thick descriptions from the multiple data sources.8 Also, by comparing 
and contrasting different forms of data through triangulation the case study 
provides a framework through which to judge the validity of the qualitative data 
that is collected.9 
The case study also provides a way to integrate the historical aspects of my study 
with the contemporary situation as its: 
...unique strength is the ability to deal with a full variety of evidence- documents, 
artefacts, interviews and observation- beyond what might be available in a 
conventional historical study.10 
 
The case study is also closely related to the methods favoured in existing academic 
research in this field.11 This is a strength, as I did not have to worry about my choice 
of methodology being inappropriate, as it locates itself within an existing academic 
tradition.  
My choice of a case study approach was also influenced by the epistemological 
standpoint guiding this research. Epistemology places limits upon what can be 
known and therefore what kinds of knowledge are ‘adequate and legitimate.’ It also 
influences the acceptable research methods and methodologies.12 Implicit in my 
methodology is a constructivist approach which accepts that rather than there being 
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8 Hopkin, J, „Comparative Methods‟, in (eds.) Marsh, D & Stoker, G. Theory and Methods in Political 
Science, (Basingstoke, 2002) 
9 Yin, R, Case Study Research... 
10 Ibid., p.8 
11 See for example: Van Kessel, I, “Beyond Our Wildest Dreams”: The United Democratic Front and 
the Transformation of South Africa, (Charlottesville & London, 2000) 
12 Crotty, M, The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process, 





objective social truths waiting to be discovered social reality is instead a result of the 
constructed meanings that individuals create through interacting with their 
surroundings.13 The fact that my research questions and case studies focus on 
gaining access to individual experience, and locating these experiences within the 
broader social structure, rather than searching for objective ‘social truths’ is 
consistent with such an approach. 
 
Defining the Field of Study 
Having selected a case study approach I needed to select the case studies that I 
would use as the basis of my comparison. Before I arrived in the field I decided on 
some broad criteria that would guide my choice of cases, but did not select the 
individual cases themselves. Specifically I planned to investigate progressive 
organisation and activism in: 
 
A coloured township 
A formal African township 
An African squatter community 
 
These criteria were linked to the broader theoretical approach I had adopted and 
were designed to increase the generalisability of my research. Hopkin sees the use 
of contrasting cases as a way of seeing if issues that manifest themselves in 
individual cases are actually general trends.14 As discussed in chapter one, theories 
of collective action and social movements focus on four broad dynamics. These are: 
the resources available to organisations and activists; the impact of the broader 
                                                   
13 Ibid. 





political context (the political opportunity structure); the identities that lay behind 
collective action; and the social basis of collective action. As these three cases differ 
on all these axes any common responses to similar changes across cases could be 
seen to represent generalisable trends. 
As detailed in chapter two, under apartheid coloureds had access to higher paid 
jobs than Africans, had privileged access to housing and welfare and were treated as 
legal citizens of the Republic of South Africa. In contrast Africans in the formal 
townships had a legal right to remain in the cities, but were not considered citizens, 
and had access to jobs and housing in front of African migrant workers (but not 
coloureds). Finally, African squatters were, for most of the apartheid period, living 
in the cities illegally. They had no legal right to housing or employment, lived in 
informal accommodation, and were usually employed on low wages. Similarly, post 
apartheid these groups have all had different experiences. Coloureds have lost 
privileged access to housing and employment, although they continue to be better 
paid and more likely to be in better housing than Africans. Africans in the formal 
townships have seen their privileges relative to migrants and squatters eroded, but 
have still seen considerable benefits of deracialisation and continue to benefit from 
their access to housing. African squatters are no longer illegal residents in the cities, 
but have still been exposed to high levels of unemployment and by their very 
definition have no access to formal housing. These differences mean that both 
during and post-apartheid all three groups had very different resources, political 
opportunities and identities. They were also all embedded within the apartheid 
political economy in different ways. Consequently the differences between the cases 
would allow me to identify how each of these dynamics impacted on the sorts of 
progressive organisation and activism that developed and the reasons people 
became involved in this activism. 
Whilst I decided on the broad criteria by which I would select cases I did not decide 
before I entered the field on the specific case study areas. Strauss & Corbin suggest 





samples that provide the best opportunities for comparison, but only doing so after 
having undertaken initial data collection which allows the researcher to identify the 
most appropriate cases.15 Adopting this approach had two key benefits for this 
thesis. Firstly, I wanted to ensure that the cases I selected could be studied 
practically. Blakie notes that whilst in an ideal world all that would influence 
research choices would be their appropriateness regarding the research questions, it 
is important to note that constraints of time, cost, researcher skills and access all 
influence such decisions and this brings both strengths and weaknesses to any 
design.16 South Africa has a high crime rate, particularly in the black communities 
which means that many areas of study are out of bounds. The archival record for 
the apartheid period is patchy and most of the archives would only be accessible 
once I reached the field. I would also need contacts if I was going to identify 
appropriate interviewees and undertake participant observation. I could not, 
therefore, tell in advance whether I would be able to access appropriate data for my 
study. By waiting until I was in the field I was able to ensure that the cases I selected 
were practically studiable as I was able to make contacts and undertake a 
preliminary audit of the available archive material.  
The second reason for waiting until I was in the field was because a lot of the 
information required to identify the most appropriate cases was not available in the 
UK. As my thesis focused on an area that has not previously been studied in any 
great depth I was unable to identify which communities had histories of 
organisation and activism and which did not. By waiting until I was in the field I 
was able to have discussions with activists past and present that allowed me to 
develop a preliminary view of the nature of activism in the city over the preceding 
thirty years and through this identify those cases that did indeed differ in terms of 
resources, political opportunities, identities and social structure. 
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After arriving in the field and undertaking preliminary discussions with both 
academics and some activists I decided to focus on the following case studies: 
Bonteheuwel (a coloured township); Guguletu, (a formal African township); 
Brown’s Farm (an African squatter community). However, as I started to undertake 
my fieldwork I came to quickly realise that the amount of work involved in 
studying three separate cases over a thirty year period would not be achievable 
within the time limit of the thesis. I therefore decided to drop Brown’s Farm and 
concentrate on the two formal townships, Guguletu and Bonteheuwel.  
I made the decision to focus on the two formal townships because after starting my 
research it became apparent that most squatter communities that had emerged 
before 1994 had been upgraded into formal housing, and the populations of those 
that remained were highly fluid. In contrast, the populations of the formal 
townships had remained relatively static as people were already in formal housing 
and therefore were not moved as the townships were upgraded. They were also less 
likely to have moved as access to housing is a major asset in a country with limited 
housing stock for people on low incomes. It was therefore impossible to trace 
activism within a single squatter community across the whole period of this thesis, 
whilst in the two formal housing areas it was relatively easy to locate activists and 
build up a picture of activism across the time period. 
Within the broader framework for comparison I chose cases that would allow me to 
study the theoretical questions I had set myself, but which could also be practically 
studied. Guguletu was chosen from a practical perspective because: it was 
physically easy to access; I had contacts in the township who could introduce me to 
activists both past and present; some earlier research, including both interviews and 
some published data, had been undertaken which I was able to utilise. However, the 
main decision was made on theoretical grounds. Guguletu is a ‘typical’ African 
Capetonian formal township. It was built in the 1960s and until the relaxing of 
influx control its residents were mainly Africans with Section 10 residence rights 





in the field also allowed me to determine that its history of activism was broadly 
representative of African activism in the formal African townships. It experienced 
some anti-apartheid activism and protest and there has been some post-apartheid 
activism and protest, however it was not a ‘hot bed’ of activism. Because of this 
‘typicality’ I was able to move beyond studies that have sought only to explain why 
protest emerged to produce a more rounded picture which includes why activism 
both did and did not occur. 
Some of the reasons for selecting Bonteheuwel were also practical. After some initial 
discussions with the local councillor I was put in touch with the Community Liaison 
Officer in the community. He had been involved in progressive politics in the mid-
1980s and was able to refer me on to other contacts. Like Guguletu, the township 
was also physically easy to access. However, the main reason for choosing 
Bonteheuwel (like Guguletu) was theoretical. Specifically it was chosen because it 
was atypical, or what Yin calls a ‘unique case.’17 After arriving in the field it quickly 
became clear that coloured involvement in progressive activism, both apartheid and 
post-apartheid, had been limited in most areas of the city and for most of the period 
under consideration. It would therefore be difficult to gain sufficient data from 
which to construct a thirty year comparative history of activism within most 
coloured communities. However, within this broader context Bonteheuwel had a 
history as the most radical coloured community. This meant that comparative data 
was available throughout the period in question. On one level, therefore, the choice 
was driven by practical considerations. However, there was also a strong 
methodological reason for choosing a unique coloured case. By focusing on the most 
radical coloured community I was able to clearly see the upper limits of coloured 
activism. Because coloured communities had greater political opportunities for 
action and greater resources, but suffered less socio-economic and political 
discrimination than African communities, this approach allowed me to compare 
activism between a community with conditions less conducive to organising but 
                                                   





with greater hardships, and a community with conditions more conducive to 
organising but with less hardships. It therefore allowed for a comparison of the 
relative significance of structural and organisational factors in activism. 
 
Methods 
I initially planned for my thesis to be based solely on qualitative data. Specifically 
the use of interviews, archives and participant observation to draw together 
detailed case studies. However, as my research progressed and I began to draw 
preliminary conclusions I realised that many of my interviewees were expressing 
views that suggested that the changing socio-economic structure of South Africa 
was playing a central role in their behaviour. Many coloured people expressed the 
view that they had been disadvantaged by the ending of apartheid, whilst many 
Africans blamed the influx of migrants from the Eastern Cape for the fact they could 
not access housing and employment. I therefore became increasingly interested in 
how discrimination and the interrelationship between race and class had changed 
over the period of my thesis. I therefore expanded my thesis to include secondary 
analysis of a range of pre-existing quantitative data sources, alongside studies by 
other academics, to draw together a picture of how the apartheid political economy 








Qualitative Data Collection: Sources 
I used multiple methods (interviews, documents and observations) to collect 
qualitative data, through which to construct a narrative of organisation and activism 
in the two case studies. I also used interviews (and observation for present day 
activism) to investigate the reasons that individuals themselves give for their 
involvement in political activity and how they interacted with the organisations 
they were and are part of.  
My interviews were all semi-structured. I considered using unstructured 
interviews18 but because I had clear research questions that I wanted to answer I 
needed relevant data and therefore needed to guide the conversations. However, 
rather than establishing a set discussion guide at the start of the research to guide all 
subsequent interviews I adopted a reflexive approach, constantly revisiting my 
discussion guide as more data became available and my understanding of the 
situation developed. I also returned to some interviewees when additional 
information made this appropriate. In this way I was able to react to the data I was 
collecting and build up a detailed picture in the two case studies. 
To adhere to ethical standards I offered confidentiality to interviewees and asked 
respondents to sign a form stating their preferences. I also made clear the purpose of 
my research to all participants. Interestingly very few people requested 
confidentiality and where they did it was more often for ‘off the record’ comments 
that they made during interviews that were otherwise ‘on the record. However, on 
writing up the thesis I made a decision to anonymise interviews unless the 
respondent was a well known figure and naming them would add considerable 
weight to the conclusions. The reason for this was twofold. Firstly, particularly with 
regard to more recent activism, people have been involved in illegal activities and 
on occasions political disloyalty is punished. Therefore, the potential consequences 
for the interviewees were such that I felt unable to identify them in a published 
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document. Secondly, the past is a contested terrain and, particularly in 
Bonteheuwel, there is considerable ongoing resentment between activists. I did not 
want to add to this resentment or place undue public scrutiny on those activists I 
quoted. I have transcripts and recordings of all interviews, which I am happy to 
make available on request.  
The use of interviews in my design was a particular strength. It allowed me to move 
beyond the proclamations of organisations to understand the individual 
motivations behind my subject’s actions and therefore provided answers to the 
research questions focus upon why people were and are involved in activism and 
organisation. Because much organising under apartheid was clandestine, and even 
when organising was above ground archival records were not always kept or have 
been destroyed, interviews also allowed me to piece together a fuller picture of the 
history of activism than would otherwise have been possible. 
The use of interviews, however, did have its weaknesses. A constant theme in 
studies of interviewing is the importance of the interaction between interviewer and 
interviewee. Burgess notes that central to a participant’s willingness to divulge 
information in a qualitative interview is the building of a good rapport between the 
interviewer and the respondent.19 This assumed significance in this study because 
there was often considerable social distance between myself and the people I was 
interviewing. As a white, middle class, English researcher I had little socially or 
economically in common with many of the people I was interviewing who were 
almost all black and South African, and many were working class and poor. 
Interestingly, however, I did not find that social difference played the major role in 
the building up of rapport and the quality of the interviews I undertook. Many of 
my best interviews were with people who were least like me and some of the worst 
were with people who were middle class and educated. Indeed, I found that being 
associated with a university gave me a certain status with many people that allowed 
me to ask difficult questions and get what appeared to be honest responses. Within 
                                                   





this, however, there were some interviews where I had little rapport with the 
subjects and this did lead to difficulties in getting reliable data. 
More problematic in interviewing people, however, were issues of recall, and 
deliberate mis-recall. What people are willing to reveal in interviews is constrained 
by what they remember, as well as a desire to present a favourable impression.20 As 
I was investigating contentious political action which at times involved violence and 
subversion there were likely to be limits to the amount people would confide in me. 
Equally importantly, many people who were active in the anti-apartheid struggle 
have assumed positions in post-apartheid South Africa based on the political 
networks that they built up during apartheid and their contribution to the struggle. 
Consequently, many interviewees had a personal hagiography to maintain which 
prevented them from always talking honestly about their involvement. This was 
most apparent in Bonteheuwel where post-apartheid divisions within the 
progressive movement have led to endless wrangling over the contribution people 
have made to the struggle. Claims and counter claims abound regarding the role 
individual activists played and these seem at times to be more driven by personal 
animosity than any clear fact. However, it was also apparent in Guguletu. A 
common theme in my interviews was people overstating their own involvement in 
organisation and the strength of the organisations they were involved in. 
To minimise the problems with the validity of the data collected through interviews 
I adopted several different approaches. Firstly, I undertook a considerable number 
of interviews (around 100 overall). By doing this I was able to compare and contrast 
various different interpretations and historical recollections. Where the same themes 
or the same events came up consistently I was able to feel surer in the accuracy of 
the descriptions and could discount interviews which were clearly inaccurate. 
Interestingly, contestation in Bonteheuwel helped with this on occasion as the level 
                                                   






of disagreement was such that when there was broad agreement across activist 
groups the validity of the data could be more easily assumed. 
As well as cross checking validity between interviews my multi-method research 
design also provided alternative sources that could both shed light on different 
aspects of organisation and activism, as well as allow for the crosschecking of 
interview data (and vice versa). To complement these interviews I analysed a range 
of historical documentary sources. These included the publications and records of 
various grassroots organisations, both city-wide and in the case studies, newspaper 
reports, evidence from political trials and records of the Black Local Authorities. 
Documentary sources were particularly useful for understanding the what and how 
of organisation and activism as they documented the physical history of 
organisations and events. However they did on occasion also provide information 
on questions of why people became involved. Trial records often provided 
justifications for involvement. Interestingly, local authority records also contained 
information that allowed me to build descriptions of the relationships between 
residents and the state that shed considerable light on the patronage networks that 
were operating and which, in combination with interviews, provided a deeper 
understanding of the reasons why people acquiesced under apartheid. 
Like interviews documentary sources present a range of problems for the 
researcher. Documents can be biased, both in their content and in the 
representativeness of what has survived. They are also unlikely to have content that 
addresses the research questions directly, meaning such research relies on 
inferences by the researcher.21 Newspaper reports were heavily affected by 
censorship; progressive publications often represented the situation as activists 
would have liked it to be rather than as it was; local authority records were never 
intended to be used to understand progressive organisation; what people say in 
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trials, and what evidence is submitted, is influenced as much by a desire to escape 
or secure prosecution as it is by a desire to preserve the historical record.  
Document survival bias was a particular problem in my research as only limited 
archival evidence for local activities survived in both case studies. As there was no 
township in the city that had a strong archival record of its progressive activities 
this was an unavoidable weakness. To mitigate this I used records of city-wide and 
regional structures which were better preserved and, although often lacking in 
detail, did provide evidence on activities in the two townships. More importantly, 
however, the triangulated methodology I adopted allowed me to combine first hand 
testimony with documentary sources. I was therefore able to both assess the bias 
and validity of documentary sources,22 and assess the accuracy and bias of these 
personal accounts.23 I was also able to move beyond the limits of the individual data 
sources and build up a more rounded picture by combining documentary evidence 
with interviews. Even when sparse in their coverage documents could point out 
topics, events and dynamics that I was then able to investigate in more detail 
through interviewing. The use of documentary sources also allowed me to validate 
my interviews. For example, claims about organisational strength were often 
disproved by the minutes of the organisations themselves. This in turn allowed me 
to challenge interviewees when they presented over simplified pictures of their 
organisations. This allowed me not only to judge when interviewees were being 
truthful, but also encouraged interviewees to be more truthful themselves as they 
were aware I had additional knowledge with which to validate their claims. 
The final data source I used was to observe political activity in action by attending 
activities such as meetings and protests. This was clearly only possible for the 
contemporary period. However, by involving myself in organisation I was able to 
gain increased access to the meanings that guided participants’ behaviour, beyond 
                                                   
22 Platt, J, „Evidence and Proof in Documentary Research: 1 Some Specific Problems of Documentary 
Research‟, Sociological Review, 29, 1981, pp.31-56 
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those that they would have been willing or able to reveal to me in a short interview 
situation.24 This was particularly important in the case of Guguletu. My 
understanding of the importance of insider/outsider identities came from attending 
meetings of the housing new social movement in the community and listening to 
the rhetoric that was employed. I was then able to both understand this rhetoric 
within the context of action, as well as incorporate questions about these identities 
into my more formal interviewing. Spending time with coloured activists also 
helped me understand the hopes and aspirations that had driven them during 
apartheid and how these had changed post-apartheid. Interestingly, by helping me 
to better understand current subjectivities within the two communities I was able to 
overcome some of the problems that arose from the fact that I initially had limited 
access to the cultural codes and norms that underlay action in the two 
communities.25  
 
Qualitative Data Collection: Limits 
Whilst the use of a triangulated approach to qualitative data collection allowed me 
to cross reference my sources and has increased my confidence in the conclusions I 
have drawn there are still limits to this approach.  
I had to rely on intermediaries to help identify potential subjects for interviewing. 
This represents a form of snowball sampling and was a weakness for two reasons. 
Firstly, choices about who to interview were taken out of my hands as other people 
made decisions on the most appropriate contacts for me to talk to.26 I tried to avoid 
this by taking multiple routes into communities; I did not simply identify one 
                                                   
24 Hammersley, M & Atkinson, P, Ethnography: Principles in Practice, (London, 1989) 
25 Vansina talks about the importance of getting to understand the subjectivities of the people that you 
are studying. See: Vansina, J, „Fieldwork in History‟, in (eds.) Adenaike, C K & Vansina, J, In Pursuit 
of History: Fieldwork in Africa, (Oxford, 1996). Through my involvement with contemporary 
grassroots organisation I was able to both understand the identities that were driving post-apartheid 
collective action, but also understand the deeper meanings that people attached to their insider status 
and therefore throw more light on events that had taken place under apartheid. 
26 Atkinson, R & Flint, J, „Accessing Hidden and Hard-to-Reach Populations: Snowball Research 





activist and snowball my sample from them, but identified several activists with 
different backgrounds and used lots of separate snowballs. However I cannot be 
sure that the activists I contacted were truly representative and I did not miss out 
key players.  
The second problem with this approach is that I had little contact with ‘ordinary’ 
citizens; I contacted activists and they passed me on to other activists. The point of 
entry into grassroots struggles and organisations was the oral testimonies of 
activists combined with surviving documentary sources. Whilst the wide range of 
sources I used (particularly the use of local authority records in Guguletu and the 
broader picture of social change I developed through the quantitative work 
discussed below) helped prevent an unquestioning acceptance of an ‘official line,’ I 
have to acknowledge that a stronger thesis may have emerged if I had had the time 
and access to conduct more interviews with ‘ordinary’ township residents. Indeed 
this would be an interesting approach for a future study of activism.27  
 The snowball sampling approach also created problems when studying 
particular time periods – most notably the unrest of 1976 and particularly 1985/6. A 
large number of people became involved in protest at this time but because of the 
fluid nature of protest many people, including leaders, did not sustain involvement 
after the unrest had died down. It was therefore difficult to locate people who had 
been central to these events as their location was not known even to others who had 
been involved. This was further compounded by the fact that the forms of activism 
during unrest did not lend themselves to the creation of archival records. In this 
respect 1976 was less problematic because the commission into the riots gathered a 
considerable amount of data which I was able to use. However sources for the 
unrest of 1985/6 were particularly hard to come by, especially as the state has 
destroyed magistrate court records from this period. There is no real mitigation to 
                                                   
27 For the problems of relying upon the testimonies of activists in assessing the nature of civic 
activities, and one methodological approach towards trying to gain a more grassroots view of the 
civics see; Janet Cherry, 'Hegemony, Democracy and Civil Society: Political Participation in 
Kwazakele Township, 1980-93', in (eds.) Adler, G and Steinberg, J, From comrades to citizens: the 





this problem as researchers from outside the community are even less likely to be 
able to trace such people than activists within the community and the lack of 
archival sources is irreversible. However it did make it more difficult to reconstruct 
the events and motivations of people at these times and at times limited the 
conclusions I was able to draw. 
 
Quantitative Data Collection 
Alongside a qualitative examination of progressive organisation and activism I also 
undertook quantitative analysis of existing data to pull together a picture of the 
changing nature of discrimination and South Africa’s political economy. The results 
of this analysis are presented in chapter two.  
The use of quantitative evidence strengthened my overall research design in two 
main ways. Firstly, it added increased depth and description to the case studies as I 
was able to not only access the narratives and explanations of organisation and 
activism provided by participants, but I was also able to chart socio-economic 
change in the communities. Secondly, by providing an understanding of socio-
economic change it also allowed me to better understand the explanations given by 
activists. A key theoretical question within this thesis is the relationship between 
structure and agency. Many activists cited the importance of hardship and 
apartheid discrimination in driving their actions. By understanding the nature of 
this hardship I was, therefore, better placed to understand and interpret these 
explanations. 
As my study involved a considerable retrospective element I was restricted when 
undertaking quantitative analysis on socio-economic change by the need to use 
already existing data. This was a weakness as I was confined in the questions I was 
able to answer by the quality and focus of the data that already existed. However, 
this weakness was more than balanced out by the fact that I would have been 





and studies that I relied upon. By undertaking secondary analysis I was, therefore, 
able to greatly expand the scope of the quantitative research. 
 
Quantitative Data Collection: Sources 
Where possible I relied on existing secondary literature to study the changing 
contours of discrimination. There have been some excellent studies of socio-
economic change in South Africa, such as Natrass and Seekings’ book on race, class 
and inequality in South Africa28 and Crankshaw’s study of changing patterns in the 
division of labour under apartheid29 and these have been used as appropriate. 
However, it was also necessary to move beyond these studies. In part this was 
because I wanted to explicitly study the differences between Africans with Section 
10 rights and those without, which had not been covered previously. It was also 
because of a desire to study changes within the coloured population, which 
similarly had not been covered in great detail since the Theron Report, which was 
produced in 1976. However, I also had to expand my study because I wanted to 
examine not only the labour market and incomes, but also how access to welfare 
transfers (housing and welfare grants) had changed.  
For the period before 1993 I relied heavily upon the South African Population 
Censuses of 1970, 1980 and 1991, supplemented where possible by various 
publications of the South African Statistical Service in the form of its yearly 
bulletins. For the period after 1993 a wider range of sources became available. 
Starting in 1993 and running until 1999 the government run Statistics South Africa 
undertook a yearly Household Survey. Following this, and running twice yearly 
since 2000, Statistics South Africa has also run a Labour Force Survey. The data from 
the 1996 and 2001 censuses is also available.  
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Quantitative Data Collection: Sources – Strengths, 
Weaknesses and Limitations 
The statistical publications could be used relatively unproblematically, as the figures 
included had already been validated by the South African Statistical Service. 
Similarly, the post-apartheid Household Survey, the Labour Force Survey and the 
1996 and 2001 census all exhibited considerable consistency between waves which 
made post-apartheid comparisons relatively straight forward. 
Comparisons within the apartheid period and between the apartheid and post-
apartheid periods were more problematic. This was for three main reasons. Firstly, 
there were often inconsistencies in the questions asked between census years. For 
example, occupational classifications, which would have permitted a detailed study 
of the division of labour, differed in each census wave between 1970 and 1996. 
Similarly, income bands were altered between census years, as were geographical 
boundaries. This meant there were some questions that could simply not be asked. 
It also prevented precise comparisons of some forms of data between years, which 
meant that rough approximations had to be used. Whilst this made it possible to 
draw broad comparisons it was not always possible to demonstrate conclusively 
changes that were taking place. Where data is not directly comparable this has been 
noted in the footnotes 
Secondly, Africans were counted in different ways throughout this period. In 1970 
Africans were only counted in areas with local authorities, which meant the 
homeland commuter townships were excluded. However those Africans surveyed 
were surveyed through a complete population survey. In 1980 the sample was 
expanded to include Africans in all of the formal Republic of South Africa, as well as 
the homelands, but a clustered sampling approach was adopted. The 1980 





methodology for measuring informal settlements. In 1996 and 2001 a general 
population survey was again undertaken. 
The changing geographical focus of the censuses does not have major consequences 
for this study because the Coloured Labour Preference Policy meant that before the 
mid 1980s most Africans lived in formal townships which were within local 
authority boundaries and were therefore not excluded from the census. Similarly, 
coloureds tended to live in areas with local authorities and therefore the vast 
majority of coloureds were enumerated in all surveys. The change in sampling 
methodology, however, has the potential to have a larger impact, especially as from 
the surviving documentation it is not possible to estimate the sampling error. I have 
not, therefore, been able to establish confidence intervals within my comparisons 
and this weakness needs to be acknowledged.  
Finally, it is also important to note that not only do explicit sampling choices affect 
the data, different response rates are also likely to slant the data collected. This 
would have been a particular problem under apartheid, when many Africans who 
were in the area would have been so illegally and therefore would have been 
unwilling to answer questionnaires, especially when they would have had 
experiences of constant harassment for pass offences. However, even post apartheid 
it is inevitable that any survey will under-represent particular groups. I have 
discussed these particular problems when presenting analysis that may have been 
impacted, however it has again to be recognised that there are weaknesses in the 
data that make it difficult to conclude beyond any doubt that there is no margin of 
error in the conclusions presented.  
However, whilst there are difficulties with some of the data sources recognising this 
allowed me to make the most effective use of the data. Where comparisons have not 
been possible due to the quality or incomparability of the data they have been 
avoided. Where exact comparisons have not been possible but broad inferences 
could be drawn this has been done and the limitations of the approach noted. 





have been able to construct a picture of the changing nature of discrimination and 




No researcher is capable of coming to the field without preconceptions and 
weaknesses that impact upon their ability to interact with and understand a 
situation and no data source is without its weaknesses. Throughout the research 
process I have accepted that my position as a researcher and my preconceptions 
have been impacting upon the data collection and analysis processes. I regularly 
reflected on interviews after they were completed and asked myself why I was 
drawing the conclusions I was from the data. Similarly, when interrogating 
historical sources I considered not only what the documents said, but also who they 
were intended for and what their broader purpose may have been when weighing 
up their particular significance. By adopting a reflexive approach to my research I 
hope to have minimised the impact that my own prejudices and subjectivities will 
have had on my conclusions.30 
Beyond this my research design has also allowed me to triangulate my findings and 
therefore increase the validity of my conclusions. I checked people’s recollections 
against surviving archival evidence to assess their accuracy and vice versa. 
Participant observation allowed me to move beyond the explanations offered by 
leaders to begin to understand the motivations of general participants. I was also 
able to locate people’s explanations for their involvement within the broader 
structural context.  
                                                   






It has to be accepted that any piece of research will be coloured by the researcher 
who undertakes it and the methodologies they choose – indeed if this was not the 
case there would be no academic debate. However, by making clear the decisions I 
have documented here in terms of research design and interpretation of data I have 
been able to show that my research was carefully thought out as it progressed and 
that my research decisions were buttressed by methodological rationale. The multi-
method design I used allowed me to cross check my data collection and conclusions 
and to draw together the thick descriptions on which case studies rely and by being 
explicit in the choices I have made I hope others will be able to judge the strengths 
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